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THE  LIBRARY  OF  THF 

UNIVERSITY  OF 

NORTH  CAROLIN/ 

AT  CHAPEL  HU  . 


ENDOWED  BY  THE 

DIALECTIC  AND  PHILANTHROPIC 

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This  book  is  due  at  the  LOUIS  R.  WILSON  LIBRARY  on  the 
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1 

T- 

THE  CIVIL  WAR  AND 
THE  CONSTITUTION 


THE  AMERICAN  HISTORY  SERIES 

Seven  volumes,  IZmo,  toith  maps  and  plans. 
Price  per  volume,  $1.00,  net. 

THR  COLONIAL  ERA..— By  Rev.  George  P.  Fisher, 
D.D.,  LL.D.,  Professor  of  Ecclesiastical  History  in 
Yale  University. 

THE  FRENCH  WAR  AND  THE  REVOLUTION.-By 
William  M.  Sloans,  Ph.D.,  Professor  of  History  in 
Columbia  University. 

THE  MAKING  OF  THE  NATION.— By  General  Francis 
A.  Walker,  LL.D.,  late  President  of  the  Massachnsetts 
Institute  of  Technology. 

THE  MIDDLE  PERIOD.— By  John  W.  Burgess,  Ph.D., 
LL.D.,  Professor  of  Political  Science  and  Constitutional 
Law  in  Columbia  University. 

THE  CIVIL  WAR  AND  THE  CONSTITUTION. -By 
John  W.  Burgess,  Ph.D.,  LL.D.,  Professor  of  Political 
Science  and  Constitutional  Law  in  Columbia  University. 
2  vols. 

RECONSTRUCTION  AND  THE  CONSTITUTION.-By 
John  W.  Burgess,  Ph.D.,  LL.D.,  Professor  of  Political 
Science  and  Constitutional  Law  in  Columbia  University. 


THE  AMERICAN  HISTORY  SERIES 

THE  CIVIL  WAR  AND 
THE  CONSTITUTION 


1859-1865 


JOHN  W.  BUEGBSS,  Ph.D.,  LL.D. 

PROFESSOR  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  AND  CONSTITDTIONAL  LAW,  AND  DEAN  OF 
THE  FACUrLTT  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE,  IN  C0LT7UEIA  UNIVERSITY 


VOLUME    II 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES   SCRIBNER'S   SONS 

1906 


CoPTRiaHT,   1901,  BY 

CHAKLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 


THOW  DIRECTOHV 

PRINTING  AND  eOOKBINDING  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK 


CONTENTS   OF  VOLUME   II 


CHAPTER  XII 

FAOE 

The  Capture  of  New  Orleans 1 


CHAPTER  XIII 
McClellan's  Campaign  against  Richmond    ....       7 

CHAPTER   XIV 
Pope's  Campaign  in  North-Eastern  Virginia      .         •        .     44 

CHAPTER  XV 
Bkagg's  Invasion  of  Kentucky 61 

CHAPTER   XVI 
Emancipation 72 

CHAPTER   XVII 
Antietam 89 

CHAPTER  XVIII 

The   Proclamation  of   Emancipation  and   the    Downfall 

OF  McClellan 97 


VI  CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  XIX 

PAeE 
Fredericksburg 106 


CHAPTER  XX 

The    President's    Order    Executing    the    Emancipation 
Proclamation 114 

CHAPTER  XXI 
The  Perrtville-Murfreesborocgh  Campaign      .        .        .  119 

CHAPTER  XXII 

Confederate  Attempts  to  Regain  the  Coasts  of  Virginia 
AND  North  Carolina 131 

CHAPTER  XXIII 
Chancellorsville 134 

CHAPTER   XXIV 
Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson        .        .         .        .        .        .   146 

CHAPTER  XXV 
Qetttsborg 157 

CHAPTER   XXVI 
The  Chickamauga-Chattanooga  Campaign  .        .        .   180 

CHAPTER  XXVII 

The  Movements    in   North-Eastern   Virginia  in  the  Au- 
tumn of  1863,  AND  the  Charleston  Expedition  .        .  206 


CONTENTS  VU 

CHAPTER  XXVIII 

Interpretation    of  the    Constitution    Under   the  Stress 

OF  THE  Military  Events  of  1862  and  1863  .         .         .  214 

CHAPTER  XXIX 

The  Capture  of  Atlanta      .         .         .         .         .       '  .         .  234 

CHAPTER  XXX 

The  Wilderness  Campaign  and  Early's  Dash  for  Wash- 
ington       .        .         .         .     , 247 

CHAPTER  XXXI 

Sherman's  March  Through  Georgia,  and  Hood's  March 
TO  Nashville 261 

CHAPTER  XXXII 
The  Last  Blows 271 

CHAPTER  XXXIII 

The    International    Complications    During    the    Latter 

Years  of  the  Civil  War        .         .         .        .         .         ,  288 


CHRONOLOGY 315 

INDEX 321 


LIST  OF  MAPS 


FACING 
PAGE 

Field  Opekations  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  .         .         .64 

Maryland 108 

Campaign  Against  Vicksburg,  1863 148 

The  Country  from  the  Potomac  to  Harrisburg      .         .  168 

Gettysburg — Final  Attack  of  the  First  Day,  and  Battle 

of  the  Second  Day        .......  172 

Chickamauga  Campaign 186 

Atlanta  to  Savannah 264 

General  Map  of  the  Field  of  Operations,  1864-65  .  280 


THE  CIVIL  WAR 

CHAPTER  XII 

THE  CAPTURE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS 

Preparation  of  the  Expedition — The  Confederate  Defences — Plan 
of  Action  of  the  Federals — The  Passing  of  the  F'orts — The 
Destruction  of  the  Confederate  Fleet — The  Occupation  of  New 
Orleans — Farragut  at  Baton  Rouge  and  Natchez — New  Mexico 
Relieved  from  Confederate  Possession. 

During  the  month  of  January,  1862,  the  Washing- 
ton authorities  had  been  secretly  preparing  an  expedi- 
tion against  New  Orleans.     The  naval  force      ^ 

°  .  .  Preparation 

ot  some  forty-Six  vessels,  carrying  about  of  the  expedi- 
three  hundred  cannons  and  mortars,  was 
placed  under  the  command  of  Captain  David  G.  Farra- 
gut, and  the  land  force,  consisting  of  about  twelve  thou- 
sand New  Englanders  was  recruited  and  led  by  General 
B.  F.  Butler. 

Farragut^s  fleet  sailed  in  the  first  days  of  February, 
and  the  transports  with  Butler's  army  left  the  Chesa- 
peake on  the  25th.  Butler  arrived  at  Ship  Island 
about  the  24th  of  March  and  found  Farragut,  who  had 
been  waiting  for  him  around  the  mouths  of  the  Missis- 
sippi for  nearly  a  month. 

To    meet   this    powerful    combination    of  land   and 
naval  forces,  the  Confederates  had  a  small  army  of  some 
three  or  four  thousand  men,   and  some  eight  or  ten 
Vol.  II.— 1  1 


2  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

armored  vessels.  The  troops  were  commanded  by  Gen- 
eral Mansfield  Lovell,  and  the  fleet  by  Captain  J.  K. 
TheConfed-  Mitchell,  who  acted  under  the  nominal  supe- 
crate defences,  rjority  of  Commodore  Whipple.  Lovell  had 
collected  a  much  larger  force  than  this  at  New  Orleans, 
but  had  been  obliged,  by  orders  from  Kichmond,  to 
send  the  most  and  best  of  it  to  Beauregard  at  Corinth, 
as  we  have  seen.  It  was  thought  by  the  Confederate 
Administration,  and  by  the  authorities  at  New  Orleans, 
that  the  city  was  sufficiently  defended  against  any  ap- 
proach from  the  Gulf  up  the  river  by  the  two  strong 
forts  on  opposite  banks  some  sixty  miles  below,  and 
against  any  approach  through  Lakes  Borgne  and  Pont- 
chartrain  by  the  shallow  water,  the  marshes,  and  the 
fortifications  with  which  Lovell  had  surrounded  the 
city  on  that  side.  They  were  correct  in  the  idea  that 
the  city  could  not  be  reached  by  the  route  through  the 
lakes,  and  they  had  equal  confidence  that  Farragut's 
wooden  vessels  would  never  be  able  to  pass  the  batteries 
of  the  forts,  containing  more  than  one  hundred  guns, 
and  directed  by  one  of  the  ablest  artillerists  in  the 
Confederate  service.  General  J.  K.  Duncan. 

Farragut  was  further  delayed  in  his  operations  after 
Butler's  arrival  by  the  mud  in  the  mouths  of  the  river, 
and  by  want  of  coal.  It  was  the  17th  of 
tion  of  the  April  before  these  difficulties  were  sur- 
Federais.  mounted.  The  fleet  now  passed  safely 
through  the  shallows,  and  anchored  in  deep  water  some 
ten  miles  below  the  forts,  and  Butler,  with  about  ten 
thousand  troops,  was  present  and  in  readiness  to  land 
at  the  proper  moment  and  when  the  proper  place  should 
be  reached.  The  Confederate  position  had  been  recon- 
noitred some  two  weeks  before,  and  Farragut's  plan 
of  action  was  fully  matured.  At  the  points  where  the 
forts  were  located,  the  course  of  the  river  was  almost 


THE  CAPTURE  OB"  NEW  ORLEANS       3 

due  eastward.  About  one  mile  below  them  it  bends 
due  southward.  The  south  and  west  bank  of  the  river 
around  this  bend  was  covered  with  a  dense  forest,  which 
hid  the  river  immediately  below  the  bend  from  Fort 
Jackson,  on  the  same  bank,  entirely,  and  from  Fort 
St.  Philip,  on  the  opposite  bank,  partially.  Farragut 
placed  his  mortar  boats,  commanded  by  Captain  David 
D.  Porter,  just  behind  this  forest,  and  on  the  moi'ning 
of  the  18th  of  April  began  the  bombardment  of  Fort 
Jackson. 

For  six  days  the  terrible  fire  was  kept  up  until  the 
fort  was  almost  a  ruin,  and  the  garrison  nearly  ex- 
hausted. The  guns  of  the  fort  had  indeed  The  passing 
answered  the  attack  in  a  spirited  manner,  of 'i^e  forts, 
but  could  not  be  aimed  with  any  precision  on  account 
of  the  concealment  of  the  exact  position  of  the  boats 
behind  the  forest.  Some  of  the  boats  had  exposed 
themselves  a  little,  and  one  had  been  struck  and  sunk. 
Few  men  had  been  killed  or  wounded  upon  either 
side.  But  the  Confederates  were  greatly  fatigued,  and 
were  wading  about  in  the  water  which  the  destruction 
of  the  fort  had  let  in  from  the  river,  while  the  Federals 
were  comfortably  quartered  in  their  boats  and  compara- 
tively fresh.  On  the  evening  of  the  23d,  Farragut  re- 
solved, without  further  delay,  to  run  past  the  forts. 
The  Confederates  had  obstructed  the  river  just  below 
the  forts  by  a  chain  stretched  across  it,  held  up  by  the 
hulls  of  eleven  old  vessels  with  their  rigging  float- 
ing about  them.  Already  on  the  20th  Farragut  had 
succeeded  in  opening  a  passage  through  this  barrier  by 
means  of  two  of  his  gun-boats.  In  the  early  morning 
of  the  24th,  the  fleet  moved  up  the  river  in  two  col- 
umns. The  left  column,  consisting  of  nine  vessels,  was 
commanded  by  Farragut  in  person,  and  was  to  brave 
the  guns  of  Fort  Jackson.     The  right  column,  consist- 


4  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

ing  of  eight  vessels,  was  intrusted  to  the  immediate 
command  of  Captain  Theodorus  Bailey,  and  had  the  task 
of  dealing  with  the  batteries  of  Fort  St.  Philip.  The 
mortar  boats  were  ordered  to  keep  their  station  below, 
and  to  throw  shells  into  the  forts  in  case  the  Confeder- 
ates should  discover  the  passing  vessels  and  attack  them. 

The  two  columns,  moving  very  slowly,  on  account  of 
the  darkness  and  the  current  and  the  obstacles  through 
which  they  were  seeking  passage,  were  soon  discovered, 
and  the  guns  of  the  forts  began  to  hurl  red-hot  shot  at 
them.  The  mortar  boats  answered  effectively,  and  the 
two  columns  pressed  on.  Two  of  the  vessels  got  en- 
tangled in  the  barrier,  and  one  was  disabled  by  a  cannon 
ball,  but  fourteen  out  of  the  seventeen  steamed  by  the 
forts,  pouring  grape  shot  into  their  embrasures,  and 
when  daylight  broke  this  powerful  fleet  anchored  above 
the  forts  safely  beyond  the  reach  of  their  guns. 

The  Federal  vessels  now  encountered  the  Confederate 
fleet,  which  had  come  down  too  late  to  attack  the  Federal 
Thedestruc-  boats  wlicn  the  battle  between  these  and  the 
confede  ra  t  e  ^ o^'^s  was  in  progress.  Duncan  had  besought 
fleet.  Mitchell  in  vain  to  come   to   his   aid,    but 

Mitchell  had  delayed  until  it  was  too  late.  Only  the 
ram  Manassas  had  taken  any  part  in  the  contest  when 
the  Federal  fleet  was  receiving  the  fire  of  the  forts. 
Now  that  the  Federal  vessels  had  passed  that  danger 
they  made  short  work  with  the  Confederate  boats.  In 
less  than  an  hour  they  had  destroyed  most  of  them, 
and  the  way  to  New  Orleans  was  entirely  open. 

Bailey  now  steamed  up  the  river  to  the  Quarantine 
Station,  and  dispersed  a  little  body  of  Confederates  there. 
This  opened  a  way  through  a  bayou  to  the 
tion  ^oT*^New  Gulf  waters  only  a  few  miles  eastward.  Far- 
Orieans.  ragut  requested  Butler  to  bring  his  troops 

through  this  waterway  into  the  rear  of  the  forts. 


THE  CAPTUUK  OF  NEW  ORLEANS        5 

Leaving  the  reduction  of  tiie  forts  now  to  Butler  and 
Porter,  Farragut  proceeded  with  most  of  his  fleet  to 
New  Orleans.  He  quickly  silenced  the  Chalmette  bat- 
teries just  below  the  city,  and  at  a  little  past  noon  on 
the  25th  of  April,  he  anchored  his  fleet  along  its  water 
front.  Every  Confederate  soldier  had  been  sent  by 
Lovell  either  to  Vicksburg  or  to  Camp  Moore  beyond 
Lake  Pontchartrain.  He  himself  was  still  in  the  city 
laboring  to  get  his  material  of  war  away. 

Soon  after  the  fleet  cast  anchor,  the  Federal  Com- 
mander demanded  the  surrender  of  the  city.  Thereupon 
General  Lovell  turned  over  his  authority  to  the  Mayor, 
Mr.  Monroe,  who  had  astuteness  enough  to  prolong  the 
negotiations  about  the  surrender  a  sufiicient  time  to 
allow  Lovell  to  get  away  with  most  of  his  arms, 
ammunition  and  other  military  property.  Monroe  knew 
that  Farragut  had  no  sufiicient  land  force  immediately 
with  him  to  take  and  hold  the  city,  and  he  not  only 
prolonged  the  correspondence  inordinately,  but  even 
defied  the  Federals  by  keeping  the  "St.ite''  flag  floating 
over  the  public  buildings. 

Meanwhile  Butler  had  made  his  way  around  to  the 
rear  of  Fort  St.  Philip,  and  had  invested  both  forts  com- 
pletely. When  the  garrisons  became  aware  of  their  help- 
less situation,  they  refused  to  make  a  useless  sacrifice 
of  themselves,  and  spiked  their  guns.  General  Duncan 
now  yielded  and  surrendered  the  forts,  on  the  28th,  to 
Captain  Porter. 

Butler  now  left  General  John  W.  Phelps  with  a 
detachment  of  troops  to  hold  the  forts,  and  proceeded 
with  the  remainder  of  his  army  to  New  Orleans.  On 
the  1st  day  of  May,  his  transports  arrived  at  the  wharves, 
and  his  troops  were  landed  and  bivouacked  in  the  squares 
of  the  city. 

Farragut  now  left  the  occupation  and  control  of  the 


6  THE    CIVIL    WAIT 

city  to  Butler,  and  proceeded  up  the  river  with  his  fleet. 
Ou  the  9th  of  May,  he  occupied  Baton  Rouge.  On  the 
12th,  Natchez.  And  on  the  18th,  he  appeared 
Baton'^^Souge  before  Vicksburg.  Here  he  found  the  guns 
and  Natchez.     ^^^^  ^^  j^^^^jj  ^^,^^  -^^^  Orleans  planted  in 

tiers  on  the  bank  so  as  to  sweep  the  course  of  the  river, 
and  manned  by  Lovell's  trained  artillerists.  He  quickly 
decided  to  make  no  rash  experiments  in  the  face  of  such 
formidable  obstacles.  For  the  moment  the  Federal  ad- 
vance was  at  last  halted. 

The  Confederate  fortunes  in  the  West  and  South-west 
seemed  now  everywhere  broken.  Even  the  promising 
New  Mexico  attempts  of  their  capable  General  Henry  H. 
cdSer'^t"  Sibley,  with  his  splendid  Texan  soldiery,  to 
possesBion.  seize  Ncw  Mexico  had,  despite  his  victories 
over  the  Federal  General  Canby  at  Valverde  Farms  and 
Apache  Pass,  on  the  21st  of  February  and  the  26th  of 
March,  and  despite  his  occupation  of  Santa  Fe  and 
Albuquerque,  come  to  grief.  Canby  so  placed  himself 
in  Sibley's  rear  as  to  force  retreat  or  surrender.  By  the 
1st  of  May  Sibley's  forces  had  all  returned  to  Texas,  and 
New  Mexico  was  in  the  undisputed  possession  of  the 
Federals. 

The  Confederacy  was  certainly  tottering  to  its  fall, 
and  if  the  Army  of  the  East  should  strike  such  a  blow  as 
that  of  the  West  had  done,  the  work  would  be  ended. 
There  was  little  doubt  felt  that  it  would.  It  was  sup- 
posed that  the  Army  of  the  East  was  far  superior  to  that 
of  the  West,  and  was  led  by  more  capable  commanders, 
and  it  was  known  that  it  was  much  better  armed, 
equipped  and  disciplined.  The  time  had  now  come  for 
it  to  prove  its  strength,  capacity  and  valor. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

McCLELLAN'S  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  RICHMOND 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac — The  Confederate  Army  in  Virginia 
— The  Illness  of  McClelian — The  Capture  of  Roanoke  Island 
— The  President  and  McClelian  in  Conflict  Concerning  the 
Route  of  Advance  against  Richmond' — The  Merrimac  and  the 
Monitor — The  Evacuation  of  Manassas  by  the  Confederates — 
Changes  of  the  Federal  Route — Confederate  Retreat  to  Rich- 
mond—McDowell's Corps  Withdrawn  from  McClelian — Battle 
of  Kernstown — McClellan's  Advance  up  the  Peninsula — The 
First  Fight  on  the  16th— The  Siege  of  Yorktown— The  Battle 
at  Williamsburg — The  Battle  at  Eltham's  Landing— The  De- 
struction of  the  Virginia — The  Federal  Fleet  in  the  James — 
The  President's  Campaign  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley — Mr. 
Davis's  Plan  to  Meet  the  Federals  in  the  Shenandoah — The 
Battle  at  Winchester — The  Scare  in  Washington — Jackson's 
Escape — Seven  Pines  and  Fair  Oaks — The  Defeat  of  the  Con- 
federates— The  Investment  of  Richmond — Robert  E.  Lee  and 
the  New  Plan  of  the  Confederates  to  Rout  the  Federals — The 
Skirmish  at  Oak  Grove — Jackson  in  Richmond — The  Plan  of 
Retreat  to  the  James— The  Battle  of  Mechanics ville — Jack- 
son's March  to  White  House — The  Battle  of  Gaines's  Mill — 
McClellan's  Entire  Army  South  of  the  Chickahominy — March 
of  the  Federals  to  the  James — The  Battle  of  Frazier's  Farm — 
The  Battle  of  Glendale— The  Battle  of  Malvern  Hill— The 
Losses — The  Withdrawal  of  the  Federals  to  Harrison's  Land- 
ing— The  Eastern  Debut  of  General  John  Pope — Halleck 
Called  to  Washington  and  Made  Commander-in-Chief  of  all 
the  Armies — Halleck  at  Harrison's. 

The  grand  army  gathered  around  Washington  in  the 
beginning  of  the  year  1863  must  have  num- 

The    Army 

bered    two    hundred    thousand    men,    well  of  the  Poto- 
armed,  equipped  and  disciplined,  and  anx-  °^*'' 
ions  to  revenge  the  defeats  at  Bull  Run  and  Ball's  Bluff. 

7 


8  THE   CIVIL   WAE 

The  Confederates  could  not,  at  that  time,  have  op- 
posed them  with  more  than  seventy-five  thousand  men. 
Not  quite  fifty  thousand  of  these  were  at 
federate  army  Manassas.  About  ten  thousand  were  along 
n  irginia.  ^^^^  lower  Potomac  and  on  York  peninsula, 
and  about  fifteen  thousand  were  in  the  Valley  under 
Stonewall  Jackson. 

General  Johnston,  commanding  at  Manassas,  was  con- 
vinced that  he  would  be  obliged  to  withdraw  his  forces 
from  that  position  when  the  spring  should  open.  He 
kept  his  secret  within  his  own  bosom,  however,  impress- 
ing McClellan  with  an  exaggerated  account  of  his 
strength,  and  all  the  while  sending  his  material  and 
stores  southward. 

During  the  first  half  of  the  month  of  January,  Mc- 
Clellan lay  ill  with  typhoid  fever.  The  President  bore 
The  illness  ^^^  delay  in  movements  caused  by  this  with 
of  McClellan.  something  less  than  his  accustomed  patience, 
and  the  restlessness  of  the  politicians  and  the  people 
was  somewhat  appeased  by  sending  out  the  expedition 
against  Eoanoke  Island. 

This  expedition,  consisting  of  a  fleet  of  twenty-nine 
gun-boats,  commanded  by  Commodore  Goldsborough, 
and  an  army  corps  of  sixteen  thousand  men 
of  Roanoke  on  transports,  commanded  by  General  Am- 
brose E.  Burnside,  set  out  on  the  12th  of 
January  from  Hampton  Eoads  for  Hatteras  Inlet.  They 
got  into  Pamlico  Sound  on  the  24th,  and  found  seven 
Confederate  gun-boats  in  the  channel  between  Koanoke 
Island  and  the  mainland,  and  a  land  force  in  the  fortifi- 
cations on  the  island  of  about  six  thousand  men  com- 
manded by  General  H.  A.  Wise. 

In  the  morning  of  the  7th  of  February  Goldsborough 
attacked  the  Confederate  fleet  and  water  batteries.  He 
soon  disabled  two  of  their  vessels  and  drove  the  rest 


MoCLELLAN's    campaign   against    RICHMOND      9 

back  into  Albemarle  Sound.  Three  brigades  of  infantr}' 
were  landed  on  the  island  in  the  afternoon,  and  while 
two  of  them  engaged  the  Confederates  by  a  front  attack 
upon  their  works,  the  other,  commanded  by  General 
J.  L.  Reno,  worked  through  the  swamp  which  covered 
the  Confederate  right  and  attacked  them  in  flank.  The 
Confederates  were  taken  by  surprise,  and  fled  in  every 
direction  open  to  them.  Wise  got  away  with  about 
three  thousand  men.  The  remainder  of  his  force,  some 
twenty-eight  hundred  to  three  thousand  men,  were 
killed,  wounded  or  captured.  The  victory  was  decisive, 
with  a  trifling  loss  to  the  Federals,  and  by  the  15th  of 
the  month  the  entire  coast  of  Albemarle  Sound  was  in 
possession  of  the  Federals,  and  the  Confederate  war- 
vessels  in  these  waters  were  all  destroyed. 

McClellan  had  by  this  time  recovered  from  his  illness, 
and  was  urging  his  plan  of  advance  via  Urbana  on  the 
Rappahannock.  The  President  preferred  The  Presi- 
the  route  via  Harper's  Ferry  and  the  Shen-  MccieDanln 
andoah.  He  at  last  yielded  to  McClellan,  ^"^n^g^th^ 
on  condition  that  he  would  first  restore  the  ™^'^^g  against 
communication  between  AVashington  and  the  Richmond. 
West  over  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  and  relieve 
the  commerce  of  the  lower  Potomac,  by  destroying  the 
Confederate  batteries  on  the  west  bank.  McClellan, 
therefore,  reoccupied  Harper's  Ferry  and  the  line  of  the 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  about  the  1st  of  March. 
The  opening  of  the  lower  Potomac,  however,  came  in 
another  way. 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  8th  of  March,  a  queer  look- 
ing object  was  seen  coming  out  of  the  mouth  of  Eliza- 
beth River,  and  making  for  the  two  Federal 

The  MeYTX' 

war- vessels  anchored  off  Newport  News,  the   mac  and  the 

Congress  and  the   Cumberland.     The  thing 

looked  like  a  floating  Mansard  roof.     The  Federals  were 


10  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

not  long  in  discovering  that  it  was  the  ironclad  which 
the  Confederates  had  constructed  at  Norfolk  out  of  the 
United  States  vessel,  named  the  Merrimac,  caught  there 
when  the  Confederates,  or  rather  the  Virginians,  seized 
Gosport  Navy  Yard.  Rumors  of  the  dangerous  char- 
acter of  this  vessel  had  reached  Washington,  and  her  ap- 
pearance among  the  wooden  ships  of  the  Federal  navy 
was  much  feared. 

She  now  bore  right  down  on  the  two  Federal  ves- 
sels, passing  contemptuously  by  the  Congress  in  order  to 
attack  the  Cumberland  first,  the  latter  carrying  the 
larger  guns.  If  these  could  make  no  impression  upon 
the  armor  of  the  Virginia,  as  the  Confederates  called  her, 
she  had  nothing  more  to  fear. 

To  the  dismay  of  the  Federals,  the  balls  from  the 
Cumberland's  heaviest  guns  rebounded  from  the  sides 
of  the  Virginia  as  if  made  of  rubber.  The  Virginia  was 
also  provided  with  a  steel  beak,  and  she  now  rammed 
the  Cumberlaiid  with  such  force  as  to  sink  her  in  a 
few  moments.  The  Congress  lay  in  too  shallow  water 
for  the  Virginia  to  reach  her  with  the  steel  prow,  but 
she  was  so  raked  by  the  guns  of  the  Virginia  that 
she  surrendered,  and  the  Confederate  Commander,  Bu- 
chanan, ordered  her  destroyed  by  fire. 

By  this  time  the  steam  frigate  Minnesota  had  come 
down  from  Fortress  Monroe  to  aid  the  Federal  vessels. 
The  Virginia  now  attacked  her,  but  night  approached, 
and  the  Confederates  drew  off  until  light  should  return. 
They  had  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  the  Minnesota 
would  share  the  fate  of  the  Congress  and  the  Cumber- 
land so  soon  as  the  Virginia  could  get  at  her. 

When  the  morning  of  the  9th  broke,  the  Minnesota 
still  lay  stranded  in  the  mud.  The  Virgi7iia  steamed 
around  to  her  rear,  and  just  as  the  Confederate  gunners 
were  about  to  open  fire,  they  descried  a  much  stranger 


McCLELLAN'S    CAMPAIGN    AGAINST    RICHMOND     11 

looking  craft  than  their  own  moving  out  from  the  side 
of  the  Minnesota,  and  placing  itself  directly  in  the  path 
of  the  Virginia.  They  called  it  "  a  cheese  box  on  a 
raft/'  It  was  the  now  famous  Ericsson  Monitor,  which, 
during  the  night  of  the  8th,  had  arrived  from  New 
York  alongside  of  the  Minnesota.  It  had  been  com- 
pleted on  the  same  day  that  the  Virginia  had  received 
her  final  touches,  and  sent,  under  the  command  of 
Lieutenant  John  Worden,  to  the  Potomac.  Worden 
had  got  into  the  waters  of  the  Chesapeake  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  8th,  in  time  to  hear  the  firing,  and 
the  pilot  whom  he  took  up  told  him  something  of  the 
disaster  to  the  Federal  vessels.  He  immediately  re- 
solved to  go  to  the  scene  of  action  upon  his  own  re- 
sponsibility. The  Monitor  consisted  of  a  cylindrical, 
armored,  revolving  turret,  twenty  feet  in  diameter,  con- 
taining two  eleven-inch  Dahlgren  guns,  set  upon  a 
shallow  flat  hull  one  hundred  and  seventy-two  feet  long 
and  forty-one  feet  wide,  with  an  overhanging  armored 
deck  protecting  the  propeller  and  the  rudder.  Worden 
did  not  know,  of  course,  how  this  strange  craft  would 
behave  itself  in  action,  but  he  fearlessly  put  her  across 
the  course  of  the  terrible  Confederate  ironclad. 

The  battle  began  at  once  and  lasted  for  about  four 
hours.  The  balls  from  neither  of  them  made  much 
impression  on  the  armor  of  the  other.  The  Monitor, 
however,  could  move  more  quickly,  and  the  Virginia 
was  thus  eluded  when  she  attempted  to  make  use  of  her 
prow.  At  last  a  ball  from  the  Monitor  struck  the  Vir- 
ginia near  the  water  line  and  opened  a  dangerous  leak. 
Her  engines  were  also  about  to  give  out  from  the  strain 
of  the  two  days  of  battle  upon  them.  She  now  gave  up 
the  fight  and  drew  off  in  the  direction  of  Norfolk.  The 
Monitor  did  not  follow,  but  laid  by  the  vessels  which 
she  had  so  successfully  protected.     Both  Buchanan  and 


12  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

Worden  had  been  wounded,  the  first  by  a  ball  from  the 
rifle  of  a  sharpshooter  on  the  land,  and  the  other  by 
splinters  from  the  steel  ingots  which  formed  his  out- 
look. Nobody  was  killed,  however,  on  either  of  the 
two  vessels. 

The  work  done  by  the  Monitor  cannot  be  overesti- 
mated. Except  for  it  nothing  could  have  prevented  the 
Virginia  from  destroying  the  entire  Federal  fleet,  and 
steaming  up  the  Potomac  to  the  capital  itself.  It  was 
long  feared  that  the  Virginia  might,  after  making  her 
repairs  and  remedying  her  defects,  come  out  of  her  hid- 
ing place  and  offer  battle  again,  but  she  never  did. 

The  Confederates  now  evacuated  Manassas,  and  also 
abandoned  their  positions  along  the  lower  Potomac.  AVith 
Theevacua-  this  Water  Communication  between  Washing- 
8a°°byThe  ton  and  the  North  was  re-established,  and 
Confederates.  McClellan  could  embark  his  army  at  Alex- 
andria in  place  of  Annapolis.  On  the  11th  of  March, 
the  Federal  troops  occupied  Manassas.  On  the  same  day 
President  Lincoln,  as  we  have  seen,  issued  an  order  con- 
fining McClellan's  commandership  to  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac.  There  may  have  been  political  reasons  for  this. 
There  certainly  were  good  military  reasons.  McClel- 
lan's  attention  would  be  absorbed  by  the  great  campaign 
upon  which  he  was  now  about  to  enter,  and  the  Western 
generals  had  proved,  by  actual  successes,  that  they  were 
better  able  to  manage  their  own  movements  than  was 
McClellan,  or  anybody  else  in  Washington. 

McClellan  now  resolved  to  land  his  troops  at  Fortress 

Monroe  instead  of  Urbana,  in  order  to  avoid  being  com- 

,  pelled  to  cross  the  York  Eiver  on  his  march 

Change  of    ^  _    .  ,  ^  •  ^t 

the    Federal  to  Kichmond,   and  m  order  to  put  himself 

in  a  better  position  to  capture  Yorktown,  a 

thing  which  he  considered  necessary  to  the  success  of 

future  operations.     Between  the  middle  of  March  and 


moclellan's  campaign  against  kichmond    13 

the  middle  of  April  the  Grand  Army,  with  its  arms,  mn- 
nitions,  and  supplies,  Avas  successfully  transported  from 
Alexandria  to  Fortress  Monroe  and  made  ready  for  its 
great  movement  up  the  York  peninsula  to  Richmond. 

After  the  evacuation  of  Manassas  the  Confederates 
had  fallen  back  to  the  line  of  the  Rappahannock,  their 
riffht  restiner  on  Fredericksbura;,  and  their      ^    ^  ,    , 

^     .  *=  °  Confederate 

left  in  the  rear  of  the  Rapidan.  Here  John-  retreat  to 
ston  waited  for  the  development  of  McClel- 
lan's  plans.  He  discovered  what  they  were  before 
McClellan  was  able  to  advance  from  around  Fortress 
Monroe,  and,  abandoning  North-eastern  Virginia,  he 
put  his  army  in  motion  to  foil  them. 

McClellan  had  left  Alexandria  with  the  idea  that  the 
army  which  he  should  carry  with  him  to  the  peninsula 
would  number  at  least  one  hundred  and  fifty  McDoweirs 
thousand  men.  But  to  his  surprise  and  dis-  ^rami  ^from 
concertion,  the  President  detained  McDow-  Mccieiian. 
eirs  corps,  containing  about  thirty-five  thousand  men, 
for  the  defence  of  Washington.  The  cause  of  this  act 
on  the  part  of  the  President  is  to  be  found  in  the  events 
then  occurring  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  When 
McClellan  went  to  the  front  the  plan  was  that  Banks's 
corps  should  protect  AVashiugton  against  Jackson's 
army.  One  division  of  it  was  to  hold  Manassas,  and  the 
other,  commanded  by  Shields,  was  to  be  posted  at  Win- 
chester. In  execution  of  this  plan  Shields,  who  had  been 
pursuing  Jackson  up  the  Valley  and  had  gone  as  far  as 
Strasburg,  was  called  back  to  Winchester.  Shields  was 
a  hot-blooded,  belligerent  Celt.  He  wanted  a  brush 
with  Jackson  terribly.  He  made  up  his  mind,  as  he 
could  not,  under  his  orders  from  Washington,  pursue 
Jackson  any  farther,  to  induce  Jackson  to  pursue  him, 
and  to  thus  draw  Jackson  into  an  engagement.  So  when 
he  turned  back  from  Strasburg  to  Winchester,  he  went 


14  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

rattling  down  the  Valley  in  hot  haste  as  if  in  precipitate 
retreat,  expecting  that  the  Confederate  sympathizers 
along  his  route  would  report  the  same  to  Jackson. 
He  had  rightly  calculated.  Jackson  was  immediate- 
ly informed  of  the  movement  and  returned  in  eager 
Battle  of  pursuit.  Shields  drew  him  on,  and  near 
Kemstown.  Kernstown,  a  village  a  little  south  of  Win- 
chester, turned  upon  him  and  gave  him  battle.  Shields's 
forces  succeeded  in  driving  the  Confederates  back  and 
holding  the  field,  but  it  was  no  easy  victory,  and  the 
Federals  lost  more  in  killed  and  wounded  than  the  Con- 
federates. This  little  battle  occurred  on  the  23d  of 
March.  It  gave  them  quite  a  scare  at  Washington, 
and  the  President  now  thought  it  necessary  to  have  the 
whole  of  Banks's  corps  at  W^inchester  in  order  to  protect 
Washington  against  an  advance  from  the  Valley  by  way 
of  Harper's  Ferry.  Other  troops  must  therefore  be 
placed  at  Manassas,  and  the  President  selected  McDow- 
ell's fine  corps  for  this  position.  It  numbered  three 
times  as  many  men  as  were  needed,  but  the  President 
did  not  know  this  at  the  time.  The  authorities  in 
Washington  had  an  exaggerated  opinion  of  Jackson's 
strength,  and  were  greatly  impressed  by  his  energy  and 
daring. 

On  the  6th  day  of  April  McClellan  began  his  move- 
ment up  the  peninsula.  On  the  7th  his  advance  arrived 
in  front  of  the  fortifications  around  York- 
advance  u  p  town  and  across  the  peninsula  at  this  point, 
the  peninsula,  rpj^^  Confederate  line  was  defended  by  about 
eleven  thousand  men,  under  the  command  of  General 
J.  B.  Magruder.  Magruder  placed  them  so  skilfully 
that  McClellan  thought  they  were  the  skirmish  line  of 
a  large  army  hidden  in  the  forests  behind.  At  the 
moment  McClellan  had  not  heard  of  the  detention  of 
McDowell's  corps,  and  supposed  it  was  on  the  march 


MoCLELLAN's   campaign   against   RICHMOND     15 

from  Fredericksburg  to  York  Eiver.  Instead  of  attack- 
ing at  once  in  front,  he,  therefore,  resolved  to  wait  for 
McDowell  to  threaten  the  Confederates  in  their  rear.  A 
few  hours  later,  he  learned  of  the  new  disposition  of 
McDowell's  troops,  and  at  the  same  time  of  the  with- 
drawal of  the  naval  force  which  was  to  co-operate  with 
him  in  opening  York  River,  and  its  return  to  Hamp- 
ton Roads  for  the  purpose  of  watching  the  Virginia 
and  keeping  her  out  of  the  Potomac.  This  news  was 
certainly  very  disturbing,  and  it  seemed  to  demoralize 
McClellan  completely.  He  simply  sat  down  in  front  of 
the  Confederate  line  for  nearly  ten  days,  while  Johnston, 
now  fully  aware  of  McClellan's  plans,  and  entirely  safe 
from  pursuit  by  McDowell,  drew  his  army  back  into  the 
neighborhood  of  Richmond,  and  sent  a  strong  division 
of  ten  thousand  men  to  reinforce  Magruder.  This 
able  and  daring  commander  had  improved  his  time  in 
strengthening  his  line  of  defence,  and  when  at  last,  on 
the  15th,  McClellan  resolved  to  make  some  move,  Ma- 
gruder had  twenty  thousand  trained  and  hardy  soldiers 
behind  his  fortifications  ready  to  receive  the  Federal 
advance. 

On  the  morning  of  the  16th,  McClellan  ordered  a 
cannonade  of  the  whole  Confederate  line  from  Yorktown 
on  the  north  to  Lee's  Mills  on  the  south, 
and  an  assault  from  a  point  on  the  Federal  flght  on'\he 
left.  The  plan  was  well  conceived,  but  the  ^^'^* 
execution  of  it  was  a  miserable  failure,  because  the 
assaulting  column  was  not  sufficiently  supported.  For 
this  there  was  absolutely  no  excuse,  since  there  were 
tens  of  thousands  of  troops  on  the  spot  that  could  have 
been  used,  and  ought  to  have  been  used,  for  the  purpose. 
The  Federal  commanders  had  blundered  dreadfully,  and 
the  confidence  of  the  soldiers  in  their  leaders  was  greatly 
shaken.     A  gloom  of  discouragement  began  to  spread 


16  THE  CIVIL   WAR 

over  the  Grand  Army,  as  it  settled  down  into  the  toil- 
some monotony  of  a  regular  siege. 

For  three  weeks  now  the  spade  took  the  place  of  the 
bayonet,  and  the  Confederates  were  given  time  to  move 
The  siege  of  ^^^  their  War  material  from  Norfolk  and  the 
Yorktown.  lower  course  of  the  James  back  to  Eichmond. 
Johnston  was  also  enabled  so  to  reinforce  Magruder  as  to 
make  his  retreat  safe,  whenever  he  could  no  longer  hold 
the  Federals  at  bay.  At  length  McClellan  was  ready  to 
begin  the  bombardment.  The  orders  were  issued  on 
the  3d  of  May  to  open  fire  on  the  morning  of  the  5th. 
But  when  the  morning  of  the  4th  broke,  it  was  dis- 
covered that  the  Confederates  had  abandoned  their 
works  during  the  preceding  night,  and  were  already 
several  miles  away  on  the  road  to  Williamsburg. 

McClellan  immediately  ordered  Franklin's  division 

which  had,  at  last,  been   sent  him   from   McDowell's 

corps,  and  three  other  divisions,  to  proceed 

The  battle  . 

at  Williams-  on  transports  up  York  Eiver  and  debark  at  a 
^^^'  point  where  they  could  throw  themselves  in 

the  rear  of  the  retreating  Confederates.  At  the  same 
time  the  six  strong  divisions,  commanded  by  Stoneman, 
Hooker,  Kearney,  Smith,  Conch  and  Casey,  were  sent  in 
pursuit. 

About  one  mile  and  a  half  east  of  Williamsburg,  the 
peninsula  is  cut  nearly  in  two  by  two  creeks,  the  one, 
called  College  Creek,  emptying  into  the  James,  and  the 
other,  called  Queen's  Creek,  emptying  into  the  York. 
The  roads  up  the  peninsula  then  traversed  the  narrow 
pass,  hardly  a  mile  wide,  between  the  sources  of  the  two 
creeks,  since  the  banks  of  both  were  impassable  swamps. 
In  the  pass  stood  Fort  Magruder,  and  here  the  Con- 
federates established  their  second  line  of  defence. 

The  Federal  commander  tried  hard  to  force  the  Con- 
federates to  battle  on  the  east  side  of  this  pass,  but 


MoCLELLAN'S   campaign    against   RICHMOND     17 

Longstreet,  who  led  the  rear  guard,  succeeded  in  effect- 
ing the  passage  of  the  whole  army  under  the  protection 
of  the  guns  of  Fort  Magruder,  The  Confederates  now 
made  a  stand  behind  their  new  line,  and  prepared  to 
give  the  Federals  such  a  check  as  would  enable  them  to 
continue  their  retreat  unmolested. 

On  the  morning  of  the  5th,  Hooker  began  the  attack 
on  Fort  Magruder,  but,  after  five  or  six  hours  of  fruit- 
less endeavor,  drew  off.  Meanwhile  Hancock's  brigade 
of  Smith's  division  found  a  passage  across  Queen's  Creek, 
and  ran  against  the  left  flank  of  the  Confederate  army. 
Kearney's  division  now  reinforced  Hooker  and  the  attack 
in  front  was  renewed,  while  Hancock  held  his  position 
on  the  west  side  of  the  creek  against  every  effort  of  the 
Confederates  to  dislodge  him.  Night  now  came  on, 
and  gave  the  Confederates  the  opportunity  to  resume 
their  retreat.  They  improved  it  well,  and  when  the  day 
broke  they  had  again  escaped  the  clutches  of  the  Fed- 
erals. The  battle  of  Williamsburg  had  been  rather 
sanguinary.  About  three  thousand  men  were  placed 
hors  de  combat  on  each  side,  and  something  like  six 
hundred  prisoners  were  captured  by  each  side.  It  was 
not  a  distinct  victory  for  either  party,  but  the  Federals 
were  checked,  and  the  Confederates  were  able  to  continue 
successfully  their  retreat.  The  Federals  were  obliged  to 
remain  several  days  at  Williamsburg  to  reorganize. 

The  four  divisions  that  ought  to  have  reached  the 
Confederate  rear  by  way  of  the  York  Eiver  were  still  on 
board  the  transports  in  Yorktown  Harbor 

The   bEttlc 

while  the  battle  of  the  5th  was  in  progress,  at  Eitham's 
During  the  night  of  the  5th  the  boats  carry-  ^'^^"^s- 
ing  Franklin's  division  steamed  up  the  river  to  Eitham's 
Landing,  and  in  the  early  morning  of  the  7th  the  single 
brigade,  that  commanded  by  General  Newton,  which 
had  got  ashore,  was  furiously  attacked  by  the  heads 
Vol.  II.  -2 


18  THE  CIVIL   WAR 

of  the  Confederate  columns  as  they  reached  this  place 
in  their  retreat  from  Williamsburg.  It  was  a  critical 
moment  for  the  Federals.  It  looked  for  a  time  as  if 
they  would  be  annihilated  by  the  greatly  superior  force 
of  the  Confederates.  But  Franklin  at  last  succeeded 
in  landing  and  placing  some  of  his  artillery,  and,  by  a 
well-directed  fire  from  his  guns,  in  repelling  the  assault. 
The  Confederates  now  passed  on,  however,  unmolested, 
and  the  flanking  movement  up  the  York  thus  ended  in 
failure.  The  retreat  of  the  Confederates  had  been  ably 
conducted,  and  if  retreats  can  ever  be  termed  successes, 
it  had  been  so  far  a  decided  success.  On  the  10th  and 
11th  the  Federals  advanced  from  AVilliamsburg  to  El- 
tham^s  Landing,  and  made  this  place  their  base  for  fur- 
ther operations. 

At  the  same  time  an  event  happened  in  the  mouth  of 

the  James  which  was  very  advantageous  to  the  Federals, 

„^    ^  .       and   contained  a  hint   which,    if   followed, 

The  destruc- 

tionofthe  vir-  might  liavc  brought  succcss  out  of  the  penin- 
sula campaign.  Three  days  after  the  battle  at 
Williamsburg,  Commander  Tatnall  of  the  dreaded  iron- 
clad, the  Virginia,  undertook,  on  account  of  the  evacu- 
ation of  Norfolk,  to  take  his  vessel  up  the  James.  He 
found  that  he  must  land  his  guns  to  get  her  over  the 
bar,  and  after  he  had  thus  disarmed  her,  the  pilot  told 
him  that  the  heavy  west  wind  then  blowing  would 
still  prevent  her  from  crossing  the  bar.  Thus  unarmed 
and  exposed  to  attack  by  the  Federal  navy  in  Hampton 
Roads,  Tatnall  resolved  to  destroy  her.  He  burned  her 
immediately,  and  the  James  was  now  open  to  the  Fed- 
eral fleet. 

Goldsborough  immediately  went  up  the  James  nearly 
to  Drury's  Bluff,  only  a  few  miles  below  Eichmond. 
The  people  of  Richmond  were  stricken  with  terror  at 
the  proximity  of  the  Federal  war-vessels.     The  Confed- 


McCLELLAN'S   campaign   against   RICHMOND    19 

erate  Congress  and  many  private  citizens  fled  from  the 
city.  A  prompt  movement,  at  this  juncture,  of  the 
Grand  Army  and  the  fleet  in  unison  ought 

The  Federal 

to  have  been  successful.  McClellan  did  con-  fleet  in  the 
ceive  it,  and  conferred  with  Goldsborough 
about  it.  But  the  President  wanted  McClellan  to  keep 
between  Richmond  and  Washington  in  his  further  move- 
ments, and  again  promised  him  McDowelFs  corps  on 
the  condition  that  he  would  do  so.  McClellan  yielded 
to  the  President's  wishes,  and  fixed  his  base  at  White 
House  on  the  Pamnnkey. 

The  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Stanton, 
now  conceived  a  plan  of  their  own  for  re-establish- 
ing Federal  iurisdiction  over  North-eastern      ^^     „    . 

°  ''  The    Presi- 

Virginia.  They  ordered  McDowell  to  ad-  dent's  cam- 
vance  from  Manassas  to  the  line  of  the  Shenandoah 
Eappahannock,  leaving  garrisons  everywhere,  *  ^^' 
commanded  Shields  to  join  McDowell  with  his  divis- 
ion, and  sent  Banks  up  the  Shenandoah  Valley  in  pur- 
suit of  Jackson.  Fremont's  army  was  at  Moorefield 
and  Franklin,  places  about  thirty  miles  west  of  Stras- 
burg  and  Harrisonburg  respectively.  The  President 
and  Mr.  Stanton  designed  to  crush  Jackson  between 
the  forces  of  Banks  and  Fremont.  Fremont,  Banks 
and  McDowell  had  no  connection  with  each  other  ex- 
cept through  Washington.  The  President  and  Mr. 
Stanton  were  now  in  a  position  to  conduct  a  little  cam- 
paign of  their  own. 

The  Confederate  President,  who  was  even  greater  as 
a  soldier  than  as  a  civilian,  was  fully  appraised  of  the 
situation  in  jSTorth-eastern  Virginia  and  in  the  , 

Valley,  and  he  rightly  divined  iust  what  the  plan  to  meet 

,.,.•',  1      •      TTT     1  •       ,  T  T     -1        theFederalsin 

political  generals  in  Washington  would  do.   the  Shenan- 

He  now  developed  the  most  brilliant  piece  of 

strategy  in  the  history  of  the  Civil  War.     He  confided 


20  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

his  plan  at  first  only  to  Jackson,  who  was  to  execute 
it,  and  who,  we  may  be  sure,  readily  concurred  in  it. 
We  will  now  follow  the  steps  in  its  unfolding. 

Mr.  Davis  sent  Ewell's  division  and  Johnston's  brigade 
to  Jackson,  and  with  these  Jackson  had  about  twenty 
thousand  splendid  soldiers.  Staunton  was  his  natural 
base  of  operations.  Sending  Ewell  down  the  Valley  to 
find  Banks,  Jackson  himself  moved  toward  Franklin 
to  surprise  Fremont.  He  met  two  of  Fremont's  bri- 
gades, commanded  by  Schenck  and  Milroy,  in  the 
mountain  passes  between  Staunton  and  Franklin.  He 
immediately  attacked  them,  drove  them  back  to  and 
through  Franklin,  and  took  possession  of  the  town. 
Fremont  and  the  remainder  of  his  force  retired  with 
them  to  Moorefield. 

Having  thus  broken  the  direct  line  of  communication 
between  Fremont  and  Banks,  Jackson  was  now  ready  to 
carry  out  the  second  movement  of  the  plan,  viz.,  to  join 
Ewell  and  crush  Banks.  When  he  joined  Ewell,  he 
learned  that  Banks  was  retiring  in  the  direction  of 
Strasburg. 

Instead  of  following  Banks  down  the  Valley  along 
the  same  roads  over  which  the  latter  was  retreating, 
Jackson  crossed  over  the  ridges  which  separate  the 
Valley  into  two  parts  here,  and  then  turned  his  column 
down  the  east  branch  of  the  Shenandoah  to  Front  Eoyal, 
a  town  where  the  two  branches  of  the  river  join  their 
waters,  situated  about  twelve  miles  almost  due  east  from 
Strasburg,  and  just  opposite  Manassas  Gap  in  the  Blue 
Kidge.  On  the  23d  of  May,  Jackson  surprised  and 
captured  the  garrison  of  about  one  thousand  men  at 
Front  Koyal.  Banks  was  now  at  Strasburg,  and  Jack- 
son at  Front  Royal  was  directly  between  Banks  and 
Washington  City.  The  two  armies  were  also  about 
equally   distant    from    Winchester,    the   point    toward 


McCLELLAN'S   campaign   against    RICHMOND     21 

which  Banks  must  continue  his  retreat  in  order  to  es- 
cape, and  protect  Maryland  against  invasion  by  way  of 
Harper's  Ferry.  In  the  race  to  Winchester,  Banks  had, 
by  a  few  hours,  the  advantage,  and  reached  there  first 
with  but  little  loss.  He  was,  however,  so  The  battle 
closely  pressed  that  he  was  obliged  to  turn  ^^  Winchester. 
and  fight  just  south  of  the  town.  In  this  little  battle 
of  the  morning  of  the  25tli  the  Confederates  were  vic- 
torious, but  they  were  too  badly  crippled  and  too  much 
fatigued  to  continue,  at  once,  the  pursuit.  Banks 
reached  Williamsport  on  the  Potomac  during  the  even- 
ing of  the  25th.  His  material  losses  had  not  been  very 
great,  about  one  thousand  men  killed,  wounded  and  cap- 
tured. But  these  losses  were  no  measure  of  the  advan- 
tage which  the  Confederates  had  won  by  their  daring 
movement. 

The  authorities  at  Washington  were  made  to  feel  that 
they  could  no  longer  trust  Banks  to  protect  the  capital 
from  the  ubiquitous  Jackson,  and  their  Thescarein 
whole  attention  was  turned  toward  him  in-  Washington, 
stead  of  toward  Johnston  at  Richmond.  They  ordered 
Shields's  division,  which  had,  as  we  have  seen,  just 
joined  McDowell  in  order  to  enable  McDowell  to  ad- 
vance toward  McClellan,  to  march  to  Front  Royal 
through  Manassas  Gap,  and  Fremont's  army  to  advance 
from  Moorefield  to  Strasburg.  They  calculated  that 
these  threatening  movements  in  Jackson's  rear  would 
cause  him  to  retreat,  and  they  instructed  Banks  to  turn 
and  pursue  upon  the  first  signs  of  this  effect. 

The  President  and  Mr.  Stanton  appeared  really  to 
believe  that  they  now  had  Jackson  in  a  trap.  On  the 
36th  they  ordered  McDowell  to  send  another  division  of 
his  corp  to  Front  Royal,  and  on  the  27th  to  go  there 
himself  with  still  another.  This  simply  meant  that 
McClellan  was  not  to  have  McDowell's  troops  with  him 


22  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

at  all  in  the  campaign  before  Richmond.  This  was 
just  what  Davis  and  Jackson  were  manoeuvring  for. 
McDowell  saw  it,  and  warned  the  President  against  it, 
but  the  warning  went  unheeded. 

Shields  reached  Front  Royal  on  the  30th,  but  Jackson, 
who  had  had  hourly  information  of  the  movements  of  the 

Jackson's  Federals,  and  who  had  now  accomplished  his 
escape.  purpose    of    scattering    McDowell's    forces 

through  North-eastern  Virginia,  had  gone  from  Win- 
chester to  Strasburg  in  time  to  elude  Shields  and  to 
reach  Strasburg  ahead  of  Fremont.  On  the  31st  he 
passed  completely  out  of  the  trap  which  the  political 
strategists  at  Washington  thought  they  had  so  securely 
set  for  him,  and  was  ready  to  enter  upon  the  accom- 
plishment of  the  final  move  in  the  plan  which  Mr. 
Davis  had  so  ingeniously  thought  out.  This  was  to 
push  rapidly  up  the  Valley  to  Port  Republic,  then 
through  Brown's  Gap  in  the  Blue  Ridge  to  Gordons- 
ville,  and  then  follow  the  railroad  to  Richmond,  thus 
not  only  preventing  McDowell  from  reinforcing  McClel- 
lan,  but  bringing  to  the  aid  of  the  Confederate  army  at 
Richmond  the  very  troops  which  McDowell's  scattered 
forces  were  hunting  for  in  the  mountains  far  to  the 
north.  This  was  the  most  daring  part  of  the  entire 
manoeuvre  ;  but,  as  we  shall  see  a  little  farther  on,  it 
was,  on  account  of  the  blundering  management  at  Wash- 
ington, altogether  feasible  and  brilliantly  successful. 

While  the  movements  just  described  were  in  progress, 
McClellan  had  advanced  to  Bottom's  Bridge  and  the  rail- 

The  advance  T^osid  bridge  just  above  it  on  the  Chicka- 
toth^chfcka-  ^lominy.  The  corps  commanded  by  Keyes 
hominy.  and  Heintzelman  had  been  thrown  across  the 

river  and  were  posted  along  the  turnpike  from  Bottom's 
Bridge  to  a  place  called  Seven  Pines  in  the  direction  of 
Richmond.     These  two  corps  composed  the  left  wing  of 


mcclellan's  campaign  against  hiciimond  23 

the  Grand  Army.  Tlie  centre  and  right  wing  remained 
on  the  north  side  of  the  river.  The  centre,  commanded 
by  General  E.  V.  Sumner,  was  located  around  DisjDatch 
Station,  the  nearest  station  on  the  railroad  to  the  river. 
The  divisions  of  Fitz  John  Porter  and  Franklin  were 
at  Gaines's  Mill  and  Mechanicsville,  and  composed  the 
right  wing.  McClellan  had  fixed  his  own  head-quarters 
at  Gaines's  Mill.  He  had  pushed  his  right  wing  thus  far 
westward  in  order  to  effect  the  junction  with  McDowell, 
when  the  latter  should  come  down  from  Fredericks- 
burg. 

The  Confederate  President  had  placed  General  Ander- 
son with  a  division  of  troops  at  Bowling  Green,  a  town 
some  twenty-five  miles  south  of  Fredericksburg  on  the 
railroad  to  Richmond,  for  the  purpose  of  hindering  any 
movement  of  Federal  troops  over  that  line  toward 
McClellan,  and  he  had  placed  Branch's  division  between 
the  Chickahominy  and  Hanover  Court  House  to  main- 
tain communication  between  Anderson  and  Richmond. 
McClellan  sought,  by  extending  his  right,  to  cut  the 
railroad  communication  between  Hanover  Court  House 
and  Richmond.  On  the  day  that  he  expected  McDowell 
to  start  from  Fredericksburg,  he  sent  Stoneman's  cavalry 
to  destroy  the  railroad  between  the  Chickahominy  and 
Hanover  Station  and  threaten  the  rear  of  the  Confeder- 
ate divisions  at  Bowling  Green  and  Hanover  Court 
House.  This  was  the  25th  of  May.  To  his  surprise 
and  almost  consternation,  he  received  in  the  evening  of 
that  day  a  telegram  from  President  Lincoln  informing 
him  of  the  intention  of  the  Government  to  send  Mc- 
Dowell's troops  to  Front  Royal.  The  President's  tele- 
gram also  contained  the  instruction  to  bring  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  back  to  AVashington,  if  in  the  opinion  of 
its  commander  it  was  not  strong  enough  to  attack 
Richmond  without  further  reinforcement. 


24  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

Naturally  McClellan  was  puzzled  what  to  do  next. 
He  had  been  trying  to  preserve  the  railroad  bridges  over 
the  South  Anna  in  order  to  enable  McDowell  to  advance. 
It  seemed  now,  however,  necessary  to  destroy  them  in 
order  to  prevent  reinforcements  going  from  Richmond 
to  Jackson.  The  Washington  authorities  felt  that  very 
keenly,  and  directed  McClellan  to  effect  it.  McClellan 
sent  Porter  with  ten  thousand  men,  on  the  27th,  to  do 
the  work.  By  the  39th  Porter  had  accomplished  it,  and 
had  destroyed  Branch's  brigade  in  addition,  and  was 
back  in  his  position  at  Gaines's  Mill. 

Meanwhile  the  Confederates  had  been  drawing  their 

troops  from  many  directions  to  Richmond.     They  came 

from  Roanoke  Island,  Newberne,  Fort  Ma- 

Thf*  O  on  "fed- 

erate  strength  con  and  Norfolk  ;  and,  after  McDowell  went 
at  Richmond.   ^^  ^^,^^^  j^^^^j^  Anderson's  division,  twelve 

thousand  strong,  retired  successfully  from  Bowling 
Green.  With  these  reinforcements  Johnston  had  an 
army  of  fully  sixty  thousand  men  with  which  to  defend 
the  Confederate  capital  against  McClellan.  McClellan 
estimated  it  at  eighty  or  ninety  thousand. 

Johnston  clearly  perceived  the  peril  of  the  Federal 
position,  with  the  left  wing  of  the  Grand  Army  on  the 
south  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  and  the 
and  Fair  Centre  and  right  on  the  north  side,  and 
^^^^'  stretching  out   far   to   the   north-westward. 

He  determined  to  take  the  offensive  and  concentrate  his 
forces  against  McClellan's  left  wing  before  communica- 
tion across  the  Chickahominy  could  be  made  easy  by 
the  completion  of  the  new  bridges,  and  before  the  right 
wing  could  be  brought  back  from  the  extreme  position 
which  it  had  occupied  in  order  to  keep  the  way  open  for 
McDowell  to  come  down  from  Fredericksburg. 

In  the  evening  of  the  30th  of  May  Johnston  issued  his 
order  of  battle  to  his  division  commanders.     D.  H.  Hill 


McCLELLAN'S   campaign   against   RICHMOND    25 

was  ordered  to  march  out  on  the  Williamsburg  turnpike 
toward  Bottom's  Bridge  and  attack  the  Federals  in 
front.  Longstreet  was  instructed  to  support  Hill.  G. 
W.  Smith  was  ordered  to  advance  along  the  Cold  Harbor 
road  to  Old  Tavern,  a  point  which  lay  directly  between 
the  left  wing  and  centre  of  the  Federal  army,  and  pre- 
vent Sumner  from  reinforcing  the  left  wing  by  way  of 
his  two  new  bridges,  nearly  completed,  over  the  river. 
And  General  Huger  was  ordered  to  proceed  down  the 
Charles  City  road  to  the  south  of  the  White  Oak  Swamp, 
which  covered  the  flank  of  the  Federal  left,  and  forcing 
his  way  through  the  passes  of  the  swamp,  to  fall  upon 
this  flank  at  the  same  moment  when  Hill  should  attack 
in  front.  It  was  a  well-planned  battle,  and  it  seemed 
almost  certain  that  it  would  be  a  victory. 

Torrents  of  rain  fell  during  the  night  of  the  30th, 
but  Johnston  considered  this  in  his  favor.  He  calculated 
that  the  rain  would  raise  the  Chickahominy,  and  that 
the  swollen  waters  would  sweep  away  Sumner's  bridges, 
and  prevent  his  troops  from  crossing. 

In  the  forenoon  of  the  31st  the  movement  began. 
Hill  attacked  Casey's  division  about  midday,  and  the 
battle  was  soon  raging  with  great  fury  in 
front  of  Seven  Pines  and  along  the  cross-road 
from  this  point  to  Fair  Oaks  station  on  the  railroad. 
The  Federal  troops  were  forced  slowly,  but  surely,  back, 
Longstreet  supporting  Hill  in  the  attack  and  Couch's 
division  supporting  Casey  in  the  defence.  The  Con- 
federate commanders  were  waiting  to  hear  Huger's 
guns  at  the  passes  of  White  Oak  Swamp,  when  they  in- 
tended to  make  their  charge.  But  Huger  failed  to  do 
his  part,  and  without  him  Hill  and  Longstreet  could 
not  rout  the  Federal  divisions. 

Johnston  had  gone  with  Smith's  division  to  Old 
Tavern,  three  or  four  miles  north-westward  from  where 


26  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  battle  was  in  progress.  A  strong  west  wind  was 
blowing  at  the  time,  and  he  did  not  hear  the  sounds  of 
the  conflict.  It  was  nearly  four  o'clock  before  he 
learned  the  state  of  affairs  at  Fair  Oaks  and  Seven 
Pines.  "When  he  did,  he  immediately  put  Smith's  di- 
vision in  motion  for  the  scene  of  action,  calculating  to 
strike  the  right  flank  of  the  Federals,  and  throw  them 
into  such  a  state  of  confusion  as  to  make  victory  easy. 

Meanwhile  Kearney's  division  had  come  forward  to 
the  support  of  Casey  and  Couch,  and  had  checked  the 
advance  of  Hill  and  Longstreet,  but  just  at  the  mo- 
ment when  the  Federals  were  about  to  succeed  in 
re-establishing  their  lines.  Smith's  troops  coming  from 
Old  Tavern  struck  them  in  their  right  flank  and  drove 
them  away  from  both  Fair  Oaks  and  Seven  Pines. 
With  the  exception  of  Hooker's  division,  which  was 
guarding  the  passes  of  White  Oak  Swamp,  all  of  the 
Federal  troops  on  the  south  side  of  the  Chickahominy 
were  now  in  action.  The  three  divisions  engaged  did 
not  number  over  twenty-five  thousand  men.  When 
Smith  arrived  on  the  field,  the  Confederates  engaged 
must  have  numbered  forty  thousand.  The  Federals 
were  now  on  the  point  of  being  overwhelmed,  when 
suddenly,  about  six  o'clock,  the  heads  of  Sumner's  col- 
umns rushed  upon  the  battlefield,  striking  Smith's  di- 
vision of  the  Confederates  almost  in  their  rear.  The 
old  war  horse  had  scented  the  battle  from  afar,  and  had, 
upon  his  own  responsibility,  pushed  his  troops  across 
his  new  bridges,  fairly  floating  on  the  swollen  waters, 
and  had  arrived  in  the  nick  of  time  to  save  the  left  wing 
of  the  Grand  Army.  The  scales  were  immediately 
turned.     The  Confederates  were  thrown  into 

The     dfifG&t 

of  the  conf  ed-  the  greatest   confusion.     Johnston   himself 

^'  was  severely  wounded  in  the  carnage  which 

followed,  and  was  carried  from  the  field.    Night  now 


McCLELLAN'S   campaign    against   RICHMOND    27 

put  an  end  to  the  battle  and  possibly  saved  the  Con- 
federate army  from  complete  annihilation. 

The  Confederate  commanders  were  convinced  that 
McClellan's  entire  army  was  now  upon  them^  and  they 
immediately  ordered  the  retreat  to  Richmond.  Huger's 
fresh  troops  came  up  in  time  to  cover  the  retreat.  The 
Federals  pursued  a  short  distance.  The  impetuous 
brigadiers.  Sickles  and  Meagher,  attacked  the  Confed- 
erate rear,  but  they  were  not  sufficiently  supported  to 
attempt  to  enter  Eichmond  with  the  retreating  army. 
McClellan  remained  supine  on  the  north  side  of  the 
Chickahominy  with  about  half  his  army,  and  lost  what 
certainly  now  appears  to  have  been  the  grand  opportun- 
ity for  bringing  his  campaign  to  a  successful  close. 
There  is  now  no  sort  of  doubt  that  he  could  have  en- 
tered Eichmond  on  the  morning  of  June  1st,  Sickles 
and  Meagher  were  within  three  miles  of  the  city, 
when  they  were  called  back,  instead  of  being  supported 
by  twenty-five  thousand  fresh  troops,  as  they  might 
have  been. 

The  authorities  at  Washington  do  not  appear  to  have 
regarded  the  battle  as  a  great  victory.  Despite  the  re- 
pulse and  demoralization  of  the  Confederates,  the  Fed- 
erals had  lost  six  thousand  of  the  ten  thousand  men 
killed  and  wounded,  and  in  their  advance  upon  the  city, 
they  had  received  a  check  from  which  they  never  re- 
covered. The  Army  of  the  Potomac  had,  however,  be- 
haved nobly,  and  had  wiped  out  the  Bull  Eun  reproach. 
The  President,  though  disappointed  at  the  failure  to 
enter  Eichmond,  now  ordered  the  garrison  at  Fortress 
Monroe,  some  eight  or  ten  thousand  men,  to  join  Mc- 
Clellan, and  again  promised  to  send  McDowelFs  corps. 
Why  the  President  renewed  this  promise  is  to  some  ex- 
tent speculation.  Most  probably  it  was  for  the  purpose 
of  holding  McClellan   back  from  marching  his  army 


28  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

to  the  James  River  below  Rielimond,  a  movement  for 
which  the  way  was  entirely  unobstructed  for  several 
days  after  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  and  a  movement 
which  ought  by  all  means  to  have  been  made. 

McClellan  now  settled  down  to  the  investment  of  Rich- 
mond with  White  House  on  the  York  River  as  his  base 
of  supplies,  and  the  railroad  from  White 
mentof  Rich-  Housc  to  Richmond  as  his  line  of  communi- 
cation. He  wanted  McDowell's  corps  sent  to 
him  by  transports  to  White  House,  but  the  President 
would  only  allow  one  division,  McCalFs,  to  go  that  way, 
and  insisted  on  the  other  divisions  marching  overland 
in  order  to  protect  Washington.  McClellan  was  thus 
obliged  to  keep  his  right  wing  on  the  north  side  of  the 
Chickahominy,  stretched  out  some  twenty  miles  to  the 
north-west  of  the  left  wing  at  Fair  Oaks,  in  order  to 
cover  McDowell's  march. 

Meanwhile  General  Robert  E.  Lee  had  been  put  in 
command  of  the  Confederates  at  Richmond  instead  of 
Robert  E.  the  Suffering  Johnston.  He  immediately 
new  p°an^of  saw  the  perilous  position  of  the  Federal  army, 
Ltes^t^^ront  ^^  Johnston  had  seen  it.  But  instead  of 
the  Federals,  making  another  attack  upon  its  left  wing,  he 
finally  gave  his  approval  to  Mr.  Davis's  plan  of  having 
Jackson  march  by  way  of  Gordonsville  into  McClellan's 
rear,  and  strike  White  House  and  the  railroad  between 
White  House  and  the  Chickahominy. 

In  order  to  effect  this  movement,  the  Washington 
authorities  must  be  again  put  in  fear  of  an  advance  by 
Jackson  upon  Washington  by  way  of  Harper's  Ferry  or 
Manassas  Gap,  so  as  to  prevent  them  from  sending 
McDowell's  two  divisions  to  hinder  Jackson's  real  move- 
ment by  way  of  Gordonsville  and  Hanover  Court  House 
into  McClellan's  rear.  With  this  in  view,  Lee,  on  the 
11th  of  June,  sent  Whiting's  division  by  cars  via  Lynch- 


MoCLELLAN's   campaign   against   RICHMOND    29 

burg  and  Charlottesville  to  Staunton.  He  made  sure 
that  this  movement  should  be  discovered  by  the  Fed- 
erals and  reported  at  AVashington.  So  soon  as  he  was 
certain  that  it  had  had  its  effect,  and  that  Jackson's 
march  would  be  unobstructed  by  McDowell,  he  ordered 
Whiting  to  return  quickly  to  Charlottesville  and  join 
Jackson,  who  had  passed  through  Brown's  Gap,  and 
was  on  his  way  to  Gordonsville. 

At  the  same  time  he  sent  General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart 
with  a  thousand  picked  cavalrymen  entirely  around 
McClellan's  army  to  see  if  Jackson  would  be  obliged  to 
encounter  any  fortification  on  his  march  from  Hanover 
Court  House  to  White  House.  This  was  a  daring  move- 
ment, but  it  was  successful  and  effective.  It  occupied 
the  attention  of  the  Federals  for  three  or  four  days,  at 
a  time  when  it  was  most  important  to  delay  their  ad- 
vance on  Eichmond.  It  raised  the  courage  and  hopes 
of  the  Confederates.  And  it  caused  surprise,  if  not  con- 
sternation, among  the  Federals  to  find  that  communi- 
cation with  their  base  of  supplies  was  subject  to  such 
perils. 

For  ten  days  more  now  McClellan  remained  quiet. 
On  the  25th,  he  advanced  his  left  wing  along  the  turn- 
pike toward   Eichmond  to  a   little    beyond 

.  The    skir- 

Seven  Pines.  Hooker's  division  was  leading  mish  at  oak 
when,  at  a  point  called  Oak  Grove,  some  four  ™^®' 
or  five  miles  from  Eichmond,  the  Confederates  disputed 
farther  advance.  The  Confederates  were,  however, 
repulsed,  and  Hooker  remained  master  of  the  ground. 
He  could  now  see  the  spires  of  the  city,  and  was  im- 
patient to  move  onward.  But  he  was  not  destined  to  go 
any  nearer. 

On  that  very  day,  in  the  early  morning,  a  solitary 
horseman  had  ridden  into  Eichmond  from  the  north- 
west, and  had  gone  directly  to  head-quarters.     It  was 


30  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

Jackson  himself,  who  had  come  to  inform  Mr.  Davis  and 
General  Lee  that  his  troops  were  only  about  twenty-five 
JackBon  in  niiles  away,  and  to  arrange  with  them  the  bold 
Richmond.  ^i^^  f^j.  crushing  McClellan's  right  wing, 
seizing  his  base  of  supplies,  cutting  off  his  line  of  re- 
treat, and  capturing  his  entire  army.  In  the  evening  of 
the  same  day  Jackson  was  back  again  at  the  head  of  his 
columns  now  nearing  Hanover  Court  House. 

McClellan  had,  on  the  24th,  been  made  aware  of  Jack- 
son's march  eastward  from  the  Valley,  but  believed  that 
Fremont,  Banks  and  McDowell  would  be  able  to  check 
him.  On  the  morning  of  the  26th,  news  was  brought 
to  the  Federal  commander  that  Jackson's  cavahy  were 
already  at  Hanover  Court  House,  that  is,  that  they  were 
almost  directly  in  the  rear  of  his  right  wing.  He  knew 
then  that  he  must  fight  both  Lee  and  Jackson,  and  that 
he  was  in  most  imminent  peril.  This  was  the  final  out- 
come of  the  little  campaign  made  under  the  immediate 
direction  of  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War. 
McClellan  now  understood  perfectly  that  the  salvation 
of  his  army  depended  upon  his  own  capacity  and  energy, 
and  that  he  could  expect  no  aid  from  the  authorities  at 
Washington.  He,  therefore,  determined  to  meet  the 
great  responsibility  in  his  own  way. 

McClellan  rightly  divined  that  Lee's  plan  was  to  at- 
tack the  Federal  right  wing  at  Mechanicsville  and 
Gaines's  Mill,  and  while  thus  occupying  the  troops  in 
this  position  to  have  Jackson  pass  across  from  Hanover 
Court  House  to  White  House,  and  cut  off  the  Federal 
line  of  retreat  to  York  River.  Lee  had  no  doubt  that  if 
McClellan  were  forced  to  retreat,  he  would  undertake  to 
go  back  by  the  line  over  which  he  had  advanced. 

The  quick  mind  of  McClellan  instantly  comprehended 
that  his  escape  depended  upon  the  maintenance  of  this 
idea  in  the  calculations  of  his  adversaries,  while  he  him- 


MCCLELLAN'S   campaign   against   RICHMOND    31 

self  should  adopt  a  very  different  course.  He  compre- 
hended that  so  long  as  they  believed  he  would  retreat 
to  York  Kiver,  Jackson  would  not  attack  his      ^^    ,       , 

'  The  plan  oi 

right  wing  at  the  same  moment  with  Lee,  retreat  to  the 
but  would  march  on  eastward  in  order  to 
get  into  the  rear  of  his  left  wing,  and  he  saw  that  he 
must  not  consider  for  a  moment  a  retreat  to  York  River. 
His  ingenious  and  masterful  plan  was  formed  almost 
in  the  twinkling  of  an  eye.  He  Avould  give  battle  to 
Lee  at  Mechanicsville  and  Gaines's  Mill,  and  cripple  him. 
He  would  let  Jackson  push  on  toward  White  House, 
and  get  as  far  away  as  possible.  And  then,  while  one  of 
his  adversaries  was  recovering  from  the  battle  and  the 
other  was  too  distant  to  strike  him,  he  would  lead  his 
own  army  across  the  passes  of  White  Oak  Swamp  and 
make  for  James  River,  where,  in  conjunction  with  the 
fleet,  he  might  establish  a  new  and  better  base  for  his 
operations  against  Richmond. 

Preparatory  to  the  oxecution  of  this  plan,  McClellan 
sent  all  of  his  sick  and  wounded  back  to  White  House, 
ordered  all  the  stores  at  White  House  to  be  re-shipped 
on  the  transports,  loaded  his  wagons  with  eight  days' 
rations  and  plenty  of  ammunition,  and  collected  a 
vast  drove  of  beef  cattle.  By  the  morning  of  the  36th 
these  preparations  were  nearly  completed  and  McClel- 
lan could  give  his  attention  to  the  Confederates  now 
crossing  the  Chickahominy  on  his  right. 

The  Federal  division  at  Mechanicsville,  McCall's,  was 
drawn  back  across  a  stream  which  runs  into  the  Chicka- 
hominy a  little  east  of  the  village,  called  Thebattieof 
Beaver  Dam  Creek.  Some  fortifications  had  Mechanics- 
been  thrown  up  on  the  east  bank,  and  be- 
hind these  the  Federals  awaited  the  attack.  The  Con- 
federates had  thrown  three  of  their  divisions  across  the 
Chickahominy  at,  and  above,  Mechanicsville,  and  now 


32  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

confident  of  crushing  McCall,  D.  H.  Hill's  division 
rushed  at  the  works  on  Beaver  Dam  Creek.  They 
were,  however,  repulsed  again  and  again  by  McCall's 
well-placed  and  well-served  artillery,  supported  by  his 
superb  regiments  of  infantry.  The  Confederates  lost 
about  three  thousand  men  in  their  rash  charge  upon 
the  Federal  intrenchments,  while  the  Federals  lost  only 
about  three  hundred. 

Jackson  had  heard  the  cannon  at  Beaver  Dam  Creek, 
but  he  judged  it  best,  as  McClellan  calculated  he  would, 
to  press  on  toward  White  House.  Had  he 
march  to  suspectcd  McClcllan's  intention  of  abandon- 
ing the  line  to  White  House  and  marching 
forward  to  the  James,  he  would  certainly  have  turned 
and  attacked  McCall  in  the  right  flank  and  have  de- 
stroyed his  division. 

In  the  early  morning  of  the  27th,  McClellan  drew 
McCall's  division  farther  back  toward  the  new  bridges 
Thebattieof  o^cr  the  Cliickahominy,  and  posted  the  en- 
Gainess  Mill.  ^jj,g  gorps  Comprising  the  right  wing  of  the 
army  in  a  tolerably  strong  position  just  behind  Gaines's 
Mill.  Fitz  John  Porter  was  now  in  command  of  the 
corps,  and  it  was  composed  of  the  divisions  of  McCall, 
Morell  and  Sykes. 

About  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the  head  of  Hill's 
advancing  columns  struck  the  Federal  line,  and  the 
bloody  battle  of  Gaines's  Mill  began.  The  Confeder- 
ates were  received  with  a  destructive  fire  from  the  Fed- 
eral batteries,  and  repulsed  with  severe  loss. 

Lee  now  arrived  on  the  field  and  discovered  at  once 
that  he  had  an  entire  Federal  army  corps  in  front  of  him 
instead  of  a  single  division,  as  on  the  preceding  day. 
He  resolved  to  call  Jackson  to  his  aid.  He  sent  a  cour- 
ier with  a  request  to  Jackson  to  turn  his  columns  south- 
ward, and  fall  upon  the  right  flank  of  the  Federals.     It 


McCLELLAN'S    campaign    against    RICHMOND    33 

was  between  five  and  six  o^elock  when  Jackson,  in  re- 
sponse to  Lee's  directions,  approached  the  extreme  right 
of  the  Federal  position.  Porter  sent  to  McClellan  for 
reinforcements,  but  only  a  brigade  or  two  recrossed 
the  Chickahominy  in  answer  to  his  request.  The  Fed- 
eral right  wing  must  now  keep  the  Confederate  divis- 
ions in  front  and  Jackson's  army  on  the  flank  at  bay 
until  darkness  should  cover  the  retreat  across  the  river. 
With  great  steadiness  and  valor  the  exhausted  soldiers 
stood  their  ground.  The  well-planted  batteries,  strong- 
ly supported  by  the  splendid  infantry,  made  havoc  with 
the  advancing  columns  of  the  Confederates,  which 
pushed  with  the  greatest  bravery  and  determination 
right  on  over  the  dead  and  wounded  up  to  the  mouths 
of  the  Federal  cannon.  Except  for  the  appearance,  at 
this  critical  moment,  of  the  first  two  brigades  sent  back 
across  the  river,  led  by  French  and  Meagher,  the  Fed- 
eral line  would  have  been  broken.  With  their  aid  the 
Confederate  advance  was  momentarily  checked.  Night 
had  now  also  come,  and  the  Federal  right  wing  was 
saved.  The  forces  under  Lee  which  had  taken  part  in 
the  battle  were  so  crippled  that  they  could  not  pur- 
sue. Jackson,  still  ignorant  of  McClellan's  purpose, 
prepared  to  resume  his  march  toward  White  House. 
And  Magruder  and  Huger  with  only  about  twenty-five 
thousand  men  had  the  duty  of  protecting  Richmond 
against  the  Federal  forces  on  the  south  side  of  the 
Chickahominy,  and  almost  in  sight  of  the  city.  Mc- 
Clellan's way  to  the  James  was  now  open.  He  had 
lost  about  seven  thousand  men  in  the  battle  of  Gaines's 
Mill,  but  the  Confederates  had  lost  even  more,  and 
were  still  in  the  dark  concerning  his  intended  move- 
ments. 

He  now  marched  his  right  wing  safely  across   the 
river,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  28th  he  had  his  whole 
Vol.  II.-3 


34  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

army  practically  united,  while  the  forces  of  his  adversa- 
ries were  scattered.    Most  of  the  Confederate  forces  were 
„  ^,  „    ,    on  the  north  side  of  the  river,  and  only  about 

McClellan's  n  ^  i    /-, 

entire  army  twenty-five  thousand  Confederates  stood  be- 
chickahomi-  twecn  the  Grand  Army  and  Richmond.  The 
^^'  Confederate  capital  was,  however,  safe.     Mc- 

Clellan  had  no  idea  of  attacking  it. 

In  the  evening  of  the  27th,  Keyes's  corps,  which  rested 

on  the  borders  of  White  Oak  Swamp,  moved  around  to 

Glendale  on  the  south  side  of  the  swamp, 

the   Federals  and  ou  the  28th  occupied  Frazier's  Farm, 

to  the  Jam^s.     j»  i-i  •    i.    ^  •  l_•^^  ii 

irom  which  point  his  artillery  commanded 
the  bridge  over  the  swamp.  McClellan  had  now  two 
lines  of  march  to  Glendale,  one  around  the  head  of  the 
swamp,  and  the  other  over  the  bridge  across  the  swamp 
about  midway  its  course.  Glendale  was  his  first  ob- 
jective point,  since  here  the  three  main  roads  from 
Richmond  running  eastward  between  White  Oak 
Swamp  and  the  James  River  were  intersected  by  the 
road  from  White  Oak  bridge  across  the  swamp  to 
Haxall's  Landing  on  the  James,  the  place  on  the  river 
to  which  he  intended  to  lead  his  army. 

The  other  divisions  of  the  army  did  not  move  until 
the  evening  of  the  28th,  on  account  of  the  necessity  of 
first  sending  forward  the  three  hundred  and  fifty  cannon, 
four  thousand  wagons,  five  hundred  ambulances  and 
twenty-five  hundred  head  of  live  cattle. 

During  the  course  of  the  day  Magruder,  at  Richmond, 

began  to  suspect  that  the  Federals  were  abandoning 

_,^      ,.       their  positions  in  front  of  him,  and  in  the 
The    diB-  ^  ' 

covery  of  the  aftemoon   he  threw  out  a  skirmish  line   to 

movement,     -     ,       »    ,,  xt      j> 

and  die  DO-  feel  of  them.     He  found  that   he  was  too 

sition  of  Lee's    ,       ,  tt  •      i  ■         • ,  i  ■>      •  ■>     i 

forces  to  meet  hasty.     Jtlis  troops  met  With  a  decided  re- 
pulse.    He  tried  again  later  and  was  again 
repulsed,  but  this  time  the  movement  of  the  Federals 


McCLELLAN'S   campaign   against   RICHMOND    35 

was  revealed  to  him.  Information  was  at  once  sent  to 
Lee,  who  now  saw  tliat  McClellan's  retreat  would  not 
be  to  White  House,  and  that  in  order  to  intercept  the 
Federal  army  he  must  seize  Glendale,  and  Malvern  Hill 
which  lay  about  midway  between  Glendale  and  the 
James.  He  immediately  ordered  Hill,  Longstreet  and 
Jackson  to  cross  the  Chickahominy.  Jackson  was  di- 
rected to  follow  the  Federals  that  were  marching  be- 
tween the  Chickahominy  and  White  Oak  Swamp  to 
White  Oak  bridge  and  across  this  bridge  to  Glendale. 
Hill  and  Longstreet  were  commanded  to  cross  above 
Mechanicsville,  go  direct  to  Richmond,  and  then  march 
down  the  roads  from  Richmond  to  Glendale  ;  while 
Wise,  who  was  on  the  south  side  of  the  James,  some 
ten  miles  below  Richmond,  was  instructed  to  cross  over 
and  occupy  Malvern  Hill.  Huger  veas  already  out  from 
Richmond  two  or  three  miles  on  the  roads  to  Glendale, 
and  Magruder  was  in  position  to  march  thither  so  soon 
as  the  Federal  columns  should  turn  their  faces  away 
from  Richmond. 

The  morning  of  the  29th  was  dark  and  foggy,  and, 
therefore,  favorable  to  the  Federals  in  the  task  of  aban- 
doning their  works  in  front  of  Magruder.  The  troops 
who  had  fought  the  battle  at  Gaines's  Mill  were  sent 
forward  first.  AverilFs  cavalry  division  kept  Huger  at 
bay,  and  in  the  afternoon  these  troops  arrived  at  Glen- 
dale, making  with  Keyes's  corps  a  large  army  at  this 
important  point.  Sumner's  corps  covered  the  retreat. 
Magruder  attacked  Sumner  in  the  afternoon  before 
he  had  left  his  position  at  Savage  Station,  but  was 
promptly  repulsed.  Jackson  finished  his  bridge  in  the 
evening  of  the  same  day,  and  crossed  over  the  Chicka- 
hominy. During  the  night  the  entire  Federal  army 
continued  its  movement  around  and  across  White  Oak 
Swamp.   Sumner  crossed  the  swamp  at  White  Oak  bridge 


36  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

with  Jackson  closely  following  him.  He  succeeded  how- 
ever in  destroying  the  bridge,  and  Keyes's  artillery  was 
so  placed  at  Frazier's  Farm  as  to  prevent  its  restoration. 

On  the  morning  of  the  30th,  McClellan  saw  that  he 
must  probably  give  battle  at  three  points,  viz.,  White 
Oak  bridge,  Glendale  and  Malvern  Hill.  Jackson  made 
his  appearance  on  the  north  side  of  the  swamp  at  this 
point  about  noon.  Hill  and  Longstreet,  supported  by 
Huger  and  Magruder,  were  approaching  Glendale  from 
Eichmond,  and  Wise  had  crossed  the  James  and  was 
marching  for  Malvern  Hill.  McClellan  now  made  his 
dispositions  for  battle.  He  moved  Keyes's  corps  on 
to  a  position  between  Malvern  Hill  and  the  James,  and 
placed  Franklin's  corps  at  Frazier's  Farm,  with  the  duty 
of  preventing  Jackson  from  crossing  White  Oak  Swamp. 
Sumner  and  Heintzelman  were  ordered  to  hold  Glen- 
dale, ajid  Porter  was  assigned  to  the  task  of  defending 
Malvern  Hill.  The  line  from  White  Oak  bridge  to 
Haxall's  Landing  Avas  a  little  more  than  ten  miles  long, 
and  McClellan  must  defend  this  line  successfully  during 
the  30th  in  order  to  bring  his  great  train  of  artillery, 
wagons,  ambulances  and  live  stock  safely  to  Haxall's. 

The  battle  began  at  Frazier's  Farm  so  soon  as  Jack- 
son made  his  appearance  on  the  north  side  of  the 
swamp  opposite  this  point.     The  Confeder- 

The  battle  . 

of  Frazier's  atcs  werc   at   least   thirty  thousand   strong, 

"™'  and  sure,  in  their  own  minds,   of  an  easy 

success.     But  Franklin's  artillery  was  well  posted  and 

skilfully  handled,  and  his  infantry  supported  the  guns 

with    great    steadiness.      With   about    half   Jackson's 

numbers,  Franklin  kept  the  impetuous  and  redoubtable 

Confederates  at  bay  during  the  entire  afternoon,  while 

McClellan's   material  of  war  and  supplies  were  being 

brought  safely  to  the  new  base  on  the  James. 

About   two  o'clock   in  the  afternoon,  the  forces  of 


McCLELLAN'S   campaign   against   RICHMOND     37 

Hill  and  Longstreet  attacked  the  Federals  in  front  of 
Glendale.  The  battle  raged  here  with  great  fury  all 
the  afternoon.  Both  President  Davis  and  rpj^g  j^^^^jg 
General  Lee  were  with  the  Confederates,  and  °*  Giendaie. 
were  deeply  disappointed  that  Jackson  was  stopped  at 
White  Oak  bridge  and  that  Huger  and  Magruder  could 
not  be  brought  up  to  the  support  of  Hill  and  Long- 
street.  The  Confederates  fought  with  great  valor  and 
determination.  They  knew  that  they  must  break  the 
Federal  line  here  if  at  all.  They  were  resolved  to 
destroy  the  whole  Federal  army,  and  fully  believed  that 
they  could  do  so.  When  now  they  met  with  such 
resistance  from  the  two  Federal  corps  posted  about 
Glendale,  their  courage  was  driven  almost  to  despera- 
tion. The  Federal  forces  were  indeed  worsted  in  the 
struggle,  but  they  were  not  routed.  They  held  their 
ground,  and  finally  withdrew  slowly  after  everything 
behind  them  had  passed  on  toward  the  James. 

The  attack  by  AVise's  troops  on  Malvern  Hill  was  i)o 
more  successful.  Porter  and  Keyes  repulsed  him 
easily,  and  kept  the  way  open  along  the 
lower  end  of  the  line  of  retreat.  By  the  onMaivem 
late  evening  of  the  30th,  the  vast  train  of 
ammunition  and  supplies  was  safely  parked  at  Hax- 
alFs,  and  the  artillery  was  being  put  in  position  on 
Malvern  plateau  for  the  great  struggle  which  the  next 
day  was  to  bring  forth.  The  entire  army  had  also 
reached  this  last  strategic  point  in  its  march  to  the 
James. 

During  the  forenoon  of  the  next  day,  July  1st,  Mc- 
Clellan  placed  his  army  in  position  for  battle.     His  left 
wing,     composed     of     Porter^s     corps     and 
Couch's  division  of  Keyes's  corps,  faced  tow-  of  Maivem 
ard   Eichmond.     The   centre,    composed   of 
the  troops  led  by  Sumner,  Heintzelman  and  Franklin, 


38  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

looked  toward  Glendale.  The  right  wing,  commanded 
by  Keyes,  was  so  placed  as  to  prevent  the  Confederates 
coming  from  Glendale  from  turning  Malvern  Hill  by 
the  right  flank. 

The  Confederate  attack  was  expected  from  two 
points,  viz.,  down  the  road  from  Richmond  running 
between  Malvern  Hill  and  the  James,  and  along  the 
roads  leading  from  Glendale  to  Haxall's.  McClellan 
planted  his  artillery  so  as  to  cover  the  approaches  of 
these  roads  to  his  positions. 

Finding  that  Franklin's  troops  had  been  withdrawn 
from  their  position  commanding  the  passage  of  White 
Oak  Swamp,  Jackson  crossed  over  at  daybreak  of  the 
1st  of  July  and  moved  forward  to  Glendale.  He  was 
ordered  to  advance  directly  upon  Malvern  Hill  with 
Longstreet  and  Hill  supporting  him ;  while  Magruder 
and  Huger  were  commanded  to  make  a  circuit  toward 
the  James  and  fall  upon  the  Federal  left  wing. 

About  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  Jackson  began 
cannonading  the  Federal  centre,  in  order  to  draw  the 
attention  of  the  Federal  commander  from  his  real  point 
of  attack.  Having  accomplished  this,  as  he  supposed, 
he  undertook  to  pierce  the  Federal  line  with  his  infan- 
try at  the  point  of  junction  of  the  left  wing  with  the 
centre.  But  he  found  himself  at  this  point  rather  un- 
expectedly in  front  of  Couch's  splendid  division,  and 
suffered  a  severe  repulse. 

About  four  o'clock  Magruder,  who  had  now  reached 
Porter's  front,  opened  with  his  artillery  upon  this  part 
of  the  Federal  line,  and  his  infantry  rushed  up  the 
slopes  of  the  hill,  but  Porter's  artillery  mowed  them 
mercilessly  down,  and  beat  the  survivors  back.  The 
attack  was  repeated  again  and  again  but  with  the  same 
result. 

The  Confederates  were  working  under  the  great  dis- 


McCLELLAN'S   campaign   against   RICHMOND    39 

advantage  of  lack  of  concert.  Their  cavalry,  which  had 
gone  down  the  peninsula  between  the  York  Eiver  and 
the  Chickahominy,  on  the  supposition  that  McClellan 
would  be  obliged  to  retreat  to  Yorktown,  had  not  re- 
turned. The  Confederate  army  was  thus  without  its 
"  very  eyes  "  in  its  manoeuvres  in  the  forest  around  the 
base  of  Malvern  Hill,  while  the  Federals,  on  the  pla- 
teau, were  able  to  observe  all  of  the  Confederate  move- 
ments. The  Confederates  were  thus  necessitated  to 
rely  upon  sounds  from  the  guns  as  signals  for  move- 
ments, and,  as  all  soldiers  well  know,  these  are  very 
likely  to  convey  false  impressions. 

About  six  o'clock,  D.  H.  Hill  thought  that  he  heard 
sounds  upon  his  right  intended  as  a  signal  for  him  to 
make  another  attempt  to  separate  the  Federal  centre 
from  the  left  wing.  He  ordered  his  troops  to  charge 
vigorously  at  this  point.  But  instead  of  Couch's  di- 
vision alone,  they  now  found  Kearney's  fine  soldiers 
also  in  front  of  them.  The  valor  and  enthusiasm  of 
the  Confederates  were  expended  in  vain.  Broken  and 
bleeding  and  decimated,  their  columns  were  repulsed 
again  and  again,  until  they  finally  gave  up  further  at- 
tempts. 

It  was  near  nine  o'clock  in  the  evening  before  they 
accepted  defeat  all  along  their  line,  and  then  they  retired 
slowly  and  sullenly  from  the  field,  with  their  hope  of 
destroying  the  Federal  army,  which  had  been  raised  so 
high  as  to  appear  to  them  a  certainty,  dashed  to  the 
ground. 

The  great  movement  of  the  Federal  army  from  the 
Chickahominy  to  the  James  was  now  successfully  ac- 
complished, and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
was  saved.      The  losses  had   been  great  in 
men,  but  not  in  material.     About  two  thousand  men 
had  been  killed,  eight  thousand  wounded,  and  six  thou- 


40  THE  CIVIL   WAR 

sand  had  been  captured  or  had  disappeared.  In  all,  the 
loss  in  men  had  been  about  sixteen  thousand  from  the 
opening  of  the  battle  at  Mechanicsville  to  the  close  of 
the  battle  at  Malvern  Hill.  The  Confederates  had  suf- 
fered even  more  severely.  Their  losses  were  calculated 
at  nearly,  if  not  quite,  twenty  thousand  men. 

Although  the  Federals  were  victorious  at  Malvern 
and  occupied  a  very  strong  position,  McClellan  felt  that 
he  must  locate  the  army  at  a  point  on  the 
drawai  of  the  James  whcre  the  river  was  broad  enough  to 
Harrison's  protcct  his  transports  from  the  attack  of 
°^'  batteries  on  the  south  bank.  For  this  reason 
he  withdrew  his  forces,  during  the  night  of  the  1st  and 
the  forenoon  of  the  2d,  to  Harrison's  Landing  about 
eight  miles  below  Malvern.  The  Confederates  were, 
however,  so  badly  crippled  that  they  gave  up  further 
pursuit,  and  soon  withdrew  to  their  old  position  around 
Eichmond. 

On  the  4th  of  July,  McClellan  still  found  himself  at 

the  head  of  a  great  army,  an  army  which  numbered 

nearly  ninety  thousand  men.     He  was  in  a 

The  strength  ...  ,   .  .  j.  j  i       i       ^ 

of  the  army  at  secure  position,  and  m  possession  of  the  best 
arnsons.  possible  line  of  communication  with  the 
sources  of  his  supplies  and  reinforcements,  a  line  which 
the  navy  could  always  keep  open  without  any  help  from 
the  army.  He  was  only  about  twenty  miles  away  from 
Richmond  on  an  air  line,  and  was  located  rightly  to 
move  upon  the  city  from  the  rear. 

It  is  true  that  the  troops  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
were  greatly  fatigued  by  their  almost  superhuman 
exertions,  but  it  was  also  true  that  the  Confederates 
were  equally  exhausted,  and  had  neither  the  power  nor 
the  inclination  for  any  further  immediate  enterprises. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  true  plan  for  the  Federals 
was  to  rest  the  army  for  a  while  at  Harrison's,  and  then 


MoCLELLAN's   campaign   against   RICHMOND    41 

resume  the  campaign  against  Richmond,  this  time  by 
way  of  Petersburg.  Such  was  undoubtedly  McClellan's 
idea  and  purpose.  And  tliere  is  also  no  doubt  that  this 
plan  received  the  approval  of  the  President  during  his 
visit  to  Harrison's,  July  7th.  But  ideas  were  growing  in 
Washington  which  were  destined  to  change  this  plan, 
and  to  cause  the  adoption  of  a  very  different  one. 

The  success  of  the  western  armies  had  naturally 
created  the  feeling  that  the  leadership  of  these  armies 
was  superior  to  that  of  the  eastern  armies.  The  eastern 
The  capture  of  New  Madrid  and  Island  No.  efai^'jo^rn 
10,  with  slight  loss  to  the  Federals  engaged  ^°p^- 
in  that  campaign,  was  regarded  as  so  far  about  the  most 
brilliant  achievement  of  the  war.  Naturally,  therefore, 
the  general  commanding  this  expedition.  General  John 
Pope,  was  held  in  high  favor.  Pope  was  a  brave  man, 
and  a  fairly  good  general  of  a  division.  He  had  the 
knack  also  of  appropriating  the  glory  of  everything  done 
by  his  subordinates  to  himself,  and  of  advertising  all 
that  he  did  for  all  that  it  was  worth.  The  Confederates 
called  him  *'  Proclamation  Pope." 

In  the  latter  half  of  June,  while  McClellan  was  oper- 
ating against  Richmond  from  the  Chickahominy,  and 
Jackson  was  raiding  up  and  down  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  eluding  Banks,  Fremont  and  McDowell,  and 
keeping  Washington  in  a  state  of  panic,  the  Washing- 
ton authorities  called  Pope  to  the  capital  and  put  him 
in  superior  command  of  the  three  corps  of  Banks,  Fre- 
mont and  McDowell,  entitling  the  new  army  thus 
formed  the  Army  of  Virginia.  Fremont  im-  ^ ^ j ,  ^^^ 
mediately  declined  to  serve  under  Pope,  and  mailed   to 

*'  ■'■Wash  mgton 

General  Franz  Sigel  was  put  in  his  place,   and  made 
Then,  on  the   11th  of  July,  Halleck   was  in-cwef  of  all 
called  to  AVashington  to  take  general  com-      ®'^°"^^- 
mand  of  all  the  armies  of  the  Union.     When  Halleck 


42  THE   CIVIL  WAR 

arrived  in  the  capital  Pope  was  already  there,  and  the 
two  generals  immediately  began  to  argue  with  the  Presi- 
dent against  the  further  prosecution  of  McClellan's  plan 
of  campaign.  The  plan  which  they  developed  and  fa- 
vored was  to  bring  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  back  to 
the  line  of  the  Kappahannock,  give  the  larger  part  of  it 
to  Pope,  occupy  the  other  part  of  it  with  the  defence 
of  Washington,  and  let  Pope  operate  against  the  main 
array  of  the  Confederates  by  the  direct  overland  route 
from  Washington  to  Richmond.  The  President  resist- 
ed these  proposed  changes  for  several  days,  but  at  last 
yielded. 

On  the  25th  of  July,  Halleck  went  to  Harrison's 
Landing  to  confer  personally  with  McClellan.  He 
Halleck  at  seems  to  have  told  McClellan  nothing  of  the 
Harrison's.  impending  changes  in  the  plan  of  opera- 
tions, but  discussed  with  him  the  resumption  of  the 
movement  against  Richmond  from  the  base  on  the 
James.  McClellan  still  held  to  his  plan  of  approaching 
Richmond  by  way  of  Petersburg,  but  Halleck  was  op- 
posed to  the  transfer  of  the  army  to  the  south  side  of 
the  river.  At  last  he  directed  McClellan  to  move  back 
toward  the  old  positions  in  front  of  Richmond  on  the 
north  side,  promising  to  reinforce  the  army  with  twenty 
thousand  men  for  the  execution  of  the  plan.  He  told 
McClellan,  finally,  that  if  he  was  unwilling  to  undertake 
the  capture  of  Richmond  by  this  route  and  with  this 
additional  force,  he  must  join  Pope  on  the  Rappa- 
hannock. McClellan  hesitatingly  consented  to  follow 
Halleck's  plan.  The  next  day,  however,  he  wrote 
Halleck,  who  had  returned  to  Washington,  suggesting 
that  some  fifteen  thousand  more  troops  might  be  loaned 
him  from  the  Western  armies  for  a  short  time.  The 
Washington  authorities  seem  to  have  interpreted  this 
suggestion   as  a  notification  from   McClellan  that  he 


MoCLELLAN'S   campaign   against   RICHMOND    43 

despaired  of  success  without  a  reinforcement  of  thirty- 
five  thousand  men  instead  of  the  twenty  thousand 
promised.  That  McClellan  himself  did  not  attach  this 
meaning  to  his  suggestion  is  quite  evident  from  the  fact 
that  he  had  put  his  columns  in  motion  before  receiving 
any  reply  to  his  letter  to  Halleck.  Hooker's  division 
drove  a  small  force  of  Confederates  from  Malvern  Hill 
on  the  4th  of  August  and  re-occupied  this  position,  and 
every  preparation  was  made  for  the  advance  by  the  roads 
on  the  north  side  of  the  river.  In  the  evening  of  the 
same  day  the  definite  order  from  Halleck  reached 
McClellan  to  abandon  the  peninsula  and  bring  his  army, 
by  way  of  Fortress  Monroe,  to  Aquia  Creek. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

POPE'S   CAMPAIGN  IN  NORTH-EASTERN  VIRGINIA 

Pope's  Campaign  in  North-eastern  Virginia — The  Strength  of  the 
Armies  in  North-eastern  Virginia — Jackson's  Advance  against 
Pope  —  The  Battle  of  Cedar  Mountain— The  Losses  —  The 
Effect  of  the  Battle  on  the  Further  Movements  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac — The  Withdrawal  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
from  Harrison's — Pope's  Marching  and  Counter-marching — 
The  Approach  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  the  Scattered 
Condition  of  the  Federals — The  Manoeuvres  of  the  Two  Armies 
— The  Capture  of  Manassas  Junction — The  Skirmish  at  the 
Railroad  Bridge  over  Bull  Run  —  Pope's  Attempt  to  Crush 
Jackson's  Army — Jackson  Reinforced — The  Battle  at  Grove- 
ton— The  Battle  of  Manassas— The  Battle  at  Chantilly— The 
Restoration  of  McClellan — The  Losses. 

Pope's  operations  on  the  line  of  the  Rappahannock 
had  already  begun.  His  first  objective  point  was  Gor- 
Pope'Bcam-  donsville,  the  junction  of  the  railroad  from 
&ort^-ea8tern  Staunton,  Via  Charlottesville,  to  Richmond, 
Virginia.  with  the  railroad  from  Alexandria,  via  Man- 
assas, to  Richmond.  His  purpose  was  to  prevent  the 
Confederates  from  going  back  again  into  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  and  threatening  Washington  again  by  way  of  Har- 
per's Ferry.  Pope's  own  base  was  Manassas  Junction,  and 
some  of  his  troops  were  as  far  forward  as  Culpeper 
Court  House.  On  the  14th  of  July,  he  ordered  Banks 
to  advance  from  Culpeper  on  Gordonsville.  The  Con- 
federates had,  however,  anticipated  the  movement,  and 
when,  on  the  16th,  Banks  neared  Gordonsville,  he  found 

41 


pope's   campaign   in   VIRGINIA  45 

Jackson  already  there.     He  withdrew  at  once  to  Cul- 
peper. 

Pope  arrived  in  person  at  Culpeper  on  the  29th  of 
July,  and  during  the  first  days  of  August  he  placed  his 
troops  in  position  along  the  road  from  Culpeper  to 
Sperryville,  a  place  some  fifteen  miles  north-west  from 
Culpeper,  at  the  foot  of  the  Blue  Kidge.  The  position 
was  of  no  great  strategic  importance.  It  was  simply  the 
ground  which  the  Confederates  would  be  obliged  to  trav- 
erse in  going  around  the  unfordable  waters  of  the  lower 
Eappahannock  in  order  to  advance  toward  Washington, 
unless  they  should  go  from  Gordonsville  to  Staunton 
and  pass  down  behind  the  walls  of  the  Blue  Kidge. 

Pope  had,  at  this  moment,  about  forty-five  thousand 
men,  double  as  many  as  Jackson  had  at  Gordonsville, 
and  so  long  as  McClellan  threatened  Rich-  The  strength 
mond,  Lee  could  send  Jackson  no  reinforce-  f^  No^th^s^ 
ments.  In  some  way  or  other,  about  the  em  Virginia, 
last  of  July,  Lee  became  convinced  that  McClellan's 
army  would  be  recalled  from  the  James,  and  he  sent 
A.  P.  Hill's  corps  to  Jackson.  This  made  Jackson's 
force  nearly  equal  to  Pope's. 

On  the  very  day  that  McClellan  received  the  order  to 
abandon  his  position  on  the  James,  Lee  was  informed 
of  the  movements  of  the  troops  both  at 
Harrison's  and  Fortress  Monroe,  and  he  im-  advance 
mediately  ordered  Jackson  to  strike  Pope  ^^^^^^  °^' 
before  reinforcements  could  reach  the  latter.  On  the 
7th  of  August  Jackson  put  his  columns  in  motion  from 
Orange  Court  House  for  the  attack  on  Pope.  The  next 
day  he  encountered  Pope's  cavalry  on  the  borders  of  the 
Rapidan,  and  pushed  them  back  across  the  stream. 
During  the  evening  he  crossed  the  Rapidan  with  his 
entire  force,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  9th  advanced 
toward  Culpeper. 


46  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

Pope  had  gathered  his  army  about  Cnlpeper,  and  had 

thrown  Banks's  corps  forward  toward  Cedar  Mountain, 

some  eight  miles  southward  from  Cul neper. 

The   battle  .  ir    r 

of  Cedar  Banks  had  about  eight  thousand  men,  but 
ounarn.  Ricketts's  division  was  close  boliind  him,  and 
Sigel's  corps  was  close  behind  Kicketts.  Banks  had 
reached  a  good  position  on  elevated  ground,  when, 
about  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  9th,  Jack- 
son's advance  came  into  view.  The  Confederates,  it  ap- 
pears, began  the  attack.  Banks,  however,  angered  and 
chagrined  at  the  way  in  which  Jackson  had  out-ma- 
noeuvred him  in  the  Shenandoah,  was  eager  for  the  fight. 
He  did  not  even  wait  for  Ricketts  and  Sigel  to  come  up, 
but  with  his  single  corps  of  eight  thousand  men  brought 
Jackson's  entire  army  to  a  halt  and  engaged  fully  the 
half  of  it  in  a  fierce  contest,  driving  it  back  until 
Jackson  himself  arrived  with  reinforcements  and  re- 
stored the  Confederate  lines.  Pope  also  appeared  on 
the  battle-field  at  about  the  same  time,  but  brought 
no  troops  with  him.  At  nightfall  the  battle  ceased. 
Ricketts  came  up  early  in  the  evening,  and  placed  his 
division  in  position  to  confront  Jackson  on  the  next 
morning.  But  the  Confederates  had  had  enough  of  it, 
and  were  not  inclined  to  fight  a  new  battle  against  fresh 
troops.  They  retired  during  the  night  to  the  south  side 
of  the  Rapidan. 

For  the  number  of  soldiers  engaged  the  battle  of 
Cedar  Mountain  was  a  sanguinary  struggle.  The  Fed- 
erals lost  in  killed  and  wounded  about  one- 
fourth  of  their  troops  brought  into  action, 
and  the  Confederate  loss,  though  not  so  great  absolutely 
or  relatively,  approached  the  number  of  fifteen  hundred 
men. 

The  effect  of  this  encounter  upon  the  minds  of  the 
authorities  at  Washington  in  determining  the  future 


pope's   campaign   in   VIRGINIA  47 

movements  of  the  campaign  seems  to  have  been  quite 
decisive.  They  seem  to  have  been  fully  convinced  by  it 
that  the  next  great  battle  was  to  take  place  The  effect  of 
on  the  upper  Rappahannock  and  its  tribu-  t'he^^farther 
taries.  They,  therefore,  urged  McClellan  to  [SrA^mTol 
make  all  haste  in  bringing  his  army  to  Aquia  ^^^  Potomac. 
Creek,  from  which  point  he  could  most  easily  reinforce 
Pope  and  protect  Washington.  Burnside's  corps  from 
Fortress  Monroe  had  already  arrived  at  Aquia  Creek  on 
the  day  before  the  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain,  and  dur- 
ing the  battle  the  divisions  of  Reno  and  Stephens  were 
marching  toward  Culpeper. 

On  the  14th  of  August  the  march  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  from  Harrison's  Landing  began,  and  on  the 
16th  McClellan  and  the  last  of  the  troops 
turned  their  backs  upon  Richmond.  The  drawai  of  the 
line  of  march  was  from  Harrison's  to  Will-  Potomac  from 
iamsburg,  crossing  the  Chickahominy  at 
Barnett's  Ferry,  and  from  Williamsburg  to  Yorktown 
and  Fortress  Monroe  by  the  roads  over  which  the  army 
had  advanced  three  months  before.  By  the  20th  the 
army  was  encamped  at  Yorktown,  Newport  News  and 
Fortress  Monroe,  awaiting  transportation  by  water  to 
Aquia  Creek  and  Alexandria.  Lee  had  let  the  grand 
army  go  unmolested.  He  was  bending  all  his  energies 
to  reinforce  Jackson,  and  crush  Pope  before  the  latter 
could  receive  the  aid  intended  for  him  from  Aquia 
Creek.  The  day  before  McClellan  began  his  march 
from  Harrison's,  both  Longstreet  and  Hood  were  or- 
dered to  leave  their  positions  north-east  of  Richmond, 
from  which  they  could  have  greatly  harassed  the  re- 
treating army,  and  go  to  Jackson  at  Gordonsville. 

On  the  20th,  Jackson,  Hill  and  Longstreet  with  their 
combined  forces  crossed  the  Rapidan  and  attempted  to 
surprise  Pope.     By  this  time  Reno's  division  was  with 


48  THE  CIVIL   WAR 

Pope,  and  had  swelled  his  numbers  to  about  fifty  thou- 
sand men.     The  Confederates,  however,  still  outnum- 

Pope's  bered  him  by  about  twenty  thousand  men, 
™"nter°march^  ^^^  Popo  decided  to  retire  to  the  north  bank 
"»g-  of  the  Eappahannock,  and  make  his  stand 

with  the  river  in  his  front.  He  placed  his  left  wing,  un- 
der the  command  of  Eeno,  at  Kelly's  Ford,  from  which 
position  he  expected  to  keep  open  his  communications 
with  Aquia  Creek.  The  centre,  under  McDowell,  was 
located  around  Eappahannock  Station  in  front  of  the 
railroad  bridges  across  the  river.  Sigel's  corps,  form- 
ing the  right  wing,  was  posted  farther  up  the  stream. 

Lee  himself  had  now  joined  the  forces  operating 
against  Pope,  and  on  the  21st  his  advance  appeared  on 
the  south  side  of  the  river.  He  soon  reached  the  con- 
clusion that  he  could  not  cross  in  the  face  of  the  Federal 
positions,  and  on  the  22d  he  sent  Jackson  up  the  river 
to  turn  the  Federal  right  wing.  The  Federals  discov- 
ered the  movement,  and  sent  a  couple  of  brigades  across 
to  attack  Jackson's  rear.  They  were,  however,  rather 
severely  repulsed,  and  Jackson  proceeded,  without 
further  molestation,  up  to  Sulphur  Springs  Bridge, 
a  place  some  five  miles  beyond  the  position  of  Pope's 
right  wing.  Jackson  took  possession  of  the  bridge  and 
sent  Early's  brigade  across  the  river  in  the  direction  of 
Warrenton,  in  Pope's  rear. 

The  idea  seems  now  to  have  seized  Pope  that  by  al- 
lowing Jackson  to  proceed  to  Warrenton,  he  could 
suddenly  turn  upon  him,  strike  him  in  the  flank,  and 
destroy  him  before  Lee  could  come  to  his  assistance. 
During  the  22d,  while  Jackson  was  going  to  Sulphur 
Springs  Bridge,  Pope  was,  therefore,  moving  troops 
from  his  centre  and  left  back  into  the  rear  of  his  right. 

In  the  late  evening  a  new  idea  took  possession  of  him. 
This  time  it  was  that  Longstreet  was  weaker  than  Jack- 


pope's  campaign   in   VIRGINIA  49 

son,  and  that  by  suddenly  crossing  the  river  and  fall- 
ing on  Longstreet,  he  could  crush  the  latter,  and  then 
be  in  Jackson's  rear,  and  thus  annihilate  the  whole  of 
Lee's  army.  He,  therefore,  ordered  his  weary  soldiers 
back  to  the  positions  which  they  had  left  twelve  hours 
before,  and  sent  some  of  those  who  had  remained  dur- 
ing the  day  on  the  bank  of  the  river  across  to  the  south 
side.  Torrents  of  rain  fell  throughout  the  night  of 
the  22d,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  23d  the  bridges 
were  in  great  danger.  Pope  now  felt  compelled  to  re- 
call the  troops  who  had  crossed  in  order  to  avoid  the 
danger  of  having  his  army  divided  by  the  swollen  waters 
of  a  bridgeless  river.  Jackson's  force  was  in  the  same 
danger.  Early's  brigade  was  separated  by  the  river 
from  the  rest  of  the  army,  and  the  Sulphur  Springs 
Bridge  was  swept  away  on  the  morning  of  the  23d. 

Pope  now  received  his  third  inspiration.  He  re- 
solved to  throw  the  larger  part  of  his  army  on  Early's 
single  brigade  and  capture  it  before  Jackson  could 
succor  him.  He,  therefore,  marched  his  exhausted 
soldiers  back  from  his  left  and  centre  to  the  rear  of  his 
right  again,  and  began  the  search  for  Early.  The  wily 
Confederate  had  sent  Stuart's  cavalry  into  the  Federal 
rear,  and,  at  the  moment  when  Pope  was  searching  for 
him  in  the  direction  of  Warrenton  and  having  no  anx- 
iety at  all  about  his  own  communications,  Stuart  ap- 
peared at  Catlett's  Station,  some  ten  miles  in  the  direct 
rear  of  the  Federal  army,  and,  for  a  few  hours,  severed 
the  communication  between  Pope  and  his  base  of  sup- 
plies at  Manassas  Junction.  The  Confederate  cavalry 
was  easily  driven  away,  but  they  carried  with  them 
Pope's  private  papers,  and  their  exploit  excited  a  feel- 
ing of  confusion  and  distress  among  the  soldiers  of 
Pope's  army. 

Naturally  Early  succeeded  in  eluding  Pope's  scattered. 
Vol.  II.  ~4 


60  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

exhausted  and  dispirited  troops,  while  Jackson  made 
good  use  of  the  time  thus  gained  in  rebuilding  the 
bridge  across  the  river.  Before  the  morning  of  the  24th 
broke  it  was  passable,  and  in  a  few  hours  Early  had 
safely  rejoined  Jackson  on  the  other  side. 

By  these  useless  marches  and  counter-marches  Pope's 
army  was  as  much  used  up  as  if  it  had  fought  a  good 
battle,  and  it  had  lost  confidence  in  its  commander  in  a 
degree  not  much  less  than  that  usually  caused  by  a 
pronounced  defeat.  On  the  other  hand,  the  larger  part 
of  Lee's  army  had  had  nearly  forty-eight  hours  of  good 
rest,  and  was  in  prime  condition  to  begin  operations  so 
soon  as  the  weather  would  permit. 

There  was  nothing  now  for  Pope  to  do  but  wait  for 

reinforcements  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.     Eey- 

T  h  e    a  p-   ^^o^^s's  division  and  Porter's  corps,  which  had 

proachofthe  debarked  at  Aquia  Creek  on  the  21st  and 

army   of    the  ^ 

Potomac  and  22d,  Were  marching  up  the  Rappahannock 

the    scattered  -—  o       j.  j.  i 

condition  of  toward  Kelly's  Ford,  where  it  was  supposed 
Pope's  left  wing  was  still  resting,  and  Heintz- 
elman's  corps,  which  had  landed  at  Alexandria,  was 
marching  toward  Manassas  Junction.  McClellan  him- 
self arrived  at  Aquia  Creek  on  the  24th.  Sumner's  corps 
debarked  there  a  day  or  two  afterward.  Franklin's 
corps  was  on  transports  going  up  the  Potomac,  while 
Keyes's  corps  was  still  on  the  peninsula. 

Pope's  army  was  also  somewhat  scattered.  Sigel's 
corps,  in  the  attempt  to  trap  Early,  had  marched  up  to 
Waterloo  Bridge,  three  miles  above  Sulphur  Springs 
Bridge.  The  troops  of  Reno  and  Banks  were  distribut- 
ed along  the  river  between  these  two  points,  while 
McDowell's  corps  was  at  Warrenton.  Nobody  seemed 
to  know  just  where  anybody  else  was,  and  General 
Halleck  at  Washington  could  not  tell  anybody  where 
General  Pope  was. 


pope's   campaign   in   VIRGINIA  51 

Naturally  General  Lee  was  not  slow  in  seizing  the 
opportunity  which  this  situation  offered  him.  He  sent 
Jackson  still  farther  up  the  river  to  Hinson's     „. 

i^  The  manceu- 

Ford,  five  miles  above  the  extreme  Federal  vresofthetwo 

armies. 

right.  Here  Jackson  crossed  over  without 
difficulty,  and  pushed  on  rapidly  to  the  little  village  of 
Orleans.  By  this  movement  he  placed  his  forces  so  that 
Bull  Kun  mountain  lay  between  them  and  Pope's  army, 
and  so  that  he  could  therefore  advance  north-eastward 
without  exposing  his  flank  to  the  Federals.  His  ob- 
jective point  was  Thoroughfare  Gap,  the  gorge  through 
which  the  railroad  from  Manassas  Junction  to  Front 
Royal  and  Strasburg  passed.  The  gap  was  about  twenty 
miles  distant  from  Orleans,  while  Pope's  troops  at  War- 
renton  were  not  over  a  dozen  miles  away,  and  those  at 
Manassas  Junction  were  only  about  twenty  miles  away 
with  a  railroad  the  entire  distance.  Jackson  knew, 
therefore,  that  he  must  move  silently  and  swiftly. 

Pope  was  informed  that  something  was  brewing 
from  the  moment  that  Jackson  started  up  the  river,  but 
he  does  not  seem  to  have  divined  Jackson's  purpose  at 
all.  He  seems  to  have  thought  that  Lee's  whole  army 
was  endeavoring  to  get  into  the  Shenandoah  Valley  in 
order  to  pass  into  Maryland.  Whatever  may  have  been 
the  working  of  his  mind  upon  the  situation  he  did  not 
make  any  movement  for  his  own  protection.  In  the 
early  morning  of  the  26th  Jackson  took  possession  of 
the  pass  without  any  difficulty,  and  marched  through, 
and  straight  on  toward  Manassas  Junction,  while  Pope 
was  sending  his  troops  from  AVarrenton  and  the  points 
along  the  railroad  up  the  river  in  pursuit. 

In  the  evening  of  the  26th,  Jackson's  cav-  of    Manassas 
airy  reached  Bristoe  Station  on  the  Alexan-  J™''""^- 
dria   railroad,    and    cut    Pope's   communications   with 
Manassas  and  Washington.     That  night  Jackson  him- 


52  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

self  arrived  with  the  infantry  and  established  his  forces 
along  the  railroad  in  Pope's  rear.  In  the  morning  of  the 
27th  he  captured  Manassas  Junction  with  the  immense 
stores  gathered  there. 

The  interruption  of  communication,  in  the  evening 
of  the  26th,  seems  to  have  given  Pope  and  the  Washing- 

The  Bktr-  ton  authorities  the  first  reliable  information 
raifroa/bridge  ^^  to  the  whereabouts  of  Jackson.  It  pro- 
over  Bull  Run,  duced  great  anxiety  at  the  capital.  Most  of 
the  garrison  had  been  sent  forward  to  Pope,  bui  happily 
Franklin's  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  arrived  at 
Alexandria  on  the  26th.  All  but  one  brigade  of  it  was 
immediately  placed  in  the  intrenchments,  while  that 
brigade,  Taylor's,  was  sent  forward,  on  the  morning  of 
the  27th,  to  make  a  reconnoissance.  It  advanced  to  the 
railroad  bridge  over  Bull  Eun,  crossed  the  stream,  and 
came  upon  the  Confederates  in  full  force.  The  Con- 
federates charged  it  vigorously  and  drove  it  back  to 
Centreville  with  great  slaughter. 

So  soon  as  Pope  realized  the  situation,  he  resolved  to 
throw  himself  upon  Jackson  and  crush  him  before  Lee 

Pope's  at-  could  comc  to  his  relief.  On  the  morning  of 
jaEkso'n'e  ^^^  27th  he  Ordered  McDowell  to  move 
*™»y'  toward  Gainesville  in  order  to  cut  Jackson's 

line  of  retreat  toward  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and  prevent 
any  reinforcements  reaching  Jackson  by  way  of  the  Gap. 
McDowell  had  with  him,  besides  his  own  corps,  Sigel's 
corps  and  Reynolds's  division,  some  twenty-five  thousand 
men,  a  force  almost,  if  not  quite,  equal  to  Jackson's. 
Moreover,  Reno's  division  was  within  supporting  dis- 
tance, and  Kearney's  division  of  Heiutzelman's  corps  was 
not  far  away  to  the  east.  Pope  also,  at  the  same  time, 
ordered  Hooker's  division  of  Heiutzelman's  corps,  which 
had  been  following  the  railroad  from  Alexandria  to  Rap- 
pahannock Station,  to  return  toward  Manassas  Junction. 


pope's   campaign   in   VIRGINIA  53 

Banks's  corps  was  directed  to  support  Hooker,  and,  last- 
ly. Porter's  corps  was  faced  for  Warrenton  Junction. 

In  the  evening  of  the  27th  McDowell  took  possession 
of  Gainesville  and  blocked  the  way  between  Jackson's 
forces  and  Thoroughfare  Gap.  Reno  and  Kearney  were 
within  supporting  distance. 

In  moving  to  his  position  Hooker  came  into  contact 
with  E  weirs  division  near  Catlett's  Station,  and  drove 
it  back  toward  Manassas  with  great  vigor  and  success. 
Otherwise  the  movements  of  the  27th  were  executed 
without  the  precipitation  of  battle. 

In  the  evening  of  the  27th,  Pope,  supposing  Jackson 
was  still  at  Manassas,  and  eager  to  pounce  upon  him, 
ordered  the  different  detachments  of  his  army  to  move 
immediately  upon  Manassas.  This  was  a  great  mistake. 
It  uncovered  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and  opened  the  way  of 
retreat  or  reinforcement  for  Jackson,  as  the  case  might 
be.  McDowell  saw  it,  and  when  he  started  for  Manassas 
on  the  morning  of  the  28th,  he,  on  his  own  responsibil- 
ity, left  Ricketts's  division  behind  to  hold  the  Gap  as 
long  as  possible. 

Jackson  kept  well  informed  of  all  these  movements, 
and  so  soon  as  he  felt  entirely  sure  that  Pope  was  mak- 
ing the  blunder  of  concentrating  all  of  his  troops  upon 
Manassas  and  leaving  Thoroughfare  Gap  uncovered,  he 
evacuated  Manassas  and  moved  his  forces  to  Groveton 
and  Sudley  Springs,  some  seven  or  eight  miles  northward 
from  Manassas.  In  this  position  Jackson  was  nearer 
Thoroughfare  Gap  than  when  at  Manassas,  and  the  pur- 
pose of  his  manoeuvre  was  to  bring  Pope's  army  to  the 
south  and  south-east  of  his  own,  and  thus  open  commu- 
nication between  Lee  and  himself  through  Thorough- 
fare Gap.  He,  therefore,  sent  Hill's  division  farther 
eastward  toward  Centreville,  calculating  to  draw  the 
Federals  after  it. 


54  THE   CIVIL    WAlt 

About  noon  on  the  28th,  Pope  arrived  at  Manassas 
Junction  with  the  divisions  of  Hooker,  Kearney  and 
Eeno.  Nothing  could  be  seen  of  Jackson's  army,  ex- 
cept Hill's  rear-guard  proceeding  toward  Centreville. 
Pope  immediately  conceived  the  idea  that  Jackson's 
whole  array  was  retreating  via  Centreville  to  Aldie  Gap, 
a  pass  in  the  Bull  Run  mountains  some  fifteen  miles 
north  of  Thoroughfare.  He,  therefore,  ordered  McDow- 
ell, whose  troops  had  reached  a  point  about  midway 
between  Gainesville  and  Manassas,  to  turn  his  columns 
north-eastward  and  march  toward  Centreville,  while  he 
himself  undertook  the  pursuit  of  Hill's  forces.  His  ad- 
vance overtook  Hill's  rear-guard  just  as  it  was  leaving 
Centreville.  To  Pope's  surprise  Hill  had  taken  the 
road  leading  from  Centreville  due  westward  to  Sudley 
Springs,  instead  of  the  road  leading  north-westward  to 
Aldie.  Even  then  Pope  does  not  seem  to  have  realized 
the  full  import  of  the  manoeuvre.  It  was  now  about 
sunset,  and  the  grand  result  of  the  movements  of  the 
28th  was  that  the  whole  of  Pope's  army,  except  Ricketts's 
division,  was  south  and  east  of  Jackson's  army,  and  far- 
ther away  from  Thoroughfare  Gap  than  Jackson's  army. 
Almost  at  the  very  moment  when  these  relative  po- 
sitions were  being  occupied  by  the  two  armies,  the  head 
Jackson  re-  of  Lougstrect's  columus  appeared  in  the  de- 
inforced.  files  of  Thoroughfare  Gap.  Ricketts's  force 
kept  the  advancing  Confederates  at  bay  for  a  little 
while  in  his  immediate  front.  He  was,  however,  soon 
surprised  by  an  attack  upon  his  right  flank,  which  even 
threatened  his  rear.  A  large  detachment  of  Lee's 
troops  had  marched  through  a  gorge  a  few  miles  north 
of  Thoroughfare,  which  was  either  entirely  unknown  to 
the  Federals  or  considered  by  them  so  diflScult  a  passage 
as  not  to  require  defence.  Ricketts  saw  at  once  that  he 
must  abandon  his  position  and  retreat  to  Manassas. 


pope's  campaign  in  vikginia  55 

During  the  entire  night  of  the  28th  Lee's  army  was 
pouring  through  Thoroughfare  Gap  and  hastening  on  to 
Gainesville,  from  which  point  the  connection  with  Jack- 
son's right  at  Groveton  was  to  be  made. 

In  executing  his  new  movement,  McDowell's  left 
touched  Jackson's  right  about  six  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon of  the  28th,  on  the  Warrenton  turn-  The  battle 
pike,  near  Groveton.  A  short  but  sangui-  »' ^^roveton. 
nary  battle  took  place  here  between  two  of  Jackson's 
divisions  and  one  of  McDowell's.  The  Confederates 
were  repulsed,  and  General  Ewell  himself  was  severely 
wounded,  but  as  the  main  body  of  McDowell's  corps  had 
passed  on  toward  Centre ville,  the  division  engaged, 
King's,  was  left  unsupported,  and  withdrew  in  the  dark- 
ness to  join  the  division  farther  forward. 

Pope  was  still,  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  unaware 
that  Longstreet  had  passed  through  Thoroughfare  Gap, 
and  was  pushing  on  to  Gainesville.  He  was  still  calcu- 
lating to  crush  Jackson  before  Longstreet  could  come 
up.  He  now  ordered  McDowell  to  move  back  toward 
Gainesville  with  the  purpose  of  attacking  and  turning- 
Jackson's  right ;  commanded  Porter  to  support  Mc- 
Dowell ;  directed  Sigel  and  Reynolds  to  advance  against 
Jackson's  front  near  Groveton  ;  and  instructed  Hooker, 
Kearney  and  Reno  to  march  from  Centre  ville  via  Stone 
Bridge  over  Bull  Run,  against  Jackson's  left.  The 
Federal  line  of  battle,  as  thus  formed,  was  a  curve 
stretching  from  Bull  Run  to  near  Gainesville,  a  distance 
of  about  ten  miles,  while  Jackson's  line  was  consid- 
erably shorter,  being  almost  straight,  and  it  was  also 
protected  by  the  embankment  of  an  unfinished  railroad. 
Sigel  quickly  struck  the  Confederate  centre,  and  before 
nine  o'clock  in  the  forenoon  began  the  battle.  It  was, 
however,  at  least  an  hour  later  before  the  wings  of  the 
Federal  army  could  get  into  position  j  and  when  Mc- 


56  THE  CIVIL   WAR 

Dowell  approached  Gainesville,  he  found  that  Long- 
street  had  anticipated  him,  and  was  even  then  establish- 
ing the  connection  with  Jackson's  right.  Sigel  now 
received  some  support  from  Reynolds  and  the  divisions 
composing  the  Federal  right  wing,  and  forced  Jackson 
momentarily  backward.  But  Longstreet  now  appeared 
on  the  other  side,  and  by  the  beginning  of  the  afternoon 
the  whole  of  Lee's  army  confronted  the  Federals  in  bat- 
tle array. 

Pope  was  still  ignorant  that  Longstreet  was  east  of 
Gainesville,  and  supposed  that  McDowell  and  Porter 
were  turning  Jackson's  right,  while,  in  fact,  they  were 
facing  Longstreet.  Pope  calculated  that  they  would  be 
able  to  strike  Jackson's  flank  about  noon,  and  when 
that  hour  arrived,  he  ordered  Hooker  to  charge  the  Con- 
federate front.  Hooker's  troops  succeeded  in  reaching 
the  railroad  embankment  behind  which  the  Confed- 
erates were  posted,  but  with  no  amount  of  exertion  were 
they  able  to  clear  it.  They  were  finally  forced  to  retreat 
with  great  loss.  Kearney's  division  now  made  the  effort, 
but  with  the  same  disastrous  results.  The  turning  of 
Jackson's  right  flank  by  McDowell  was  the  nect3sary 
condition  for  the  success  of  the  charge  in  front,  and 
that  had  failed,  as  we  have  seen,  through  the  appear- 
ance of  Longstreet  on  Jackson's  right. 

When  McDowell  realized  that  the  movement  against 
Jackson's  flank  could  not  be  executed,  and  heard  the 
sounds  of  the  battle  at  the  centre,  he  left  Porter  in  front 
of  Longstreet,  and  turned  the  head  of  his  own  columns 
in  the  direction  of  the  battle-field.  It  was  now  the  middle 
of  the  afternoon  and  the  aspect  of  affairs  was  most  serious 
to  the  Federals.  Pope  sent  another  order  to  the  troops 
on  his  left  to  attack,  and,  after  waiting  until  he  thought 
the  attack  could  have  begun,  he  commanded  Kearney 
and  Reno  to  charge  Jackson's  front  again.     They  again 


pope's   campaign    in   VIRGINIA  57 

reached  the  railroad  embankment,  but  the  carnage  in 
their  ranks  caused  by  the  well-directed  fire  of  the  Con- 
federate artillery  forced  them  to  yield  again. 

At  this  moment  McDoweirs  corps  reached  the  scene 
of  action,  and  would  probably  have  turned  the  battle 
against  the  Confederates  except  for  the  fact  that  Long- 
street,  quickly  perceiving  the  departure  of  McDowell 
from  his  front,  and  emboldened  by  Porter's  inactivity, 
had  sent  Hood's  strong  division  to  Jackson.  Porter  either 
did  not  receive  Pope's  order,  sent  to  him  in  the  middle 
of  the  afternoon  to  attack,  or  he  paid  no  attention  to  it. 
He  claimed  that  he  did  not  receive  it  until  after  night- 
fall, and  we  must  accept  his  word.  The  fact,  however, 
remains  the  same  that  Longstreet  was  left  unmolested 
by  Porter  and  was  thus  enabled  to  offset  McDowell  with 
Hood  at  the  critical  moment  of  the  battle.  McDowell 
threw  his  troops  into  the  conflict,  but  they  were  met 
and  repulsed  by  the  fresh  troops  upon  the  other  side. 
Darkness  now  intervened,  and  the  Federals  were  com- 
pelled to  acknowledge  to  themselves  that  they  had  been 
outmanoeuvred  and  repulsed. 

Pope,  however,  was  unwilling  to  acknowledge  defeat. 
He  now  knew  that  the  whole  of  Lee's  army  was  in  front 
of  him,  and  that  his  own  army  was  fatigued  Tjjp  ^^^^i^ 
and  decimated  and  in  great  need  of  supplies.  ofManasBas. 
But  he  boldly  and  rashly  resolved  to  renew  the  battle  on 
the  coming  day.  When  light  appeared  the  Confederates 
did  not  manifest  any  desire  to  reopen  the  conflict.  Pope 
seems  to  have  conjectured  that  they  were  preparing  to 
retreat.  He  concluded  from  this  conjecture  that  they 
would  be  weakest  on  their  left.  He,  therefore,  massed 
his  own  troops  on  his  right,  and  early  in  the  afternoon 
ordered  Porter  to  charge  the  Confederate  line  at  a  point 
between  their  centre  and  right.  These  brave  soldiers 
rushed  forward  at  the  word  of  command,  but  soon  found 


58  THE   CIVIL    WAU 

themselves  under  the  murderous  fire  of  Longstreet's  ar- 
tillery, which  had  been  most  judiciously  posted,  and  was 
very  skilfully  handled.  They  were  driven  back  with 
great  loss  and  in  great  confusion. 

The  Confederates  now  seized  this  opportunity  to  ad- 
vance their  entire  line.  They  also  swung  their  right 
wing  around  the  Federal  left,  which  had  been  weakened 
in  carrying  out  Pope's  plan  of  massing  on  his  own  right. 
The  danger  which  at  this  juncture  threatened  the  Federal 
army  was  that  the  Confederate  right  wing  would  seize 
some  of  the  heights  commanding  the  stone  bridge  over 
Bull  Eun,  and  thus  block  the  Federal  line  of  retreat  to 
Centreville.  It  was  now  apparent  that  Longstreet  was 
making  his  way  toward  the  noted  Henry  Hill.  At  this 
most  critical  moment,  Buchanan's  brigade  of  regulars,  be- 
longing to  Porter's  corps,  checked  Longstreet's  advance. 
Buchanan  was  soon  joined  by  the  divisions  of  Eeynolds 
and  Kicketts,  and  together  they  held  the  plateau  of 
Henry  Hill  until  the  army  crossed  Bull  Run  in  safety. 

On  the  morning  of  the  31st  the  defeated  army  arrived 
at  Centreville,  where  it  was  met  by  Franklin's  corps 
from  Alexandria,  and  where  it  found  munitions  and 
supplies.  It  was  not,  however,  to  find  the  much-needed 
rest  here.  Lee  had  resolved  to  make  another  effort  to 
cut  it  off  from  Washington  and  force  its  surrender. 

On  the  morning  of  the  31st  Jackson  moved  around 
Centreville  on  the  north  to  the  road  leading  from  Aldie 
The  battle  at  ^o  Fairfax  Court  House.  In  the  evening  of 
chantiiiy.  ^he  3 1st  he  reached  Chantilly  on  that  road, 
and  was  therefore  nearer  to  Fairfax  Court  House  than 
the  Federals  at  Centreville  were.  While  Jackson  was 
thus  getting  into  the  Federal  rear  again,  Longstreet  was 
crossing  Bull  Run  in  front  of  Centreville,  and  putting  his 
troops  in  position  to  attack  when  Jackson  should  strike 
the  road  from  Centreville  to  Fairfax  at  Germantown. 


pope's   CAMPAIGN   IN   VIRGINIA  59 

In  the  early  morning  of  September  1st,  Pope  learned 
of  the  presence  of  Jackson  at  Chantilly.  He  immedi- 
ately drew  his  army  from  Centreville  back  to  German- 
town,  and  placed  it  across  the  two  roads  just  in  front 
of  their  intersection  at  Germantown.  The  right  wing, 
composed  of  the  divisions  of  Hooker,  Eeno  and  Kearney, 
commanded  the  road  from  Chantilly,  while  the  left 
wing,  composed  of  the  corps  of  Porter,  Sigel  and  Sum- 
ner, commanded  the  road  from  Centreville.  McDowell 
and  Franklin  were  in  reserve  on  the  right,  and  Banks's 
troops  were  ordered  to  protect  the  train  of  munitions 
and  supplies  on  its  way  to  Alexandria. 

Late  in  the  afternoon,  Jackson's  troops  began  the 
attack  on  the  Federal  right.  They  were  at  first  repulsed, 
but  flushed  with  the  victory  of  the  day  before,  and 
strongly  reinforced,  they  finally  forced  the  Federals  to 
retire  after  losing  the  gallant  Kearney,  who  seemed  on 
the  point  of  restoring  the  battle  to  the  Federals  when 
he  fell.  On  the  morning  of  the  2d  the  Federal  army 
continued  its  retreat  toward  AVashington. 

Dismayed  by  the  results  of    Pope's  blunders  and 

misfortunes.  President  Lincoln  restored  McClellan,  by  a 

formal  order  of  September  2d,  to  "  the  com- 

Tll6r68" 

toration  of  maud  of  all  the  troops  for  the  defence  of 
McCieUan.  ^j^^  capital,"  and  personally  directed  him  to 
go  forward  to  meet  the  retreating  army,  and  take  com- 
mand of  it,  and  place  it  in  such  positions  as  would  best 
enable  it  to  repulse  the  advance  of  the  Confederates  and 
protect  the  city.  He  was  welcomed  with  open  arms  by 
his  old  soldiers,  who  felt  their  courage  revived  by  having 
again  a  commander  in  whom  they  felt  confidence.  In 
a  very  few  days  McClellan  re-established  the  defences 
around  the  city  so  strongly  that  the  Confederates  gave 
up  all  idea  of  making  an  attack  upon  it,  if  indeed  they 
had  ever  entertained  the  plan. 


60  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

The  losses  suffered  by  the  Federal  army  in  this  ten 

days'  campaign  were  very  great.     Besides  the  capture 

and  destruction  of  supplies  and  material  of 

TllG  l0fi&6S 

war,  fully  fifteen  thousand  men  had  been 
killed,  wounded  and  captured,  and  the  entire  army  had 
become  more  or  less  demoralized.  The  Confederates 
had  also  suffered.  Some  ten  thousand  of  their  men  had 
been  put  liors  de  combat,  but  they  were  flushed  with 
victory,  full  of  courage,  and  inspired  with  confidence  in 
their  own  power,  and  in  the  ability  of  their  leaders. 

It  was  certainly  a  heavy  burden  and  a  vast  re- 
sponsibility which  McClellan  was  now  again  called  upon 
to  assume  in  taking  command  of  this  routed  army  at 
the  very  gates  of  the  capital,  reorganizing  it  in  the  very 
face  of  the  victorious  Confederates,  and  defending  the 
capital  with  it  against  their  further  advance.  And  it 
certainly  was  greatly  to  his  honor  as  a  soldier  and  a  man 
that  he  not  only  accepted  the  demands  imposed  upon  him 
and  made  the  capital  secure,  but  that  he  re-established 
the  organization  and  morale  of  the  army,  and  turned 
the  tide  of  victory  once  more  in  favor  of  the  Union  arms. 


CHAPTER  XV 

BRAGG'S  INVASION  OF  KENTUCKY 

The  Plans  of  Bragg — Halleck's  Attempt  to  Occupy  Chattanooga — 
Partisan  War  in  Buell's  Rear — Morgan's  First  Raid — Forrest — 
Morgan  Again — The  Disposition  of  Buell's  Forces — Nelson  Sent 
Back  into  Kentucky,  and  Kirby  Smith's  Invasion — The  Battle 
at  Richmond,  Kentucky — The  Confederate  Advance  after  the 
Battle  at  Richmond — Bragg's  Advance — The  Capture  of  Mun- 
fordville — Discouragement  at  the  North. 

The  abandonment  of  the  peninsula  by  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  and  the  victories  of  Jackson  and  Lee  over 
Pope  naturally  encouraged  the  Confederates  The  plans  of 
in  the  West  to  make  a  strong  effort  to  repair  Bragg, 
the  disasters  of  the  Donelson-Shiloh  campaign.  Their 
new  commander-in-chief,  General  Braxton  Bragg,  had 
rightly  concluded  that  he  must  make  sure  of  three  points, 
Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson  on  the  Mississippi,  and  Chat- 
tanooga on  the  Tennessee.  By  holding  the  first  two  he 
would  maintain  the  territorial  connection  of  the  parts 
of  the  Confederacy  east  and  west  of  the  Mississippi,  and 
by  holding  the  latter  he  would  maintain  the  direct  con- 
nection by  rail  between  Eichmond  and  the  South-west, 
prevent  the  Unionists  of  East  Tennessee  from  obtaining 
the  protection  of  the  Federal  army,  and  establish  a  base 
of  operations  for  the  recovery  of  Middle  Tennessee  and 
Southern  Kentucky  by  the  Confederate  arms. 

General  Halleck  had  also  discerned  the  importance  of 
these  points,  especially  of  Chattanooga,  and  had  formed 
the  plan  of  anticipating  the  Confederates  in  regard  to 

61  3 


62  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

its  occupation.  Mitchell's  division  of  Buell's  army, 
which,  as  we  have  seen,  was  sent  by  way  of  Murfrees- 
Haiieck'sat-  borough  into  Northern  Alabama,  at  the  time 
^upf 'chaua-  t^iat  the  main  body  went  to  Pittsburg  Land- 
nooga.  ing^  ^a,s  during  the  month  of  June  in  pos- 

session of  the  country  north  of  the  Tennessee  Eiver  from 
Decatur  to  Bridgeport.  His  head-quarters  were  at 
Huntsville,  and  he  once  came  very  near  seizing  Chatta- 
nooga. 

During  the  first  days  of  June  the  place  was  held  by  a 
small  detachment  of  Kirby  Smith's  East  Tennessee 
army.  Bragg  now  sent  the  divisions  of  Hardee  and 
Polk  from  Tupelo  in  Mississippi  to  Chattanooga,  while 
Van  Dorn  occupied  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson  with 
his  troops. 

It  was  the  10th  of  June  when  Halleck  instructed  Buell 
to  begin  operations  against  Chattanooga.  Buell's  first 
division  set  out  from  Corinth  on  the  next  day,  but  it  was 
the  first  week  in  July  before  his  entire  force  had  arrived 
in  the  country  between  Huntsville  and  Bridgeport.  The 
delay  was  caused  by  the  direction  from  Halleck  to  repair 
the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Kailroad  as  he  went,  in  or- 
der to  draw  his  supplies  over  it  from  Memphis.  Buell 
soon  found,  however,  that  this  line  was  too  much  exposed 
to  sudden  attack  by  the  Confederates  to  answer  for  any 
such  purpose,  and  in  the  latter  part  of  June  he  began  to 
repair  the  roads  from  Nashville  to  Decatur  and  to  Chat- 
tanooga, for  the  purpose  of  establishing  railroad  commu- 
nication with  Nashville  and  Louisville.  Delayed  by  this 
work,  Buell  found,  when  he  arrived  within  striking  dis- 
tance of  Chattanooga,  that  Bragg's  forces  had  won  the 
race  and  were  already  established  in  this  highly  impor- 
tant position. 

Bragg  now  developed  and  put  into  execution  his  plana 
for  forcing  the  Federals  out  of  Alabama,  Middle  Ten- 


BRAGG' S   INVASION   OF   KENTUCKY  63 

nessee  and  Kentucky.  During  July  and  the  larger  part 
of  August,  while  the  Confederates  were  gathering  at 
Chattanooga,  and  preparing  for  the  main  ad- 
vance, a  partisan  warfare  was  inaugurated  warinBueii's 
and  prosecuted  in  Buell's  rear,  which  so 
interrupted  his  communications  and  demoralized  his 
whole  army  as  to  render  Bragg  the  greatest  aid  in  the 
campaign  upon  which  he  was  about  to  enter. 

About  the  4tli  of  July  the  noted  cavalry  chief,  John 
H.  Morgan,  with  a  thousand  picked  men,  left  Knoxville 
in  East  Tennessee,  and  rode  straight  for  the  Morgan's 
Louisville  and  Nashville  Railroad  at  a  point  ^®*  ■■*^^- 
just  beyond  Glasgow.  He  reached  this  point  almost 
without  resistance,  and  burned  the  railroad  bridge  across 
Salt  River.  He  then  turned  the  head  of  his  column  tow- 
ard Lebanon,  and  pursued  his  march  through  Leba- 
non, Springfield,  Harrodsburg,  Lawrenceburg,  Versailles 
and  Georgetown  to  Cynthiana,  a  place  only  about  fifty 
miles  south  of  Cincinnati.  He  easily  overcame  every 
obstacle  in  his  course,  and  spread  consternation  through- 
out the  whole  of  Central  Kentucky.  General  J.  T. 
Boyle,  the  Federal  commander  at  Louisville,  seems  to 
have  been  terror-stricken  and  almost  paralyzed.  His 
frantic  despatches  to  Buell,  Halleck  and  Secretary  Stan- 
ton, full  of  exaggerations  and  crying  for  aid,  manifested 
utter  demoralization  and  helplessness.  At  Cincinnati 
they  were  not  so  excited,  and  Morgan  properly  con- 
cluded that  his  best  course  was  to  make  his  escape  be- 
fore the  Federals  should  sufiiciently  recover  their  senses 
to  entrap  him.  He  captured  Cynthiana  on  the  17th, 
and  on  the  18th  he  turned  his  face  southward  again. 
He  took  his  way  through  Paris,  Winchester,  Richmond, 
Crab  Orchard,  Somerset  and  Monticello,  and  on  the 
28th  was  back  at  Livingston  in  Tennessee,  having  en- 
tered nearly  a  score  of  towns,  and  captured  more  than  a 


64  THE   CIVIL   WAK 

thousand  prisoners,  besides  destroying  a  vast  amount  of 
military  stores. 

A  few  days  after  Morgan  started  from  Knoxville,  an- 
other noted  Confederate  cavalry  officer,  N.  B.  Forrest, 
Forrest's  sct  out  from  Chattanooga  with  some  two 
first  raid.  thousand  men,  and,  proceeding  by  way  of 
Altamont  and  McMinnville,  surprised  the  garrison  of 
about  a  thousand  men,  commanded  by  General  T.  T. 
Crittenden,  at  Murfreesborough,  and  after  a  few  hours 
of  fighting  captured  the  whole  force. 

BuelFs  direct  connection  with  Nashville  was  thus 
broken,  and  his  projected  advance  upon  Chattanooga 
was  thus  delayed  and  ultimately  frustrated.  It  was  a 
fortnight  before  the  railroad  was  sufficiently  repaired  to 
allow  Buell  to  think  of  resuming  the  forward  move- 
ment. During  this  time  the  Confederates  at  Chatta- 
nooga were  daily  receiving  accessions  to  their  ranks, 
and  were  making  everything  ready  for  an  offensive  cam- 
paign on  their  part. 

Forrest,  who  had  retreated  to  McMinnville  a  few  days 
after  the  capture  of  Murfreesborough,  was  back  again 
on  the  21st  of  July  to  within  five  miles  of  Nashville, 
destroying  railroad  bridges.  Buell  had  sent  General 
Nelson  with  his  division  from  Northern  Alabama  to 
Murfreesborough  to  drive  Forrest  away  from  the  line 
of  communication  with  Nashville.  The  arrival  of  Nel- 
son's forces  in  Murfreesborough  protected  the  line  from 
Nashville  south.  But  Morgan  now  appeared  again  on 
.  the  line  between  Nashville  and  Louisville. 
On  the  12th  of  August,  he  captured  the  gar- 
rison of  two  hundred  men  at  Gallatin,  thirty  miles  from 
Nashville,  on  the  railroad  to  Louisville ;  destroyed  the 
railroad  bridges,  and  blocked  the  long  tunnel  near  the 
place  ;  and  on  the  21st  he  met  the  force  sent  out  to  chas- 
tise him  at  Hartsville,  and  completely  annihilated  it. 


r!!£?.2a?.  j^€M^ 

m    o 


iln^ntucky  and  Tennessee. 


BRAGr/S   IJTVASION   OF   KENTUCKY  65 

About  tlie  same  time  the  garrison  at  Clarksville,  fifty 
miles  below  Nashville  on  the  Cumberland,  was  captured 
by  a  band  of  Confederate  partisans,  who  afterward  raided 
through  Western  Kentucky,  and  even  crossed  the  Ohio 
into  Indiana. 

The  whole  country  in  the  rear  of  BuelFs  long  line 
seemed  to  be  again  in  a  state  of  insurrection.  This  line 
extended  nominally  from  Corinth  to  Cum-      _    ,. 

•'  The  dieposi- 

berland  Gap,  a  distance  of  three  hundred  tionofBueU's 

forc6B> 

miles,  with  its  lines  of  communication  with 
the  North  reaching  back  two  to  three  hundred  miles. 
Eeally,  however,  Buell  had  no  troops  west  of  Tuscum- 
bia  in  Alabama,  or  east  of  McMinnville  in  Tennessee, 
until  Cumberland  Gap  was  reached,  where  General  G. 
W.  Morgan  was  posted  with  a  force  of  some  twelve 
thousand  men. 

At  McMinnville,  which  was  occupied  by  General  Nel- 
son on  August  3d,  there  were  only  a  few  thousand 
soldiers,  until  Thomas  arrived  there  with  his  division, 
about  the  16th.  When  Thomas  relieved  Nelson  here, 
the  latter  was  sent  back  into  Kentucky,  unaccompanied 
by  his  troops,  to  take  command  of  that  whole  district 
and  organize  a  new  force  in  it  for  the  protection  of  the 
country  generally,  and  of  Buell's  lines  of  communica- 
tion in  particular. 

President  Lincoln  had,  on  July  1st  preceding,  called 
for  three  hundred  thousand  new  troops;  and  from  among 
these  chiefly  Nelson  was  to  construct  a  new  y^^^go^  gent 
army  for  the  purpose  mentioned.     Nelson  backintoKen- 

''  .        ■"■   .  lucky,   and 

had  hardly  arrived  in  Kentucky,  however,  Kirby  smith's 
when  he  learned  that  Kirby  Smith  had  suc- 
ceeded in  crossing  the  Cumberland  Mountains  from 
Knoxville,  through  the  defiles  west  of  Cumberland 
Gap,  with  about  ten  thousand  men.  The  right  flank 
of  the  Federal  force  at  Cumberland  Gap  was  thus 
Vol  U.—r, 


66  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

turned,  to  the  great  surprise  of  the  Federals  there  and 
elsewhere.  About  the  2Gth  of  August  the  Confederates 
arrived  at  Barboursville,  which  place  lay  directly  between 
Cumberland  Gap  and  the  base  of  supplies  of  the  army 
there,  which  was  Lexington.  Smith  left  the  garrison  at 
Cumberland  Gap,  however,  for  future  attention,  and 
marched  on  toward  Cincinnati.  He  found  no  Federal 
troops  in  his  way  until  he  approached  Richmond,  a 
place  thirty  miles  south  of  Lexington.  Some  seven 
thousand  Federal  soldiers,  mostly  raw  recruits,  were 
posted  here  under  the  command  of  General  M.  D. 
Manson. 

General  Nelson's  head-quarters  were,  at  the  moment, 
in  Lexington,  and  he  was  subject  to  the  superior  com- 
mand of  General  H.  G,  Wright,  the  commander-in-chief 
of  the  newly  created  Department  of  the  Ohio,  whose 
head-quarters  were  at  Cincinnati.  Wright  had  in- 
structed Nelson  not  to  risk  a  battle  at  Richmond  unless 
sure  of  success,  and  had  suggested  that  he 
Richmond,  retire  the  troops  at  Richmond  behind  the 
Kentucky.  Kentucky  River  in  case  of  the  Confederate 
advance.  At  half-past  two  in  the  morning  of  the  30th, 
Nelson  was  informed  by  Manson  that  the  Confederates 
were  on  his  front,  and  that  he  expected  an  engagement. 
Nelson  immediately  sent  orders  to  Manson  not  to  fight, 
but  to  retreat  westward  toward  Lancaster,  where  he 
expected  to  mass  his  entire  force  consisting  of  about 
sixteen  thousand  men.  Nelson  himself  followed  his 
courier  to  Manson  in  order  to  attend  in  person  to  the 
movement  of  the  troops  from  Richmond. 

When  he  arrived  within  a  few  miles  of  Richmond  he 
heard  the  sounds  of  battle,  and  pressing  on  he  reached 
the  scene  of  action  about  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 
He  found  that  before  his  order  to  retreat  had  reached 
Manson,  the  Confederates  had  delivered  their  attack 


BRAGG'-S   invasion   of   KENTUCKY  67 

upon  the  little  force  at  Richmond,  and  had  at  first 
turned  the  Federal  left  and  then  their  right,  and  had 
driven  the  routed  soldiers  back  into  the  town  in  great 
disorder.  Nelson  came  up  Just  at  this  moment  and  un- 
dertook to  rally  the  fleeing  troops.  His  splendid  pres- 
ence and  courage  checked  them  momentarily,  but  they 
soon  gave  way  again,  thoroughly  panic-stricken  and 
demoralized,  and  left  their  brave  General  almost  alone. 
Only  about  a  thousand  men  of  the  entire  Federal  force 
escaped.  About  two  hundred  were  killed,  nearly  nine 
hundred  were  wounded,  and  over  four  thousand  were 
captured.  Manson  was  taken  prisoner  and  Nelson  him- 
self was  wounded,  but  escaped  capture.  The  Confed- 
erate commander  reported  his  loss  at  some  five  hundred 
killed  and  wounded. 

All  the  Federal  forces  now  retired  to  Louisville  and 
Covington,  and  the  Confederates  advanced  to  Lexing- 
ton, Frankfort,  and  Cynthiana  without  op-  TheConfed- 
position.  They  did  not  however  venture  Ifterthebattie 
to  attack  either  Louisville  or  Covington,  at  Richmond. 
Through  the  energy  of  General  Lew  Wallace,  principally, 
Covington  was  placed  in  such  a  state  of  defence,  that 
when  the  Confederate  General  Heth  approached  it  on 
the  15th  of  September,  he  found  that  he  had  no  pros- 
pect of  taking  the  town,  but  that  his  own  safety  re- 
quired a  hasty  retreat.  He  retired  to  Frankfort,  where 
another  detachment  of  Kirby  Smith's  army  was  now 
awaiting  the  advance  of  Bragg. 

By  the  middle  of  August,  General  Buell  had  about 
given  up  the  hope  of  capturing  Chattanooga.  He  esti- 
mated the  Confederate  force  in  and  around  Bragg's  ad- 
the  place  at  sixty  thousand,  against  which  ^*°*'^- 
he  could  not  bring  more  than  forty  thousand.  His 
chief  thought  now  was  to  prevent  the  Confederates  from 
taking  the   offensive,   and    crossing    the   Cumberland 


68  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

Mountains  into  Middle  Tennessee.  He  thought  that 
Bragg  would  cross  the  mountains  to  Dechard,  and  place 
himself  between  the  two  wings  of  the  Federal  army,  the 
one  at  Huntsville  and  the  other  at  McMinnville,  and 
enable  himself  thus  to  fight  each  separately.  General 
Thomas,  in  command  at  McMinnville,  thought,  on  the 
other  hand,  that  after  crossing  the  first  ridge  of  the 
mountains,  Bragg  would  go  up  the  Sequatchie  Valley, 
turn  the  Federal  left  wing  at  McMinnville,  and  thus 
oblige  the  Federal  troops  to  abandon  North  Alabama 
and  Middle  Tennessee  and  fall  back  into  Kentucky 
without  a  battle. 

Buell  also  recognized  the  possibility  of  such  a  move- 
ment. In  view  of  all  the  exigencies,  he  determined 
finally  to  advance  from  Battle  Creek  up  the  Sequatchie 
Valley,  prevent  the  Confederates  from  crossing  Walden 
Eidge  into  the  Valley,  if  possible,  and  if  Bragg  should, 
nevertheless,  succeed  in  getting  into  the  Valley,  at  least 
be  in  a  position  himself  to  retire  across  the  main  range 
of  the  mountains  to  Altamont,  where  he  could  form  a 
junction  with  Thomas  coming  from  McMinnville. 

On  the  20th  of  August  Buell  ordered  McCook  to  pro- 
ceed up  the  Valley  with  his  division,  and  directed  Crit- 
tenden to  follow  within  supporting  distance.  McCook 
started  at  once,  but  before  reaching  the  point  in  the 
Valley  where  the  road  to  Altamont  branches  off,  he 
received  information  from  scouts  which  led  him  to  con- 
clade  that  the  Confederates  would  be  able  to  cross 
Walden  Ridge  and  come  down  to  the  Altamont  road 
before  he  could  reach  it.  He,  therefore,  fell  back  to 
another  road  lower  down  the  Valley  which  also  led  to 
Altamont,  but  on  reaching  it  found  that  he  could  not 
pass  his  artillery  over  it.  He  finally  went  nearly  back 
to  Battle  Creek,  and  crossed  the  main  range  of  the  Cum- 
berlands  by  a  road  leading  up  from  the  east  bank  of 


BRAGG' S   INVASION   OF   KENTUCKY  69 

Battle  Creek.  Buell,  who  was,  at  the  moment,  at 
Dechard,  now  ordered  McCook  to  march  toward  Alta- 
mont  so  as  to  meet  Thomas.  Thomas  reached  Altamont 
on  the  25th,  but  found  no  sign  of  the  Confederates. 
Lack  of  water  compelled  him  to  return  to  McMinnville. 
McCook  arrived  at  Altamont  on  the  29th,  but  there 
were  still  no  signs  of  the  Confederates,  and  he  also  was 
obliged  to  draw  back  nearer  to  the  depots  of  supplies. 

It  was  now  August  30th  and  Buell  still  did  not  know 
where  Bragg  was,  or  whither  he  was  going.  His  own 
stores  were  running  low,  and  the  railroad  between 
Louisville  and  Nashville,  over  which  they  chiefly  came, 
was  so  far  destroyed  as  to  be  practically  useless.  The 
Confederates  were  simply  waiting  for  the  exhaustion  of 
supplies  to  force  the  retreat  of  BuelFs  army.  They  did 
not  cross  Walden  Ridge  into  the  Sequatchie  Valley  until 
the  28th.  When  they  arrived  in  the  Valley  they  marched 
up  it,  as  Thomas  had  predicted,  to  Pikeville,  and  then 
took  the  road  to  Sparta  around  the  Federal  left  wing  at 
McMinnville. 

Buell  at  last  saw  that  Bragg  was  going  around  his  left 
to  join  Kirby  Smith  in  Kentucky,  and  strike  for  Louis- 
ville and  Covington,  He  at  once  sent  orders  to  all  the 
divisions  of  his  army  to  fall  back  upon  Murfreesborough. 
On  the  5  th  of  September  the  entire  Federal  army  was 
at  and  above  Murfreesborough.  From  there  Buell 
drew  back  to  Nashville,  and  waited  to  learn  that  the 
Confederates  had  crossed  the  upper  Cumberland.  He 
received  this  information  on  the  7th,  and  the  race  for 
Louisville  began.  The  Confederates  were  headed  for 
Glasgow,  a  place  near  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  Eail- 
road,  and  about  thirty  miles  beyond  Bowling  Green 
from  Nashville.  The  Confederates  were  only  fifty  miles 
away  from  their  objective,  while  Buell,  at  Nashville, 
was  ninety-five  miles  away  from  it.     On  the  15th,  Buell's 


70  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

entire  army,  except  the  garrison  left  at  Nashville,  was 
in  Bowling  Green,  and  at  the  same  moment  Bragg's  rear- 
guard  was  leaving  Glasgow.      On  the  next 

The  capture  o  o 

of  Miinford-  day  Bragg  captured  the  Federal  post  at 
Munfordville  on  the  Louisville  and  Nash- 
ville Railroad.  He  took  four  thousand  prisoners,  and 
was  in  possession  of  a  most  important  point  on  the  rail- 
road between  BuelFs  army  and  Louisville.  It  seemed 
now  as  if  nothing  could  prevent  him  from  entering 
Louisville.  A  large  number  of  raw  troops  were  con- 
gregated there,  indeed,  but  Bragg  could  not  have 
considered  them  a  match  for  his  veteran  army  flushed 
with  success.  Nevertheless  he  turned  away  from  this 
rich  prize,  and  on  the  20th  started  his  columns  toward 
Bardstown,  and  left  the  road  to  Louisville  open  for 
Buell's  troops.  Bragg's  explanation  of  his  strange 
movement  was  that  his  supplies  were  exhausted  and 
that  he  must  get  nearer  to  Lexington,  where  Kirby 
Smith  hud  established  new  depots.  He  seemed  also  to 
think  that  a  junction  with  Smith  was  necessary  to  a 
successful  attack  on  Louisville,  and  that  this  could  not 
be  effected  without  moving  his  own  forces  toward  Lex- 
ington. He  instructed  Smith  to  send  supplies  from 
Lexington  to  Bardstown,  and  to  move  the  troops  from 
Lexington  to  Shelbyville  for  co-operation  with  him 
against  Louisville.  But  Smith  had,  before  receiving 
Bragg's  instructions,  sent  the  larger  part  of  his  troops 
eastward  in  search  of  the  Federal  General  G,  W.  Morgan 
and  his  division  of  twelve  thousand  men,  who  had  been 
compelled  by  hunger  to  abandon  Cumberland  Gap,  and 
were  marching  toward  the  Ohio.  This  delayed,  accord- 
ing to  Bragg's  statement,  the  junction  of  his  forces 
with  those  of  Smith  in  front  of  Louisville  so  long  that 
Buell's  army  arrived  in  the  city  before  the  assault  upon 
it  could  be  made.     On  the  29th  Buell's  entire  army  was 


BUAGG'S   invasion   of    KENTUCKY  71 

in  Louisville  and  the  place  was  entirely  secure  against 
the  approach  of  the  Confederates.  Smith's  pursuit 
of  Morgan  was  also  fruitless.  Morgan  eluded  him  and 
reached  the  Ohio  safely  in  the  first  days  of  October. 

The  last  days  of  August  and  the  first  days  of  Septem- 
ber constituted  thus  a  period  of  great  discouragement 
to   the   Union   cause   and  the  Union  arms. 
General   Grant  still   held   the  Corinth  and  ment  at  the 

North 

Memphis  line  and  was  master  of  West  Ten- 
nessee. General  Butler  maintained  a  firm  grasp  upon 
New  Orleans  and  a  large  part  of  Louisiana.  The  points 
along  the  Atlantic  Coast  which  had  been  occupied  were 
also  kept  in  possession,  and  Nashville  remained  an 
isolated  point  in  Federal  hands.  But  beyond  these 
advantages,  the  Federals  had  lost  nearly  everything 
which  they  had  gained  by  their  tremendous  exertions 
in  the  campaign  of  the  winter,  spring  and  summer  of 
1862. 

It  was  under  these  deeply  depressing  circumstances 
that  the  people  of  the  North,  and  Congress  and  the 
President  at  Washington,  were  constrained  to  review 
the  situation,  and  reflect  upon  the  question  of  organizing 
the  friends  of  the  Union  in  greater  and  more  compact 
power,  and  upon  the  question  of  using  that  power 
against  the  most  vulnerable  point  of  the  Confederacy. 
Down  to  that  time  the  conflict  had  been  waged  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  Union  simply  without  regard  to 
the  cause  of  disunion.  It  was  now,  however,  clear  to 
the  minds  of  all  far-seeing  men,  especially  to  the  mind 
of  President  Lincoln,  that  this  deep  cause  must  be  at- 
tacked and  eradicated  before  victory  could  be  won,  union 
vindicated  and  peace  restored.  It  was  during  these 
dark  days  that  the  President  came  to  his  resolution  to 
make  the  war  against  disunion  a  war  against  the  prime 
cause  of  disunion  as  well. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

EMANCIPATION 

The  Republican  Party's  Original  Creed  in  Reference  to  Slavery — 
Mr.  Lincoln's  Attitude  in  1861  toward  Slavery — The  Confisca- 
tion Act  of  August  6.  1861 — Mr.  Lincoln's  Attitude  toward 
this  Act — Fremont's  Proclamation  of  August  30,  1861 — Mr. 
Lincoln's  Disavowal  of  Fremont's  Proclamation  and  the  Effects 
— Mr.  Lincoln  on  Slavery  in  His  First  Annual  Message — Devel- 
opment of  Anti-Slavery  Purposes  in  Congress — The  President's 
Recommendation  of  Compensated  Emancipation — Conference 
between  the  President  and  the  Members  of  Congress  from  the 
Border  "  Slaveholding  States  " — The  Consideration  of  the  Presi- 
dent's Recommendation,  and  the  Bill  for  the  Abolition  of  Sla- 
very in  the  District  of  Columbia  by  Congress — Mr.  Sumner's 
Resolutions  of  February  11,  1862 — Passage  of  the  President's 
Resolution  and  of  the  Bill  Abolishing  Slavery  in  the  District  of 
Columbia — Hunter's  Emancipation  Proclamation — The  Presi- 
dent's Repudiation  of  Hunter's  Proclamation — The  Act  Prohib- 
iting Slavery  in  the  Territories  Present  and  Future — Reply  of 
the  Members  of  Congress  from  the  Border  "  States  "  to  the 
President's  Plan  for  Compensated  Emancipation — The  Presi- 
dent's Idea  of  Emancipation  by  Military  Order — The  Second 
Confiscation  Act— The  Preparation  of  the  Emancipation  Proc- 
lamation— The  Cabinet  and  the  Proclamation — The  Delay  in 
Issuing  the  Proclamation. 

It  must  always  be  remembered  that  the  Republican 

party  was  not  originally  an  Abolition  party,  but  an  An- 

ti-slavery-extension  party,  and  became  grad- 

lican   party's  uallv  an  Abolitiou  party  through  the  experi- 

original  creed  ''  -  •<•  /  i  j     . 

in  reference  to  ences  and  necessities  of  war — of  war  waged  at 
eavery.  ^-^^  outsct  for  the  preservation  of  the  Union 

against  the  attempt  of  the  slaveholders  to  destroy  it. 

72 


EMANCIPATION  73 

The  Chicago  platform  of  I860,  upon  which  Mr.  Lin- 
coln was  elected  President,  guaranteed  the  exclusive 
rights  of  the  "States "in  regard  to  their  domestic  in- 
stitutions, and  impliedly,  if  not  expressly,  classed  sla- 
very within  the  States  as  a  domestic  institution. 

In  his  inaugural  address,  Mr.  Lincoln  declared  :  "  I 
have  no  purpose,  directly  or  indirectly,  to  interfere 
with  the  institution  of  slavery  in  the  States  mt.  Lincoln's 
where  it  exists.  I  believe  I  have  no  lawful  igeVtoward 
right  to  do  so,  and  I  have  no  inclination  to  ^laveiy. 
do  so.  Those  who  nominated  and  elected  me  did  so 
with  full  knowledge  that  I  had  made  this  and  many 
similar  declarations,  and  had  never  recanted  them." 
He  also  declared,  in  this  same  address,  that  he  had  no 
objection  to  the  proposition  which  had  just  passed  both 
Houses  of  Congress  to  so  amend  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  as  to  prohibit  Congress  from  ever  inter- 
fering with  the  domestic  institutions,  slavery  expressly 
included,  of  the  States,  and  as  to  make  this  amendment 
irrevocable  and  unchangeable,  except  by  the  consent  of 
every  "  State,"  since  he  considered  that  this  prohibition 
was  already  by  implication  in  the  Constitution. 

In  his  special  message  of  July  4th  (1861),  he  declared 
that  the  issue  of  the  conflict  forced  upon  the  country  by 
the  secessionists  was  ''immediate  dissolution  or  blood." 
It  was  simply  and  solely  a  war  for  the  maintenance  of  the 
Union  which  he  was  waging,  not  a  war  against  slavery 
where  it  existed.  To  make  this  plain  he  said  :  "  Lest 
there  be  some  uneasiness  in  the  minds  of  candid  men 
as  to  what  is  to  be  the  course  of  the  Government 
toward  the  Southern  States  after  the  rebellion  shall  have 
been  suppressed,  the  Executive  deems  it  proper  to  say 
it  will  be  his  purpose  then,  as  ever,  to  be  guided  by  the 
Constitution  and  the  laws,  and  that  he  probably  will 
have  no   different  understanding   of   the    powers  and 


74  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

duties  of  the  Federal  Government  relatively  to  the 
rights  of  the  States  and  the  people  under  the  Constitu- 
tion than  that  expressed  in  the  inaugural  address.'* 
The  status  of  the  country  had  been  changed  from  peace 
to  war,  between  the  dates  of  tliese  two  utterances,  but  it 
is  evident  that  the  President  had  not  worked  out  in 
his  own  mind  any  change  of  attitude  toward  the  ques- 
tion of  slavery  under  the  changed  conditions.  He  did, 
however,  in  his  cautious  way,  leave  himself  an  opportu- 
nity. He  said,  it  will  be  observed,  that  he  would  prob- 
ably have  no  other  understanding  about  the  powers  and 
duties  of  the  Government  over  against  the  rights  of 
the  States  than  that  which  he  had  expressed  in  the  in- 
augural. It  is  possible,  indeed,  that  he  had  begun  al- 
ready to  feel  the  necessity  for  some  modification  of  his 
original  views,  but  it  is  far  more  likely  that  the  qual- 
ifying word  was  used  from  instinctive  caution  than  any 
definite  reflection. 

There  is  no  question  that  the  great  mass  of  the  party 
coincided  in  opinion  with  the  President  upon  this  all- 
important  subject.  After  the  defeat  at  Bull  Eun,  both 
Houses  of  Congress  passed,  by  an  almost  unanimous 
vote,  a  concurrent  resolution,  offered  by  Mr.  John  J. 
Crittenden  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  by  Mr. 
Andrew  Johnson  in  the  Senate,  which  declared  :  "  That 
the  present  deplorable  civil  war  has  been  forced  upon 
the  country  by  the  di^nionists  of  the  Southern  States 
now  in  revolt  against  the  constitutional  Government,  and 
in  arms  around  the  capital  ;  that  in  this  national  emer- 
gency Congress,  banishing  all  feelings  of  mere  passion 
or  resentment,  will  recollect  only  its  duty  to  the  whole 
country  ;  that  this  war  is  not  waged  on  their  part  in 
any  spirit  of  oppression,  or  for  any  purpose  of  conquest 
or  subjugation,  or  purpose  of  overthrowing  or  inter- 
fering with  the  rights  or  established  institutions  of  those 


EMANCIPATION  7o 

States,  but  to  defend  and  maintain  the  supremacy  of 
the  Constitution,  and  to  preserve  the  Union  with  all  the 
dignity,  equality,  and  rights  of  the  several  States  un- 
impaired ;  that  as  soon  as  these  objects  are  accomplished 
the  war  ought  to  cease." 

At  the  very  time,  however,  when  Congress  voted  this 
resolution,  the  end  of  July,  the  Houses  were  maturing 
the  Confiscation  Act  of  the  6th  of  August  The  Confls- 
(1861),  which  presaged,  if  it  did  not  dis-  TngiAf  ef 
tinctly  announce,  the  approaching  change  of  i^^^- 
view  concerning  the  relations  of  the  war  to  slavery. 
The  fourth  section  of  this  Act  pronounced  the  forfeiture 
of  property  in  any  slave  who  should  be  required  or  per- 
mitted by  his  master,  or  his  master's  lawful  agent,  to 
bear  arms  against  the  United  States,  or  to  do  any  labor 
in  or  upon  "any  fort,  navy-yard,  dock,  armory,  ship, 
intrenchment,"  or  "any  military  or  naval  service  what- 
ever, against  the  Government  and  lawful  authority  of 
the  United  States." 

This  section  was  not  in  the  bill  when  reported  from 
the  Judiciary  committee  to  the  Senate,  but  was  placed 
in  it  as  an  amendment,  because  of  the  discovery,  after 
the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  that  the  Confederates  were  making 
use  of  negro  slaves  to  construct  their  fortifications,  drive 
their  wagons,  do  their  cooking,  etc.  These  slaves  were 
thus  being  made  a  munition  of  war,  so  to  speak,  and 
Congress  now  affirmed  as  to  such  slaves  General  Butler's 
doctrine  that  they  were  "contraband  of  war."  It  is 
certainly  true  that  Congress  did  not  intend  this  as  an 
emancipation  measure,  although  the  Republicans  were 
accused  of  entertaining  this  purpose.  Mr.  Lincoln 
himself  was  not  pleased  with  the  measure,  Mr.  lj^. 
although  he  felt  constrained  to  sign  it.  He  toward**fhf8 
greatly  feared  that  it  would  alienate  the  bor-  »<='• 
der  "  slaveholding  States  "  from  his  administration,  a 


76  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

result  which  he  was  at  this  time  making  most  strenuous 
efforts  to  avoid.  He  wanted  Congress  to  refrain  from 
meddling  with  the  slavery  question,  and  trust  him,  as 
having  the  more  commanding  point  of  view,  to  fix  the 
attitude  of  the  Government  toward  the  subject. 

Entertaining  such  ideas  and  moved  by  such  feelings, 
it  must  have  been  highly  disturbing  to  the  President's 
Fremont's  ^^^^^  that  oue  of  liis  military  subordinates, 
o/auS"'o?   General  Fremont,  then  in  command  of  the 
1861.  Department  of  the  West,  should  assume,  on 

August  30th  (1861),  to  issue  a  proclamation  declaring  the 
property  of  all  persons  in  the  "  State  "  of  Missouri  who 
should  take  up  arms  against  the  United  States  or  take 
an  active  part  with  the  enemies  of  the  United  States  in 
the  field  to  be  confiscated,  and  their  slaves,  if  they  held 
any,  to  be  emancipated.  It  will  be  remembered  that, 
at  that  time,  Fremont's  command  had  suffered  severe 
reverses  in  South-western  Missouri,  and  that  Fremont 
was  an  ambitious  politician  as  well  as  a  soldier.  Some 
of  Mr.  Lincoln's  closest  friends  thought  that  Fremont 
had  a  double  purpose  in  issuing  this  manifesto,  viz., 
to  efface  from  the  public  mind  the  impressions 
of  his  military  failure,  and  to  make  himself  the 
leader  of  the  more  pronounced  anti-slavery  wing  of  the 
Republican  party.  AVhether  Mr.  Lincoln  himself  shared 
this  view,  we  do  not  know.  From  what  he  said  and 
wrote  about  it  at  the  time,  it  would  seem  that  he  was 
thinking  only  of  the  effect  of  it  upon  his  plans  for  hold- 
ing the  border  slaveholding  Commonwealths  loyal  to 
the  Union.  He  wrote  to  General  Fremont  himself 
under  date  of  September  2d  :  "I  think  there  is  great 
danger  that  the  closing  paragraph,  in  relation  to  the 
confiscation  of  property  and  liberating  slaves  of  trai- 
torous owners,  will  alarm  our  Southern  Union  friends 
and  tuin  them  against  us  ;  perhaps  ruin  our  rather  fair 


EMANCIPATION  77 

prospect  for  Kentucky.  Allow  me,  therefore,  to  ask 
that  you  will,  as  of  your  own  motion,  modify  that  para- 
graph so  as  to  conform  to  the  first  and  fourth  sections 
of  the  Act  of  Congress  entitled  '  An  Act  to  confiscate 
property  used  for  insurrectionary  purposes,'  approved 
August  6,  1861,  and  a  copy  of  which  I  herewith  send 
you."  This  language  does  not  reveal  any  suspicion  on 
the  part  of  Mr.  Lincoln  that  Fremont  was  endeavoring 
to  cover  up  military  failures  with  political  pronuncia- 
mentos,  or  any  jealousy  of  Fremont  as  a  possible  political 
rival,  and  had  Fremont  listened  to  the  kind  admoni- 
tion, and  yielded  to  the  courteous  request,  it  is  probable 
that  his  proclamation  would  have  been  attributed  to 
hasty  and  imprudent  zeal ;  but  he  refused  the  President's 
request,  and  required  the  President  to  disavow  and  re- 
pudiate the  proclamation  by  an  order  of  his  own.  This 
the  President  did  with  promptness  and  decision  by  an 
order  issued  September  11th  (1861),  in  which  Fremont 
was  commanded  to  so  modify  and  construe  his  proclama- 
tion "  as  to  conform  to,  and  not  to  transcend,  the  provi- 
sions on  the  same  subject,"  in  the  Confiscation  Act  of 
August  6th. 

The  effect  of  this  episode  was  not  only  to  make  the 
Abolitionists  more  hostile  toward  the  President,  but  to 
excite  some  of  the  President's  own  party  Mr.  Lin- 
friends  to  criticise  the  action  of  their  chief.  avo°w\1'of 
But  Mr.  Lincoln  saw  correctly  that  the  time  p/oc™mSlon 
had  not  yet  come  for  a  pronounced  anti-  anditseffecta. 
slavery  policy  on  the  part  of  the  Government.  More- 
over he  was  still  under  the  influence  of  the  assurances 
given  both  by  himself  and  Congress  that  the  war  was 
waged  solely  for  the  preservation  of  the  Union,  and  was 
not  a  war  against  slavery.  Both  political  prudence  and 
sense  of  honor  prompted  his  attitude  at  tliis  juncture, 
even  though  many  of  his  party  friends  were  beginning 


78  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

to  feel  that  a  war  for  the  Union  must  be  at  the  same 
time  a  war  against  slavery. 

In  his  first  annual  message,  that  of  December  3d, 
1861,  the  President  advocated  the  recognition  of  the  in- 
Mr.  Lincoln  dependence  of  Hayti  and  Liberia,  referred  to 
h^8*fl^ttVn°  the  successful  efforts  which  the  Government 
nuai  message,  -^^^as  making  for  the  suppression  of  the  Afri- 
can slave-trade,  and  recommended  that  Congress  should 
make  provision  for  the  colonization  of  slaves  made  free 
by  the  operation  of  the  Confiscation  Act  of  August  6th, 
preceding,  and  of  such  other  like  measures  as  might  be 
passed  by  Congress,  or  the  legislatures  of  the  Common- 
wealths. He  said,  however,  that  he  had  "thought  it 
proper  to  keep  the  integrity  of  the  Union  prominent  as 
the  primary  object  of  the  contest,"  on  the  part  of  the 
Administration,  ''leaving  all  questions  which  are  not 
of  vital  military  importance  to  the  more  deliberate 
action  of  the  Legislature,'*  i.e.,  Congress. 

Whether  the  members  of  Congress  were  incited  by 
this  language  to  assume  a  more  hostile  attitude  toward 
Deveio  slavery  or  not  would  be  only  a  conjecture, 
ment  of  anti-  but  it  is  historical  fact  that  some  of  them 
poses  in  Con-  began  almost  immediately  to  develop  an 
^'^^^'  anti-slavery    program.     During   the   month 

of  December,  bills  were  introduced  for  the  repeal 
or  modification  of  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law,  and  for 
the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia. 

Before,  however,  much  discussion  upon  these  propo- 
sitions had  taken  place,  the  President  sent  in  to  Congress 
^     „        liis  noted  message  of  March  6,  1862,  recom- 

The    Presi-  , .  °  .  , 

dent's  recom-  mending  a  measure  of  compensated  emanci- 
compensated  pation  in  the  "  Slave  States."  The  President 
emancipation.  ^-^   ^^^  assume  the  power  to  be  either  in 

the  Executive  or  in  Congress  to  proceed  in  this 
matter  independently  of  the  "States"  concerned.      He 


.  EMANCIPATION  79 

put  his  recommendation  into  the  form  of  a  resolution 
himself,  in  order  to  avoid  any  misconception  upon  this 
point.  It  read  as  follows:  "Resolved:  That  the  United 
States  ought  to  co-operate  with  any  State  which  may 
adopt  gradual  abolishment  of  slavery,  giving  to  such 
State  pecuniary  aid,  to  be  used  by  such  State,  in  its  dis- 
cretion, to  compensate  for  the  inconveniences,  public 
and  private,  produced  by  such  change  of  system." 

Although  this  language  was  so  general  as  to  apply  to 
all  the  "  slaveholding  States,"  yet  from  what  follows  in 
the  message  it  is  evident  that  the  object  in  the  mind  of 
the  President  was  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  border 
'*  slaveholding  States,"  those  which  had  not  passed 
secession  ordinances,  and  that  the  main  purpose 
which  had  occasioned  the  making  of  this  proposition 
was  the  extinguishment  of  the  hope,  entertained  by  the 
Confederates,  that  the  interest  in  the  perpetuation  of 
slavery  would  at  last  bring  these  border  "  slaveholding 
States  "  into  the  Confederacy.  The  President  said,  "  to 
deprive  them  of  this  hope  substantially  ends  the  rebel- 
lion ;  and  the  initiation  of  emancipation  deprives 
them  of  it  as  to  all  the  States  initiating  it."  The 
President  made  it  thus  evident  that  he  was  beginning 
to  understand  that  the  permanent  loyalty  of  the  border 
"  slaveholding  States"  would  depend  upon  the  abolition 
of  slavery  in  them,  and  that  the  overthrow  of  the 
Southern  Confederacy  would  depend  upon  the  same 
thing.  Down  to  that  time  he  had  appeared  to  think 
that  by  sparing  slavery  in  the  "border  States,"  he 
would  keep  them  loyal,  but  now  he  manifestly  saw 
deeper,  and  had  been  convinced  by  experience  that  his 
first  principle,  enunciated  nearly  four  years  back,  was 
correct  and  necessary,  namely,  that  the  Union  in  order 
to  be  permanent  must  be  either  all  slave  or  all  free. 
The  re-enlivening  of  this  thought  in  his  mind  presaged 


80  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

the  turning  of  the  war  against  slavery  as  the  root  of 
disunion. 

Four  days  subsequent  to  the  sending  in  of  this  mes- 
sage, the  President  called  the  members  of  Congress  from 
Conference  ^^®  "border  slaveliolding  States"  to  the  Ex- 
between  the  ecutive  Mausion  for  the  purpose  of  confer- 

Presideut  and  .  '■        '- 

the  members  ring  With  them  in  reference  to  the  subject  of 
from  the  bor-  the  message.  He  told  them  how  deeply  em- 
h^idin'g  barrassed  his  Administration  was  by  the 
states."  necessary  contact  of  the  army  in  the  field 

with  slaves  in  these  "  States."  He  said  that 
the  slaves  would  continually  come  into  the  camps, 
and  raise  the  question,  at  every  point  and  moment,  as  to 
what  should  be  done  with  them,  and  that  whatever  way 
the  question  was  determined,  a  large  number  of  the  loyal 
people  of  the  Union  were  offended  and  irritated.  He 
also  repeated  the  argument,  contained  ia  the  message, 
that  emancipation  in  the  "border  slaveliolding  States" 
would  strike  down  the  hope  of  the  Confederates  of  some 
time  attaching  those  "  States  "  to  their  Confederacy,  and 
would  thus  contribute  most  largely  to  a  speedy  termina- 
tion of  the  war  in  favor  of  the  Union.  He,  furthermore, 
declared,  in  answer  to  a  question,  that  he  thought  there 
was  no  power  anywhere,  except  in  the  "  States  "  them- 
selves, to  carry  out  his  scheme  of  emancipation. 

Without  revealing  at  all  their  feelings  in  regard  to  the 
proposition,  but  assuring  the  President  that  they  would 
consider  respectfully  the  important  suggestions  he  had 
made,  the  gentlemen  withdrew  from  his  presence. 

The  debate  in  Congress  upon  the  President's  proposi- 
tion proceeded  at  the  same  time  with  the  consideration 
of  the  bill  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District  of 
Columbia.  The  President's  proposition  was  evidently 
somewhat  prejudiced  by  the  bill.  Mr.  Willey,  one  of 
the  senators  from  Virginia,  declared  that  the  bill  was 


-   EMANCIPATION  81 

one  of  a  series  of  measures,  which  looked  to  "the  uni- 
versal abolition  of  slavery  by  Congress."  He  designated 
as  the  other  measures  of  the  series  Mr,  Trum-  .j^^  po^gj^. 
bull's  bill,  of  January  15th  preceding,  to  preg^^^enj!® 
confiscate  the  property  and  free  the  slaves  of  recommenda- 
rebels,  and  Mr.  Sumner's  proposed  resolution  bm  'for  the 
of  February  11th  "declaratory  of  the  rela-  slavery  in  the 
tions  between  the  United  States  and  the  terri-  lu^^bu  by 
tory  once  occupied  by  certain  States  and  now  Congress, 
usurped  by  pretended  governments,  without  constitu- 
tional or  legal  right." 

These  resolutions  maintained  that  by  passing  ordi- 
nances of  secession,  and  undertaking  their  forcible  ex- 
ecution, local  governmental  autonomy,  Mr.  sum- 
" State"  organization,  was,  in  the  political  ^f^l  opFeb- 
system  of  the  United  States,  extinguished,  riaxyii,  i862. 
and  the  territorial  condition  under  the  exclusive  jurisdic- 
tion of  Congress  was  restored.  This  is  certainly  sound 
political  science,  and  if  Mr.  Sumner  had  based  upon 
this  doctrine  the  constitutional  power  of  Congress  to 
abolish  slavery  by  an  ordinary  statute  in  those  parts  of 
the  territory  of  the  United  States  where  secession  ordi- 
nances had  been  passed  and  sustained  by  force,  it  would 
have  been  very  difficult  indeed  to  meet  successfully 
his  contention.  But  he  went  beyond  this,  and  asserted 
that  the  termination  of  the  "  State  "  organization  within 
a  given  part  of  the  territory  of  the  United  States  "  nec- 
essarily causes  the  termination  of  those  peculiar  local 
institutions  which,  having  no  origin  in  the  Constitution 
or  in  natural  rights,  are  upheld  by  the  sole  and  exclu- 
sive authority  of  the  State."  In  other  words,  he  asked 
Congress  to  declare  that  slavery  had  been  already  abol- 
ished in  that  part  of  the  territory  of  the  Union  where 
secession  ordinances  had  been  passed  and  forcibly  sus- 
tained, and  by  virtue  of  these  very  acts.  Congress  was 
Vol.  II.— 6 


82  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

not  prepared  to  accept  the  first  part  of  his  proposition  ; 
and  the  second  part  was  out  of  the  question. 

Despite  these  and  all  other  obstacles  and  objections, 
however,  both  the  President's  resolution  and  the  bill 
PasBage  of  abolishing  slavery  in  the  District  of  Co- 
resoimion^and  lumbia  were  passed  by  both  Houses  of  Con- 
aboHshi^ng  g^ess  before  the  middle  of  April.  The  latter 
Dfe^rict  of  Co^-  ^*^^  Contained  provisions  for  the  compensa- 
lumbia.  tiou  of  loyal  owncrs  at  the  maximum    rate 

of  three  hundred  dollars  for  each  slave,  and  for  the 
colonization  in  Hayti  and  Liberia  of  such  emancipated 
slaves  as  might  desii'e  to  go  to  either  of  these  places, 
at  a  cost  of  not  more  than  one  hundred  dollars  for  each 
person.  The  President  signed  this  act  on  the  16th 
of  April,  but  not  with  entire  cordiality.  He  suggested 
a  few  amendments  to  it,  which  were  immediately  adopted 
by  Congress,  but  he  still  felt  that  it  might  affect  unfa- 
vorably his  policy  in  regard  to  the  border  slaveholding 
Commonwealths. 

Disturbed  in  mind,  as  the  President  evidently  was, 

over  the  whole  subject,  it  is  not  at  all  surprising  that  he 

should  have  manifested  some  impatience,  not 

Hunter's    ,  i  •         i  -tti        »    t.«- 

e  mancipation  to  Say  anger,  wlien,  in  the  middle  of  May, 
proc  ama  ion.  j^g^g  j-gad^ed  him  that  General  David  Hun- 
ter, the  commanding  General  of  what  was  called  the 
Department  of  the  South,  the  district  about  Port  Royal 
in  South  Carolina  and  Georgia,  had  issued  a  proclama- 
tion declaring  the  incompatibility  of  the  martial  law  of 
the  United  States  with  slavery,  and  the  consequent 
emancipation  of  the  persons  theretofore  held  as  slaves  in 
South  Carolina,  Georgia  and  Florida.  There  was,  no 
doubt,  much  justification  for  this  act  of  the  General. 
He  had  some  ten  thousand  negroes  in  his  Department, 
who  had  been  deserted  by  their  masters,  and  who  were 
practically  dependent  upon  the  United  States  Govern- 


-      EMANCIPATION  83 

ment  for  employment  and  support.  By  the  act  of  March 
13th  preceding,  Congress  had  forbidden  the  officers  of 
the  army  and  navy,  and  all  other  persons  in  either,  to 
return  escaped  slaves  to  their  masters.  This  certainly 
covered  the  case  of  slaves  left  within  the  lines  of  the 
United  States  army  by  disloyal  masters  fleeing  before 
the  approach  of  the  army.  General  Hunter  could  not 
thus  send  these  negroes  beyond  his  lines  to  their  former 
masters.  He  could  not  hold  them  as  the  property  of 
the  United  States,  because  the  laws  of  the  United  States 
did  not  allow  any  such  property  to  be  held  by  the 
United  Stated.  They  were,  as  a  fact,  free  men,  and  the 
General  was  only  announcing  a  fact  when  he  proclaimed 
them  to  be  such. 

But  the  President,  despite  the  solicitations  of  some 
of  his  advisers  to  let  the  order  of  General  Hunter  stand, 
revoked  and  repudiated  it.  In  doing  so,  fm,  ptp  • 
however,  the  President  sounded  a  note  of  dent'srepu- 
warning  to  the  slaveholders  both  in  the  Hunter'sproc- 
Southern  Confederacy  and  in  the  border  *™* 
slaveholding  Commonwealths.  He  said,  in  his  procla- 
mation, "  I  further  make  it  known  that  whether  it  be 
competent  for  me,  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Army 
and  Navy,  to  declare  the  slaves  of  any  State  or  States 
free,  and  whether  at  any  time,  in  any  case,  it  shall  have 
become  a  necessity  indispensable  to  the  maintenance  of 
the  Government  to  exercise  such  a  supposed  power,  are 
questions  which,  under  my  responsibility,  1  reserve  to 
myself,  and  which  I  cannot  feel  justified  in  leaving  to 
the  decision  of  commanders  in  the  field."  He  concluded 
by  urging  the  people  of  the  border  slaveholding  Com- 
monwealths not  to  be  blind  to  the  signs  of  the  time,  but 
to  consider  calmly  and  impartially  the  resolution  of  Con- 
gress proposing  the  co-operation  of  the  Government  in 
the  emancipation  of  the  slaves  in  these  Commonwealths. 


84  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

The  Cougressional  members  from  these  Common- 
wealths still,  however,  remained  silent  in  regard  to  the 
proposition,  despite  the  fact  that  the  signs  referred  to 
by  the  President  continued  to  multiply. 

In  the  following  month  (June)  the  great  step  was 
taken  by  the  Government  of  prohibiting  slavery  in  all 
The  Act  pro-  the  Territories  of  the  United  States,  and  in 
ve^"\'if  th*e  ^1^  territory  which  might  be  acquired  by  the 
Jree'en7ind  United  States  in  the  future.  This  important 
future.  act,  approved  June  19th,  was  the  realization 

of  the  prime  article  of  the  creed  of  the  Republican 
party. 

On  the  12th  of  July,  Mr.  Lincoln,  in  anticipation  of 

the  adjournment  of  Congress,  caused  the  members  from 

„    ,    ^,^     the  border  slaveholding  Commonwealths  to 

Reply  of  the  •         t.  ^        •  t    • 

members    of  assemble  at  the  Executive  Mansion,  and  in 

CongreBsfrom  .  j  j 

the     border  the  most  solemn  and  impressive  words  and 

"  states  "to  ,  J.1  X  •  J  J. 

the  President's  manner  urged  upon  them  to  consider  earnest- 
p  eV^a^tTd  ly  the  message  and  resolution  in  regard  to 
emancipation,  compensated  emancipation,  and  to  commend 
the  propositions  contained  therein  to  the  consideration 
of  their  constituents.  Four  written  replies  were  received 
by  the  President  to  this  address.  One  signed  by  twenty 
of  the  persons  addressed,  one  signed  by  seven,  one  signed 
by  Mr.  Horace  Maynard  of  Tennessee  alone,  and  one 
signed  by  Mr.  John  B.  Henderson  of  Missouri  alone. 
The  last  three  contained  expressions  of  strong  sympathy 
with  the  President's  plan,  and  generous  promises  of 
cordial  co-operation.  The  first,  on  the  other  hand, 
presented  an  opinion  in  regard  to  the  causes  of  the 
continuation  of  the  rebellion,  and  a  proposition  that 
Congress  should  provide  the  necessary  funds,  and  place 
them  at  the  disposal  of  the  President,  to  carry  out 
its  resolution  concerning  compensated  emancipation, 
as  a  condition  precedent  to  the  consideration  of  the 


EMANCIPATION  85 

President's   project    by   themselves  and   their   constit- 
uents. 

This  happened  on  the  14th  of  July,  and  from  tliis 
moment  forward  it  was  evident  to  the  President  that 
the   plan   developed   in  his  March  message  . 

must  be  abandoned.  In  fact  the  President  dent's  idea  of 
had  already  anticipated  this  result,  and,  the  b  y  military 
day  before  he  received  this  reply,  had  im- 
parted to  two  members  of  his  Cabinet,  Mr.  Seward  and 
Mr.  Welles,  his  thought  of  a  military  proclamation  of 
emancipation. 

On  the  17th  of  July,  the  President  signed  the  second 
Confiscation  Act,  which  provided,  among  other  things, 
for  the  emancipation  of  the  slaves  of  traitors 
and  rebels  against  the  United  States  and  of  confiscation 
those  of  their  abettors,  and  for  the  employ-  **''" 
ment  of  such  freedmen  in  the  suppression  of  the  rebel- 
lion as  the  President  might  order  and  direct. 

Four  days  after  this,  the  President  called  the  Cabinet 
together  to  consider  some  military  orders  in  regard  to 
the  employment  of  freedmen,  in  the  service  J.^^^  prepa- 
of  the  United   States,    as  authorized    and  ^^^°^  P*  t*^e 

'  emancipation 

provided  in  the  Confiscation  Act.  The  dis-  proclamation, 
cussion  of  the  subject  lasted  through  the  meeting  and 
was  resumed  the  next  day.  It  was  at  this  juncture  that 
the  President  drew  forth  and  read  to  the  Cabinet  the 
famous  first  draft  of  the  Emancipation  Proclamation. 
It  began  with  a  warning  to  all  persons  participating  in 
the  rebellion  to  desist  forthwith  "  on  pain  of  the  for- 
feitures and  seizures  "  provided  in  the  Confiscation  Act. 
It  then  gave  notice  of  the  intention  of  the  President  to 
again  recommend  to  Congress  a  practical  measure  for 
co-operating  with  the  Commonwealths  in  effecting  com- 
pensated emancipation,  and  it  closed  with  the  declaration 
that  "  as  a  fit  and  necessary  military  measure  for  effect- 


86  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

ing  this  object "  (the  restoration  of  the  constitutional 
relations  between  the  general  Government  and  the 
Commonwealths)  "I,  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Army  and  Navy  of  the  United  States,  do  order  and  de- 
clare that  on  the  first  day  of  January,  in  the  year  of  our 
Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  sixty-three,  all 
persons  held  as  slaves  within  any  State  or  States  wherein 
the  constitutional  authority  of  the  United  States  shall 
not  then  be  practically  recognized,  submitted  to,  and 
maintained,  shall  then,  thenceforward,  and  forever  be 
free." 

With  the  exception  of  the  two  members  to  whom  the 
President  had  indicated  his  intention  the  preceding 
week,  the  Cabinet  officers  were  taken  by  surprise.  They 
thought  that  Mr.  Lincoln  had  committed  himself,  in 
his  different  acts  and  expressions,  to  a  policy  which 
practically  ignored  the  existence  of  slavery  in  the 
struggle  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Union,  and  to  the 
doctrine  that  when,  incidentally,  slavery  had  to  be  dealt 
with  in  principle,  the  power  to  deal  with  it  belonged  to 
Congress.  They  were,  doubtless,  still  laboring  under 
the  impressions  made  upon  them  by  the  inaugural  mes- 
sage and  by  the  correspondence  with  Fremont.  They 
had  not  sufficiently  observed  that  during  the  three 
months  immediately  preceding,  the  President  had  been 
working  out  in  his  own  mind  the  principle  and  the 
extent  of  the  war  powers  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  army  and  navy  of  the  Union.  The  proposition 
may,  indeed,  be  hazarded  that  Mr.  Lincoln  himself  did 
not  appreciate  the  scope  of  these  powers  until  taught 
by  the  actual  necessities  of  the  disastrous  campaign  of 
McClellan  in  front  of  Kichmond, 

At  first  only  two  members  of  the  Cabinet  approved 
his  purpose.  Bates  and  Stanton.  The  others  raised  ob- 
jections.    The  considerations  which  they  urged  against 


EMANCIPATION  87 

it  had,  however,  been  already  anticipated  in  the  mind 
of  the  President,  and  disposed  of  to  his  own  satisfaction. 
At  last  Seward  declared  that  he  approved  of 
the  plan  in  principle,  but  thought  that  the  and  the  Proc- 
proclamation  would  be  effective  only  after  a  *™**'°°- 
victory  in  the  field.  Lincoln,  who  was  so  often  pre- 
served against  unwise  action  and  words  by  his  keen 
sense  of  the  ridiculous,  detected  at  once  the  soundness 
of  Seward's  advice,  and  concluded  to  defer  the  issue  of 
the  proclamation  until  a  military  success  would  give  it 
the  proper  weight. 

He  gave  out  only  that  part  of  it  which  related  to  the 
warning  of  those  in  rebellion  to  desist,  on  pain  of  the 
forfeitures  and  seizures  provided  in  the 
recent  Confiscation  Act.  This  was  done  on  isBuinV^the 
the  25th  of  July,  and  the  President  was  P'^^^''^^^"""- 
doomed  to  pass  through  many  anxious  days  before  the 
proper  psychological  moment  was  reached  for  announcing 
the  other  part  of  his  great  project. 

The  month  of  August  wore  away,  as  we  have  seen, 
under  conditions  of  great  discouragement.  And  the 
first  days  of  September  gave  no  promise  that  the  great 
deed  contemplated  by  the  President  was  approaching 
execution.  The  Confederates  were  actually  crossing 
the  Potomac  and  pushing  the  war  into  loyal  territory. 
The  issue  of  the  Emancipation  Proclamation,  at  such  a 
moment,  would  certainly  have  been  considered,  as  Mr. 
Seward  said,  "  the  last  shriek  of  retreat." 

But  the  dawn  of  a  better  day  was  approaching,  de- 
spite the  oppressive  darkness  which  enveloped  the  souls 
of  loyal  men.  McClellan  had  been  restored  to  the 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  was  again 
devoting  his  great  genius  for  organization  to  putting 
it  in  shape  for  another  trial  of  strength.  Recruits  and 
material  were  being  sent  forward  from  all   points  to 


88  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

the  front.  And  before  the  first  half  of  the  month  had 
passed,  a  vast  host  of  more  than  one  hundred  thousand 
well-armed,  well-drilled  and  well-provisioned  men  were 
ready  to  advance  against  the  invaders  of  the  loyal 
North. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

ANTIETAM 

The  Confederate  Invasion  of  Maryland — The  Federal  Pursuit — 
Lee's  Order  for  the  Campaign — McClellan's  Plan— The  Battle 
at  Crampton's  Pass,  and  Turner's  Gap  or  South  Mountain — 
The  Capture  of  Harper's  Ferry  by  the  Confederates — McClel- 
lan's Advance  to  Antietam — The  Battle  Delayed  by  McClellan 
—McClellan's  Plan  of  Battle— The  Battle  of  Antietam— The 
Losses— Retreat  of  the  Confederates. 

McCLELLAJf  immediately  upon  resuming  command 
made  such  a  strong  disposition  of  the  troops  in  front  of 
Washington  that  the  Confederates  abandoned  The  c  on- 
all  idea  of  attack,  if  they  had  ever  enter-  ffotTS: 
tained  any,  and  on  the  third  of  the  month  '^°'^- 
(September)  turned  the  heads  of  their  victorious  col- 
umns up  the  Potomac.  McClellan  at  once  divined  their 
purpose  of  crossing  by  the  upper  fords  of  the  river,  and 
invading  Western  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania.  He, 
therefore,  after  making  the  necessary  ar-  The  Federal 
rangements  for  the  defence  of  the  capital,  P^smt. 
and  placing  the  command  of  the  garrison  in  the  hands 
of  General  Banks,  began  moving  the  main  body  of  his 
army  up  the  north  bank  of  the  river  toward  Frederick. 
McClellan  left  Washington  himself  on  the  7th.  He 
knew  then  that  the  Confederates  had  passed  up  the 
south  side  of  the  river  to  Leesburg,  and  that  some  de- 
tachments of  them  had  already  crossed  over  into  Mary- 
land. He  did  not  know,  however,  whether  their  im- 
mediate purpose  was  to   strike   at  Washington   or    at 

8y 


90  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

Baltimore,  or  to  advance  into  Pennsylvania.  He  felt, 
therefore,  obliged  to  move  his  army  in  such  a  way  as  to 
cover  both  Washington  and  Baltimore,  that  is,  while 
keeping  his  left  near  the  river,  to  throw  his  right  well 
back  to  the  eastward.  He  operated  under  this  uncer- 
tainty until  the  13th,  when  a  copy  of  General  Lee's 
order  for  the  campaign  fell  into  his  hands,  and  enabled 
him  to  make  disposition  of  his  forces  with  some  cer- 
tainty as  to  the  plans  of  his  enemy. 

The  order  was  dated  from  the  head-quarters  of  Lee's 

army  near  Frederick,  September  9th,  and  it  directed 

General  T.  J.  Jackson  to  go  to  Sharpsburg, 

Lee's   order  r  o' 

for  the  cam-  cross  the  Potomac  just  back  of  that  place, 
^*'^"  advance  on  Martinsburg,  seize  the  Baltimore 

and  Ohio  Railroad  at  that  place,  and  shut  the  Union 
forces  at  Harper's  Ferry  off  from  escape  in  that  direction. 
It  directed  General  McLaws  to  go,  via  Middletown,  to 
Maryland  Heights,  and  from  this  point  to  attack  Har- 
per's Ferry.  It  directed  General  Walker  to  cross  the 
Potomac  at  Cheek's  Ford,  and  occupy  Loudoun  Heights 
overhanging  Harper's  Ferry  on  the  south  side  of  the 
river,  simultaneously  with  the  movement  of  McLaws. 
It  directed  General  Longstreet,  with  the  main  body  of 
the  Confederate  army,  to  go  to  Boonsboro,  and  halt  there. 
It  directed  General  D.  H.  Hill  to  follow  Longstreet 
as  the  rear-guard.  And  finally,  it  directed  Jackson, 
McLaws  and  Walker,  after  the  capture  of  Harper's 
Ferry,  to  join  the  main  body  at  Boonsboro  or  Hagers- 
town. 

McClellan  now  knew  that  Lee  had  divided  his  army 
into  two  very  nearly  equal  parts,  and  had  separated 
them  widely  from  each  other,  and  had  subdivided  one 
of  these  parts  into  three  parts,  and  had  separated  each 
of  these  from  the  others.  He  saw  that  he  could  now 
throw  his  whole  force  of  near  one  hundred  thousand 


ANTIETAM  91 

men  against  Longstreet  and  Hill,  and  crash  them  before 
the  others  could  join  them. 

McClellan  immediately  sent  the  whole  of  Burnside's 
command,  and  the  corps  of  Sumner,  Hooker  and  Mans- 
field after  the  enemy  at  Boonsboro,  and  or-  Mccieiian's 
dered  Franklin's  corps,  supported  by  Couch's  p^*"^- 
division,  to  advance  through  Jefferson  and  Burkittsville 
against  the  rear  of  McLaws's  troops  to  relieve  Harper's 
Ferry.  In  execution  of  these  movements,  Franklin, 
who  had  reached  Burkittsville,  in  front  of  Cramp- 
ton's  Pass  through  the  Blue  Ridge,  about  The  battles 
noon  of  the  14th,  found  himself  confronted  Pass'^'^^apd 
by  a  strong  force  of  Confederates,  who  dis-  J ^^^^s  o  ^t"^ 
puted  his  further  advance.  In  a  brilliant  Mountain, 
action  of  some  three  hours'  length,  Franklin  carried  the 
position,  with  a  loss  of  something  over  five  hundred 
men. 

At  the  same  time  the  main  body  of  the  army,  led  by 
Burnside  and  Eeno,  met  the  enemy  at  Turner's  Gap  in 
the  Blue  Ridge,  some  six  or  seven  miles  north  of  Cramp- 
ton's.  The  Confederates  fought  with  great  energy  to 
hold  the  Pass,  but  in  a  severe  battle,  lasting  from  the 
middle  of  the  afternoon  until  about  nine  o'clock  in  the 
evening,  the  Union  forces  inflicted  such  a  blow  upon  them 
as  to  cause  the  Confederates  to  abandon  the  Pass  during 
the  night.  This  is  called  the  battle  of  South  Mountain 
in  the  reports.  In  it  the  Union  loss  was  about  sixteen 
hundred  men  killed  and  wounded.  The  loss  of  the  Con- 
federates was,  perhaps,  a  little  less. 

It  seemed  now  that  McClellan  would  be  able  to  at- 
tain his  purpose  of  liberating  the  garrison  at  Harper's 
Ferry,  and  then  crushing  Longstreet  and  The  capture 
Hill  before  Jackson,  McLaws  and  Walker  Fen7*by*the 
could  join  them.  Franklin  was  now  within  confederates, 
six  or  seven  miles  of  Harper's  Ferry,  and  the  garrison 


92  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

could  easily  hear  the  sound  of  his  cannon.  There  is 
little  doubt  that  if  the  garrison  had  been  commanded 
by  a  capable  oiiicer,  it  would  have  held  out  until  re- 
lief came,  but  Colonel  Dixon  S.  Miles,  the  officer  in 
command,  while  brave  was  not  capable.  Instead  of 
concentrating  his  entire  command  on  Maryland  Heights, 
the  point  on  the  north  side  of  the  Potomac  which  Frank- 
lin was  approaching,  he  allowed  this  most  strategic 
point  to  be  abandoned  in  the  afternoon  of  the  13th 
to  the  enemy,  and  thus  permitted  his  own  forces  to  be 
shut  up  in  Harper's  Ferry  with  the  Confederates  occu- 
pying the  eminences  all  around  him.  On  the  morning 
of  the  15th,  with  succor  within  a  few  miles  of  him, 
he  caused  the  white  flag  to  be  raised,  and  surrendered 
his  troops  and  ammunitions  to  the  Confederates.  Colo- 
nel Miles  was  mortally  wounded  by  a  stray  shot  be- 
fore the  surrender  was  executed,  and  the  command  de- 
volved upon  General  Julius  White,  who  had  been  driven 
by  General  Jackson  from  Martinsburg  back  upon  Har- 
per's Ferry  a  few  days  earlier.  Nearly  thirteen  thou- 
sand men  and  a  large  quantity  of  arms  and  ammunition 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Confederates. 

McClellan   still    had   the   opportunity,    however,  to 

crush  Longstreet  before  the  troops  who  had  captured 

,,  ^, .,        Harper's  Ferry  could  reioin  their  comrades 

McClellan'8  ^  ,  -^     _^  ^"'       ,     .  . 

advance  toAn-  at  Boonsboro.  He  ordered  his  army  to 
advance  in  the  early  morning  after  the  bat- 
tles at  Crampton's  Pass  and  South  Mountain.  Frank- 
lin soon  came  upon  the  Confederates  in  considerable 
force  at  Brownsville,  and  the  corps  of  Sumner,  Hooker 
and  Mansfield  found  the  main  body  of  them  in  posi- 
tion on  the  heights  along  the  west  side  of  Antietam 
Creek.  At  the  moment,  they  could  not  have  num- 
bered over  thirty  thousand  men,  while  Sumner,  Hooker 
and  Mansfield  had  forty  thousand  or  more,  and  there 


ANTIETAM  93 

were  other  corps  in  reserve.  It  does  seem  as  if  they 
should  have  attacked  at  once.  But  it  must  be  re- 
membered that  it  takes  time  to  place  an  array  of  forty 
thousand  men  in  position  for  battle  when  advancing 
along  two  or  three  roads  in  columns  a  few  feet  in 
breadth,  and  many  miles  in  length,  and  also  that  part 
of  the  troops  were  wearied  by  the  battles  of  the  14th, 
and  all  of  them  by  long  marching. 

Moreover,  McClellan  had  given  orders  that  if  the 
Confederates  should  be  found  in  strong  force  in  posi- 
tion, the  pursuing  columns  should  not  attack  imme- 
diately, but  should  take  position  and  await  his  own 
arrival  on  the  scene.  The  Union  commanders,  there- 
fore, delayed  the  attack  until  McClellan  him- 
self arrived.  The  afternoon  was  much  ad-  delayed  by 
vanced  when  he  came  up,  and  although  he 
was  aware  that  Harper's  Ferry  had  been  captured  in 
the  forenoon,  and  that,  consequently,  Jackson  and 
the  others  were  free  to  move  toward  Longstreet's  posi- 
tion, yet  he  decided,  after  examining  the  ground,  not 
to  begin  the  battle  until  the  next  morning. 

When  the  morning  of  the  16th  broke,  it  was  found 
that  the  Confederates  had  changed  their  position  some- 
what, requiring  a  somewhat  different  disposition  of  the 
Union  forces.  The  Confederate  line  now  stretched  from 
the  Potomac  above  Sharpsburg  on  their  left  to  An- 
tietam  Creek  below  Sharpsburg  on  their  right,  and  lay 
along  the  crest  of  the  hills  which  hid  all  their  opera- 
tions in  the  rear  of  their  front.  It  was  a  very  strong 
position,  and  McClellan  employed  the  whole  of  the 
forenoon  of  the  16th  in  examining  the  Confederate 
position,  and  in  finding  places  and  means  for  crossing 
Antietam  Creek.  He  reported  that  he  was  also  obliged 
to  await  the  arrival  of  his  ammunition  trains. 

According  to  McClellan's  own  statement,  his  plan  of 


94  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

battle  was  to  attack  the  Confederate  left  with  the  corps 
of  Hooker  and  Mansfield,  supported  by  Sumner's  corps, 

Mccieiian's  ^^^  ^J  Franklin's,  if  necessary,  and,  so  soon 
plan  of  battle,  ^s  the  attack  began  to  appear  successful,  to 
move  Burnside's  troops  against  the  extreme  right  of 
the  Confederate  line,  lying  on  the  ridge  southward 
from  Sharpsburg,  carry  this  position,  and  then  turn 
Burnside's  columns  northward  along  the  crest  toward 
the  Union  right,  and  finally  upon  the  success  of  these 
flank  movements,  or  of  either  of  them,  to  advance  the 
centre  of  the  Union  line  with  all  the  disposable  forces. 
It  was  a  good  plan,  and  it  ought  to  have  succeeded  en- 
tirely. It  probably  would  have  succeeded  much  more 
fully  than  it  did,  had  it  been  executed  at  once. 

But  it  was  past  the  middle  of  the  afternoon  before 
Hooker  crossed  the  Antietam,  and,  in  the  skirmish  with 

The  battle  ^^^  front  of  the  Confederate  line  commanded 
of  Antietam.  jjy  Hood,  he  did  not  have  the  support  of 
either  Sumner  or  Mansfield.  Nightfall  arrived  before 
they  came  up,  and  although  partially  successful  Hooker 
was  unable  to  break  the  Confederate  line. 

During  the  night  Mansfield  succeeded  in  crossing  his 
troops  ;  but  Jackson  and  Ewell  arrived  at  the  same  time, 
bringing  large  reinforcements  to  the  Confederate  left. 
By  delaying  the  battle  until  the  17th,  McClellan  had  thus 
lost  his  opportunity  of  fighting  the  two  parts  of  the  Con- 
federate army  separately.  Still  A.  P.  Hill's  division  had 
not  yet  come  up  from  Harper's  Ferry.  It  was  approach- 
ing the  point  of  the  Confederate  line  opposite  Burnside's 
command  on  the  Union  left.  If  Burnside  could  only 
drive  in  the  Confederate  right  before  Hill  could  arrive 
to  support  it,  the  victory  might  still  be  decisive.  This 
was  McClellan's  plan.  According  to  his  own  statement, 
he  sent  the  order  to  Burnside  to  advance  across  the 
bridge  in  front  of  the  Union  left  at  eight  o'clock  in  the 


ANTIETAM  95 

mornmg  of  the  17th.  At  that  moment  the  battle  was 
raging  between  the  Union  right  and  the  Confederate 
left,  and  the  Confederate  right  had  to  be  weakened  in 
order  to  aid  their  left  against  the  onslaught  from  the 
corps  of  Hooker,  Mansfield  and  Sumner.  Burnside 
averred  in  his  report,  that,  on  the  morning  of  the  17th, 
he  received  an  order  from  McClellan  to  make  his  dispo- 
sitions for  the  attack  on  the  bridge,  but  to  await  further 
orders  before  making  it,  and  that  the  order  to  attack 
came  to  him  about  ten  o'clock.  Burnside's  report  coin- 
cides, however,  with  McCIellan^s  in  saying  that  this  or- 
der was  not  executed  until  one  o^clock  in  the  afternoon, 
and  that  it  was  after  three  when  the  Union  troops  made 
their  movement  against  the  main  heights  on  the  left  of 
Sharpsburg.  It  was  at  this  moment  that  A.  P.  Hill's 
division  arrived  on  the  scene  to  reinforce  the  Confed- 
erate right,  and  successfully  protected  the  heights  against 
the  Union  assault.  Burnside's  advance  was  checked 
and  his  troops  driven  back  toward  the  bridge.  So  far 
as  human  eye  can  divine  the  delay  of  Burnside  in  carry- 
ing out  the  movement  against  the  Confederate  right, 
marred,  in  large  degree,  the  results  of  a  good  battle. 
During  the  day  the  Union  right  had  hard  work  to  main- 
tain its  ground  on  the  west  side  of  the  Antietam,  and 
the  centre  had  to  be  weakened  in  order  to  support  it,  so 
that  the  contemplated  movement  of  the  Union  centre 
had  to  be  abandoned.  The  loss  on  the  Union  right  had 
been  very  large.  Mansfield  was  killed,  and  Hooker, 
Sedgwick,  Meagher  and  Richardson  were  wounded.  The 
larger  part  of  the  thirteen  thousand  Unionists  killed  and 
wounded  in  the  battle  fell  in  the  severe  contest  on  the 
Union  right.    When  night  fell  upon  the  com- 

The  losses. 

batants,  it  was  difficult  to  say  with  which 

side  rested  the  victory.     Nearly  twenty-five  thousand 

men  were  stretched  upon  the  field.     The  Union  loss 


96  THE  CIVIL   WAR 

had  been  a  little  more  severe  than  that  of  the  Confeder- 
ates. But  the  Union  forces  had  advanced  their  position 
and  held  ground  taken  from  the  Confederates.  Both 
sides  were  worn  out  with  the  conflict,  and  with  the 
marches  and  battles  preceding  it. 

After  long  deliberation,  during  the  night,  McClellan 
decided  not  to  renew  the  battle  on  the  morning  of  the 
18th,  but  to  permit  his  troops  twenty-four  hours'  rest, 
allow  his  ofl&cers  time  to  reorganize  their  broken  and 
scattered  commands,  and  give  opportunity  for  reinforce- 
ments to  come  up.  The  Confederates  were  also  too 
much  exhausted  to  make  any  movements.  They  re- 
mained quietly  in  their  positions  during  the  18th. 
Toward  the  close  of  the  day  McClellan  gave 
the  confeder-  his  ordcrs  to  renew  the  attack  on  the  next 
*^^'  morning.     During  the  night,  however,  the 

Confederates  abandoned  their  ground  and  retreated 
across  the  Potomac. 

Antietam  was,  thus,  a  Union  victory,  but  not  a  very 
brilliant  victory.  McClellan  estimated  his  own  force 
engaged  at  over  eighty  thousand  men,  and  that  of  the 
Confederates  at  over  ninety  thousand.  Lee,  on  the 
other  hand,  affirmed  that  the  battle  was  fought  on  the 
Confederate  side  with  less  than  forty  thousand  men. 
There  is  little  doubt  that  the  Union  force  outnumbered 
the  Confederate  somewhat,  but  not  to  the  degree  indi- 
cated in  Lee's  report.  On  the  other  hand  the  Union 
army  acted  on  the  offensive  against  a  strong  position, 
well  selected  by  the  Confederates,  and  defended  by  them 
with  great  skill,  bravery  and  obstinacy. 

Incomplete  as  was  this  victory,  however,  it  was  most 
welcome  to  the  Union  cause,  which  had  suffered  during 
the  preceding  months  such  general  reverse.  It  restored 
courage,  faith  and  hope  throughout  the  loyal  North. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

THE  PROCLAMATION  OF  EMANCIPATION  AND  THE 
DOWNFALL  OF  McCLELLAN 

The  Opportunity  Given  by  the  Victory  for  Issuing  the  Proclamation 
— The  Text  of  the  Proclamation — Suspension  of  the  Privileges 
of  the  Writ  of  Habeas  Corpus — Effect  of  the  Proclamation — 
The  President's  Anxiety  and  Restlessness — The  Autumn  Elec- 
tions— The  Crossing  of  the  Potomac  by  the  Federals — The 
Movements  of  the  Confederates,  Stuart's  Raid — Longstreet  at 
Culpeper  Court  House— The  Downfall  of  McClellan— The 
Reason  for  his  Removal  from  the  Command  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac — The  Influence  of  the  Emancipation  Proclama- 
tion in  Producing  the  Removal. 

MoEE  than  all,  this  quasi-victory  furnished  Mr.  Lin- 
coln with  the  opportunity  for  which  he  had,  for  several 
months,  been  anxiously  waiting.     Accordinsr 

,,.',,.  ^  \  1,  The  oppor- 

to  his  own  testimony,  as  we  have  seen,  he  tunity    given 

IT  IT  n        •  <»  -by  the  victory 

had  resolved  upon  the  issue  of  an  emanci-  forissmngthe 
pation  proclamation,  as  a  war  measure,  but  """^^  *^*'i°i»- 
not  wishing  it  to  appear  like  a  cry  of  desperation,  he 
had  felt  constrained  to  delay  it  until  after  a  success 
in  the  field.  He  thought  this  necessary  to  make  the 
measure  appear  serious  and  practicable.  Mr.  Lincoln 
affirmed  that  several  days  elapsed  after  the  battle  before 
he  could  learn  whether  the  Union  forces  had  gained 
a  victory  or  suffered  a  defeat,  and  that  when  he  was 
certain  of  the  former,  he  "fixed  up '^  his  already  pre- 
pared proclamation,  and  issued  it.  It  appeared  on  the 
22d  of  September.  It  was  substantially  the  paper  read 
to  his  Cabinet  on  the  21st  of  the  preceding  July. 
Vol.  II.— 7  97 


98  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

The  importance  of  this  great  document  makes  it  neces- 
sary, however,  that  it  should  be  fully  quoted.     It  read  : 
"  I,    Abraham   Lincoln,    President    of    the 

The  t6xt  of 

the  Prociama-  United  States  of  America,  and  Commander- 
*^°°"  in-Chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy  thereof,  do 

hereby  proclaim  and  declare  that  hereafter,  as  hereto- 
fore, the  war  will  be  prosecuted  for  the  object  of 
practically  restoring  the  constitutional  relation  between 
the  United  States  and  each  of  the  States  and  the  people 
thereof  in  which  States  that  relation  is  or  may  be  sus- 
pended or  disturbed. 

"  That  it  is  my  purpose,  upon  the  next  meeting  of 
Congress,  to  again  recommend  the  adoption  of  a  practical 
measure  tendering  pecuniary  aid  to  the  free  acceptance 
or  rejection  of  all  slave  States,  so  called,  the  people 
whereof  may  not  then  be  in  rebellion  against  the  United 
States,  and  which  States  may  then  have  voluntarily 
adopted,  or  thereafter  may  voluntarily  adopt,  immediate 
or  gradual  abolishment  of  slavery  within  their  respec- 
tive limits ;  and  that  the  effort  to  colonize  persons  of 
African  descent  with  their  consent  upon  this  continent  or 
elsewhere,  with  the  previously  obtained  consent  of  the 
governments  existing  there,  will  be  continued. 

"That  on  the  1st  day  of  January,  A.D.  1863,  all 
persons  held  as  slaves  within  any  State  or  designated 
part  of  a  State  the  people  whereof  shall  then  be  in 
rebellion  against  the  United  States  shall  be  then, 
thenceforward,  and  forever  free ;  and  the  executive 
government  of  the  United  States,  including  the  military 
and  naval  authority  thereof,  will  recognize  and  maintain 
the  freedom  of  such  persons,  or  any  of  them,  in  any 
efforts  they  may  make  for  their  actual  freedom. 

"  That  the  Executive  will,  on  the  1st  day  of  January 
aforesaid,  by  proclamation,  designate  the  States  and 
parts  of  States,  if  any,  in  which  the  people  thereof,  re- 


THE   PROCLAMATION   OF   EMANCIPATION        99 

spectively,  shall  then  be  in  rebellion  against  the  United 
States ;  and  the  fact  that  any  State  or  the  people 
thereof  shall  on  that  day  be  in  good  faith  represented 
in  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  by  members  chosen 
thereto  at  elections  wherein  a  majority  of  the  qualified 
voters  of  such  State  shall  have  participated  shall,  in  the 
absence  of  strong  countervailing  testimony,  be  deemed 
conclusive  evidence,  that  such  State  and  the  people 
thereof  are  not  then  in  rebellion  against  the  United 
States."  The  Proclamation,  furthermore,  called  atten- 
tion to  the  Congressional  Act  of  March  13,  1862, 
forbidding  the  employment  of  the  army  and  navy  in 
returning  fugitive  slaves,  and  to  the  Confiscation  Act 
of  July  17,  1862,  and  commanded  their  enforcement  by 
all  persons  in  the  military  and  naval  service  of  the 
United  States. 

The  Proclamation,  finally,  announced  the  intention  of 
the  President  to  recommend  that  compensation  should 
be  made  to  all  citizens  of  the  United  States  remaining 
loyal  during  the  rebellion  for  all  losses  sustained  by 
them  through  acts  of  the  United  States,  including 
the  loss  of  slaves,  upon  the  restoration  of  constitutional 
relations. 

Two  days  later  the  President  issued  his  proclamation 
suspending  the  privileges  of  the  writ  of  Ha- 

■,  r^  •  i   x       n  J.         Suspension 

beas  Corpus  in  respect  to  all  persons  arrest-   of  the  privi- 

•  le*'e8  of  the 

ed,  or  thereafter,  during  the  rebellion,  to  be  writ  of  Ha- 
imprisoned,  by  any  military  authority,  or  by  ^*^  corpuB. 
the  sentence  of  any  court-martial  or  military  commission. 
While  it  is  not  difficult  to  say  what  the  effect  of  the 
Emancipation  Proclamation  was  upon  the  inhabitants  of 
the  sections  in  rebellion,  it  is  not  at  all  easy  Effect  of  the 
to  calculate  what  the  immediate  effect  was  ^''o<=i*™ati°°- 
upon  the  people  of  the  loyal  sections.  It  certainly  stif- 
fened and  consolidated  the  Southerners  in  their  determi- 


100  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

nation  to  win  their  independence.  The  non-slaveholding 
whites,  and  the  loyal  men  among  the  small  slaveholders, 
now  generally  gave  up  their  opposition  to  the  Confed- 
eracy, and  fell  into  line  with  the  secessionists.  Every- 
where in  the  South  the  President  was  considered  to  have 
violated  his  plighted  word,  and  to  have  left  the  Union- 
ists in  the  lurch.  Everywhere  the  purpose  of  his  Proc- 
lamation was  represented  as  being,  and  generally  believed 
to  be,  a  desperate  attempt  to  mend  the  fortunes,  or  rather 
the  misfortunes,  of  the  Union  arms,  by  recourse  to  the 
incitement  of  slave  insurrection,  and  its  attendant  con- 
sequences of  rapine,  rape  and  murder.  And  every- 
where the  former  Unionists  now  hastened  to  prove  their 
devotion  to  their  firesides  by  entering  the  ranks  of  the 
Confederate  armies.  The  Confederacy  was  enabled  by 
it  to  assemble  its  entire  strength  for  the  mighty  effort 
for  deliverance.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Proclamation 
was  received  in  some  parts  of  the  North  with  aston- 
ishment, and  dismay,  and  even  with  hostility.  The 
Abolitionists  approved  it,  naturally  ;  a  large  number  of 
the  Kepublicans  were  amazed  and  puzzled  ;  while  the 
Democrats  denounced  it  as  a  violation  of  plighted  faith, 
a  usurpation  of  power,  and  a  destructive  policy  to  the 
nation.  Especially  did  it  grieve  the  hearts  of  the  loyal 
men  of  the  "  border  States,"  who  had  been  able  to 
keep  their  "  States  "  true  to  the  Union  only  by  repeating 
the  President's  earlier  declarations  that  the  war  was  for 
the  Union  entirely  and  exclusively.  The  patriotism  of 
these  men  was  sorely  tried,  and  it  is  greatly  to  their 
credit  that  it  came  out  in  most  cases  chastened  and 
refined. 

The  President  himself  was  at  first  troubled  by  the 
effect  of  it.  In  a  private  letter  to  the  Vice-President, 
of  September  28th,  he  wrote  :  "  It  is  known  to  some 
that  while  I  hope  something  from  the  proclamation. 


THE   PROCLAMATION   OF   EMANCIPATION      101 

my  expectations  are  not  as  sanguine  as  are  those  of  some 
friends.  The  time  for  its  effect  southward  has  not 
come  :  but  northward  the  effect  should  be  instanta- 
neous. It  is  six  days  old,  and  while  commendation  in 
newspapers  and  by  distinguished  individuals  is  all  that 
a  vain  man  could  wish,  the  stocks  have  declined, 
and  troops  come  forward  more  slowly  than  ever.  This, 
looked  soberly  in  the  face,  is  not  very  satisfactory." 

The  anxiety  of  the  President  was  so  greatly  increased 
that  he  became  restless,  and  turned  his  attention  again 
from  the  play  of  politics  to  the  movements  The  Preei- 
in  the  field.  He  visited  McClellan's  head-  aTd'rtsS 
quarters  on  October  1st.  He  felt  he  must  °®^^- 
have  another  victory,  and  a  more  decisive  one.  De- 
spite the  tremendous  exertions  which  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  had  made  during  the  preceding  four  months, 
he  began  to  ply  McClellan  with  exhortations  and  or- 
ders to  advance.  On  October  6th,  he  sent  a  despatch 
through  Halleck  to  McClellan  directing  him  to  cross 
the  Potomac  at  once,  and  to  give  battle  to  the  Confed- 
erates or  drive  them  southward.  McClellan  replied  on 
the  next  day  that  his  army  needed  shoes,  clothing,  tents, 
horses,  etc.,  before  it  could  advance,  and  that  not  an 
hour  would  be  lost  in  carrying  out  the  President's  in- 
structions, so  soon  as  his  troops  could  be  equipped  for 
the  movement.  He  estimated  that  three  days  would 
be  the  minimum  time  in  which  this  could  be  accom- 
plished. He  also  informed  Halleck  that  he  should 
operate  on  the  line  of  the  Shenandoah,  although  the 
President  had  expressed  preference  for  a  line  nearer 
Washington. 

Four  days  later,  McClellan  telegraphed  again  to  Hal- 
leck complaining  that  the  required  supplies  had  not 
been  received,  and  telling  him  that  the  army  could  not 
move  until  they  arrived. 


102  THE   CIVIL   ^VAR 

On  the  13th,  President  Lincoln  wrote  a  long  letter  to 
McClellan,  upbraiding  him  for  his  "over  cautiousness," 
and  appealing  to  his  sense  of  manliness  to  go  forward. 
The  General  still  delayed,  however,  alleging  that  the 
shoes,  clothing  and  horses  necessary  to  equip  his  troops 
for  a  successful  advance  were  still  wanting. 

The  autumn  elections  for  members  of  the  lower  House 
of  Congress  now  began  to  occur.  In  the  five  great 
The  autumn  States  of  Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois,  New  York 
elections.  ^^^  Pennsylvania,  the  Democrats  were  vic- 
torious, also  in  Wisconsin  ;  and  in  Michigan  and  New 
Jersey,  the  Kepublican  majorities  of  1860  were  much 
reduced.  The  anxieties  of  the  President  were  driven 
to  the  highest  point.  He  felt  that  immediate  success 
in  the  field  was  indispensable.  There  is  no  question 
that,  under  the  existing  conditions,  McClellan's  appar- 
ent slowness  and  excessive  caution  irritated  and  dis- 
tressed him  severely.  Still  he  bore  with  it,  though  not 
without  using  some  cutting  words  in  his  correspondence 
with  the  General. 

At  last,  on  the  26th  of  October,  McClellan  began 
crossing  the  Potomac.  As  we  have  seen,  he  had  in  the 
The  cross-  early  part  of  Octobcr  expressed  the  intention 
feac^by  the  o^  crossiug  at,  and  above.  Harper's  Ferry, 
Federals.  g^^jj  ^f  operating  upon  the  line  of  the  Shenan- 
doah River,  but  now,  at  the  end  of  the  month,  he 
adopted  the  President's  suggestion  of  crossing  below 
Harper's  Ferry,  and  moving  along  the  east  side  of  the 
Blue  Ridge.  He  gave  as  his  reasons  for  this  change 
that  the  approaching  rainy  season  would  swell  the  upper 
Potomac,  and  make  the  roads  in  that  section  heavy, 
and  that  the  Confederates  would,  on  these  accounts,  be 
prevented  from  recrossing  into  Maryland  while  he  was 
operating  to  the  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  He  was  also 
influenced  by  the  fact  that  the  President  promised  him 


THE   PROCLAMATION   OF   EMANCIPATION      103 

thirty  thousand  additional  soldiers,  if  he  would  choose 
the  more  eastern  line,  while  he  would  engage  to  send 
him  only  fifteen  thousand  if  he  followed  the  line  of  the 
Shenandoah.  By  the  2d  of  November  the  army  was 
on  the  south  bank  of  the  river  and  headed  for  Warren- 
ton.  The  troops  were  now  in  fine  condition,  well 
rested  and  thoroughly  equipped.  Organization  and 
discipline  were  restored,  and  there  seemed  every  pros- 
pect of  a  successful  movement.  Morell,  with  some  ten 
or  fifteen  thousand  men,  had  been  left  to  watch  the 
crossings  of  the  upper  Potomac.  Still  there  remained 
something  like  one  hundred  thousand  men  in  the  ad- 
vancing army. 

The  Confederates  had  also  rested  and  reorganized  their 
beaten  and  scattered  forces,  and  were  on  the  watch  for  de- 
velopments. They  sent  their  great  cavalry  leader.  General 
Stuart,  with  some  twelve  or  fifteen  hundred  men,  entirely 
around  the  Union  forces  in  search  of  information.  They 
undoubtedly  intended  to  recross  into  Maryland  The  move- 
in  case  McClellan  had  placed  his  army  on  the  co^'lde/ates.^ 
east  side  of  the  Blue  Ridge  during  the  first  Stuart's  raid. 
half  of  October.  When,  now,  in  the  first  days  of  Novem- 
ber, he  turned  his  columns  toward  Warrenton,  they  felt 
that  part  of  their  forces  must  be  interposed  between  him 
and  Richmond.  Longstreet's  corps,  there- 
fore, hastily  crossed  the  Blue  Ridge  and  took  at  cufpeper 
position,  about  November  3d,  at  Culpeper 
Court  House.  One  of  Jackson's  divisions  was  also  re- 
moved to  the  east  side  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  The  remainder 
of  the  Confederate  army  was  at  different  points  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley.  McClellan  saw  his  op-  tj^^  ^ownfan 
portunity  for  attacking  the  two  parts  of  the  of  MccieUan. 
Confederate  army  separately,  and  was  laying  his  plans 
for  such  a  movement,  when  suddenly  and  without  warn- 
ing, on  the  night  of  the  7  th  of  November,  he  was  ordered 


104  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

from  Washington  to  turn  the  command  of  the  army  over 
to  General  Burnside,  and  to  report  at  Trenton,  New 
Jersey. 

No  sufficient  specific  reason  has  ever  been  given  for 
this  act  of  the  President  at  that  juncture.     The  Presi- 

The  reason  dent  Said  afterward  that  he  had  made  up  his 
ii'from°'the  mind  to  remove  McClellan  if  he  failed  to 
th'e'^my  of  Prevent  the  Confederates  from  crossing  the 
the  Potomac,  gj^e  Kidge.  To  the  mind  of  any  man  who 
knows  anything  about  military  matters,  this  must  appear 
almost  childish.  The  great  desideratum  at  that  moment 
was  to  get  at  the  Confederate  forces  in  open  field.  Sim- 
ply keeping  them  in  the  mountain  fastnesses,  and  seizing 
their  empty  capital,  were  matters  of  little  moment.  The 
destruction  of  their  army  was  the  thing  to  aim  for.  The 
capital  would  then  fall  as  a  consequence,  and  without 
any  expenditure  of  energy  to  effect  it.  The  only  satis- 
factory explanation  of  the  order  of  removal  must  be  that 
it  was  the  final  outcome  of  the  long  course  of  misunder- 
standings, conflicting  views,  and  heated  controversy 
which  had  obtained  between  McClellan  and  the  Washing- 
ton authorities,  and  of  the  political  jealousies  existing 
between  the  Republicans  and  the  Democrats  in  regard 
to  the  command  of  the  army. 

The  hostilities  aroused  by  the  Emancipation  Procla- 
mation between  the  Eepublicans  and  the  Democrats  un- 

The  infln-  doubtcdly  influenced  the  President,  in  some 
ltoanc?pation  degree,  in  his  view  of  the  fitness  of  Democratic 
^"producing  generals  to  prosecute  the  war  against  slavery, 
the  removal.  "What  McClellan  would  have  done  in  the  next 
few  days,  if  he  had  been  left  in  command,  can,  of 
course,  never  be  known.  Whether  a  crushing  victory 
over  the  Confederates,  ending  at  once  the  rebellion, 
before  slavery  was  destroyed,  was  wanted  by  all  of  those 
who  composed  the  Washington  Government  may  well  be 


THE   PROCLAMATION   OF   EMANCIPATION      105 

suspected.  And  it  is  very  nearly  certain  that  there  were 
some  who  would  have  preferred  defeat  to  such  a  victory 
with  McClellan  in  command.  It  was  a  dark,  mysteri- 
ous, uncanny  thing,  which  the  historian  does  not  need 
to  touch  and  prefers  not  to  touch. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

FREDERICKSBURG 

Burnside's  Plan  of  Operations — Halleck  and  Burnside— Burnside's 
March  to  Falmouth — The  Counter-movements  of  the  Confed- 
erates— The  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  Falmouth,  and  the  Con- 
federate Army  on  the  Heights  of  Fredericksburg — The  Delay 
in  Crossing  the  River — The  Confederate  Fortifications — Burn- 
side's  Plan  of  Attack — The  Laying  of  the  Pontoons — The 
Crossing  of  the  Troops — The  Federal  Line  of  Battle — Burn- 
side's  Plan  of  Battle— The  Failure  of  the  Plan— The  Attempt 
to  Storm  Marye's  Heights — Defeat  of  the  Federals — Cause  of 
the  Defeat — Burnside's  Desire  to  Make  Another  Effort  Op- 
posed— The  Removal  of  Burnside — The  Failure  of  the  Expedi- 
tion against  Vicksburg. 

Burnside  assumed  command  on  the  9th  of  Novem- 
ber ;  and  on  the  same  day  he  sent  a  communication  to 

General  Halleck  outlining  his  plan  of  opera- 
i>ian  of  opera-  tions,  as  requested  by  Halleck  a  few  days 

before.  This  plan  involved  the  abandon- 
ment of  the  line  of  advance  on  Richmond  through  Cul- 
peper  and  Gordonsville,  as  favored  by  the  President 
and  General  Halleck,  and  substituted  therefor  a  move- 
ment on  Fredericksburg,  and  the  establishment  of  a 
new  base  of  operations  at  Aquia  Creek.  Upon  the  re- 
ceipt of  this  communication  Halleck  went  to  Warrenton 
Halleck  and  ^o  meet  Burnside  and  discuss  the  proposed 
Burnside.  change.  Bumside  says,  in  his  report,  that 
the  result  of  the  discussion  was  that  Halleck  declined 
to  take  the  responsibility  of  issuing  an  order  for  either 
plan^  but  said  that  the  whole  matter  would  be  left  to 

106 


"  FREDERICKSBURG  107 

the  decision  of  the  President,  and  that  if  the  President 
approved  the  Fredericksburg  line,  the  main  army  should 
be  moved  to  Falmouth,  opposite  Fredericksburg,  and 
should  cross  the  Rappahannock  River  at  that  point  on 
pontoon  bridges,  to  be  sent  from  Washington.  General 
Halleck  says  in  his  report  that,  as  the  result  of  the  discus- 
sion. General  Burnside  agreed  to  so  modify  his  plan  for 
approaching  Fredericksburg  as  to  cross  the  army  over  the 
Rappahannock  by  fords  many  miles  above  the  town,  in- 
stead of  by  marching  down  the  north  side  to  Falmouth, 
opposite  the  town,  and  crossing  by  pontoons;  that  he 
submitted  this  modified  plan  to  the  President ;  and  that 
when  the  President  assented  to  it  he,  on  the  14th,  tele- 
graphed the  same  to  General  Burnside.  Halleck  does 
not  recite  the  words  of  the  despatch.  Burnside  does, 
and,  according  to  him,  they  ran  :  ''The  President  has 
just  assented  to  your  plan.  He  thinks  it  will  succeed  if 
you  move  rapidly  ;  otherwise  not."     .     .     . 

Upon  receipt  of  the  despatch  Burnside  put  his  army 
in  motion  direct  for  Falmouth  by  roads  on  the  north 
side  of  the  river.     The  grand  division  com- 

°  Barnside'B 

manded  by  Sumner  was  in  advance,  and  the  march  to  Fai- 
head  of  it  arrived  at  that  place  on  the  17th. 
Sumner  with  his  accustomed  energy,  proposed  to  ford 
the  river  at  once  near  Falmouth,  and  seize  upon  the 
heights,  which  run  from  the  opposite  point  on  the  south 
side  of  the  river,  along  behind  Fredericksburg,  to  a 
point  a  mile  or  more  below  the  town.  Burnside,  how- 
ever, interdicted  the  movement. 

Meanwhile  the  Confederates  had  discovered  the  move- 
ment toward  Fredericksburg,  and  the  Confederate  com- 
mander ordered,  on  the  17th,  two  divisions  The  coun- 
of  infantry,  a  brigade  of  cavalry  and  a  bat-  o/the'c^fed- 
tery  of  artillery,  all  from  Longstreet's  corps,  *'**®^- 
to  go  to  Fredericksburg  and  strengthen  the  small  garri- 


108  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

son  there.  At  the  same  time  he  sent  General  Stuart 
with  his  cavalry  across  the  upper  Rappahannock  to 
ascertain  more  fully  the  movements  of  the  Union  army. 
Stuart  forced  a  passage  at  Warrenton  Springs,  on  the 
18th,  and  entered  Warrenton  just  after  the  last  of 
Burnside's  troops  had  left  for  Falmouth.  He  returned 
to  Lee  with  the  information  that  the  whole  Union 
army  was  marching  on  Fredericksburg.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  the  19th,  consequently,  Lee  sent  the  remainder  of 
Longstreet's  corps  to  Fredericksburg,  and  directed  Jack- 
son to  move  his  corps  across  the  Blue  Eidge  to  Orange 
Court  House  in  order  to  be  able  to  support  Longstreet. 
Burnside  himself  arrived  at  Falmouth  on  the  19th, 
and  his  entire  army  was  there  and  in  the  neighborhood 
The  Army  ^^  ^^®  ^■'^^^"  Longstrect  had,  however,  by 
of  the  Poto-  this    time    arrived,   and   had   occupied  the 

mac    at    Fal-    ,.,  .  '  ii-tt-it-i 

mouth,  and  heights  running  along  behind   Fredericks- 

the  Confeder-    ,*=  ,^°  °  .  .  ... 

ate  army  on  burg,  and  Jacksou  was  approaching  rapidly 
Fredericks-  from  Orange  Court  House.  Nothing  but 
tourg.  prompt  and  energetic  action  on  the  part  of 

the  Union  army  could  warrant  any  reasonable  expecta- 
tion of  success.  Both  Sumner  and  Hooker  were  anxious 
to  go  ahead,  but  Burnside  sat  down  to  wait  for  the  pon- 
toons from  Washington.  Sumner  was  allowed  to  sum- 
mon the  municipal  authorities  of  Fredericksburg  to 
surrender  the  place  on  the  21st,  and  to  threaten  bom- 
bardment in  case  of  refusal,  but  the  inhabitants  simply 
abandoned  their  homes,  and  the  Union  General  omitted 
his  bombardment. 

The  pontoons  did  not  arrive  until  the  25th,  owing,  as 

Burnside  claimed,  to  the  remissness  of  the  Washington 

„^  , ,    .     authorities,  who,  on  their  part,  claimed  that 

Thedelaym  '  '  r       ' 

crossing  the  they  had  approved,  or  assented  to,  no  plan 

which   involved   the  need  of    pontoons    in 

crossing  the  Rappahannock.     When  they  arrived,  the 


.  FREDERICKSBURG  109 

entire  Confederate  army  was  on  the  heights   back  of 
Fredericksburg,  or  in  easy  supporting  distance. 

For  two  weeks  more  now  Burnside  waited,  as  he  said, 
perfecting  his  plans  for  crossing  in  the  face  ^j^^  con- 
of  a  formidable  force.     By  the  expiration  of  federate  forti- 

•^  ^  ,  ncationB. 

this  time,  the  Confederates  had  so  fortified 

the  crest  of  the  hills  behind  the  town  as  to  make  their 

position  fairly  impregnable. 

Burnside  says,  in  his  report,  that  his  first  intention 
was  to  attempt  the  crossing  at  Skinker's  Neck,  a  point 
some  fourteen  miles  below  Fredericksburg,  Bumside's 
but  that  his  preparations  attracted  the  atten-  P'an  of  attack, 
tion  of  the  Confederates,  and  caused  them  to  make  for- 
midable arrangements  to  meet  him  at  that  place.  He 
thereupon  concluded  to  surprise  his  antagonists  by  lan- 
dertaking  to  cross  at  the  town,  where  he  had  appeared 
to  make  no  preparations. 

In  execution  of  this  design,  he  caused  the  material 
for  his  bridges  to  be  taken  during  the  night  of  the  10th 
of  December   to  the  points   determined  on.  . 

His  plan  was  to  throw  two  bridges  across  at  "f  the  pon- 
the  upper  end  of  the  town,  one  at  the  lower 
end,  and  two  about  a  mile  further  down.  The  work 
began  about  three  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  11th. 
The  whole  of  the  day  was  employed  in  this  work.  The 
Confederate  forces  in  the  town  kept  up  a  musketry  fire 
upon  the  working  parties,  until  the  heavy  fog,  which 
had  hung  over  the  valley  during  the  entire  morning, 
raised  and  gave  the  Union  artillery  posted  along 
Stafford  Heights  on  the  north  side  of  the  river  oppor- 
tunity to  drive  them  away.  Four  regiments  of  Union 
infantry,  sent  across  on  pontoons,  completed  this  work 
of  protection  to  those  placing  the  bridges  in  position. 

The  troops  began  to  cross  over  during  the  night  of  the 
11th,  and  continued  to  do  so  throughout  the  12th.   The 


110  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

Confederates  did  not  molest  them  much,  but  awaited 

the  attack  in  their  intrenched  position  on  the  heights 

„.  back  of  the  town.     On  the  night  of  the  12th, 

The    cross-  _  ~  ' 

ing  of  the  the  army  was  placed  in  position  as  follows  . 

troops.  "^  ^  ... 

Sumner's  grand  division  of   some   twenty- 
seven  thousand  men  held  the  centre  and  right  of  the 

The  Federal  town.  Franklin's  grand  division  of  some 
line  of  battle,  gjxty  thousand  men  held  the  ground  in  front 
of  the  lower  bridges  and  along  the  old  turnpike  road  to 
Richmond,  which  runs  here  for  a  little  distance  parallel 
with  the  river,  and  then  turns  southward  around  the 
lower  end  of  the  line  of  hills  back  of  the  town,  and  runs 
up  the  valley  of  the  Massaponax  Creek.  Hooker's  grand 
division  of  some  twenty-six  thousand  men  remained  on  the 
north  side  of  the  river,  to  render  support  at  either  point 
as  might  be  needed.  The  Union  artillery  was  planted 
on  the  heights  on  the  north  side,  which  were  higher 
than  those  on  the  south  side  occupied  by  the  Confeder- 
ates, with  the  purpose  of  silencing  the  Confederate  bat- 
teries when  the  Union  infantry  should  make  the  assault 
upon  the  intrenchments. 

Burnside's  plan  was  to  have  a  part  of  Franklin's  force 
go  around  the  eastern  end  of  the  heights  occupied  by 

Burnside's  ^^^  Confederates,  and  fall  upon  their  flank 
plan  of  battle,  and  rear  at  the  same  time  that  Sumner  should 
storm  the  heights  in  front.  In  order  to  accomplish  this, 
however,  it  was  necessary,  first  of  all,  that  the  eastern 
point  of  those  heights  should  be  taken,  to  protect  the  pas- 
sage of  the  troops  around  the  same  in  the  valley  below. 
Between  seven  and  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the 
13th,  Franklin  received  Burnside's  order  to  carry  this 

The  failure  point.  He  sent  Meade's  division  to  do  this 
of  the  plan.  work.  Jackson's  corps  of  the  Confederates 
formed  this  portion  of  their  line.  Some  of  the  best  troops 
of  the  Confederacy  were,  therefore,  in  front  of  Meade. 


FREDERICKSBURG  111 

Supported  first  by  Donbleday's  division  and  then  by 
Gibbon's,  the  brave  Pennsylvanians  moved  to  the  attack. 
It  was,  however,  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  before 
Meade  met  with  any  considerable  success.  At  that 
moment,  or  a  few  minutes  after,  he  carried  the  point, 
and  seemed  able  to  hold  his  ground,  but  the  sudden 
advance  of  the  Confederate  divisions  of  Eai'ly  and  Talia- 
ferro, while  Meade  was  still  insufficiently  supported, 
caused  the  withdrawal  of  Meade's  troops  from  this  very 
important  position.  The  Union  forces  were  not  able  to 
regain  this  indispensable  point,  and  the  plan  of  turning 
the  right  flank  of  the  Confederates  thus  failed  completely. 
Feeling  sure  that  Franklin  with  his  large  force  could 
and  would  turn  the  Confederate  right  by  noon  at  the 
latest,  Burnside  ordered  Sumner  to  proceed  Tjig  ^^. 
to  storm  the  heights  directly  in  front.  With  Btora^Maryl's 
the  situation  obtaining  on  the  Confederate  Heights, 
right  at  the  moment,  this  was  a  perfectly  reckless,  des- 
perate and  hopeless  movement.  The  brave  soldiers  led 
by  their  brave  old  General  advanced  to  the  attack  again 
and  again,  only  to  be  repulsed  by  the  murderous  fire  of 
the  Confederates  lying  safely  behind  their  intrench- 
ments.  At  half -past  one,  Burnside  ordered  Hooker  to 
support  Sumner.  Hooker,  seeing  the  perfectly  useless 
nature  of  the  movement,  pleaded  with  Burnside  not  to 
waste  any  more  lives  at  that  point,  but  the  Commander 
seems  to  have  lost  his  head  entirely  at  the  moment,  and 
sternly  ordered  Hooker  to  go  forward.  The  result  was 
simply  the  sacrifice  of  a  few  more  thousands  of  brave 
men.  Six  times  the  noble  soldiers  led  by  Sumner  and 
Hooker  attempted  to  carry  Marye's  Heights,  but  every 
time  they  were  hurled  back  by  the  storm  of  lead  and 
iron  which  was  poured  upon  them.  When  Defeatofthe 
night  fell  the  Union  forces  had  been  re-  Federals, 
pulsed  at  all  points.     They  had  lost  over  twelve  thou- 


112  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

sand  men.  The  Confederates  had  lost  only  about  five 
thousand. 

The  Confederates  had  repulsed  the  attack  with  so 
much  ease,  that  they  did  not  think,  at  first,  that  the 
battle  was  ended.  They  expected  its  renewal  on  the  next 
morning.  They  did  not  know  the  severity  of  the  losses 
which  they  had  inflicted  on  their  antagonists.  The 
Union  army  was,  however,  too  much  crippled  and 
demoralized  to  undertake  battle  again,  immediately. 
During  the  14th  and  15th,  it  remained,  for  the  most 
part,  quietly  in  the  town  and  along  the  river.  On  the 
night  of  the  15th,  it  recrossed  to  the  north  side. 

If  there  is  any  special  criticism  to  be  made  on  the 
failure  to  execute  the  miserable  plan  of  battle,  it  would 
Cause  of  the  Seem  to  be  that  Franklin  did  not  do  his  part, 
defeat.  p^ll  j^j^lf  of  i\^q  army  was  under  his  com- 

mand, and  yet  his  grand  division  lost  less  than  four 
thousand  of  the  more  than  twelve  thousand  men  placed 
hors  de  combat.  Moreover,  he  had  the  only  chance 
for  success  in  the  plan.  He  ought  to  have  so  supported 
Meade's  advance  as  to  have  enabled  the  latter  to  hold 
the  point  which  he  so  bravely  won,  the  point  which  would 
have  protected  the  march  of  the  Union  troops  into  the 
Confederate  rear.  The  fact  that  the  largest  division  in 
Franklin's  grand  division  hardly  participated  at  all  in 
the  battle,  indicates  certainly  that  he  had  the  power  to 
support  Meade,  and  simply  failed,  for  some  rather  un- 
satisfactory reason,  to  use  it. 

Unwilling  to  accept  the  defeat  as  final,  Burnside 
planned  to  make  another  attempt,  which  was  interdicted 
Burnside's  ^J  ^^^  President,  and  then  another  which 
^nothCT°^OTt  ^^^  prevented  by  the  inclemency  of  the 
opposed.  weather.  Nearly  all  of  the  leading  ofiicers 
advised  against  any  further  movements  on  that  line, 
and  Generals  Franklin  and  W.  F.  Smith  addressed  a 


-     FREDERICKSBURG  113 

letter  to  the  President  protesting  against  it,  and  advis- 
ing a  return  to  the  line  of  the  James  River.  It  was 
evident  that  Burnside  had  lost  the  confidence  of  his 
officers  and  of  the  army.  He  recognized  the  The  removal 
sad  fact  himself  and  besought  the  President  of  Burnside. 
to  accept  his  resignation.  The  President  seemed  at  first 
unwilling  to  do  so,  but  when,  at  last,  Burnside  pro- 
posed the  dismissal  of  Generals  Hooker,  Brooks,  New- 
ton and  Cochrane,  and  the  relief  from  duty  of  Generals 
Franklin,  Smith,  Sturgis,  Ferrero,  and  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  J.  H.  Taylor,  the  President  surmised  that  he 
had  lost  his  mental  balance,  and  immediately  issued  an 
order,  dated  January  25th  (1863)  relieving  him  from  the 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  substitut- 
ing General  Hooker  in  his  place.  This  order  also  re- 
lieved Generals  Sumner  and  Franklin  from  duty,  the 
former  at  his  own  request. 

Thus  ended  the  disastrous  Fredericksburg  campaign. 
Thereto  came,  at  the  same  time,  the  failure  of  the  ex- 
pedition undertaken  by  Grant  and  Sherman  The  failure 
against  Vicksburg.  Grant's  depot  and  stores  [*[ o^  Iga^t 
at  Holly  Springs  having  been  captured  by  Vickeburg. 
Van  Dorn  on  the  20th  of  December,  Grant  had  been 
forced  to  turn  back  to  protect  his  line  of  communica- 
tion. And  Sherman  had  been  severely  repulsed  at 
Chickasaw  Bluffs. 

The  advantages  and  good  effects  of  the  victory  at 
Antietam  seemed  entirely  destroyed  and  effaced,  and 
the  gloom  of  spiritual  as  well  as  physical  winter  seemed 
to  hang  over  the  discontented  and  sorrowing  North. 

Vol.  II.— 8 


CHAPTER  XX 

THE    PRESIDENT'S    ORDER    EXECUTING    THE    EMAN- 
CIPATION   PROCLAMATION 

The  Execution  of  the  Order  of  Emancipation — The  Morality  and 
Legality  of  the  Order  of  Emancipation. 

In  the  midst  of  such  deep  and  universal  discourage- 
ment throughout  the  North,  the  time  arrived  for  Mr. 
The  execn-  Lincohi  to  Carry  out  his  threat  of  emancipa- 
OTdlrofemaif-  ^ion.  Defeat  at  the  polls,  defeat  on  the 
cipation.  battle-field,  and  Indian  treachery  and  attack, 
even  so  near  as  Minnesota,  where  in  August  a  massacre 
of  some  eight  hundred  whites  had  been  perpetrated  by 
the  Sioux  tribes,  were  enough  to  break  the  courage  of 
any  mortal.  Nevertheless  the  President  proceeded  upon 
the  course  he  had  marked  out  in  the  preceding  Septem- 
ber, when  under  the  inspiration  of  the  victory  at 
Antietam. 

On  the  day  appointed  in  his  monitory  Proclamation, 
he  issued  the  final  Proclamation.  In  this  immortal  in- 
strument, after  referring  to  such  parts  of  his  September 
Proclamation  as  bore  upon  the  immediate  subject,  the 
President  struck  the  death-blow  at  slavery  by  the  exec- 
utive edict,  which  was  expressed  in  the  following  lan- 
guage :  "  Now,  therefore,  I,  Abraham  Lincoln,  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  by  virtue  of  the  power  in  me 
vested  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  and  navy  of 
the  United  States,  in  time  of  actual  armed  rebellion 
against  the  authority  and  government  of  the  United 

114 


EXECUTING   THE   PROCLAMATION  115 

States,  and  as  a  fit  and  necessary  war  measure  for  sup- 
pressing said  rebellion,  do,  on  this  first  day  of  January, 
in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
sixty-three,  and  in  accordance  with  my  purpose  so  to  do, 
publicly  proclaimed  for  the  full  period  of  100  days  from 
the  day  first  above  mentioned,  order  and  designate  as 
the  States  and  parts  of  States  wherein  the  people  there- 
of, respectively,  are  this  day  in  rebellion  against  the 
United  States,  the  folfcowing,  to  wit :  Arkansas,  Texas, 
Louisiana  (except  the  parishes  of  St.  Bernard,  Plaque- 
mines, Jefferson,  St.  John,  St.  Charles,  St.  James,  As- 
cension, Assumption,  Terre  Bonne,  Lafourche,  St.  Mary, 
St.  Martin,  and  Orleans,  including  the  city  of  New  Or- 
leans), Mississippi,  Alabama,  Florida,  Georgia,  South 
Carolina,  North  Carolina,  and  Virginia  (except  the  forty- 
eight  counties  designated  as  West  Virginia,  and  also  the 
counties  of  Berkeley,  Accomac,  Northampton,  Eliza- 
beth City,  York,  Princess  Anne,  and  Norfolk,  including 
the  cities  of  Norfolk  and  Portsmouth),  and  which  ex- 
cepted parts  are  for  the  present  left  precisely  as  if  this 
proclamation  were  not  issued. 

*'And  by  virtue  of  the  power  and  for  the  pur- 
pose aforesaid,  I  do  order  and  declare  that  all  persons 
held  as  slaves  within  said  designated  States  and  parts  of 
States  are,  and  henceforward  shall  be,  free  ;  and  that 
the  Executive  Government  of  the  United  States,  includ- 
ing the  military  and  naval  authorities  thereof,  will  rec- 
ognize and  maintain  the  freedom  of  said  persons.  And 
I  hereby  enjoin  upon  the  people  so  declared  to  be  free 
to  abstain  from  all  violence,  unless  in  necessary  self- 
defence  ;  and  I  recommend  to  them  that,  in  all  cases 
when  allowed,  they  labor  faithfully  for  reasonable  wages. 

"  And  I  further  declare  and  make  known  that  such 
persons  of  suitable  condition  will  be  received  into  the 
axmed  service  of  the  United  States  to  garrison  forts, 


116  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

positions,  stations,  and  other  places,  and  to  man  vessels 
of  all  sorts  in  said  service." 

Both  the  morality  and  the  legality  of  this  act  have  been 

made  subject  to  serious  question,  and  it    is  certainly 

J    proper,  if  not  necessary,  in  a  constitutional 

ity  and  legal-  historv,  to  suspcud  the  narrative  of  military 

ityoftheorder  ,  •  ,.  ^^         i  ■        ^     •   a 

of  emancipa-  operations  for  a  moment  and  examine  briefly 
the  criticisms  which  have  been  made  upon  it. 

It  was  claimed,  in  the  first  plate,  that  the  purpose  of 
the  Presidenrt  was  slave  insurrection,  or  that,  at  least, 
the  inevitable  result  of  his  act  would  be  slave  insurrec- 
tion, and  that  the  incitement  of  the  slaves  to  the  mas- 
sacre of  their  masters  and  mistresses  was  not  only  im- 
moral but  positively  barbaric.  It  would  be  difficult  to 
meet  this  criticism,  provided  it  were  true  that  such  was 
the  President's  purpose,  or  that  such  would  be  the  in- 
evitable result  of  his  act.  It  is  certainly  immoral  to 
attain  any  end,  however  desirable  and  necessary,  by  im- 
moral means.  If  the  progress  and  the  ends  of  civil- 
ization are  providentially  ordered,  still  the  means  for 
effecting  that  progress  and  realizing  those  ends  are 
subject  to  human  choice,  and  it  is  in  the  making  of 
such  choice  that  the  human  will  manifests  its  freedom 
and  proves  its  quality. 

But  did  the  President  entertain  the  immoral  purpose 
attributed  to  him  ?  He  said  that  he  did  not,  in  the 
words  of  the  Proclamation  itself.  He  enjoined  upon 
those  who  might  attain  freedom  to  abstain  from  violence 
and  to  labor  for  reasonable  wages.  So  far  as  his 
purpose  was  concerned,  if  we  accept  his  own  assur- 
ances in  regard  to  it,  it  went  no  further  than  to  de- 
prive the  Confederates  of  the  support  of  slave  labor 
in  their  rebellion  against  the  Government  and  the 
Union.  The  ethics  of  war  certainly  allowed  this. 
While  the  fact  that  no  slave  insurrection,  no  massacre 


EXECUTING   THE   PROCLAMATION  117 

of  whites  by  blacks,  resulted  from  it  is  sufficient  proof 
that  such  were  not,  and  were  not  seen  to  be,  the  inevi- 
table results  of  the  Proclamation  either  by  the  President 
or  by  his  advisers. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  existing  law,  the  President 
had  no  authority  to  fix  the  permanent  status  of  the 
negro,  who  might  be  freed  from  slavery  as  the  result  of 
the  enforcement  of  his  Proclamation.  The  military  dic- 
tatorship of  the  President  is  temporary,  and  the  powers 
exercised  by  virtue  of  it  are  limited  by  the  period  of  the 
necessity  which  calls  them  into  play.  The  freedom 
acquired  by  the  slave  in  consequence  of  the  President's 
act  could  continue  legally,  after  the  suspension  of  the 
war  powers,  only  by  means  of  some  constitutional  pro- 
vision or  of  some  legislative  act  warranted  by  constitu- 
tional provision.  The  war  powers  of  the  President  justi- 
fied his  act  as  a  temporary  measure,  but  they  did  not  and 
do  not  authorize  the  President  to  fix  the  permanent  civil 
or  political  status  of  anybody. 

In  the  second  place,  the  declaration  of  the  President 
that  the  persons  freed  from  bondage  by  his  Proclamation 
would  be,  when  of  suitable  condition,  received  into  the 
military  and  naval  service  of  the  United  States  was  de- 
nounced as  an  immorality,  the  immorality  of  arraying  a 
barbarous  race  against  a  civilized  race  upon  the  battle- 
field, and  in  the  prosecution  of  war.  To  this  it  may  be 
answered  that  the  negro  race  in  the  South  was  not  ex- 
actly a  barbarous  race.  It  was  an  uneducated  race,  but 
it  did  not  exhibit  the  cruel  qualities  which  are  generally 
considered  as  attaching  to  barbarism.  It  was  simply  a 
subject  race  sunken  in  ignorance,  which  the  President 
was  calling  upon  to  lend  a  hand  in  its  own  enfranchise- 
ment, by  becoming  regular  soldiers  of  the  United  States 
under  the  commaud  of  officers  who  would  lead  them 
and  employ  them  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  civil- 


118  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

ized  warfare.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  questions  at 
issue  between  the  Union  and  the  Confederacy  could  not 
have  been  fought  out,  when  appealed  to  the  trial  of 
arms,  by  the  whites  only.  But  it  is  difficult  to  demon- 
strate the  immorality  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  order  upon  this 
subject ;  while  the  previous  employment  of  Indians  by 
the  Confederates,  and  the  method  of  warfare  actually 
followed  by  the  Indians  so  employed,  make  all  criti- 
cisms upon  the  use  of  negro  soldiers  by  the  United 
States  from  that  quarter  appear  insincere  and  trifling. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

THE  PERRYVILLE-MURFREESBOROUGH   CAMPAIGN 

Strength  of  the  Armies  of  Buell  and  Bragg — Buell's  Advance — Re- 
treat of  the  Confederates  from  Bardstown,  and  their  Stand  at 
Perryville — The  Battle  at  Perryville — The  Confederate  Retreat 
— The  Pursuit — The  Losses  at  Perryville — The  Removal  of 
Buell — Rosecrans — The  Battle  of  luka — The  Battle  of  Corinth 
— Rosecrans's  Advance  toward  Murfreesborough — Rosecrans's 
Plan  of  Battle — The  Plan  Discovered  by  the  Confederates  and 
the  Federal  Attack  Anticipated — The  Confederate  Attack — The 
Momentary  Check  of  the  Confederates  by  Sheridan — Union 
Situation  on  the  Night  of  the  Slst  of  December — The  Renewal 
of  the  Battle  on  the  2d  of  January,  1863 — The  Operations  of  the 
3d  of  January — The  Confederate  Retreat  from  Murfreesborough 
— The  Terrible  Losses — The  Results  of  the  Union  Victory, 

It  mnst  have  seemed  to  the  sad  and  discouraged 
President  that  a  sign  of  approval  from  Heaven  had  been 
vouchsafed  him,  when,  two  days  after  he  issued  the  final 
order  of  emancipation,  the  news  of  victory  from  the 
West  reached  him. 

We  left,  in  the  course  of  our  narration,  the  Army  of 
the  Ohio  at  Louisville  in  the  latter  part  of  September. 
It  was  fatigued  by  long  and  rapid  marching  strength  of 
and  considerably  discouraged  and  disorgan-  Bue^T"aVd 
ized.  Buell  found  awaiting  him  at  Louis-  Bragg, 
ville  a  large  number  of  raw  levies.  These  he  incorpor- 
ated at  once  into  his  existing  regiments,  and  in  five  or 
six  days  from  the  time  of  the  arrival  of  the  main  body 
of  his  troops  in  the  city,  he  was  ready  with  an  army  of 
nearly  one  hundred  thousand  men  to  face  the  Confeder- 

119 


120  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

atea.  Bragg  had,  including  Kirby  Smith's  division,  only 
about  fifty  thousand  soldiers,  but  they  were  all  seasoned 
veterans.  The  mass  of  them  were  at  Frankfort  and 
Bardstown.  Kirby  Smith  was  in  immediate  command 
at  Frankfort,  and  General  Polk  at  Bardstown.  Bragg 
himself  was  at  Frankfort,  engaged  in  political  business, 
in  setting  up  a  rebel  "State  Government"  there  with 
Richard  Haines  as  governor. 

On  the  very  day  that  Bragg  inaugurated  Haines, 
October  1st,  Buell  put  his  army  in  motion  from  Louis- 

Bueii'8    ad-  ^^^^®  ^^  drive  the  invaders  out  of  the  Common- 
vance.  wealth.     The  left  corps  of  the  army,  com- 

manded by  A.  McD.  McCook,  bore  off  a  little  toward 
Frankfort,  while  the  centre  and  right  corps,  commanded 
by  Generals  Gilbert  and  Crittenden,  marched  toward 
Bardstown. 

As  the  Federals  approached  the  latter  place,  Polk 
drew  his  forces  back  in  the  direction  of  Harrodsburg, 

„  _        ^   and  it  appeared  that  this  place  had  been  se- 

Retreat    of  ,        t^  i  •  «     . 

the  confeder-  lected  by  Bragg  as  the  pomt  of  junction 
Bar  do  town,  of  Smith's  army  with  Polk's.  The  Federals 
st°nd  at  Per-  pressed  the  retiring  Confederates  rather  hard, 
ryviiie.  ^^^  when  Polk   reached  the   advantageous 

position  along  the  Chaplin  Fork  of  Salt  River,  at  Perry- 
ville,  he  halted  his  troops,  by  command  from  Bragg, 
and  drew  them  up  in  line  of  battle  along  the  west  bank 
of  the  river.  Buckner's  division  was  on  the  right,  An- 
derson's formed  the  centre,  and  Donelson's  division  the 
left.  Polk's  entire  army  was  organized  in  two  wings, 
commanded  by  Hardee  and  Cheatham.  The  divisions 
of  Buckner  and  Anderson  belonged  to  Hardee's  wing, 
and  that  of  Donelson  to  Cheatham's. 

It  was  Buell's  centre  corps  which  was  pressing  upon 
the  Confederate  rear,  and  when  on  the  morning  of  the 
8th  of  October,  the  Confederates  first  struck  back,  they 


PERRY VILLK-MUKFREESBOKOUGH   CAMPAIGN     121 

came  upon  Colonel  Dan  McCook's  brigade  of  this  corps, 
which  was  protecting  the  meagre  water-supply  of  the 
troops.     This  brigade  was  supported  by  the      tj^^  y^g^■^^ 
divisions  of  Mitchell  and  Sheridan  of   the  at  PerryviUe. 
same  corps,  and  it  was  therefore  able  to  hold  its  ground. 

Bueli,  who  was  with  the  centre  corps,  had  sent  orders, 
in  the  evening  of  the  7th,  to  McCook  on  his  left  and 
Crittenden  on  his  right  to  hasten  forward  in  the  support 
of  the  centre.  McCook's  corps  came  up  about  eleven 
o'clock  in  the  forenoon  of  the  8th,  and  took  a  strong 
position  on  the  left  of  the  centre  corps.  McCook's 
corps  was  organized  in  two  divisions,  one  commanded 
by  General  L.  H,  Rousseau  and  the  other  by  General  J.  S. 
Jackson.  McCook's  line  of  battle  was  composed  of  the 
brigades  of  Lytle  and  Harris  of  Eousseau's  division  on 
the  right,  Terrill's  brigade  of  Jackson's  division  in  the 
centre,  with  Webster's  brigade  of  the  same  division  in 
reserve  behind  the  right  centre,  and  Starkweather's 
brigade  of  Eousseau's  division  with  two  batteries  of  ar- 
tillery on  the  left. 

Buell's  purpose  was  to  attack  the  Confederates  upon 
the  following  day.  But  Bragg,  who  arrived  on  the 
field  about  the  middle  of  the  forenoon  of  the  8th,  deter- 
mined to  take  the  offensive  at  once,  before  the  concen- 
tration of  all  the  Federal  corps  could  be  consummated. 
His  plan  was  to  attack  McCook's  corps,  the  Federal  left, 
and  overwhelm  it.  With  this  purpose  in  view  the  three 
brigades  on  the  Confederate  left  led  by  Cheatham  were 
swung  around  to  the  extreme  right  of  Polk's  line,  and 
Wharton's  cavalry  which  covered  the  Confederate  right 
opened  the  battle  with  a  fierce  charge  upon  McCook's  left, 
and  then  with  the  infantry  support  from  Cheatham's 
men  upon  the  centre  of  McCook's  line.  Starkweather's 
brigade  and  the  artillery  supported  by  it  remained  firm, 
but.  Terrill's  brigade,  composed  largely  of  raw  troops. 


122  THE   CIVIL    WAK 

gave  way  in  confusion,  Terrill  and  Webster,  and  also 
Jackson,  their  division  commander,  all  being  killed. 

During  the  fierce  attack  on  the  left  and  centre  of  Mc- 
Cook's  line,  Buckner  assaulted  the  right  and  drove  it 
back  some  distance.  The  Federals  seemed  now  to  be  in 
considerable  peril,  and  McCook  sent  to  Buell  for  help. 
Buell  was  with  Gilbert's  corps,  and  knew  nothing  of  the 
battle  raging  on  his  left.  About  four  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon  McCook's  aid  found  him,  gave  him  the  news 
of  the  struggle  and  asked  for  reinforcements.  Buell 
immediately  ordered  Schoepf's  division  of  veteran  troops 
to  go  to  McCook's  assistance,  and  dispatched  an  order  to 
Crittenden  or  Thomas,  who  was  second  in  command  of 
the  whole  army  and  was  with  Crittenden,  to  send  a  divis- 
ion to  take  Schoepf's  place  in  the  centre,  and  to  attack 
the  Confederate  left  flank  with  the  remainder  of  his  corps. 
Night  came  before  these  orders  could  be  entirely  executed. 
Schoepf  reached  McCook,  but  Crittenden's  corps  did  not 
deliver  the  attack  on  the  Confederate  left  flank. 

The  Federal  commanders  supposed  that  the  battle 
would  be  surely  renewed  on  the  next  morning,  and 
The  confed-  Buell's  Orders  were  for  Gilbert  and  Crittenden 
erate  retreat.  ^^  attack  the  Confederate  centre  and  left, 
while  McCook's  troops,  greatly  fatigued  and  decimated 
by  the  battle  of  the  8th,  should  remain  quiet  in  their 
position,  and  take  advantage  of  any  opportunity  which 
might  occur.  But  during  the  night  of  the  8th  the 
Confederates  withdrew  and  retreated  safely  to  Harrods- 
burg,  where  they  were  joined  by  Kirby  Smith's  troops. 

The  Federals  waited  in  Perryville  until  the  11th  for 

Sill's  division  of  McCook's  corps,  which  had  marched 

farther  to  the  left  than  the  other  divisions 
The  pursuit.   .^  ^^^^^  ^^  ^^^^^  -^^^^^  g^^-^j^  ^^  Frankfort. 

Sill  struck  a  part  of  Smith's  troops  going  to  Harrods- 
burg  at  Lawrenceburg  and  a  sharp  skirmish  ensued. 


PERRYVILLE-MURFREESBOROUGH   CAMPAIGN     123 

On  the  11th  Bnell  began  the  pursuit.  The  Confed- 
erates retired  slowly  and  in  good  order  toward  Cumber- 
land Gap,  stripping  the  country  of  everything  as  they 
went.  The  Federals  followed  them  as  far  as  London. 
Here  they  halted.  Buell  saw  that  his  enemy  was  escap- 
ing through  the  defiles  of  the  mountains  and  could  not 
be  caught.  He,  therefore,  resolved  to  send  his  troops 
westward  toward  Bowling  Green  and  Nashville,  while 
the  Confederates  poured  through  Cumberland  Gap,  and 
down  the  East  Tennessee  valleys,  and  then  up  the  rail- 
road to  Murfreesborough  before  the  Federals  could  get 
south  of  Nashville. 

The  battle  of  Perryville  was  a  bloody  conflict.  The 
Federals  had  about  eight  hundred  and  fifty  men  killed, 
twenty -eight  hundred  wounded,  and  five  The  loBses 
hundred  captured.  The  Confederate  loss  atPerryviiie. 
was  about  half  as  many.  From  the  point  of  view  of 
Federal  strategy,  it  was  one  of  the  worst  fought  battles 
of  the  war.  It  was  entirely  beyond  comprehension  that 
Buell  allowed  McCook's  corps  to  be  almost  overwhelmed 
by  Polk's  entire  force,  when  he  had  two  large  corps  of 
soldiers,  one  of  them  hardly  a  mile  distant  from  Mc- 
Cook's  right,  at  the  time  the  battle  was  in  progress.  He 
had  the  very  best  of  opportunities  to  throw  his  right, 
under  the  lead  of  such  a  commander  as  Thomas,  around 
the  Confederate  left  and  cut  off  the  line  of  retreat  of 
Polk's  entire  army.  The  pursuit  also  was  managed  in  a 
very  slovenly  way.  Opportunities  for  bringing  the  Con- 
federates to  battle  were  thrown  away,  and  they  were 
allowed  to  escape  with  all  their  plunder,  which  fur- 
nished them  subsistence  for  the  following  .j^^  remov- 
winter.  The  dissatisfaction  with  Buell's  aiofBueii. 
management  was  so  great  in  the  army,  and  among  the 
people  of  the  North,  and  at  Washington,  that  the  Presi- 
dent felt  compelled  to  remove  him  and  to  institute  a 


124  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

commission  of  inquiry  upon  the  campaign,  which  finally 
reported  very  unfavorably  to  Buell.  He  was  removed 
on  the  30tli  of  October,  while  at  Bowling  Green,  and 
General  W.  S.  Kosecrans  was  appointed  in  his  stead 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio. 

General  Rosecrans  had  won  his  way  to  this  high 
distinction  by  his  successful  work  in  Northern  Missis- 
sippi  during  the  two  months  just  preceding 
his  appointment.  After  BuelFs  army  had 
gone  from  Corinth  to  make  the  attempt  on  Chatta- 
nooga, General  Sterling  Price,  with  great  audacity, 
occupied  luka,  on  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Rail- 
road, about  twenty-five  miles  south-east  from  Corinth. 

The  battle  Rosccraus,  who  had  been  left  at  Corinth  in 
ofiuka.  command  of  the  troops  in  Northern  Missis- 

sippi, undertook,  in  conjunction  with  General  Grant, 
who  then  commanded  the  troops  in  West  Tennessee,  an 
expedition  against  Price  at  luka  about  the  middle  of 
September.  The  attack  was  delivered  on  the  19th, 
and.  Grant's  soldiers  failing  to  come  up,  by  Rosecrans's 
men  alone.  After  a  stubborn  battle,  the  Confederates 
abandoned  the  place  under  cover  of  the  night  and  re- 
treated to  Ripley,  where  Van  Dorn  joined  Price  with 
reinforcements  sufficient  to  make  the  combined  army 
number  thirty  thousand  men,  and  took  command  of  the 
entire  force. 

Van  Dorn  now  laid  his  plan  for  driving  Rosecrans  out 
of  Corinth.     On  the  morning  of  the  3d  of  October  his 

The  battle  troops  Collided  with  some  of  Rosecrans's  de- 
of  Corinth.  tachmcuts  which  had  been  thrown  out  to  the 
west  of  the  fortifications  for  the  purpose  of  discovering 
whether  an  attack  on  Corinth  was  designed,  or  whether 
the  Confederates  were  pushing  on  to  attack  Ord's  troops 
at  Bolivar  in  Tennessee,  or  Grant's  at  Jackson  still  far- 
ther north.     The  Federal  commander  soon  made  up  his 


rKKKYVILLE-MURFKEESBOROUGH   CAMPAIGN     125 

mind  that  Corinth  was  Van  Dorn's  objective  point,  and 
he  drew  his  forces  back  into  the  intrenchments  and  pre- 
pared to  receive  the  assault.  It  came  without  delay,  and 
during  the  afternoon  of  the  3d  and  the  forenoon  of  the 
4th,  the  battle  raged  with  great  fury.  The  Confederates 
charged  the  works  with  such  determination  that  they 
actually  captured  one  of  the  strongest  forts,  Fort  Eich- 
ardson,  and  Rosecrans's  own  head-quarters,  but  the  Fed- 
erals brought  up  their  reserves  and  retook  them.  At 
last  the  Confederates  gave  up  the  desperate  attack  and 
fell  back  with  exhausted  and  decimated  ranks.  They 
had  lost  nearly  five  thousand  men  of  their  thirty  thou- 
sand in  their  grand  effort.  The  Federals  lost  only  about 
half  as  many.  Rosecrans  had  only  twenty  thousand 
men,  and  although  he  had  fought  behind  strong  forti- 
fications and  had  only  repulsed  his  enemy,  still  the  bat- 
tle of  Corinth  was  regarded  as  the  chief  Federal  victory 
of  the  autumn  of  1862  after  Antietam.  It  established 
the  claim  of  Rosecrans  to  the  great  advance  in  rank 
which  he  received  by  being  made  Commander-in-Chief 
of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio. 

On  reaching  Nashville,  Rosecrans  came  finally  to  the 
conclusion  that,  despite  the  inclement  season,  he  would 
move  at  once  against  Bragg.  He  had  learned  that  a 
large  part  of  the  cavalry  belonging  to  Bragg's  army 
had  been  sent  into  Kentucky,  under  Morgan,  to  cut 
communication  between  Louisville  and  Nashville,  and 
that  another  division  of  it,  under  Forrest,  had  been 
sent  into  West  Tennessee  to  destroy  the  railroad  which 
supplied  General  Grant's  army  in  West  Tennessee  and 
Northern  Mississippi,  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Road.  Bragg 
had  supposed  that  the  Union  forces  had  gone  into  win- 
ter quarters  at  Nashville,  and  that  he  could  with  im- 
punity weaken  his  cavalry  arm.  But  Rosecrans  was  not 
thinking  of  rest  until  after  he  had  dealt  a  decisive  blow. 


126  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

and  had  freed  Middle  Tennessee  from  the  Confeder- 
ates. The  Confederates  themselves  had  gone  into  win- 
ter quarters  at  Murfreesborough,  and  had  planned  and 
were  enjoying  a  season  of  gay  festivity.  The  President 
of  the  Confederacy  in  company  with  General  J.  E.  John- 
ston made  them  a  visit,  and  exhorted  and  encouraged 
them  to  hold  their  ground  in  Middle  Tennessee. 

On  the  26th  of  December,   Rosecrans  began  opera- 
tions.      At  the   moment  a   large   part  of  one   of   the 

Rosecrans'B  three  Confederate  corps,  that  of  Hardee,  was 
l^/r*^M'a7-  located  about  twenty  miles  west  of  Murfrees- 
freesborough.  borougli  ou  a  turnpike  leading  from  Nash- 
ville to  Shelbyville,  via  Nolensville.  The  other  two 
corps,  commanded  by  Polk  and  Kirby  Smith,  were  at 
Murfreesborough  and  at  Readyville.  Rosecrans  Avas 
thus  compelled  to  advance  with  a  broad  front.  He  sent 
McCook  with  three  divisions  direct  against  Hardee,  at 
the  same  time  that  he  ordered  Thomas  to  move,  with 
his  two  divisions,  down  the  turnpike  to  Franklin  on  the 
right  of  McCook  and  threaten  Hardee's  left  flank. 
Crittenden,  with  three  divisions,  was  directed  to  advance 
on  the  turnpike  leading  from  Nashville  to  Murfrees- 
borough, and  stop  at  the  village  of  Lavergne.  These 
movements  were  all  accomplished  under  sharp  skir- 
mishing during  most  of  the  day. 

Rosecrans's  plan  was  to  have  McCook  develop  the  in- 
tentions of  the  Confederates  by  pressing  Hardee,  and 

Roaecrans's  to  keep  Thomas  in  a  position  to  support 
plan  of  battle,  either  McCook  or  Crittenden,  as  circum- 
stances might  require.  On  the  27th  and  28th,  McCook's 
movements  forced  Hardee  to  seek  a  junction  with  the 
other  Confederate  corps  at  Murfreesborough.  Thomas 
was,  therefore,  directed  to  move  by  cross-roads  to  the 
support  of  Crittenden.  By  the  night  of  the  29th  the 
Confederates  were  all  consolidated  in  and  around  Mur- 


PERRYVILLE-MURFREESBOROUGH   CAMPAIGN     127 

freesborough,  and  the  Union  forces  were  in  position  some 
three  or  four  miles  to  the  north  and  north-west  of  the 
place.  McCook's  divisions  formed  the  Union  right, 
Thomas's  the  centre,  and  Crittenden's  the  left.  The  plan 
of  battle  was  to  have  Thomas  and  McCook  engage  the 
Confederate  centre  and  left,  while  Crittenden  should 
cross  Stone's  River  which  separated  the  Confederate  right, 
consisting  of  the  division  commanded  by  Breckenridge, 
from  the  centre  and  left,  and  crush  this  single  division 
by  hurling  his  two  divisions,  commanded  by  Van  Cleve 
and  Wood,  upon  it.  From  this  position  his  artillery 
would  take  the  Confederate  fortifications  in  reverse, 
and  make  them  untenable,  and  Thomas  would  be  thereby 
enabled  to  drive  the  Confederate  centre  westward  and 
crush  it,  and  Crittenden  would  have  the  way  open  before 
him  into  Murfreesborough,  from  which  place  by  moving 
westward  along  the  turnpike  to  Franklin  he  would  gain 
the  Confederate  rear,  cut  off  their  retreat,  and  crush 
their  whole  army  between  his  troops  and  those  of  Mc- 
Cook and  Thomas. 

It  was  a  most  skilful  plan.  Theoretically  nothing 
was  wanting.  But  the  most  skilful  plan  must  be  care- 
fully concealed  and  ably  executed.  The  The  plan  die- 
trouble  with  the  battle  was  that  the  Confed-  confederates 
erates  divined  the  plan  and  foiled  it  by  t?^i  attacif an- 
their  sudden  and  furious  attack,  in  the  dim  'icipated. 
light  of  the  early  morning  of  the  31st,  on  McCook's 
right.  The  success  of  the  plan  of  battle  depended, 
as  Rosecrans  told  McCook,  on  McCook's  being  able 
to  hold  his  ground  for  three  hours.  It  proved  that 
McCook's  line  fronted  too  much  eastward  with  his  ex- 
treme right  not  sufficiently  refused,  as  the  military  men 
say,  to  protect  his  right  flank. 

At  about   half-past  six   in  the  morning,   while   the 
Union  troops  were  calmly  drinking  coffee,  the  Confeder- 


128  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

ates  rushed  in  heavy  force  upon  the  extreme  right  of 
McCook's   line,   crumbled   two   brigades   of   Johnson's 

TheConfed-  division  in  pieces,  and  quickly  dislodged  the 
erate  attack,  j-ight  brigade  of  Davis's  division  and  then 
the  centre  brigade  of  the  division. 

The  Confederates  next  struck  Sheridan's  division, 
and  were  momentarily  halted  by  the  energy  and  ability 

_,.  of  this  splendid  officer  and  his  brave  men. 

The  momen-  ^ 

tary  check  of  It  soon  became  evident,  however,  that  Mc- 
atea  by  sheri-  Cook  must  be  reinforced,  or  the  entire  right 
wing  of  the  army  would  be  crushed.  In- 
stead of  being  able  to  hold  his  ground  for  three  hours, 
McCook  had,  within  one  hour,  demanded  succor.  Rose- 
crans  soon  saw  that  the  plan  of  the  battle  was  spoiled, 
and  that  he  must  now  work  hard  and  quickly  to  save  the 
army.  He  immediately  countermanded  the  order  to 
Crittenden  to  cross  the  river,  and  sent  Rousseau's  divis- 
ion of  Thomas's  corps,  and  Van  Cleve's  division  of  Crit- 
tenden's corps  to  the  support  of  Sheridan,  who  had  re- 
pulsed the  Confederates  three  or  four  times,  but  in  so 
doing  had  swung  his  right  from  a  south-easterly  to 
a  north-westerly  face.  This  prompt  redisposition  of 
Union  situa-  the  Union  troops  checked  the  Confederates 
nightof^hes'i'^t  ^^^  enabled  Rosecrans  to  form  a  new  line 
ofWember.  ^f  battle,  against  which  the  Confederates 
stormed  in  vain.  When  night  fell  the  Union  army 
held  its  original  ground  on  the  left,  but  on  the  centre 
and  right  it  had  been  forced  backward  a  considerable 
distance.  The  new  line  was,  however,  a  better  one  for 
defensive  action  than  the  original  one,  and  during  the 
night  the  left  wing  of  the  army  was  also  drawn  back 
to  it. 

The  following  day,  January  1st  (1863),  passed  with- 
out any  serious  movement  from  either  side.  On  the 
2d,  the  battle  was  renewed.     In  the  forenoon,  the  Con- 


PERRYVILLE-MUEFREESBOROUGH   CAMPAIGN    129 

federates  began  a  fire  from  heavy  artillery  on  the  centre 
and  right  of  the  Union  line,  but  the  Union  artillery 
replied  with  so  much  energy  and  such  good  xherenewai 
aim  as  to  put  a  speedy  end  to  the  attack,  "n  [^e  2d"o£ 
About  the  middle  of  the  afternoon,  the  Con-  January,  ises. 
federate  right  advanced  to  attack  the  Union  left,  which 
had.  now  again  occupied  ground  on  the  east  side  of  the 
river.  The  Confederates  were  at  first  successful  and 
drove  Van  Cleve's  division  back  across  the  river  again 
in  confusion.  But  Rosecrans,  who  happened  to  be 
present  at  this  point,  at  the  critical  moment,  sent  the 
larger  part  of  Negley^s  division  and  some  other  forces 
to  Van  Cleve's  support.  These  reinforcements,  assisted 
by  the  heavy  fire  from  Crittenden's  artillery  posted  on 
an  eminence  on  the  west  side  of  the  river,  compelled 
the  Confederates  to  retire  again  with  great  loss.  The 
night  now  came  on,  and  the  weary  troops  sank  to  rest 
on  the  battle-field. 

The  next  day  it  rained  dismally,  and  little  was  done, 
except  to  clear  the  woods  occupied  by  the  Confederates 
in  front  of  Thomas's  corps.  The  Union  left  The  opera- 
wing  had  at  this  moment,  however,  advanced  sd^of** Janu^ 
so  near  to  Murfreesborough  that  the  artillery  ^y- 
could  shell  the  town.  The  Confederate  commander  was 
now  convinced  that  the  battle  was  lost,  and  that  he 
must  save  his  army.  He  did  not  await  the  coming  of 
the  dawn  of  the  next  day,  but  began  his  retreat  in  the 
middle  of  the  night,  and  by  the  time  that  the  Union 
commanders  learned  of  his  movement,  in  the  TheConfed- 
forenoon  of  the  4th,  his  rearguard  of  in-  f'^o^  ^mu^ 
fantry  was  several  miles  to  the  south  of  Mur-  freeeborough. 
freesborough,  and  only  a  cavalry  force  remained  in  the 
town.  This  withdrew  in  the  early  morning  of  the  next 
day,  and  the  weary  but  victorious  Union  army  quietly 
took  possession. 
Vol.  II.— 9 


130  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

Nearly  fifty  thousand  men  had  taken  part  in  this  con- 
flict on  the  Union  side,  and  nearly  forty  thousand  Con- 
The  terrible  federates.  The  Union  loss  was  about  thir- 
losses.  |.gg^   thousand,   and  the  Confederate  about 

ten  thousand.  It  was  one  of  the  most  sanguinary  and 
obstinately  fought  battles  of  the  war. 

Considered  as  a  trial  of  strength  alone,  it  was  not  very 
decisive,  but  its  results  were  most  important  to  the 
Union  cause.  It  gave  Middle  Tennessee  back 
of  the  Union  to  the  Union.  This  Avas  much.  But  its  in- 
fluence in  raising  the  hopes  and  the  courage 
of  the  North  was  vastly  more  important.  At  the  same 
time  the  news  was  received  that  Colonel  Harlan  had 
driven  Morgan  away  from  the  line  of  railroad  connect- 
ing Eosecrans's  army  with  its  base  at  Louisville,  and 
that  General  Sullivan  had  driven  Forrest  out  of  West 
Tennessee.  The  campaign  of  1862  may  be  said  to  have 
ended  with  these  victories  instead  of  with  the  defeat  at 
Fredericksburg,  and  the  anxious  President  could  now 
feel  that  his  Proclamation  was  more  than  ink  and  parch- 
ment. He  could  even  feel  that  he  had  a  sign  from 
above  that  his  great  act  was  approved  by  Almighty  jus- 
tice and  power. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

CONFEDERATE  ATTEMPTS  TO  REGAIN  THE  COASTS 
OF  VIRGINIA  AND  NORTH  CAROLINA 

The  Confederate  Attempt  to  Retake  Suffolk — Longstreet  Sent  by 
the  Richmond  Government  to  Carry  Out  the  Plan — The  Con- 
federate Strategy — The  Discovery  of  the  Confederate  Plan  by 
the  Federals — Longstreet  and  Hill  in  Front  of  Suffolk. 

The  Confederate  victory  at  Fredericksburg  and  the 
Union  victory  at  Murfreesborough  seemed  to  balance 
each  other,  in  a  way,  and  to  make  both  parties  content 
to  give  themselves  a  little  time  for  rest  and  recaperation. 
While  the  main  armies  both  of  the  East  and  the  West 
were  thus  living  in  a  state  of  suspended  activity,  the 
Confederates  on  the  lower  course  of  the  James  and 
the  Union  forces  on  the  Mississippi  were  planning 
advances  upon  their  respective  adversaries  in  these 
quarters. 

When  McClellan  abandoned  the  Peninsular  campaign, 
he  left  General  Keyes  with  his  corps  to  hold  possession 
of  Yorktown,  Williamsburg,  Norfolk  and  TheConfed- 
Suflfolk.  Of  these  points,  Sufifolk  was,  in  ?™*|takS- 
some  respects,  the  most  important,  since  *°^'^- 
from  this  quarter  the  railroads  running  south  from 
Richmond  might  be  most  easily  reached.  The  Federal 
forces,  under  General  Peck,  at  Suffolk,  occupied  them- 
selves during  the  latter  part  of  the  year  1862  in  forti- 
fying the  place  ;  and,  in  January  of  1863,  the  Confed- 
erates commanded  by  General  Prior  appeared  upon  the 

131 


132  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

Blackwater,  a  stream  some  twenty  miles  west  of  Suffolk, 
and  began  to  throw  up  intrenchmeuts  along  the  course 
of  the  river.  The  last  of  January,  Prior  advanced  a 
part  of  his  troops  in  the  direction  of  Suffolk.  He  met 
the  Federal  forces  at  about  the  half-way  point  between 
his  base  on  the  Blackwater  and  Suffolk.  A  sharp  en- 
counter followed  in  which  the  Federals  were  worsted. 
The  Confederates,  however,  decided  to  retire  to  the 
line  of  the  Blackwater. 

The  Confederate  Government  at  Richmond  now  formed 
a  plan  for  rescuing  the  coasts  of  Virginia  and  North 

Lon^street  Carolina  from  Federal  occupation.  Long- 
R^chmon^d  Street  with  three  divisions  of  his  corps  was 
L°Jo^^^^^^»  withdrawn  from  Lee  at  Fredericksburg,  and 

L  o  c  ft  r  r  y  uut  o ' 

the  plan.  gent  to  Petersburg,  from  which  place  he 
might  operate  to  best  advantage  for  the  realization  of 
the  plan  ;  and  General  D.  H.  Hill  was  sent  into  North 
Carolina  to  organize  the  North  Carolina  militia.  Long- 
street  was  to  operate  against  Norfolk  and  Suffolk,  and 
Hill  against  the  Federal  forces  at  the  mouths  of  the 
North  Carolina  rivers. 

The  plan  of  campaign  of  the  Confederates  was  to 

threaten  the  North  Carolina  coasts  first,  and  thereby 

cause  reinforcements  to  be  drawn  from  Nor- 

The  Co  Ti"  

federate  strat-  folk  and  Suffolk  to  the  Federal  garrisons  on 
*^*  these  coasts,  and  then  make  a  dash  for  Suf- 

folk. Fortunately  for  the  Confederates,  the  Federal 
commander  on  the  coasts  of  North  Carolina,  General 
Foster,  was  ordered  at  this  juncture  to  send  some  ten 
thousand  of  his  best  troops  to  General  Hunter  at  Port 
Royal,  to  aid  in  one  of  those  abortive  expeditions 
planned  at  Washington  for  the  capture  of  Charleston. 
The  Confederates  were  quick  to  take  advantage  of  Fos- 
ter's weakness.  On  the  14th  of  March,  the  Confederates, 
under  Pettigrew,  attacked  a  Federal  fort  on  the  Neuse 


ATTEMPTS   TO    REGAIN   THE   COASTS  133 

just  across  from  Newbern.     They  were  beaten  off,  how- 
ever, by  the  gun-boats. 

On  the  30th,  General  Hill  himself  laid  siege  to  the 
town  of  Washington  on  the  Tar  River,  General  Fos- 
ter reinforced  the  Federal  garrison,  and  it  was  able  to 
hold  out  against  the  attack.  Foster  felt  obliged,  how- 
ever, to  apply  to  Keyes  for  aid.  This  was  just  what 
the  Confederates  were  working  to  effect.  A  brigade 
of  Peck's  division  at  Suffolk  was  made  ready  to  go  to 
Foster,  but,  most  happily  for  the  Federals,  Peck  learned 
on  the  very  day  set  for  the  brigade  to  de-  ^^ 
part,  that  Longstreet  was  preparing  to  attack  eiyofthecon- 
him  at  Suffolk  with  a  large  force,  and  that  by  the  Fed- 
tlie  Confederate  movements  in  North  Caro- 
lina were  feints  to  draw  troops  from  Suffolk.  Peck 
took  the  responsibility  of  keeping  his  men  at  Suffolk, 
and  began  vigorous  preparations  to  meet  Longstreet. 
The  latter  arrived  in  front  of  Suffolk  about  the  12th  of 
April  with  nearly  twenty-five  thousand  men.  Thanks 
to  a  feAV  small  vessels  and  his  fortifications.  Peck  was 
able  to  ward  off  immediate  danger,  and  to  convince 
Longstreet  that  he  could  not  take  the  place  except  by 
a  regular  siege.  Longstreet  sat  down  for  more  than  two 
weeks  to  wait  for  his  siege  guns,  which  did  Longstreet 
not  arrive  until  the  30th.  Hill  now  came  11^^  ^%^. 
up  from  North  Carolina  with  about  ten  thou-  *'*'*^- 
sand  new  troops,  and  just  as  everything  was  ready  to 
proceed  to  active  work.  Hooker's  movements  in  front 
of  Fredericksburg  caused  the  Confederate  President  to 
recall  Longstreet's  forces  to  Richmond,  and  Suffolk  was 
relieved  from  the  impending  danger. 

On  the  Federal  side,  the  attack  on  Charleston  proved 
a  signal  failure.  Du  Pont  with  nine  ironclads  under- 
took, on  the  7th  of  April,  to  force  his  way  into  the  har- 
bor, but  was  repulsed  with  the  loss  of  one  of  his  boats. 


CHAPTEK  XXIII 

CHANCELLORSVILLE 

Hooker's  Reorganization  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac — The  Dispo- 
sition of  the  Confederate  Forces — Cavalry  Fight  near  Kelly's 
Ford — Hooker's  Plan  of  Campaign — The  Real  Movements  of 
the  Federals — The  Defect  in  Hooker's  Plan — The  Discovery 
of  the  Federal  Plan  of  Attack  by  Lee — The  Relative  Strength 
of  the  Armies  Around  Chancellorsville  and  Fredericksburg — 
Hooker's  Indecision — The  Confederate  Plan  to  Attack  Hooker's 
Right  Wing  in  Flank  and  Rear — Jackson's  Attack  on  the  Fed- 
eral Right  Rear  in  the  Wilderness — Rout  of  the  Federals  at 
Dowdall's — The  Battle  of  Chancellorsville — Death  of  Jackson 
— Federal  Preparations  for  the  Renewal  of  the  Battle — The 
Confederate  Attack  on  the  3d — Hooker  Injured — Sedgwick's 
Attack  upon  Early — The  Battle  at  Salem  Church — The  New^ 
and  Advantageous  Position  of  the  Federals — Critical  Position  of 
Sedgwick's  Troops — The  Retreat  of  the  Federals — Results  and 
Losses  of  the  Expedition — Fruitless  Operations  of  Stoneman's 
Cavalry. 

Hooker,  the  new  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac, had  spent  the  months  of  February  and  March  in 
Hooker's  re-  reorganizing  the  army  in  front  of  Freder- 
oftheArmyof  icksburg,  and  in  restoring  its  numbers  and 
the  Potomac,  discipline  to  the  condition  existing  before 
Burnside's  disaster.  He  abolished  Burnside's  grand 
division  system,  and  went  back  to  the  corps  organization 
of  McClellan.  He  divided  the  army  into  seven  corps, 
under  the  respective  commands  of  Reynolds,  Couch, 
Sickles,  Meade,  Sedgwick,  Howard  and  Slocum.  Each 
of  these  corps  numbered  from  fifteen  to  twenty  thousand 
men.     The  cavalry  was  organized  in  one  grand  division 

134 


'       CHANCELLOKSVILLE  135 

under  the  command  of  Stoneman.  Hooker's  army  thus 
reached  the  enormous  figure  of  about  one  hundred  and 
twenty-five  thousand  men,  well  armed  and  equipped,  and 
supported  by  a  powerful  artillery  of  some  three  hundred 
cannon.  It  was  not  to  be  expected  that  such  a  force 
would  remain  inactive  when  the  mild  weather  appeared  ; 
it  was  not  to  be  tolerated  that  it  should. 

Upon  the  opposite  bank  of  the  Rappahannock,  within 
plain  sight,  lay  Lee's  army,  numbering  about  half  as 
many  men  as  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  The  dispo- 
Longstreet  with  three  of  his  divisions  being,  ^'"n'fe'derite 
as  we  have  seen,  absent  on  the  Suffolk  cam-  *<«"c«8- 
paign.  The  two  divisions  of  his  corps  remaining  at 
Fredericksburg  formed  Lee's  left  wing,  while  Jackson's 
large  corps  formed  the  right  wing,  and  guarded  the 
river  below  Fredericksburg  against  any  movement  of 
the  Federals  in  that  quarter.  The  Confederate  cavalry 
divisions  under  Stuart,  Fitzhugh  Lee,  and  Mosby  were 
carrying  on  petty  warfare  about  and  within  the  Federal 
lines. 

On  the  17th  of  March  a  sharp  little  battle  took  place 
between  them  and  three  brigades  of  Federal  cavalry 
commanded  by  Averill,  at  a  point  about  a  cavairyfight 
mile  south  of  Kelly's  Ford,  on  the  upper  nea^r  ieifys 
Rappahannock.  The  Confederates  were  rath- 
er worsted,  but  the  Federal  commander  decided  that  it 
was  wise  for  him  to  retire  to  the  north  side  of  the  river. 

It  seems  that  Hooker's  plan  at  that  moment  was,  so  far 
as  it  had  been  developed,  to  send  Stoneman  with  his  en- 
tire division  around  the  Confederate  left  wing  ^  ^,  ^  ^  ^  ^  .^ 
for  the  purpose  of  destroying  Lee's  commu-  plan  of  cam- 
nications  and  line  of  retreat,  and  to  cross  the 
river  with  his  grand  army  below  Fredericksburg  and 
turn  the  Confederate  right. 

About  the  middle  of  April,  Stoneman  took  possession 


136  THE   CIVIL    AVAR 

of  the  crossings  of  the  upper  Kappahannock  and  pre- 
pared to  enter  upon  his  part  of  the  movement.  Hooker, 
however,  became  convinced  that  the  more  promising 
plan  was  to  divide  his  army,  leaving  one  part  of  it  before 
Fredericksburg  to  detain  Lee,  and  make  a  rapid  march 
with  the  other  up  and  across  the  Rappahannock  and 
down  the  other  side  through  a  country  known  as  the 
Wilderness,  and  thus  take  Lee  in  his  left  flank  and  rear. 
He  made  a  feint  upon  Port  Royal  below  Fredericks- 
burg in  order  to  confuse  Lee  as  to  his  real  intention, 
and,  on  the  28th  of  April,  he  sent  the  corps 

The  reEl  move- 

ments  of  the  of  Howard,  Slocum  and  Meade  up  the  river 

Fftdftrftlfl 

to  Kelly's  Ford,  where  they  crossed  to  the 
south  side.  They  were  now  above  the  point  where  the 
Rapidan  empties  into  the  Rappahannock.  They  must, 
therefore,  cross  the  Rapidan  before  they  could  reach 
their  objective  point,  which  was  Chancellorsville,  a  place 
situated  a  little  south  of  west  from  Fredericksburg,  and 
about  twelve  miles  distant  therefrom.  It  was  also  about 
six  miles  south  of  the  Rappahannock.  On  the  morning 
of  the  30th  the  three  corps  had  crossed  the  Rapidan  and 
by  the  evening  of  that  day  they  had  advanced  nearly  to 
Chancellorsville.  Hooker  had  placed  these  three  corps 
under  the  superior  command  of  Slocum,  as  the  senior  of- 
ficer, and  had  ordered  him,  in  case  Lee  did  not  come  out 
to  meet  him  at  Chancellorsville,  to  proceed  toward  Fred- 
ericksburg, on  a  line  of  march  parallel  with  the  Rappa- 
hannock, until  he  should  come  upon  the  high  ground 
opposite  Banks's  Ford,  some  three  or  four  miles  above 
Fredericksburg,  and  thus  force  Lee's  extreme  left  wing 
to  draw  back  upon  Fredericksburg.  This  would  give  the 
Federals  possession  of  the  fords  of  the  Rappahannock  be- 
tween the  confluence  of  the  Rapidan  with  the  Rappahan- 
nock and  Fredericksburg,  viz.:  United  States  Ford  and 
Banks's  Ford,  and  would  thus  enable  them  to  connect  the 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  137 

two  parts  of  tlieir  army  separated  by  the  Rappahannock. 
With  this  in  view.  Hooker  ordered  Couch  to  move  with 
two  divisions  of  his  corps  to  a  point  on  the  north  side  of 
the  river  directly  in  front  of  these  two  fords,  and  wait 
there  for  the  appearance  of  Slocum  on  the  south  side. 

The  three  corps  commanded  by  Reynolds,  Sickles  and 
Sedgwick,  and  the  one  division  of  Couch's  corps  left 
opposite  Fredericksburg,  were  placed  under  the  superior 
direction  of  Sedgwick,  as  Hooker  himself  designed  to 
be  with  the  other  part  of  the  army,  and  Sedgwick  was 
instructed  to  cross  the  Rappahannock  below  Fredericks- 
burg when  informed  that  Slocum  had  crossed  the  Rapi- 
dan,  and  endeavor  to  seize  the  roads  leading  from  Fred- 
ericksburg to  Richmond.  In  case  Lee  should  weaken 
himself  by  sending  troops  to  meet  Slocum,  Sedgwick 
was  expected  to  attack  the  Confederate  works.  In  case 
he  should  retreat  toward  Richmond,  a  vigorous  pursuit 
must  be  made. 

It  was  a  good  plan,  and  in  the  first  stages  of  its  exe- 
cution the  Federal  officers  and  troops  acted  with  energy 
and  enthusiasm.  One  great  mistake  had  rpjjg  defect  in 
been  made,  however.  Having  sent  all  of  Hooker's  plan, 
his  cavalry  toward  Gordonsville,  Hooker  failed  to  cover 
properly  the  movements  of  Slocum's  columns  on  the 
south  side  of  the  river.  In  consequence  of  this  error, 
the  ever-present  Stuart  had  on  the  29th  discovered  these 
movements,  and  during  the  night  of  the  29th  succeeded 
in  reporting  them  to  Lee. 

At  the  same  time  Sedgwick  sent  two  divisions  across 
the  Rappahannock  to  make  the  proper  diversion,  but 
his  inactivity  revealed  his  true  purpose  to  The  discovery 
Lee,  and  convinced  Lee  entirely  that  the  pfan  ^of  ^att^k 
attack  was  coming  from  the  other  side.  He  ^^  ^^• 
sent  General  Anderson  at  once,  with  one  brigade  toward 
Chancellorsville  and  authorized  him  to  draw  the  two 


138  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

brigades  which  were  guarding  United  States  Ford  to 
him.  Anderson  succeeded  in  getting  to  Chancellors- 
ville  with  these  troops  in  advance  of  the  Federals,  but 
was  obliged  to  yield  the  place  on  the  morning  of  the 
30th  to  the  superior  numbers  of  the  Federals.  Hooker 
now  ordered  both  Couch  and  Sickles  to  cross  the  river 
at  the  fords  left  open  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  Confed- 
erates to  go  to  Anderson,  and  went  himself  to  Chan- 
cellorsville  to  assume  the  immediate  command. 

On  the  1st  day  of  May,  Hooker  had  an  army,  at  and 

around  Chancellorsville,  which   exceeded   in   numbers 

The  relative  ^^e's  entire  force,  and  in  addition  to  these 

Btrengthof  sixty  or  Seventy  thousand  men  he  had  two 

the  armies  *'  •' 

around  Chan-  more  full  army  corps  on  the  other  side  of 

cellorsville  ..         •'^ 

and  Freder-  Lcc  s  position.  It  Seemed  as  if  nothing  could 
now  save  Lee  from  a  most  disastrous  defeat. 

At  this  critical  moment.  Hooker's  judgment  began  to 
waver.  Instead  of  marching  entirely  out  of  the  Wilder- 
Hooker's  ^^^ss  into  the  open  country  between  Chancel- 
indecision.  lorsvillc  and  Frcdcricksburg,  where  he  could 
deploy  his  great  infantry  force  and  use  his  superior  ar- 
tillery to  advantage,  he  now  began  to  cling  to  the  skirts 
of  the  almost  impenetrable  forest  through  which  his 
troops  had  made  a  successful  march,  as  if  he  thought  he 
needed  its  protection. 

On  the  preceding  night,  Jackson  had  begun  moving 
from  his  position  on  the  Confederate  right  wing  toward 
Chancellorsville.  He  took  with  him  about  twenty-five 
thousand  fine  troops.  He  arrived  in  the  morning  of  the 
1st  of  May  within  a  few  miles  of  the  Federal  forces  around 
Chancellorsville  and  made  a  junction  with  Anderson  and 
McLaws.  Jackson  now  had  at  least  thirty-five  thousand 
troops.  About  noon  the  heads  of  the  two  columns  mov- 
ing in  opposite  directions  on  the  turnpike  between  Chan- 
cellorsville and  Fredericksburg  met  on  the  hill  just  east 


CHANCELLOUSVILLE  139 

of  Chancellorsville.  Sykes's  division  of  Meade's  corps 
formed  the  Federal  advance,  and  Mahone's  brigade  of 
Anderson's  division  the  Confederate.  The  Federal 
forces  rapidly  occupied  good  positions  clear  of  the  for- 
est, and  appeared  to  be  quite  advantageously  placed  to 
receive  the  attack. 

At  this  moment,  to  the  surprise  and  consternation  al- 
most of  his  corps  and  division  commanders.  Hooker  or- 
dered his  troops  to  draw  back  to  the  edges  of  the  forest. 
At  the  same  time  he  sent  instructions  to  Reynolds  to 
bring  his  corps  to  the  south  side  of  the  river,  and  to 
Sedgwick  to  threaten  Early  at  Fredericksburg.  Lee 
was  now  with  Jackson  before  Chancellorsville,  and  the 
Confederate  force  left  at  Fredericksburg  was  not  strong 
enough  to  hold  the  Confederate  positions  against  a  de- 
termined attack  by  Sedgwick.  The  situation  before 
Chancellorsville  was  now  simply  an  investment  of  the 
large  Federal  army  in  the  Wilderness  by  the  whole  Con- 
federate army,  except  the  ten  or  twelve  thousand  troops 
with  Early.  As  we  have  seen,  the  Federals  greatly  out- 
numbered the  Confederates,  but  in  the  tangles  of  the 
forest,  their  superiority  in  this  respect  was  to  prove  of 
little  value.  At  first,  the  Confederate  commander  was 
at  a  loss  how  to  begin  active  operations  against  an 
adversary  so  situated. 

In  the  evening  of  this  day  (May  1st),  while  Lee  and 
Jackson  were  in  close  consultation,  Stuart  appeared  at 
their  quarters  with  the  information  that  the  TheConfed- 
Federal  right  was  badly  exposed  at  a  place  luack^Hook^ 
called  Dowdall's  Tavern  in  the  Wilderness.  |„-n|iL*^k 
Jackson,  as  usual,  took  in  at  a  glance  the  im-  *"'*  '^^*'- 
portance  of  this  communication.  He  quickly  proposed 
to  his  superior  to  allow  him  to  march  around  the  Fed- 
eral right  and  attack  it  in  reverse.  Lee  also  saw,  in 
a  twinkling,   the  advantage  of  such  a  movement.     It 


140  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

meant  indeed  the  division  of  his  army  into  three  parts, 

widely  separated  from  each  other,  and  the  exposure  to 

the  danger  of  having  each  part  overpowered  in  detail, 

but  he  felt  that  he  could  rely  upon  the  immobility  of 

the  Federals  to  preserve  him.     He  allowed  Jackson  to 

take  almost  his  entire  corps,   nearly   thirty   thousand 

strong,  thus  leaving  only  about  half  that  number  with 

which  to  hold  Hooker  in  check  at  Chancellorsville. 

In   the   early   morning   of  the  2d,    Jackson    started 

upon  his  march  through  the  southern  part  of  the  Wilder- 

,    ,       ,    ness.     The  Federals  discovered   the    move- 
jack  son's 

attack  on  the  ruent  by  the  middle  of  the  forenoon,  but 
rear  in  the  thought  that  the  Confederates  were  retreat- 
ing toward  Gordonsville,  and  did  not  take 
the  slightest  precautions  for  the  security  of  their  ex- 
treme right.  Sickles's  corps  started  in  pursuit  of  Jack- 
son, but  Jackson's  veteran  rearguard  not  only  protected 
his  march,  but  concealed  the  purpose  and  destination  of 
it.  About  the  middle  of  the  afternoon,  Jackson  caught 
sight  of  the  Federal  encampment  at  Dowdall's.  It  was 
Howard's  corps  which  occupied  the  position.  The  line 
was  fronting  nearly  southward  at  the  moment,  and 
Jackson  thought  best  to  move  a  little  farther  around  to 
the  westward  in  order  to  take  it  in  the  flank  and  rear. 
Between  five  and  six  o'clock,  while  Howard's  soldiers 
were  engaged  in  preparing  their  evening  meal,  the  at- 
tack began.  The  Federals  were  taken  completely  by 
surprise. 

In  a  few  minutes  Devens's  division  was  crushed,  and 
the  Confederates  were  rushing  toward  Chancellorsville. 
In  a  few  minutes  more  Schurz's  division  was 
Federals  at  routcd.  The  last  of  Howard's  divisions,  Stein- 
owda  '8.  "vyehr's  troops,  endeavored  to  make  a  stand, 
but  in  vain.  In  less  than  an  hour  from  the  beginning 
of  the  attack,  Howard's  corps  was  almost  annihilated. 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  141 

Those  who  had  not  been  killed  or  wounded  were  fleeing 
in  every  direction  open  to  them. 

By  this  time,  report  of  Jackson's  onslaught  spread 
through  the  army,  and  Sickles  and  Pleasanton  succeeded 
in  bringing  together  sufficient  infantry  and 
artillery  on  the  plateau  of  Chancellorsville  chanceiiors- 
to  check  the  Confederate  advance  from  the  ^  ^' 
south-west  side.  Night  now  closed  upon  the  combatants, 
and  the  battle  ceased  momentarily. 

During  the  evening,  while  reconnoitring  the  posi- 
tions of  the  Federals,  Jackson  was  accidentally  wounded 
by  his  own  men,  and  died  a  few  days  later  Death  of 
from  the  complications  occasioned  by  the  in-  "aci^soQ- 
jury.  The  knowledge  of  the  disaster  was  kept  from  his 
men  so  far  as  possible.  Stuart  assumed  the  chief  com- 
mand of  the  corps. 

Sickles  renewed  the  battle  in  the  moonlight,  and 
drove  the  Confederates  back.  The  Confederates  suf- 
fered anew  in  the  wounding  of  another  of  their  chiefs, 
General  A.  P.  Hill.  About  midnight  the  conflict  ceased 
again. 

The  Federal  line  now  extended  from  Ely's  Ford  on 
the  Rapidan  through  Chancellorsville  to  United  States 
Ford  on  the  Eappahannock.  It  was  a  fairly  Federal 
good  defensive  position,  after  Sickles  had  ^ortCenew! 
occupied  the  heights  on  the  south-west  of  «•  of  the  battle. 
Chancellorsville.  Hooker  had  gathered  here  about 
eighty  thousand  of  his  men,  and  had  not  much  more 
than  half  that  number  in  front  of  him.  There  seemed 
no  doubt  that  he  would  repulse  the  Confederates,  if 
they  dared  to  make  another  attack.  In  the  early  morn- 
ing of  the  3d,  Hooker  surprised  and  amazed  his  gen- 
erals again  by  ordering  Sickles  to  abandon  the  high 
ground  to  the  south-west  of  Chancellorsville,  and  draw 
his  line  back  to  the  plateau  upon  which  the  place  was 


142  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

situated.  These  heights  commanded  Chancellorsville 
on  that  side,  as  was  seen  so  soon  as  the  Confederates 
occupied  them  and  planted  their  artillery  upon  them. 
This  happened  almost  immediately,  and  under  the  ar- 
tillery fire  as  a  protection,  the  Confederate 

TheConfed-    .     ,       ,  ,  i    ,       ^i  ^^i^      i  ^i 

erateattackon  infantry  advanced  to  the  attack  upon  the 
plateau  of  Chancellorsville.  The  troops  of 
Sickles  and  of  Couch  met  and  drove  them  back  again 
and  again.  They  returned  as  often  to  the  conflict  with 
renewed  determination.  The  decisive  moment  was 
approaching.  The  Confederate  troops  remaining  with 
Lee  on  the  east  and  south-east  of  Chancellorsville  had 
reached  around  to  the  southward  until  they  formed  con- 
nection with  Stuart's  right.  From  the  east,  south  and 
west,  the  Confederates  now  rushed  up  the  slopes  around 
Chancellorsville.  Hooker  had  plenty  of  fresh  troops 
with  whom  to  oppose  them.  The  corps  of  Eeynolds 
and  of  Meade  had  not  yet  been  in  the  battle  at  all. 
They  were  awaiting  the  word  of  command  from  Hooker. 
Hooker  in-  ^^  ^^^^  instant  Hooker  was  so  stunned  by  the 
jured.  concussion  of  a  cannon-ball  from  one  of  the 

Confederate  batteries  striking  the  pillar  of  the  Chancellor 
House  against  which  he  was  leaning,  that  he  was  ren- 
dered incapable  of  directing  the  battle,  and  before  any 
of  his  subordinates  could  assume  command,  the  Con- 
federate infantry  gained  the  plateau  and  forced  the  Fed- 
erals back  toward  the  Rappahannock. 

It  was  now  nearly  midday  of  the  3d.     At  this  mo- 
ment of  Confederate  success,  news  was  brought  to  Lee 
that  Sedgwick  had  attacked  Early,  and  driven 

Sedgwick's       , 

attack  upon  him  from  the  heights  back  of  Fredericksburg, 
"^'  and  now  held  the  road  from  Chancellorsville 

to  Fredericksburg.  Instead  of  advancing  upon  the  Fed- 
erals in  front  of  him,  Lee  must  now  look  to  those  in  his 
rear.     He  immediately  sent  most  of  the  troops  of  Long- 


CHANCELLOUSVILLE  143 

street's  corps  to  meet  Sedgwick,  remaining  himself  with 
the  rest  before  Hooker. 

One  of  Longstreet's  brigades,  that  commanded  by 
Wilcox,  which  had  been  left  with  Early  at  Fredericks- 
burg, retreated  from  Marye's  Heights  along  The  battle  at 
the  road  to  Chancellorsville  in  order  to  im-  Saiem  church, 
pede  Sedgwick's  march  as  much  as  possible.  Wilcox 
made  a  stand  at  a  strong  point  on  the  road  some  four 
miles  out  from  Fredericksburg.  There  was  a  building 
at  this  point  called  Salem  Church.  He  met  here  the 
forces  sent  back  by  Lee  before  the  head  of  Sedgwick's 
column  arrived.  When  the  Federal  troops  came  up,  the 
Confederates  were  ready  to  receive  them,  and  the  battle 
opened  at  once.  While  the  Federals  were  not  worsted 
in  the  encounter,  their  advance  was  checked.  Night 
fell  again  at  this  juncture  and  the  two  forces  ceased  op- 
erations. 

The  whole  Federal  army  was  now  in  position  for  easy 
communication  between  all  of  its  parts.  Hooker  with  the 
main  army  being  in  front  of  United  States  The  new  and 
Ford,  and  Sedgwick  in  front  of  Banks's  Ford,  ^^^'n^^eous 
only  about  five  or  six  miles  apart,  and  the  B'ederais. 
north  side  of  the  river  being  entirely  in  the  hands  of 
the  Federals.  Hooker  had  heard  the  sounds  of  the  bat- 
tle at  Salem  Church.  He  knew,  therefore,  that  Sedg- 
wick was  near  at  hand.  He  could  easily  have  sent 
Sedgwick  one  of  his  corps  during  the  night,  without  the 
slightest  danger  to  himself  ;  or  he  could  have  ordered 
Sedgwick  to  join  him  by  crossing  to  the  north  side  of 
the  river  at  Banks's  Ford,  marching  up  the  north  side  to 
United  States  Ford,  and  crossing  again  to  the  south  side. 
But  he  does  not  seem  to  have  thought  of  either  of  these 
things.  It  is  charitable,  at  least,  to  conclude  that  his 
mind  was  still  in  a  state  of  confusion  from  the  severe 
shock  which  he  had  received  a  few  hours  before.     Dur- 


144  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

ing  the  entire  night  of  the  3d,  he  remained  passive, 
while  Early  was  reorganizing  his  scattered  forces,  and 
bringing  them  to  the  aid  of  Lee  against  Sedgwick.  He 
virtually  left  Sedgwick  to  take  care  of  himself,  with 
about  half  of  the  Confederate  army  preparing  to  attack 
his  single  corps.  When  the  morning  of  the  4th  broke, 
.  Sedgwick  found  himself  in  a  highly  danger- 
tion  of  sedg-  ous  Situation.  The  Confederates  were  moving 
^  '   on  him  from  all  sides  except  the  north  and 

east.  A  little  after  midday,  they  retook  Marye's  Heights 
with  but  slight  opposition  and  thus  threatened  his  rear. 
Fortunately  for  him,  it  was  late  in  the  afternoon  before 
the  Confederates  were  ready  to  reopen  the  attack.  He 
was  able  to  hold  out  against  them  until  night  came. 
The  darkness  was  so  great  that  the  Confederates  were 
obliged  to  retire  a  little  from  the  positions  won  by  them 
in  order  to  reform  their  lines.  This  gave  Sedgwick 
the  opportunity  to  retreat  to  Banks's  Ford  and  cross 
to  the  north  side,  which  he  accomplished  successfully  in 
the  early  morning  of  the  5th.  Lee  now  turned  upon 
Hooker  again,  but  the  great  fatigue  of  his  soldiers  and 
the  inclemency  of  the  weather  prevented  him  from  get- 
ting into  position  for  this  purpose  before  the  night  of 
the  5th.     But  Hooker  decided  not  to  wait  for  him. 

The  Federal  troops  had  lost  all  desire  for  battle  and 
about  all  confidence  in  their  Commander-in-Chief,  and 
he  gave  the  order  to  retreat.     Through  rain 
of  the  Feder-  and  mud  and  darkness  the  disheartened  sol- 
*'^'  diers  dragged  themselves  and  their  trains  of 

artillery  back  across  the  river,  and  back  to  their  old  po- 
sitions at  Falmouth.  On  the  7th  they  were  all  in  the 
old  places,  and  the  Confederates  had  reoccupied  their 
old  positions  in  front  of  them. 

The  expedition   had  cost  the  Federal   army  nearly 
eighteen  thousand  men,  while  the  Confederates  lost  only 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  145 

about  twelve  thousand.  But,  more  than  this,  it  had  cost 
the  Federal  army  almost  all  confidence  in  its  leaders  and 
in  itself,  while  it  had  inspired  the  Confed- 
erates, on  the  other  hand,  with  an  enthusias-  losses  of  the 
tic  faith  in  their  own  invincibility.  At  this  *^^^ 
day  it  seems  so  plain  to  anybody,  who  knows  anything  at 
all  about  military  movements,  what  ought  to  have  been 
done  to  make  the  campaign  a  Union  success,  that  no  ex- 
planation of  Hooker's  conduct  is  satisfactory,  except  that 
his  mind  was  so  affected  by  the  concussion  which  he  suf- 
fered in  the  battle  of  the  3d  as  to  deprive  him  of  a  prop- 
er realization  of  the  situation  down  to  the  last  moment. 
Stoneman's  cavalry  operations  were  equally  fruitless. 
Their  purpose  was  to  cut  off  Lee's  retreat ;  but  Lee  did 
not  retreat.  That  part  of  the  force  under  Fruitless  op- 
Averill  was  driven  back  by  W.  H.  F.  Lee,  |tonem'a,?e 
and  returned  to  Hooker  about  the  2d .  of  cavalry. 
May.  The  rest  of  it  was  separated  by  Stoneman  into  a 
number  of  detachments,  which  scoured  the  country  be- 
tween Fredericksburg  and  Kichmond,  and  created  quite 
a  panic  throughout  that  region.  Kilpatrick,  with  his 
detachment,  rode  almost  up  to  the  suburbs  of  Eichmond. 
But  so  little  real  damage  was  done  to  Lee's  communica- 
tions that  everything  was  restored  to  previous  conditions 
by  May  12th. 

Vol.  II.— 10 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

VICKSBURG  AND  PORT  HUDSON 

Operations  on  the  Mississippi  River — Grant's  March  from  Milliken's 
Bend  to  Hard  Times — The  Diversions  against  Vicksburg  and 
Port  Hudson — March  of  Grant's  Army  to  Schroon's  and  the 
Crossing  of  the  Mississippi — The  Capture  of  Port  Gibson  and 
Grand  Gulf — Retreat  of  the  Confederates  toward  Vicksburg — 
Communication  Established  between  Grant  and  Banks,  and 
Grant  Reinforced  by  Sherman — Pemberton's  Plan  of  Defence 
— Grants  Line  of  Advance — Pemberton's  Mistake — The  Fight 
at  Raymond — The  Approach  of  Johnston — Attempt  of  Johnston 
to  Unite  with  Peniberton — The  Battle  of  Champion  Hill — The 
Federal  Victory  and  the  Confederate  Losses — Pemberton  Con- 
fined in  Vicksburg — The  Federal  Assaults  on  Vicksburg— Fed- 
eral Reinforcements  around  Vicksburg,  and  the  Confederate 
Strength — The  Siege — Attempts  to  Divert  the  Federals  from 
Vicksburg — The  Capture  of  Vicksburg — The  Occupation  of 
Jackson— Siege  and  Capture  of  Port  Hudson — The  Results  of 
the  Victories  on  the  Mississippi. 

At  the  same  time  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was 

suffering  its  almost  disgraceful  defeat  at  Chancellors- 

^      ,.  ville.  Grant   and   Porter,  from  above,  and 

Operations  on  '  '  ' 

the  Mississippi  Banks  and    Farragut,   from    below,    were 

River.  o      '  »  ,  • 

pushing  their  movements  lor  the  opening 
of  the  great  river  through  the  middle  of  the  Confed- 
eracy. The  former  had  Vicksburg  for  their  objective 
point  and  the  latter  Port  Hudson. 

The  first  months  of  the  year  1863  had  been  employed 
by  Grant  and  Porter  in  tlie  attempt  to  cut  a  canal 
around  Vicksburg  on  the  west  side  of  the  river,  and  in 

146 


VICKSBURG   AND   PORT   HUDSON  147 

the  attempt  to  open  up  a  waterway  from  the  Mississippi 
to  the  upper  Yazoo,  through  which  Vicksburg  might  be 
taken  in  the  rear.  Both  of  these  enterprises  were,  how- 
ever, finally  abandoned.  Banks  had  likewise  failed  in 
his  first  attempt  on  Port  Hudson,  in  the  middle  of 
March,  although  Farragut  had  succeeded  in  running  the 
batteries  with  two  of  his  vessels. 

After  Porter's  failure  to  get  his  fleet  into  the  Yazoo, 
Grant  returned  to  his  plan  of  going  around  Vicksburg 
on  the  west  side  of  the  Mississippi,  and  Grant's 
crossing  his  army  over  below  the  town.    With  ™¥F^.?i"  °?» 

1  .  .  T  M 1  1  Ilk  en's 

this  plan   m  view,  he  collected   an  army  of  Bend  to  Hard 

Tiines. 

about  eighty  thousand  men  with  a  great 
quantity  of  material  and  stores  at  Milliken's  Bend, 
some  twenty  miles  above  Vicksburg  on  the  west  bank  of 
the  river.  During  the  first  half  of  April  he  succeeded 
in  marching  a  large  part  of  this  force  through  the  mud 
and  swamps  on  the  west  side  of  the  river  to  New  Car- 
thage some  twenty  miles  below  Vicksburg  ;  and  on  the 
night  of  the  16th  of  the  month  Porter  ran  the  batteries 
both  of  Vicksburg  and  Warrenton  with  his  fleet.  On 
the  17th,  thus,  both  the  army  and  the  fleet  were  below 
Vicksburg  and  in  position  to  make  the  crossing.  On  the 
night  of  the  22d  five  large  transports  ran  the  batteries 
and  reached  New  Carthage  safely,  and  therewith  Grant 
had  the  means  necessary  to  transfer  his  army  to  the  east 
bank  of  the  river.  Grant  now  marched  his  forces  a  little 
farther  down  the  river  to  Hard  Times  Plantation  almost 
opposite  Grand  Gulf. 

His  first  concern  was  to  prevent  the  Confederate 
forces  at  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson  from  disputing 
the  passage  of  the  river.  That  is,  those  The  diversions 
places  must  be  so  threatened  as  to  prevent  bS'g^and^'port 
troops  being  sent  by  them  to  the  point  on  Hudson, 
the  east  bank  of  the  river  Avhich  Grant  had  selected  for 


148  THE  CIVIL   WAR 

the  debarkation  of  his  forces.  Two  diversions  from  the 
north,  and  one  from  the  south  were  now  executed. 
Sherman  threatened  Haines's  Bluff  on  the  Yazoo  above 
Vicksburg,  and  Colonel  Grierson  made  his  famous  cav- 
alry raid  through  the  country  back  of  Vicksburg,  from 
La  Grange  to  Baton  Rouge,  in  which  he  destroyed  the 
Southern  railroad  between  Meridian  and  Jackson,  the 
road  over  which  Pemberton  received  his  supplies  at 
Vicksburg,  and  created  a  perfect  panic  in  Pemberton's 
rear.  At  the  same  time,  Banks  advanced  from  Baton 
Rouge  against  the  Confederate  forces  at  Opelousas, 
commanded  by  General  Richard  Taylor.  On  the  20th 
of  April,  he  drove  Taylor  back  and  occupied  Opelousas, 
and  from  this  point  opened  communication  with  the 
Mississippi  River  above  Port  Hudson  through  the  Bayou 
Atchafalaya. 

On  the  29th  of  April  the  attempt  was  made  by  Por- 
ter's fleet  to  silence  the  Confederate  batteries  at  Grand 
March  of  Gulf,  in  Order  to  make  the  crossing  safe  for 
Po^schroOTrZ  *^^®  troops  ;  but  the  movement  was  not  suc- 
fngonheMis-  ccssful.  Grant  now  found  that  he  must 
sissippi.  march  his  army  still  farther  down  the  west 

bank  of  the  river  and  seek  a  crossing  below  Grand  Gulf. 
He  therefore  moved  his  army,  on  the  next  day,  to 
Schroon's  Plantation,  some  six  or  seven  miles  lower 
down  ;  and  from  this  point  he  succeeded,  on  the  day 
following,  May  1st,  in  transporting  a  large  part  of 
his  forces  over  to  the  east  bank  of  the  river.  The 
diversions  made  by  Sherman  and  Grierson,  and  the 
movements  of  Banks,  had  prevented  the  sending  of 
troops  from  Vicksburg  or  Port  Hudson  to  dispute  the 
passage,  and  Grant  reached  the  high  ground  on  the  east 
bank  without  any  considerable  resistance  from  the  Con- 
federates. 

His  first  objective  point  was  now  Port  Gibson,  a  place 


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VICKSBURG   AND   PORT   HUDSON  149 

some  ten  miles  inward  from  the  point  of  his  crossing,  on 
Bayou  Pierre,  from  which  he  could  take  Grand  Gulf  in 
the  rear,  advance  on  Jackson,  and  then  take  The  cap- 
Vicksburg  in  the  rear.  The  Confederate  ^^^^^^^  f^^ 
commander  at  Port  Gibson  undertook  to  de-  Grand  Guif. 
fend  the  place  against  the  Federals.  He  had  nearly  eight 
thousand  men  under  his  direction,  but  the  Federal  force 
sent  by  Grant  against  him  was  too  strong,  and  he  was 
compelled  to  evacuate  his  works  on  May  1st  and  to  retreat 
toward  Grand  Gulf.  Grand  Gulf  was,  however,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  occupation  of  Port  Gibson  by  the  Fed- 
erals, immediately  evacuated,  and  the  Confederates 
turned  the  heads  of  their  columns  in  the  direction  of 
Vicksburg. 

Grant  now  sent  McPherson  toward  the  crossings  of 
the  Big  Black  River  in  order  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the 
Confederates  upon  Vicksburg.  McPherson  Retreat  of 
succeeded  in  forcing  his  way  across  the  north  ^^^^^  ^"tow^a^rd 
branch  of  Bayou  Pierre  in  the  face  of  General  Vicksburg. 
Loring's  division,  which  had  advanced  from  Jackson  to 
the  aid  of  Bowen,  but  the  delay  at  this  point  enabled  the 
garrisons  from  Grand  Gulf  and  Port  Gibson  to  escape 
across  the  Big  Black  at  Hankinson's.  When  the  van- 
guard of  the  Federals  reached  the  bridge,  the  Confeder- 
ate rear  was  just  disappearing  on  the  other  side.  The 
pursuit  was  so  hot  that  the  Confederates  were  not  able 
to  destroy  the  bridge. 

At  the  same  time  General  Banks  advanced  to  Alexan- 
dria on  the  Red  River,  and  on  the  6th  of  May  was  in  com- 
munication with  Grant  by  means  of  Porter's  commnnica- 
lleet,  which  had  gone  up  Red  River  to  meet  usted  between 
him.  Grant  had  also  ordered  Sherman  to  Banks, *aud 
bring  his  corps  to  Port  Gibson,  and  on  the  ^J^^'c'e'd "^b  y 
8th  of  May  these  fine  troops  arrived  at  the  Sherman, 
point  designated.     The  Federal  commander  had  by  this 


150  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

time  accumulated  a  sufficient  store  of  supplies  at  Grand 
Gulf,  and  was  now  ready  to  resume  his  advance  move- 
ment. 

Pemberton's  plan  of  resistance  was  to  hold  the  line  of 
the  Big  Black  River  in  the  rear  of  Vicksburg,  and  to 
rely  upon  such  forces  as  might  be  gathered 

I 


la  a  of  de-  at  Jackson  from  the  immediate  neighborhood 


of  the  city  and  from  the  east  to  defend  the 
Mississippi  capital. 

In  his  advance.  Grant,  supposing  that  Pemberton 
might  attempt  to  come  out  of  Vicksburg  and  cross  the 

Grant's  Une  ^^S  Black  in  Order  to  form  a  junction  with  the 
of  advance.  Confederate  troops  in  and  around  Jackson, 
kept  his  left  wing  along  the  course  of  the  river  to  pre- 
vent Pemberton  from  crossing,  pushed  his  centre  toward 
Clinton,  in  order  to  cut  railroad  communication  between 
Jackson  and  Vicksburg,  and  marched  his  right  wing 
directly  against  Jackson.  McClernand  commanded  the 
left,  Sherman  the  centre,  and  McPherson  the  right. 

Pemberton  evidently  thought  that  Grant's  entire  army 
was  seeking  him,  and  Avas  manoeuvring  to  concentrate 

Pemberton'B  ^^  ^^  ^®^^  Edwards's  Station.  Grant  encour- 
miotakc.  aged  tliis  idea  in  Pemberton's  mind  by  mak- 

ing a  strong  diversion  toward  this  place,  at  the  same 
time  urging  his  right  wing  on  toward  Jackson. 

On  the  12th  of  May  McPherson  encountered  a  Con- 
federate force  near  Eaymond,  about  twelve  miles  south- 

The  fight  at  west  from  Jackson,  under  General  Gregg. 
Raymond.  ^  sharp  little  battle  resulted,  in  which  about 
five  hundred  men  were  killed  and  wounded  on  each  side  ; 
but  the  Confederates  were  driven  back,  and  lost  also 
about  five  hundred  prisoners. 

Grant  now  learned  that  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston 
was  on  his  way  to  Jackson  with  reinforcements  drawn 
from  Bragg's  army  in  South-eastern   Tennessee.-    He, 


VICKSBURG   AND   PORT  HUDSON  151 

Vherefore,  pushed  his  troops  forward  speedily.  Ou  the 
next  day  (the  13th),  McPherson  struck  the  railroad  from 
Jacksou  to  Vicksburg  near  Clinton,  and  cut 
railroad  and  telegraphic  communication  be-  p^'o'lch^of 
tween  Johnston,  who  arrived  that  day  at  ^"^'^^'■°°- 
Jackson,  and  Pemberton.  Pressing  rapidly  forward,  the 
Federals  attacked  Jackson  on  the  next  day,  and  drove 
Johnston  Avith  his  little  force  northward.  In  the  after- 
noon of  that  day,  the  Federals  occupied  the  Mississippi 
capital. 

Johnston  now  endeavored  to  make  a  junction  with 
Pemberton.  From  his  position  north  of  Jackson,  he 
sent  an  order  to  Pemberton  to  leave  small  Attempt  of 
garrisons  at  Vicksburg,  Warrenton,  and  u^nftTwith 
Haines's  Bluff,  and  march  with  the  main  Pemberton. 
body  of  his  troops  toward  Clinton.  Pemberton,  fear- 
ing to  go  on  the  north  side  of  the  railroad  line,  lest  he 
should  uncover  Vicksburg  to  Grant,  moved  along  on 
the  south  side  of  it.  This  made  the  junction  with 
Johnston  far  more  difficult,  in  fact,  as  we  shall  see,  im- 
possible ;  for  Grant,  learning  of  Johnston's  plan,  and  of 
Pemberton's  movement,  resolved  to  throw  his  whole 
army  on  Pemberton  at  once  and  crush  him.  He  headed 
his  columns  for  Bolton  Station,  and  on  the  15th  occu- 
pied this  position.  A  successful  reconnoissance  during 
the  night  gave  him  the  necessary  information  in  regard 
to  the  location  of  Pemberton's  troops,  and  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  16th  he  pressed  on  to  the  attack. 

Pemberton  had  by  this  time  learned  his  mistake  in 
moving  on  the  south  side  of  the  railroad  in  place  of 
going  to  the  north  of  it,  and  was  attempting 
to  rectify  it  by  retreating  across  Baker's  of  champion 
Creek  in  order  to  place  this  stream  between  ™'' 
himself  and  the  Federals  and  then  turn  northward,  but 
he  was  too  slow  in  this  change.     Smith's  division  of  Mc- 


152  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

demand's  corps  caught  np  with  his  rear  about  eight 
o'clock  in  the  forenoon,  and  forced  the  Confederates  to 
turn  and  fight.  Pemberton  immediately  seized  a  good 
position,  the  chief  point  of  which  was  a  hill  something 
less  than  one  hundred  feet  in  height,  called  Champion 
Hill,  and  made  a  stand  against  the  Federal  advance. 
He  had  between  twenty  and  twenty-five  thousand  men 
in  line.  Grant  had  some  seven  or  eight  thousand  more. 
Grant's  left  wing  held  the  Confederate  right  at  bay, 
while  Grant's  right,  led  by  the  impetuous  Logan,  flanked 
the  Confederate  left,  and  cut  off  their  retreat  toward 
Johnston.  Pemberton  was  thus  forced  back  toward 
Vicksburg.  The  Confederate  right  wing,  under  Loring, 
was  also  separated  from  the  rest  of  Pemberton's  force, 
and  was  prevented  from  crossing  the  Big  Black.  It 
wandered  for  days  through  the  forests  south  of  the  bat- 
tle-field, and  finally  reached  Johnston  by  going  around 
the  Federal  forces  by  the  east. 

The  Confederate  loss  in  this  battle  was  very  severe, 
some  three  thousand  in  killed  and  wounded,  about  as 
The  Federal  many  more  in  prisoners,  and  a  large  part  of 
thf*c^nfeder*^  their  artillery.  The  consequences  of  the 
ate  losses.  defeat  were,  however,  far  more  disastrous. 
Pemberton  was  cut  off  from  Johnston,  and  forced  back 
into  a  position  from  which  it  was  impossible  to  extricate 
himself.  He  retreated  rapidly  with  the  main  body  of 
his  troops  toward  the  railroad  bridge  across  the  Big 
Black  River.  The  Federals  were  in  close  pursuit.  By 
sacrificing  almost  another  division  of  his  troops  in  the 
defence  of  the  crossing,  Pemberton  succeeded  in  getting 
over  with  the  rest,  and  in  destroying  the  bridge.  This 
delayed  Grant  sufficiently  to  allow  Pemberton  to  draw 
the  garrisons  from  Haines's  Bluff  and  Warrenton  to 
Vicksburg.  He  had  now  about  thirty  thousand  men 
with  which  to  defend  the  place.     On  the  next  day  (the 


VICKSBURG   AND   PORT   HUDSON  153 

18th)  just  before  the  Federals  shut  off  all  communica- 
tion between  him  and  Johnston  by  the  north-east,  Pem- 
berton  received  an  order  from  Johnston  to  come  out 
of  Vicksburg  with  his  army  by  that  line,  and  make  an- 
other attempt  to  join  him. 

But  before  Pemberton  could  prepare  to  obey  this 
order  the  Federal  line  closed  in  upon  him.  By  the  19th 
the  forces  of  Grant  extended  from  the  Yazoo     t>„„k„  f „„ 

Pemberton 

above  Vicksburg  to  the  Mississippi  below,  ^°°^?^'*  *° 
and  communication  with  the  fleet  was  re- 
established, whereby  the  army  could  receive  reinforce- 
ments and  supplies.  If  Johnston  wanted  a  junction 
with  Pemberton  now,  he  must  go  to  Vicksburg  himself. 
Down  to  this  stage  of  this  brilliant  campaign,  the  Fed- 
eral loss  had  been  comparatively  small,  not  over  four 
thousand  men,  if  so  many. 

Grant  now  made  two  attempts  to  take  Vicksburg  by 
assault,  one  on  the  19th  and  another  on  the  22d,  but 
both  failed,  the  latter  with  great  loss.  He  t^  f  a 
was  convinced  thereby  that  he  must  advance  assaults  on 
by  regular  circumvallation.  He  also  felt 
that  he  must  have  more  troops  in  order  to  hold  Pember- 
ton in  Vicksburg,  and  capture  him  there,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  hold  Johnston  with  his  newly  organized 
force  at  bay. 

He  sent  in  every  direction  for  reinforcements,  and  by 
the  12th  of  June  he  had  received  six  new  divisions,  con- 
taining some  forty  thousand  men,  making  Federal  re- 
his  army  nearly  eighty  thousand  strong.  Lroun'd  Vicks^ 

Johnston's  force  at  Jackson  now  numbered  coi^ederate 
nearly  thirty  thousand  men,  and  with  Pem-  strength, 
berton's  thirty  or  thirty-five  thousand  made  a  Con- 
federate army  of  between  sixty  and  seventy  thousand 
with  which  Grant  had  to  deal.  His  approaches  were 
now  within  five  hundred  yards  of  the  Confederate  works 


154  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

at  Vicksbnrg,  but  he  had  only  a  few  siege  guns,  most  of 
his  artillery  being  field  pieces,  and  no  regular  corps  of 
engineers.  He  made  his  mortars,  however,  out  of  the 
trunks  of  trees  bound  with  iron,  and  the  few 
West  Pointers  under  his  command  taught  the 
men  the  art  of  siege  movements  in  the  trenches.  He 
confided  to  Sherman  the  task  of  checking  Johnston's 
approach.  Sherman  stretched  his  line  across  from 
Haines's  Bluff  on  the  Yazoo  to  the  Big  Black,  and 
fortified  it  strongly.  The  rear  of  Grant's  army  was  now 
completely  defended  against  Johnston  by  these  fortifica- 
tions and  the  course  of  the  Big  Black  River. 

By  the  last  of  June  Grant  had  some  two  hundred 
guns  in  position  against  Vicksbiirg,  and  had  pushed 
some  of  his  approaches  to  within  one  hundred  feet  of 
the  Confederate  works. 

The  Confederate  forces  in  Arkansas  had  begun  a  di- 
version for  the  relief  of  Pemberton  during  the  first  half 

Attempt  to  of  the  month.  On  the  9th,  they  approached 
^/lis^'^ffom  Milliken's  Bend,  but  were  repulsed.  Their 
Vicksburg.  commander.  General  Holmes,  now  planned 
an  attack  upon  Helena,  Arkansas.  But  he  was  too  late. 
The  attack  was  made  on  the  day  that  Pemberton  raised 
the  white  flag,  and  was  then  repulsed  with  great  loss. 
Johnston  was  also  too  late  in  his  movements.  He  set 
out  from  Jackson  on  the  29th  and  advanced  as  far  as 
Brownsville,  but  found  that  it  would  be  useless  to  at- 
tempt to  break  the  Federal  lines  from  Haines's  Bluff  to 
the  Big  Black,  and  along  the  course  of  that  river.  Pem- 
berton was  left  to  his  fate.  His  army  was  now  thor- 
oughly exhausted  with  fatigue  and  hunger.  He  knew 
The  capture  ^^^^  ^^  could  not  withstand  the  assault  which 
of  Vickeburg.  ^jjg  ^^q  ]^q  expected  at  any  moment.  On  the 
3d  of  July  he  sought  Grant  and  proposed  surrender. 
The  negotiations  were  concluded  on  the  next  day,  and 


VICKSBURG   AND   PORT   HUDSON  155 

Vicksburg,  with  thirty-two  thousand  men  and  seventy- 
two  cannon,  was  delivered  into  the  hands  of  the 
Federals. 

Grant  now  sent  Sherman  with  some  forty  thousand 
men  to  attack  Johnston.  Upon  hearing  of  the  fall  of 
Vicksburg  Johnston  had  retreated  to  Jack- 
son. Sherman  arrived  in  front  of  the  place  tion  of  Jack- 
on  the  9th  of  July,  and  began  the  investment. 
Johnston  decided  not  to  take  the  chances  of  a  siege,  and 
on  the  16th  evacuated  his  works  and  retreated  toward 
Meridian.  There  had  been  some  fighting  in  front  of 
Jackson,  which  had  demonstrated  to  Johnston  the  tem- 
per and  the  strength  of  his  adversaries. 

Banks  was  also  successful  at  Port  Hudson.  Setting 
out  from  Alexandria  on  the  Eed  Eiver,  May  14th,  he 
brought  his  army  to  Port  Hudson,  and,  on      _.  . 

o  J  '  '  Siege  and 

the  25th,  began  the  siege.     He  had  some  six-  capture  of 

,1  T  1  M      ii       A^.       ,    -.         .         Port  Hudson. 

teen  thousand  men,  while  the  Confederates 
numbered  some  seven  or  eight  thousand.  He  first  un- 
dertook to  carry  the  works  by  assault.  He  made  three 
attempts,  on  the  27th  of  May  and  the  11th  and  14th  of 
June,  but  was  not  successful.  He  then  began  a  regular 
siege.  The  Confederate  General  Taylor  advanced  from 
Western  Louisiana,  captured  Brashear  City  on  the  23d 
of  June  and  threatened  New  Orleans,  but  Banks  pressed 
the  siege.  On  the  6th  of  July  the  news  of  the  fall  of 
Vicksburg  reached  both  armies  at  Port  Hudson.  The 
Confederate  commander.  General  Gardener,  now  real- 
ized the  hopelessness  of  his  situation,  and  on  the  next 
day  surrendered  the  place  with  his  army. 

The  Mississippi  was  at  last  open  again  from  source  to 
mouths  to  the  commerce  of  the  Union,  and     The  resaits 
the  Confederacy  was  cut   squarely  in  two.   on^lhe^j^ssis- 
The  country  west  of  it  was  now  virtually  cut  "pp'- 
off  from  any  further  participation  in  the  conflict  against 


156  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

the  Union.  Besides  this,  the  Confederates  had  lost  be- 
tween sixty-five  and  seventy  thousand  soldiers,  while  the 
Federal  loss  was  only  about  fifteen  thousand.  It  was  the 
most  crushing  blow  which  the  Confederates  had  received, 
one  from  which  they  never  recovered. 


CHAPTER  XXV 

GETTYSBURG 

Lee's  Army  after  Chancellorsville— The  Invasion  of  Pennsylvania 

Hooker  Prevented  by  Halleck  from  Taking  the  Offensive— 

Lee's  Strategy— The  Battle  of  Brandy  Station — Lee's  Plans  at 
Last  Discovered— Hooker  Held  Back  from  Richmond  by  the 
Washington  Authorities— Hooker's  Pursuit  of  Lee— Milroy's 
Defeat  at  Winchester— Halleck's  Plan  for  Cutting  the  Confed- 
erate Army  in  Two — The  Invasion  of  Pennsylvania— Early's 
Rush  for  Harrisburg  Checked  by  the  Federals— The  Move- 
ments of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac— Stuart's  Raid — Hooker's 
Resignation  of  the  Chief  Command— Meade's  Plans — Lee's 
Movement  toward  Gettysburg— Preoccupation  of  Gettysburg 
by  the  Federals— The  Battle  of  Gettysburg— Federal  Defeat 
on  the  First  Day— The  Situation  on  the  Morning  of  the  2d — 
The  Battle  of  the  2d  of  July— The  General  Repulse  of  the 
Confederates— Rectification  of  Lines  During  the  Night  of  the 
2d— The  Battle  of  the  3d— Pickett's  Charge— Federal  Victory 
— The  Losses— The  Cavalry  Battle  between  Stuart  and  Pleas- 
anton— The  Retreat  of  the  Confederates — Federal  Pursuit — 
The  Skirmish  between  Stuart  and  Kiipatrick— Meade's  Appre- 
hensions —  The  Attacks  on  the  Confederate  Trains  —  Lee's 
Manoeuvres — Concentration  of  the  Federals  on  the  Antietam — 
The  Confederates  Escape  into  Virginia— The  Army  of  the 
Potomac  in  Virginia  Again— The  Confederates  Regain  Com- 
munication with  Richmond— The  Weakening  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac — The  Advance  of  the  Federals  to  Culpeper  Court 
House. 

At  tlie  same  time  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  inflicted 
on  the  Confederacy  a  corresponding  defeat.  It  is  true 
that  it  did  not  annihilate  the  Virginia  army  as  did  Grant 
the  army  of  Pemberton,  but  it  hurled  the  invading  Con- 

157 


158  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

federates  back  beyond  the  Potomac  with  enormous  loss 
in  men,  material  and  prestige. 

After  the  victory  of  the  Confederates  at  Chancellors- 

ville,  Lee  brought  back  to  Fredericksburg  Longstreet's 

troops  from  Richmond  and  the  lower  James, 

Lee'e  army  i,,  i  i,.  ,- 

after  Chancel-  and  gathered  around  himself  a  veteran  army 
of  about  eighty  thousand  men.  He  divided 
this  formidable  host  into  three  corps  of  infantry,  under 
the  respective  command  of  Longstreet,  Ewell  and  A.  P. 
Hill.  To  each  of  these  corps  he  attached  about  eighty 
pieces  of  artillery.  Besides  the  three  infantry  corps  of 
over  twenty  thousand  men  each,  Lee  had  some  ten  thou- 
sand splendid  cavalry.  These  he  organized  into  a  single 
corps,  under  the  immediate  lead  of  Stuart.  This  great 
army  of  excellent  soldiers,  flushed  with  victory,  full  of 
faith  in  its  chiefs,  and  puffed  up  with  confidence  in 
itself,  could  not  remain  quietly  behind  Fredericksburg 
when  the  season  should  arrive  which  would  permit  ac- 
tion. The  army  which  watched  it  from  across  the  Eap- 
pahannock  was,  on  the  other  hand,  reduced  in  numbers, 
sceptical  about  the  capacity  of  its  leaders,  and  gloom- 
ily despondent.  It  was  natural,  even  inevitable,  that 
the  Confederate  commanders  should  feel  that  the  mo- 
ment had  arrived  for  a  supreme  effort.  They  resolved 
to  make  the  attempt  to  transfer  the  war  to  the  soil  of 
Pennsylvania.  They  felt  that  they  must  destroy  the 
sources  from  which  the  Federals  drew  their  strength  in 
order  to  reach  a  final  triumph. 

On  the  3d  of  June  Longstreet  started  with  the  first 

corps  for   Culpeper   Court    House,   en  route    for  the 

^   .  Shenandoah  Valley,  and   through    this  for 

Xli6  i  n  V  a- 

eion  of  Penn-  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania.  On  the  4th 
eyvama.  ^^^  .^^^  Ewell  followed,  leaving  only  Hill's 
corps  to  detain  Hooker  before  Fredericksburg. 

The  movements  of  Hill's  troops  in  accomplishing  the 


GETTYSBURG  159 

redispositions  made  necessary  by  the  departure  of  Long- 
street  and  Ewell  excited  the  attention  of  Hooker.  On 
the  5th  he  caused  pontoons  to  be  thrown  across  the 
river  at  Franklin's  Crossing  below  the  town,  and  ordered 
Sedgwick's  corps  to  hold  itself  in  readiness  to  pass  over. 
Hooker's  idea  was  to  make  such  a  demonstration  against 
the  Confederate  lines  back  of  Fredericksburg  as  either  to 
cause  Lee  to  return,  or  to  put  Hill  in  such  a  position  as 
to  make  his  destruction  easy.     But  Halleck      „    , 

•'  Hooker  pre- 

now  ordered  Hooker  to  cover  Washington  vented  by 
and  Harper's  Ferry  against  the  movements  taking  the  of- 
of  Lee.  Hooker  was  thus  prevented  from 
making  any  offensive  movement  himself,  and  was  com- 
pelled to  sit  still  and  watch  the  developments  of  Lee's 
campaign,  the  purpose  and  destination  of  which  were 
naturally,  at  the  moment,  unknown  to  him. 

On  the  6th  Hooker  sent  only  Howe's  division  of  Sedg- 
wick's corps  across  the  river,  and  ordered  his  cavalry, 
now  commanded  by  Pleasanton,  to  make  a  reconnoissance 
toward  Culpeper  Court  House  and  find  out,  if  possible, 
what  was  occurring  in  that  quarter. 

Lee  joined  Longstreet  at  Culpeper  on  the  7th,  and 
immediately  ordered  his  cavalry  to  threaten  the  Federal 
light  wing  in  such  a  way  as  to  produce  the  Le^.g  ^^^^^^ 
impression  on  Hooker  that  a  movement  tow-  ^ss- 
ard  Washington  by  way  of  fatal  Manassas  was  what  was 
in  process  of  execution.  Stuart  started  on  the  morning 
of  the  8th,  and  in  the  evening  arrived  at  a  place  called 
Brandy  Station,  situated  about  midway  between  Cul- 
peper and  the  fords  of  the  Rappahannock,  which  the 
Federal  cavalry  were  at  the  same  time  approaching  on  the 
north  side.  In  the  early  morning  of  the  9th,  the  Fed- 
erals crossed  over  in  two  columns,  one  at  Beverly  Ford 
and  the  other  at  Kelly's  Ford.  The  first  column  was 
composed  of  Buford's  cavalry  division  and  Ames's  bri- 


160  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

-gade  of  infantry  belonging  to  Howard's  corps.  The 
second  column  was  composed  of  the  cavalry  divisions, 
commanded  by  Gregg  and  Duffie,  and  Russell's  brigade 
of  infantry  belonging  to  Sedgwick's  corps.  The  Fed- 
eral force  numbered  some  seven  or  eight  thousand 
cavalry,  and  three  or  four  thousand  infantry.  Stuart 
had  about  ten  thousand  cavalry  and  some  twenty-five  or 
thirty  pieces  of  artillery.  Pleasan ton's  plan  was  for 
both  columns,  except  Duffie's  cavalry,  to  move  on 
Brandy  Station,  and  for  Duflfie  to  go  to  Stevensburg  on 
the  road  between  Chancellorsville  and  Culpeper,  and 
find  if  the  Confederates  were  marching  along  this  road. 
Buford's  column  had  hardly  crossed  at  Bev- 

The   battle 

of  Brandy  erly  before  it  struck  Stuart's  outposts.  The 
Federal  cavalry  began  a  vigorous  attack. 
They  were  at  first  successful,  but  Stuart  soon  came  up 
with  the  larger  part  of  his  entire  force  and  checked  the 
victors. 

At  this  moment,  the  other  Federal  column,  which 
had  crossed  at  Kelly's  Ford,  approached  Stuart's  rear. 
Stuart  left  two  brigades  in  front  of  Buford,  and  went 
with  the  remainder  of  his  troops  to  meet  this  new  force 
led  by  Gregg.  By  this  time  Gregg  had  captured  Stuart's 
head-quarters  on  Fleetwood  Hill  and  dispersed  the  troops 
that  had  been  left  to  guard  it.  With  double  Gregg's 
numbers,  Stuart  now  threw  himself  upon  the  victorious 
Federals  and  beat  them  back.  Before  being  obliged  to 
withdraw  from  the  commanding  eminence,  however, 
Gregg  had  seen  Ewell's  division  marching  toward 
Brandy  Station,  and  in  the  effects  of  Stuart,  which  had 
been  captured,  were  found  plans  and  instructions 
which  showed  that  Lee's  army  was  moving  toward  the 
Shenandoah  Valley,  and  that  Stuart  was  executing  a 
demonstration  against  Manassas  to  cover  Lee's  move- 
ments.    Pleasanton  had  thus  obtained  what  he  wanted. 


GETTYSBURG  161 

and  he  withdrew  his  forces  to  the  north  side  of  the  river 
about  nightfall,  and  sent  his  information  to  Hooker. 

Hooker  wanted  now  to  throw  himself  on  Hill,  crush 
him,  and  open  the  way  to  Richmond.  But  Lincoln 
and  Halleck,  consumed  with  their  old  fear 
about  the  safety  of  Washington,  would  not  at  last  discov- 
agree  to  the  plan,  despite  the  fact  that  they 
had  a  garrison  of  forty  thousand  men  in  and  around  the 
capital.  Hooker  must  follow  Lee  whithersoever  the  lat- 
ter might  choose  to  go. 

It  was  all  in  vain  that  he  referred  to  the  Washington 
garrison,  to  Keyes's  corps  needlessly  remaining  at  Suf- 
folk, to  the  troops  under  Milroy  and  Tyler  Hookerheid 
at  AVinchester  and  Harper's  Ferry,  together  Rfchmond°b? 
an  army  of  seventy  thousand  men  or  more,  to^n^^uthori- 
which  might  be  assembled  at  Washington,  ^^^• 
while  he  might  advance  upon  Richmond,  where  there 
were  not  more  than  ten  thousand  men.  The  General- 
in-Chief  at  Washington  put  his  foot  down  upon  any 
such  plans  and  insisted  obstinately  upon  the  covering  of 
Washington  by  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  as  the  prime 
element  in  any  campaign  which  Hooker  might  under- 
take, and  that  too  without  giving  him  command  of  any 
of  the  seventy  thousand  men  above  mentioned. 

On  the  11th,  Hooker  began  to  follow  Lee.  He  sent 
Sickles's  corps  up  the  Rappahannock  to  a  point  near 
Beverly  Ford,  Reynolds's  corps  to  Bealeton 
and  Howard's  corps  to  Catlett's,  remaining  pj^g^^^fX! 
himself  with  about  half  the  army  at  Fal- 
mouth. Ewell's  corps,  composed  of  Jackson's  old  sol- 
diers, accompanied  by  the  cavalry  brigades  of  Imboden 
and  Jenkins,  formed  Lee's  advance.  They  passed 
through  the  Blue  Ridge  at  Chester  Gap  and  reached  the 
Shenandoah  on  the  12th.  His  first  object  was  to  crush 
Milroy,  with  his  division  of  some  seven  thousand  men. 
Vol.  II.  -11 


162  THE   CIVIL   AVAR 

at  Winchester.     Milroy  was  in  utter  ignorance  of  what 

was   impending.      On    the    13th,    Ewell's   advance   ap- 

Miiro  '8  de-  P^oached  Winchester.     Milroy  thought  that 

feat  at  Win-  it  was  a  mere  cavalry  raid.     He  posted  about 

Chester.  *'.  ^ 

five  thousand  of  his  troops  south  of  the 
town,  leaving  the  rest  in  the  intrenchments.  In  a  skir- 
mish during  the  lute  afternoon,  he  took  a  few  Confed- 
erate prisoners,  and  from  these  he  learned  that  Ewell's 
entire  corps  was  in  front  of  him.  Still  he  did  not  re- 
treat from  Winchester.  General  Schenck,  who  was  his 
immediate  superior,  had  ordered  him  to  defend  Win- 
chester, and  he  supposed  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
was  closely  following  the  Confederates.  He  simply  con- 
centrated all  his  forces  in  the  town  and  in  the  forts,  and 
awaited  Ewell's  pleasure.  During  the  14th  the  Confed- 
erates placed  their  artillery  in  position  to  batter  the 
works,  and  about  six  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  they  made 
the  assault.  The  chief  fortification  was  quickly  carried, 
but  night  now  intervened  and  stopped  the  battle.  Un- 
der the  cover  of  the  darkness  Milroy  undertook  to  escape 
in  the  direction  of  Martinsburg,  but  he  was  intercepted 
at  Eocktown  by  Johnson's  division  of  Ewell's  corps, 
and  his  force  was  completely  broken  up  and  routed. 
Some  of  his  soldiers  reached  the  Potomac  at  Hancock, 
and  others,  with  Milroy  himself,  reached  Harper's  Ferry, 
About  one-half  of  the  men  of  his  division  were  lost. 

By  this   time   Hooker's   entire  army  was   marching 

toward  Manassas  and  Fairfax  Court  House,  and  Hill  had 

„  ,,     ,,    left  Fredericksburg  to  ioin  Lee  in  the  Shen- 

Halleck's  °         •' 

plan  for  cut-  andoali.     Lincoln  and  Halleck,  after  learn- 

ting  the  Con-    .  •    t-i       m  ttt- 

federate  army  mg  of  Ewcli  s  presence  at  \V  inchester  and 
the  rout  of  Milroy,  wanted  Hooker  to  try  to 
cut  Lee's  long  column  in  two  somewhere.  But  events 
followed  too  rapidly  now  to  permit  of  any  movement  of 
that  kind.    On  the  15th,  Jenkins's  cavalry  entered  Penn- 


GETTYSBURG  163 

sylvania  and  reached  Chambersburg,  but  immediately 
returned  to  Williamsport  on  the  Potomac,  where  Ewell 
was  waiting  for  Longstreet  and  Hill  to  come  up.  It 
was  quite  evident  now  that  the  invasion  of  Maryland, 
and  probably  of  Pennsylvania,  was  intended.  On  the 
17th,  19th  and  20th,  Pleasanton  ran  upon  j,^^  inva- 
the  Confederate  cavalry  at  Aldie,  and  near  eion  of  Penn- 

Bylvama. 

Middleburg  and  Ashby's  Gap,  and  drove  them 
in.  Some  of  Buford's  scouts  climbed  to  the  summits  of 
the  Blue  Eidge,  and  saw  Lee's  whole  army  marching 
toward  the  Potomac.  Up  to  this  time  Stuart's  move- 
ments had  confused  Hooker  somewhat  as  to  Lee's  ulti- 
mate purpose,  but  now  his  object  was  tolerably  clearly 
revealed. 

General  Couch  was  now  sent  in  great  haste  to  Harris- 
burg  to  organize  the  Pennsylvania  militia  for  the  protec- 
tion of  that  city  and  Philadelphia,  while  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  was  pushed  on  toward  the  Potomac.  On 
the  20th  and  21st,  Ewell's  corps  crossed  the  river  at 
Shepherdstown,  and  occupied  Sharpsburg  and  Hagers- 
town.  Lee  now  ordered  Ewell  to  push  on  to  Harris- 
burg.  On  the  24th,  Ewell's  troops  were  in  Chambers- 
burg. They  immediately  moved  on  toward  Harrisburg, 
the  divisions  of  Johnson  and  Kodes  marching  by  the 
direct  route,  and  Early's  division  going  by  way  of  Get- 
tysburg. On  the  27th,  Johnson  and  Kodes  reached 
Carlisle,  and  Early  passed  through  Gettysburg,  e7i  route 
for  York,  while  Longstreet  and  Hill  occupied  Cham- 
bersburg. On  the  28th,  Early  arrived  in  York,  while 
the  scouts  of  Johnson  and  Rodes  had  reached  the 
banks  of  the  Susquehanna,  and  were  examining  the 
approaches  to  Harrisburg. 

Early's  next  move  was  to  have  been  the  seizure  of  the 
bridge  across  the  Susquehanna  at  Wrightsville,  over 
which  he  intended  to  throw  his  division  with  great  ra- 


164  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

pidity  and  march  upon  Harrisburg  by  the  east  bank  of 
the  river.  At  this  juncture,  however,  the  fortune  of  the 
Early's  rush  Confederates  began  to  fail  them.  A  detach- 
chedfed^bythe  "^ent  of  Federal  troops  succeeded  in  burning 
Federals.  ^he  bridge  at  Wrightsville,  and  Early's  ad- 
vance was  thus  stopped  at  the  bank  of  the  river. 

From  the  24th  to  the  27th  inclusive,  the  different 
corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  succeeded  in 
The  move-  Crossing  the  Potomac  at  or  near  Edwards's 
Army  of  the  Ferry  and  had  seized  Turner's  and  Cramp- 
Potomac.  ton's  Passcs  in  South  Mountain.  They  were 
marching  in  the  same  general  direction  as  the  Confed- 
erates, with  the  South  Mountain  range  between  them  and 
the  two  Confederate  corps  led  by  Longstreet  and  Hill.' 

Lee  had  strangely  allowed  Stuart  to  leave  his  right 
flank  on  the  24th  and  make  an  attempt  to  ride  around 
Hooker's  army  and  join  the  Confederate  col- 
umn again  in  Maryland.  Stuart  expected  to 
accomplish  this  exploit  in  three  days,  but  on  account  of 
Hooker's  rapid  movements  northward,  he  was  obliged  to 
make  a  much  wider  detour  east  and  north,  and  did  not 
reach  Lee  again  for  more  than  a  week.  Deprived  of 
the  protection  of  his  cavalry,  Lee's  movements  were  ex- 
posed now  to  the  reconnoissances  of  the  Federal  cavalry, 
which  both  kept  watch  of  his  advance  and  veiled  the 
movements  of  Hooker.  He  did  not  learn  that  the  Fed- 
erals had  crossed  the  Potomac  for  forty-eight  hours  after 
it  had  happened.  Moreover  he  had  now  the  difficulties 
to  contend  with  which  the  Federals  had  suffered  under 
in  Virginia.  He  did  not  know  the  country,  and  the  in- 
habitants would  give  him  no  information,  while  they 
gave  notice  of  his  movements  to  the  Federals. 

At  this  juncture  a  most  important  event  happened  in 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  army  was,  on  the  27th, 
concentrated  in  Maryland  between  the  Monocacy  River 


'    GETTYSBURG  165 

and  South  Mountain.  The  extreme  left  was  within  reach 
of  Hcirper's  Ferry,  where  there  was  a  Federal  garrison  of 
some  twelve  thousand  men,  at  the  time  com-  Hooker's 
manded  by  General  French.  Hooker  wanted  [^I'S^om* 
to  send  Slocum's  corps  through  South  Moun-  ™*'*'^- 
tain,  join  French's  troops  with  it,  making  a  force  of 
about  thirty  thousand  men,  march  them  up  the  Cum- 
berland Valley,  in  Lee's  rear,  cut  thus  Lee's  communica- 
tions, and  force  him  to  fight  on  ground  chosen  by  the 
Federals.  He  felt  that  he  could  keep  this  force  in  easy 
connection  with  the  rest  of  his  army  on  the  east  side  of 
South  Mountain  range.  Of  course  this  plan  involved 
the  evacuation  of  Harper's  Ferry,  which,  on  account  of 
Lee's  presence  in  Pennsylvania,  was  a  useless  post,  as 
Hooker  viewed  it.  But  Halleck  absolutely  forbade  the 
abandonment  of  Harper's  Ferry,  except  in  case  of  su- 
preme necessity,  and  Hooker  did  not  feel  that  the  move- 
ment up  the  Cumberland  Valley  would  be  successful 
without  the  aid  of  the  troops  under  French.  He  had 
been  balked  so  many  times  by  Halleck,  that  he  now  felt 
that  his  resignation  was  desired.  He  sent  it  to  Wash- 
ington on  the  evening  of  the  27th,  and  on  the  next  day 
Meade  was  appointed  to  take  the  chief  command.  It  is 
certainly  a  demoralizing  thing  to  chaiige  commanders  at 
a  critical  moment,  such  as  this  was,  unless  reasons  of  great 
weight,  derived  from  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  re- 
quire it.  It  was  true  that  the  army  had  lost  very  largely 
its  confidence  in  Hooker  at  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville, 
but  he  had  certainly  done  well  during  the  movements  of 
the  fortnight  just  passed,  and  was  beginning  to  win  back 
that  confidence. 

It  is  pretty  sure  that  the  President  and  General  Hal- 
leck thought  his  plans  too  risky,  and  considei-ed  the  situ- 
ation too  serious  for  brilliant  enterprises.  In  the  light 
of  succeeding  events,  it  is  probable  that  the  substitution 


166  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

of  Meade  for  Hooker,  at  this  juncture,  was  no  mistake. 
Meade  was  certainly  more  careful  and  prudent  than 
Hooker,  and  the  situation  seemed  to  require  his  quali- 
ties more  than  those  of  his  brilliant  friend. 

Meade  agreed  with  Halleck  in  regard  to  the  matter  of 
not  abandoning  Harper's  rerr}^  and  deemed  it  wise  to 
M  e  a  d  e '  B  keep  the  entire  Army  of  the  Potomac  between 
plans.  Lee's  army  and  Washington  and  Baltimore. 

He,  therefore,  marched  his  army  on  substantially  parallel 
lines  with  Lee's  advance  in  the  direction  of  Harrisburg. 
He  marched  in  three  columns.  His  left  was  composed 
of  the  corps  of  Reynolds  and  Howard,  his  centre  of  the 
corps  of  Sickles  and  Slocum,  and  his  right  of  the  corps 
of  Hancock  (Couch's  old  corps),  Sykes  (Meade's  old 
corps),  and  Sedgwick.  His  left  wing  was  therefore 
nearest  to  the  corps  of  Longstreet  and  Hill,  on  the  west 
side  of  the  South  Mountain  range,  while  his  right  wing 
was  marching  almost  directly  against  Earljr's  division, 
now  in  the  neighborhood  of  York. 

On  the  29th  General  Eeynolds  received  information 

which  led  him  to  surmise  that  Lee  was  moving  through 

the   South  Mountain  passes  east  of  Cham- 

meut  toward  bersburg  in  the  direction  of  Gettysburg.     It 

ttys  urg.  iQQ]je(j  as  if  Lge  yfQj-Q  trying  to  lead  the  corps 
of  Longstreet  and  Hill  into  a  position  where  Swell's 
troops  could  easily  form  a  junction  with  them. 

Reynolds's  line  of  march  lay  through  Gettysburg,  and 
he  decided  to  push  Buford's  cavalry  quickly  forward  to 
occupy  the  place  before  the  advance  guard  of  the  Con- 
federates could  arrive. 

When  Buford  reached  the  place,  about  midday  of  the 
Preoccnpa-  30th,  he  found  a  detachment  of  Confeder- 

bS^o-^^b^^the  ^^®^  ^^  ^^®  '"'^^^  ^^^®  °^  *^®  town,  and  drove 
Federals.  them  off.  They  belonged  to  Hill's  corps, 
which  was  already  at  Cashtown.     Meade  now  ordered 


GI<]TTYSI}URG  167 

Reynolds  to  proceed  at  once  to  Gett3^sbnrg  with  his 
own  corps  and  that  of  Howard.  Before  they  arrived 
Lee  had  pushed  Hill's  corps  forward  from  Cashtown 
to  drive  Buford  back  and  occupy  the  place.  But 
Buford,  who  had  taken  in  at  a  glance  the  advantages  of 
the  location,  immediately  seized  the  ridge  lying  west  of 
the  town,  called  Seminary  Kidge,  and  resolved  to  hold  it 
until  Eeynolds  could  arrive.  Buford  saw  that  the  hills 
and  ridges  on  the  south-east  of  the  town,  called  Ceme- 
tery Eidge  and  Hill,  offered  the  strongest  positions,  but 
Reynolds  was  advancing  up  the  Emmetsburg  road  in  the 
valley,  which  ran  along  the  west  side  of  Cemetery  Ridge, 
and  between  Cemetery  and  Seminary  Ridges,  and  unless 
Buford  should  hold  Seminary  Ridge,  and  keep  back  the 
Confederates  to  the  west  of  it  until  Reynolds  should  ar- 
rive, the  Confederates  would  take  Reynolds's  troops  on 
their  exposed  left  flank  as  they  marched  up  the  valley. 
Buford  quite  correctly,  therefore,  saw  that  Seminary 
Ridge  must  be  held  by  his  own  force  alone  until  Rey- 
nolds should  arrive.  He  had  about  five  thousand  men 
with  whom  to  resist  the  onslaught  of  Heth's  entire  di- 
vision, made  in  the  early  morning  of  the  1st  The  battle 
of  July.  For  two  hours  the  battle  raged,  ofOettysbm-g. 
and  the  Confederates  slowly  pressed  forward,  when  sud- 
denly the  advance  division  of  Reynolds's  corps,  led  by 
the  brave  general  himself,  appeared,  and  began  to  climb 
the  ridge.  They  had  not  succeeded  in  getting  into  po- 
sition before  the  Confederate  line  struck  them,  and  in 
the  attempt  to  place  his  men,  under  such  disadvantage, 
Reynolds  fell  and  instantly  expired.  His  troops,  how- 
ever, drove  the  Confederates  back,  and  held  the  Em- 
metsburg road  open  until  the  remainder  of  the  corps  and 
the  divisions  of  Howard's  corps  arrived.  By  virtue  of 
seniority,  Howard  now  took  chief  command,  while  Dou- 
bleday  succeeded  to  the  immediate  command  of  Rey- 


168  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

nolds's  corps.  He  immediately  posted  his  troops  so  aa 
still  to  keep  open  the  Emmetsburg  road,  and  sent  word 
to  Sickles  and  Slocum  to  hurry  up. 

Ewell's  troops  were  now,  however,  approaching  from 
the  north  and  north-east,  and  threatened  the  Federals  in 
Federal  de-  ^^^^  ^^^  ^^^^-  ^hc  part  of  the  Federal 
feat  on  the  line  which  they  were  advancing  upon  was 
composed  of  Howard's  men,  now  commanded 
by  Schurz.  At  the  moment  when  Doubleday  was  suc- 
cessfully resisting  another  onset  from  the  west,  Early's 
division  of  Ewell's  corps  came  rushing  down  the  road 
from  Heidlersburg,  struck  Schurz  in  the  right  flank, 
and  routed  the  entire  corps.  Doubleday  was  now  forced 
back,  and  the  remnants  of  the  two  Federal  corps  drew 
slowly  back  to  the  strong  ground  on  Gulp's  Hill  and 
Cemetery  Hill. 

At  this  moment  of  defeat,  in  the  late  afternoon,  Han- 
cock arrived  on  the  scene  of  battle.  He  had  been  sent 
forward  by  Meade  to  take  command  of  the  two  corps  at 
Gettysburg.  After  placing  the  troops  and  artillery  in 
position  to  defend  the  new  line,  he  was  reinforced  by 
the  arrival  of  the  corps  of  Sickles  and  Slocum.  Lee 
had  not  followed  up  his  success  vigorously,  but  had  de- 
cided to  wait  on  Seminary  Hill  and  in  the  village  of 
Gettysburg  for  Longstreet  to  come  up.  He  did  not 
immediately  close  the  Emmetsburg  road,  and  the  cen- 
tral column  of  the  Federal  army,  composed  of  the  corps 
of  Sickles  and  Slocum,  came  unhindered  up  to  the 
Cemetery  Eidge  during  the  night  of  the  1st. 

Hancock  immediately  transferred  the  command  to 
Slocum,  and  set  out  for  Taneytown  to  find  Meade 
and  give  him  personal  information  in  regard  to  the 
situation.  He  met  his  own  corps  a  few  miles  from  the 
battle-field  and  placed  it  within  easy  supporting  dis- 
tance. 


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The  Country  from  the  Potomac  to  Harrisburg. 


GETTYSBURG  169 

The  two  corps  commanded  by  Sykes  and  Sedgwick 
were,  however,  some  twenty  or  thirty  miles  away, 
Sykes  near  Hanover,  and  Sedgwick  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  Manchester.  Meade  arrived  at  Cemetery  Hill 
about  midnight,  and  Sykes's  troops  came  up  about  ten 
o'clock  in  the  forenoon  of  the  2d.  The  entire  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  with  the  exception  of  Sedg-  The  situa- 
wick's  corps,  was  now  concentrated  on  the  moming  'of 
hills  and  ridges  south-east  and  south  of  Get-  ^'^^^d. 
tysburg,  under  the  command  of  its  general-in-chief ;  and 
the  entire  Confederate  army  under  Lee,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  some  six  or  seven  thousand  men  of  Longstreet's 
corps  and  Stuart's  cavalry,  was  concentrated  on  Seminary 
Eidge  and  in  the  village  of  Gettysburg.  The  Federal 
line  extended  from  Gulp's  Hill,  on  the  right,  to  Little 
Round  Top,  on  the  left,  forming  a  curve  with  the  con- 
vex side  to  the  Confederates,  having  thus  the  advantage 
of  shorter  interior  connections.  Slocum  was  on  the  ex- 
treme right ;  then  came  Newton,  now  in  command  of 
Reynolds's  corps ;  then  Howard  and  Hancock,  with 
Sykes  in  reserve  behind  them  ;  and  lastly.  Sickles  on 
the  extreme  left.  Sickles's  troops  extended  from  the 
south  base  of  Cemetery  Ridge  to  Little  Round  Top. 
He  did  not  occupy  this  eminence,  but  threw  his  troops 
forward  toward  the  Emraetsburg  road  on  to  a  slight 
elevation  called  the  Peach  Orchard.  This  was  the  weak 
point  in  the  Federal  line.  It  was  a  much  longer  dis- 
tance than  that  covered  by  any  other  corps,  and  the  line 
bent  outward  making  the  curve  here  rather  concave  tow- 
ard the  Confederates  than  convex.  The  Confederates 
were  quick  to  discover  the  vulnerable  point,  and  made 
their  attack  just  there.  The  Confederate  line  reached 
from  Benner's  Hill,  opposite  Gulp's  Hill,  through  the 
village  of  Gettysburg,  and  along  Seminary  Ridge  to  a 
point  opposite  Little  Round  Top.     Ewell's  corps  com- 


170  THE  CIVIL   WAR 

posed  their  left  wing,  Hill's  their  centre,  and  Long- 
street's  their  right. 

The  Confederates  began  the  battle  in  the  afternoon 

of  the  2d   by  an  attempt  to  seize  Little  Round  Top. 

Law's  and   Robertson's    brigades  of  Long- 

T  h  e  battle 

of  the  2d  of  street's  corps  were  ordered  forward  to  the 
^^'  attack.     They  were  met  by  Ward's  and  De 

Trobriand's  brigades  of  Sickles's  corps.  A  most  obsti- 
nate conflict  followed,  in  which  the  Federals  were  grad- 
ually pressed  backward,  on  account  of  the  thinness  of 
their  line  and  the  superiority  in  numbers  of  the  Con- 
federates. Meade  himself  now  ordered  one  division  of 
Hancock's  corps  and  Sykes's  whole  corps  to  support  this 
part  of  the  line.  Having  some  doubt  of  the  wisdom  of 
Sickles's  selection  of  positions,  he  had  sent  General  War- 
ren to  look  over  the  ground,  and  select  new  points,  if 
he  should  find  better  ones.  Warren  recognized  at  once 
the  necessity  for  occupying  Little  Round  Top,  and  suc- 
ceeded in  leading  a  regiment  of  Sykes's  corps  to  the  sum- 
mit of  the  hill  just  in  time  to  prevent  a  Confederate 
detachment  from  taking  possession  of  it.  Vincent's 
brigade  of  the  same  corps  and  Hazlitt's  battery  and  then 
Weed's  brigade  arrived  soon  afterward,  and  this  most 
important  position  was  saved  to  the  Federals.  Sedg- 
wick's corps  now  came  up  and  took  the  reserve  position 
which  Sykes's  corps  had  occupied,  so  that  the  whole  of 
Sykes's  troops  could  go  into  the  battle.  The  Confeder- 
ates now  hurled  two  of  Longstreet's  finest  brigades, 
commanded  by  Barksdale  and  Wofford  against  Sickles's 
men  in  the  Peach  Orchard,  and  succeeded  in  pushing 
them  back.  In  the  struggle  Sickles  himself  was  so  se- 
verely wounded  that  he  was  compelled  to  transfer  the 
command  to  the  general  of  his  first  division,  Birney. 

Lee  had  ordered  Ewell  to  attack  the  right  wing  of  the 
Federals  so  soon  as  he  heard  Longstreet's  cannon,  but 


GETTYSBURG  171 

an  adverse  wind  carried  these  sounds  in  the  contrary 
direction,  and  Ewell's  troops  had  remained  quietly  in 
position.  By  this  time,  however,  that  is,  near  five 
o'clock,  Hill  began  to  execute  his  movement  against  the 
Federal  centre,  and  Ewell  taking  the  sound  of  Hill's 
guns  as  his  notice,  advanced  to  the  assault  of  the  forces 
on  Gulp's  Hill.  He  sent  Johnson's  division  for  this 
purpose,  but  it  was  promptly  repulsed.  Johnson  now 
attempted  to  turn  Gulp's  Hill  by  marching  through  the 
gorge  to  the  east  of  it.  At  the  same  moment,  the  Gon- 
federates  made  their  last  supreme  effort  of  the  day  to 
break  through  the  Federal  line  between  Gemetery  Eidge 
and  Little  Round  Top.  Hancock,  now  in  command  at 
this  point,  succeeded  in  establishing  a  new  line  running 
direct  from  the  base  of  Gemetery  Ridge  to  Little  Round 
Top,  some  distance  back  of  Sickles's  first  line  through 
the  Peach  Orchard.  This  he  defended  successfully 
against  the  advancing  Gonfederates.  He  even  extended 
this  line  to  the  Devil's  Den  and  Great  Round  Top  on 
the  extreme  left.  The  Gonfederates  were  now  repulsed 
all  along  the  line  :  Johnson  in  the  gorges  ^j^^  ^^^^^j 
of  Rock  Greek,  Rodes  and  Early  in  front  of  repulse  of  the 

.  Conieaerates. 

Cemetery  Hill,  Anderson's  division  of  Hill's 
corps  in  front  of  the  Federal  centre,  and  McLaws's  di- 
vision of  Longstreet's  corps  in  front  of  the  Federal  left. 
They  had,  however,  gained  some  ground,  and  when  the 
night  of  the  second  day  of  the  great  battle  came  on,  it 
was  still  doubtful  which  party  would  be  finally  victo- 
rious. The  losses  on  both  sides  had  been  enormous,  but 
as  the  Federal  army  outnumbered  by  twenty  thousand 
that  of  the  Gonfederates,  it  could  better  afford  the  dim- 
inution of  forces. 

During  the  night  of  the  2d  the  Federals  rectified  their 
lines  and  made  ready  for  the  attack  which  they  felt  the 
Confederates  would  deliver  on  the  next  day.     The  rein- 


172  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

forcements  which  had  been  drawn  from  the  right  to  sup- 
port the  left  were  largely  returned  to  the  right  in  order 

Kectiflcation  to  prevent  the  Confederates  from  turning 
theiHlwS  the  Union  right  through  the  defiles  of  Kock 
^^  Creek  to  the  east  of  Culp's  Hill.     Several 

brigades  of  Sedgwick's  corps  were  also  sent  to  the  same 
part  of  the  line.  Newton  and  Howard  still  held  Cemetery 
Eidge  and  Hill.  Sickles's  troops,  who  had  suffered  so 
severely,  were  drawn  back  into  the  position  of  reserve, 
while  Hancock's  men  took  their  place  in  front,  and 
Sykes's  men  were  firmly  planted  on  the  Round  Tops. 

The  Confederates  strengthened  Johnson  in  his  posi- 
tion to  the  east  of  Culp's  Hill,  and  their  line  in  front 
of  Cemetery  Ridge  was  also  strengthened  by  the  arrival 
of  Pickett's  splendid  division  of  Virginians.  It  was 
evident  that  the  Confederates  were  going  to  make  a 
desperate  attempt  to  turn  the  Union  right  and  seize  the 
road  from  Gettysburg  to  Baltimore  in  their  rear,  and  in 
aid  of  this  movement  would  make  another  attack  upon 
the  Federal  left  to  prevent  any  help  being  sent  from 
that  quarter  toward  the  right. 

The  battle  began  again  on  the  morning  of  the  3d  on 
the  extreme  Federal  right,  where  Johnson  was  attempt- 

The  battle  ^^^S  ^^  ^^^^  ^^^^  troops  around  Culp's  Hill, 
of  the  3d.  Again  and  again  did  he  hurl  Jackson's  old 
soldiers  against  the  obstacles  in  his  way  to  the  Baltimore 
road,  but  the  Federal  artillery  mowed  them  down 
mercilessly  and  the  soldiers  of  AVilliams  and  Sedgwick 
would  not  yield  the  ground.  By  noon  the  Confederate 
strength  was  exhausted  in  this  quarter,  and  their  thinned 
ranks  were  driven  back  across  the  valley  and  the  creek. 
The  battle  on  the  right  was  about  over,  before  that  on 
the  left  and  centre  was  opened  again.  Longstreet's 
men,  except  Pickett's  division,  having  sustained  the  loss 
and  fatigue  of  the  struggle  of  the  2d  in  this  quarter,  it 


Gettysburg— Final  Attack  of  the  First  Day,  and  Battle  of  the  Second  Day." 

•  The  first  day's  battle  is  represented  north  of  the  Fairfield  and  Hanover  roads.     The 
second  day's  battle  south  of  the  same  roads. 


GETTYSBURG  173 

was  decided  by  the  Confederates  to  make  the  attack 
with  Pickett's  division,  strengthened  by  some  six  or 
seven  brigades  of  Hill's  corps.  Nearly  one  hundred  and 
fifty  pieces  of  Confederate  artillery  were  trained  upon 
the  Federal  position  to  be  attacked,  with  the  purpose  of 
silencing  the  Federal  guns  which  swept  the  ground  in 
front  of  it.  It  was  about  half-past  one  in  the  afternoon 
when  the  fire  from  this  artillery  opened.  It  was  im- 
mediately answered  by  the  Federals,  who  had  planted 
some  eighty  pieces  of  fine  ordnance  at  this  point  in 
their  line.  For  an  hour  the  terrific  roar  of  more  than 
two  hundred  cannon  went  on,  when  gradually  the  Fed- 
erals ceased  firing.  The  Confederates  thought  that  the 
Federal  batteries  were  silenced,  and  prepared  to  make 
the  infantry-charge  upon  the  position.  This  pickett's 
was  what  the  Federals  wanted.  And  they  ^^"s®- 
had  ceased  firing  to  invite  it  and  prepare  to  receive  it. 
Nearly  fifteen  thousand  of  the  finest  Confederate  in- 
fantry now  rushed  forward  upon  the  Federal  line  on 
the  southern  declivity  of  Cemetery  Hill.  The  Federals 
allowed  them  to  approach  within  good  grape  and  canister 
range,  and  then  opened  upon  them  a  most  murderous 
fire  from  the  batteries,  with  terrible  effect ;  but  on  they 
came  without  faltering  up  to  the  musket  shot  line  of 
the  Federal  infantry.  Thousands  and  tens  of  thousands 
of  rifles  now  belched  forth  their  deadly  contents.  The 
carnage  was  terrible,  but  still  the  brave  Virginians 
rushed  on.  Up  to  and  over  the  first  line  of  intrench- 
ments  they  went,  striking  Gibbon's  frontline  with  great 
force  and  driving  part  of  it,  in  a  hand  to  hand  conflict, 
back  upon  the  second  line.  They  could  not,  however, 
break  the  second  line.  Decimated  and  exhausted,  they 
now  began  to  falter  and  to  yield.  Hill's  brigade  had 
not  sustained  Pickett  very  closely  and  the  daring  Vir- 
ginians  were  left  almost    alone    within    the    Federal 


174  THE   CIVIL    WAK 

position.  Overwhelmed  and  almost  surrounded,  it  be- 
came a  matter  of  sauve  qui  peut.  More  than  two-thirds 
of  the  entire  division  had  been  killed  or  wounded. 
Only  Pickett  and  one  other  of  the  general  and  field 
officers  remained  unhurt.  The  remnants  of  this  once 
Federal  vie  Splendid  body  of  troops  now  fled  in  great 
tory.  disorder  down  the  slope  and  across  the  valley, 

followed  by  Hill's  troops,  who  had  supported  them  so 
badly.  The  great  battle  was  over.  The  Confederate 
army  had  failed,  and  from  that  moment  the  Confederacy 
was  a  sinking  cause. 

The  losses  on  both  sides  were  enormous.  Nearly  fifty 
thousand  men  were  placed  hors  de  combat, 
about  equally  divided. 

During  the  time  that  the  battle  was  raging  in  front  of 
Hancock,  Stuart  had  attempted  to  flank  the  Union 
The  cavalry  forccs  by  the  east  and  take  possession  of  the 
s'fua^tTnd  ^'^^^  ^^  Westminster,  so  as  to  cut  off  the  way 
pieasanton.  ^f  retreat  in  case  of  a  Confederate  victory. 
But  Pleasanton's  men  were  on  the  watch  for  him,  and  in 
a  bloody  encounter  checked  the  dangerous  movement. 

The  Federals  were  too  much  exhausted  to  pursue 
their  vanquished  foes,  and  the  Confederate  army  drew 
its  bleeding  columns  back  to  a  defensive  posi- 
oftheConfed-  tioii  Oil  Seminary  Ridge,  preparatory  to  the 
erates.  retreat  through  the  defiles  of  South  Moun- 

tain. In  the  late  afternoon  of  the  4th,  in  the  midst 
of  a  downpour  of  rain,  this  movement  began.  Hill's 
corps  leading  the  way,  Longstreet's  in  the  middle,  and 
Ewell's  soldiers  bringing  up  the  rear.  The  retreat  was 
directed  toward  the  bridge  across  the  Potomac  left 
standing  by  Lee  some  four  or  five  miles  below  Williams- 
port,  and  some  twenty  miles  above  Harper's  Ferry.  Lee 
sent  his  wagons  in  two  trains,  one  by  Cashtown  and  the 
other  by  Fairfield. 


GETTYSBURG  17^ 

Kilpatrick  started  out  in  the  early  morning  of  the 4th  to 
feel  the  movements  of  the  Confederates.  He  went  first 
to  Emmetsburg,  but  finding  no  traces  of  them  Federal 
there,  and  concluding,  therefore,  that  they  poi'suit. 
were  making  no  effort  to  turn  the  Federal  left,  but  were 
really  in  retreat,  he  turned  his  column  westward,  with 
the  purpose  of  striking  the  road  leading  from  Gettysburg 
to  Hage rsto wn  through  Fairfield.  He  came  into  this 
road  at  Fountain  Dale  in  the  early  evening,  a  few  hours 
after  the  Confederate  wagon  train  had  passed  through. 
By  a  rapid  pursuit  he  overtook  this  train  before  mid- 
night, captured  and  burned  a  part  of  it,  and  then  hur- 
ried on  to  Hagerstown  in  advance  of  Lee's  army.  Some 
of  his  men  entered  the  place  during  the  morning  of  the 
5  th,  thus  severing  Lee's  communications  with  Virginia. 
Already  on  the  3d,  a  detachment  of  cavalry  from 
French's  force  at  Frederick,  having  learned  that  the 
bridge  below  Westport  was  feebly  guarded,  had  sur- 
prised the  few  Confederates  left  there,  dispersed  them 
and  destroyed  the  bridge  ;  and  the  heavy  rain  of  the 
night  of  the  4th  was  now  raising  the  waters  of  the  river 
so  rapidly  that  fording  would  soon  be  impossible.  It 
seemed  as  if  prompt  and  vigorous  movements  on  the 
part  of  the  Federals  must  result  in  the  destruction  of 
the  Confederate  army. 

Lee  himself  was  at  the  moment  ignorant  of  the  mor- 
tal danger  which  impended  over  him.  But  his  capable 
and  energetic  lieutenant,  Stuart,  discovered  The  skir- 
almost  immediately  the  movements  of  Kil-  "tn^r^tTnd 
patrick,  and  set  out  in  pursuit  of  him.  The  Kilpatrick. 
two  cavalry  forces  collided  at  Smithburg,  and  after 
a  sharp  skirmish  the  Confederates  drew  off,  to  go  in 
search  of  the  column  of  infantry  coming  from  Fairfield, 
and  protect  the  retreat. 

The  main  body  of  the  Confederate  infantry  was,  ii\ 


176  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  late  afternoon  of  the  6th,  between  Fairfield  and  the 
pass  through  South  Mountain,  on  the  Fairfield  and 
Meade's  ap-  Hagerstown  road.  Meade  had  now  the  best  of 
prehensions,  opportunities  to  attack  the  long  column  in 
flank  and  cut  it  in  two.  But  the  Federal  chief  did  not 
dare  to  risk  an  attack.  Instead  of  this,  he  began  march- 
ing his  army  along  the  east  side  of  South  Mountain  in 
the  general  direction  of  Middletown,  where  he  purposed 
to  make  a  new  concentration  of  his  forces.  On  the  6th 
the  advance  of  the  Confederate  infantry  reached  Ha- 
gerstown, and  passed  on  toward  the  Potomac. 

Meade  now  knew  that  the  bridge  below  Williamsport 
was  destroyed,  and  that  the  river  was  no  longer  fordable. 
His  infantry  force  was  now  about  double  that  under  the 
command  of  Lee,  and  its  morale  was  much  better.  Still 
he  did  not  incline  to  incur  the  chances  of  an  attack.  He 
was  afraid  of  spoiling  his  victory  at  Gettysburg,  and 
of  uncovering  Washington.  His  plan  was,  therefore,  to 
keep  his  army  between  the  Confederates  and  Washing- 
ton, but  out  of  striking  distance. 

Only  the  energetic  cavalry  leaders,  Buford  and  Kil- 

patrick,  made  strong  efforts  to  destroy  the  Confederate 

trains.      In  this  attempt  they  fought  two 

The  attacks  •/  o 

ontheConfed-  sharp  little  engagements  on  the  6th  at 
erate trams.  Hagerstown  and  near  Williamsport,  with 
Stuart  and  Imboden,  in  which,  however,  the  Confed- 
erates succeeded  in  beating  them  off  and  saving  their 
trains. 

Lee  now  ordered  his  cavalry  to  make  a  strong  demon- 
stration in  order  to  keep  Meade  on  the  east  side  of  South 

Lee's  ma-  Mountain  and  give  the  Confederate  army  time 
noeuvres.  ^q  cross  the  Potomac.  The  Federal  division 
under  General  Kelley,  resting  above  Hancock,  had  also 
to  be  watched. 

Meade,  at  the  same  time,  began  to  manifest  some  inten- 


GETTYSBURG  177 

tion  to  attack  before  the  swollen  waters  of  the  Potomac 
should  subside.  He  ordered  his  forces  to  march  through 
the  South  Mountain  passes  and  concentrate  concentra- 
on  the  Antietam.  This  was  eliected  on  the  9th  plder^aL' on 
and  10th.  Lee  met  this  threatening  move-  the  Antietam. 
ment  by  placing  his  army  in  a  good  defensive  position  in 
front  of  Williamsport,  and  throwing  up  intrenchments. 
On  the  11th,  Meale  advanced  his  troops  in  line  for  battle 
about  a  mile.  On  the  12th,  it  seemed  as  if  the  struggle 
would  be  opened  again.  The  Washington  authorities 
were  urging  another  battle,  and  the  troops  were  anxious 
for  it ;  but  Meade  still  hesitated.  The  13th  passed  unim- 
proved ;  and,  during  the  night,  the  Confederates  began 
to  cross  the  Potomac  on  a  hastily  constructed  bridge,  and 
by  the  fords,  which  had  now  become  passable  again. 
Before  the  night  of  the  14th  the  whole  of 

TheConfed- 

Lee's  army  was  safely  over  and  collected  on  crates  escape 
the  south  bank  of  the  river.  Lee  had  ma-  ^°  **  ""gima. 
nceuvred  with  great  skill,  and  this,  with  the  indecision 
of  his  adversary,  had  effected  his  escape  from  what  ap- 
peared to  be  a  fatal  position.  The  army,  the  people  of 
the  North,  and  the  Washington  Government  were  greatly 
disappointed  and  displeased.  Meade  was  made  to  feel 
the  general  discontent  so  keenly  that  he  asked  to  be  re- 
lieved of  the  chief  command.  The  President,  however, 
felt  too  grateful  for  what  he  had  done  at  Gettysburg  to 
show  him  any  lack  of  sympathy  or  the  least  unkindness. 
He  declined  to  relieve  him,  and  the  General  began  to 
withdraw  the  troops  to  the  east  side  of  the  mountain 
range,  in  order  to  keep  the  army  between  Lee  and 
Washington. 

The  Federal  army  now  crossed  the  Potomac,    and 

took  possession  of  the  more  northern  passes  of  the  Blue 

Ridge.     Meade's  plan  was  to  march  southward  on  the 

east  side  of  these  mountains,  and,  while  covering  Wash- 

VoL.  II.— 13 


178  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

ington,  threaten  Lee's  communications  with  Richmond. 
Lee  divined  the  purpose  of  tlie  Federal  movements  im- 
TheArmyof  mediately,  and  by  rapid  and  precise  march- 
inVi^°g?nfa  i^g  ^6  passcd  his  troops  through  Chester 
again.  q^^  .^^^^  ^|-jg  gg^pg  fj^j-ther  south  before  Meade 

could  arrive  in  front  of  their  eastern  outlets. 

By  the  25th,  two  of  the  three  Confederate  corps  were 
at  Culpeper,  and  the  other  was  at  Madison.     The  com- 
munications with  Richmond  were  thus  com- 

The    Con- 

federates  re-  pletely  protected,  and  the  plan  of  the  Fed- 
nfcation"with  eral  General  to  interrupt  them  had  failed. 

c  ™oi»  •  Meade  now  turned  his  columns  toward  War- 
renton  Junction  as  a  new  point  of  concentration,  while 
Lee  drew  his  army  back  behind  the  Rapidan  in  order  to 
be  in  easy  reach  of  Chancellorsville  and  Fredericks- 
burg. In  these  positions,  the  two  armies  rested  during 
the  month  of  August. 

The  riots  in  some  of  the  Northern  cities,  notably 
in   New  York,   caused  by  the  attempt  to  enforce  the 

The  weak-  conscription  law,  passed  March  3d  (1863), 
Army  of  the  ^^"^  made  it  necessary  to  send  some  of  the 
Potomac.  troops  under  Meade  to  these  cities,  and  the 
movements  around  Chattanooga  caused  the  Richmond 
Government  to  order  one  of  Lee's  corps,  that  com- 
manded by  Longstreet,  to  Northern  Georgia.  These 
things,  with  the  great  exhaustion  in  both  armies  after 
the  active  work  of  the  spring  and  summer,  made  this 
period  of  rest  both  necessary  and  grateful  to  both  parties. 
So  soon,  however,  as  Meade  learned  of  Longstreet's 
departure  for  the  south-west,  he  resolved  to  advance 
again.  Between  the  13th  and  loth  of  Sep- 
of  the  Feder-  tcmbcr,  he  occupied  the  country  between  the 
er  "court  Rappahannock    and    the    Rapidan,   and   es- 

*'"^^"  tablished  head-quarters  at  Culpeper    Court 

House.     While  perfecting  here  the  plans  for  further 


GETTYSBURG  179 

movements,  the  defeat  of  Rosecrans  at  Chickamauga  oc- 
curred. This  occasioned  a  halt,  from  the  necessity  of 
sending  reinforcements  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
to  Chattanooga.  The  two  strong  corps  of  Howard  and 
Slocum  were  ordered  from  Washington  to  go  imme- 
diately to  the  rescue  of  Rosecrans. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

THE  CHICKAMAUGA-CHATTANOOGA   CAMPAIGN 

Rosecrans's  Advance  against  Bragg,  and  Burnside's  Advance  toward 
Knoxville — Morgan's  Raid  into  Indiana  and  Ohio — The  Capture 
of  Morgan  and  His  Raiders — Bragg's  Retreat  to  Chattanooga — 
Burnside's  Occupation  of  Knoxville — The  Evacuation  of  Chat- 
tanooga by  the  Confederates — Position  and  Strength  of  the 
Federals — The  Confederate  Line — The  Battle  of  Chickaraauga 
— The  Disaster  to  the  Federal  Right  Wing — The  Federal  Retreat 
— The  Losses — The  Advance  of  the  Confederates  on  Chatta- 
nooga, and  the  Beginning  of  the  Siege — Reinforcements  for 
Chattanooga  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  from  Vicks- 
burg — General  Grant  Ordered  to  Cairo  —  The  Situation  at 
Chattanooga  in  the  Last  Days  of  September,  and  Wheeler's 
Raid— Grant  and  Sherman  en  route  for  Chattanooga — Opening 
of  the  Line  of  Communication  between  Bridgeport  and  Chatta- 
nooga— Seizure  of  Brown's  Ferry  by  the  Federals — Battle  be- 
tween Hooker  and  Longstreet — Longstreet's  Expedition  against 
Knoxville — The  Siege  of  Knoxville — Sherman's  Arrival  in 
Chattanooga  and  the  Plan  of  Operations  Fixed — The  Federal 
Reconnaissance  of  the  23d — The  Battle  of  Lookout  Mountain 
— The  Capture  of  Lookout  Mountain,  and  the  Crossing  of  the 
Tennessee  by  Sherman's  Troops — The  Battle  of  Missionary 
Ridge — The  Federal  Victory — The  Losses — Grant's  Attempt  to 
Relieve  Burnside — The  Pursuit  of  Bragg's  Forces — The  Con- 
federate Attack  upon  Knoxville — Sherman's  March  to  Knox- 
ville— Longstreet's  Retreat  from  Knoxville,  and  the  Entry  of 
Sherman's  Army — The  Pursuit  of  Longstreet — Disposition  of 
the  Armies  in  Northern  Georgia  and  East  Tennessee  During  the 
Winter  of  1863-64. 

Fkom  the  battle  of  Stone's  River  to  the  1st  of  June 
Rosecrans  had  done  little  more  than  reorganize  and  re- 

180 


CHICKAMAUGA-CHATTANOOGA    CAMPAIGN      181 

equip  his  forces,  so  greatly  decimated  and  fatigued  by 
that  exhausting  campaign.  By  the  close  of  Kogecrans's 
June  he  was,  however,  pressing  upon  Bragg's  advance 
forces  along  the  line  of  Duck  River.  At  the  and  Bum- 
same  time  three  divisions  of  Burnside's  Army  vance  toward 
of  the  Ohio,  commanded  by  General  Hartsuff,  °^"'  ^' 
were  advancing  from  South-eastern  Kentucky  on  Knox- 
ville. 

Bragg  became  immediately  aware  of  these  move- 
ments, and  planned  to  delay  them,  at  least,  by  a  strong 
diversion  in  the  Federal  rear.  He  selected  the  bold 
partisan  John  Morgan  for  the  purpose. 

On  the  2d  of  July,  Morgan  effected  the  crossing  of  the 
Cumberland  above  Nashville  with  a  fine  body  of  cavalry, 
some  twenty-five  hundred  strong.  He  im-  Morgan's 
mediately  came  into  collision  with  a  troop  l**^®™?'^^^ 
of  Federal  horse  belonging  to  the  command  of  Federal  a  d  - 

V£II1CG 

General  Judah,  and  drove  them  back.  This 
event  gave  notice  of  Morgan^s  presence  in  Kentucky,  and 
the  Federal  commanders  in  this  section  began  to  concen- 
trate their  scattered  forces  in  pursuit  of  him.  Morgan 
rode  straight  on  toward  Louisville,  fighting  several  skir- 
mishes, some  successfully  and  others  unsuccessfully, 
until  he  reached  a  point  some  twenty  miles  south  of 
the  city,  and  then,  to  the  confusion  of  his  pursuers,  he 
turned  westward  and  went  to  Brandenburg  on  the  Ohio 
River.  Here  he  captured  some  boats  and  crossed  with 
his  men  over  into  Indiana.     This  was  July  8th. 

Bragg  had  forbidden  Morgan  to  cross  this  river,  but 
the  wilful  chieftain,  calculating  on  a  victory  for  Lee  in 
Pennsylvania,  of  whose  defeat  he  had  not  ^.^  ^.^.^ 
yet  heard,  and  counting  upon  the  sympathy,  into  Indiana 
if  not  the  positive  assistance,  of  the  peace 
men,  or  copperheads  as  they  were  called,  along  the 
border,   determined,    upon  his  own   responsibility,   to 


182  THE   CIVIL   WAIt 

make  the  bold  attempt  to  ride  up  the  north  bank  of  the 
Ohio,  and  join  Lee  in  Pennsylvania. 

After  getting  into  Indiana,  Morgan  learned  of  the  de- 
feats of  the  Confederates  at  Vicksburg  and  Gettysburg. 
He  now  recognized  the  desperate  character  of  his  situa- 
tion. He  quickly  saw,  however,  that  there  was  nothing 
left  for  him  to  do  except  to  attempt  to  go  up  the  Ohio 
to  a  point  above  navigation  and  ford  the  stream  into 
Virginia.  The  Ohio  was  now  closed  to  him  by  the  gun- 
boats. The  militia  of  Indiana  and  Ohio  were  gathering 
to  attack  him,  and  the  cavalry  brigades  of  Judah  and 
Hobson  were  in  pursuit  of  him.  On  the  13th,  Morgan 
reached  the  boundary  line  between  Indiana  and  Ohio, 
with  Hobson  only  forty  miles  behind  him,  and  Judah's 
force  ascending  the  river  on  transports  to  intercept 
him.  By  means  of  a  clever  diversion  against  Hamil- 
ton, he  succeeded  in  attracting  Burnside's  attention 
from  Cincinnati  to  this  point,  then,  crossing  the 
Miami  Eiver  much  lower  down,  he  seemed  to  threaten 
Cincinnati.  Whereupon  Burnside  drew  his  troops 
stationed  on  the  outskirts  into  the  city,  as  Morgan 
had  calculated  he  would,  and  the  Confederates  slipped 
by,  a  few  miles  northward,  unmolested.  Judah  now 
proceeded  up  the  Ohio  Kiver  still  farther  with  his 
boats,  while  Hobson  continued  the  pursuit  from  be- 
hind. 

Morgan  was  headed  for  Buffington  Ford,  a  place  on 
the  river  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles  eastward 
from  Cincinnati.  The  ford  is  above  the  rapids  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Kanawha,  which  usually  prevent  further 
ascent  by  steamers  in  the  summer  season.  By  most  pro- 
digious efforts  and  excellent  manoeuvring,  Morgan 
reached  this  point  on  the  18th,  ahead  of  his  pursuers. 
To  his  consternation,  however,  he  found  the  river  so 
full  of  water  as  to  allow  the  passage  of  the  gun-boats  over 


CniCKAMAUGA-CHATTANOOGA    CAMPAIGN      183 

the  rapids,  and  to  make  fording  extremely  dangerous. 
His  only  course  was  to  go  higher  up.  His  men  were 
now  utterly  exhausted,  and  he  was  obliged  to  give 
them  a  few  hours  of  rest.  The  delay  thus  caused  was 
fatal. 

On  the  morning  of  the  19th  the  Federals  were  upon 
him.  Judah,  who  had  disembarked  a  little  lower  down 
the  river,  came  into  his  rear,  and  Hobson, 

T  T  c  XT  11-         The  capture 

descending  from  Jackson,  appeared  on  his  ofMorganand 
left  flank,  while  the  gun-boat  Morse  barred  ^'*^  ^^^' 
the  river.  About  one-half  of  his  command  surrendered. 
He,  with  the  other  half,  went  farther  up  the  stream  to 
the  ford  at  Belleville.  Here  about  half  of  these  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  over  into  West  Virginia.  Morgan,  how- 
ever, was  still  left  on  the  northern  side  of  the  Ohio. 
With  this  last  remnant  of  his  fine  force,  he  fled  farther 
up  the  river,  pursued  by  Shackelford^s  cavalry.  He 
tried  to  cross  at  Blennerhassett's  Ford  on  the  19th,  but 
a  Federal  boat  intercepted  him.  He  fled  onward,  toward 
the  north  now,  coming  into  contact  with  Federal  detach- 
ments and  losing  his  men.  At  last  with  a  few  trusty 
followers  he  was  captured  by  Shackelford's  cavalry  at 
New  Lisbon,  on  the  26th,  a  place  which  is  nearly  west 
from  the  point  where  the  Ohio  River  crosses  the  Pennsyl- 
vania line.  Although  Morgan's  force  was  thus  destroyed, 
except  the  three  hundred  men  who  crossed  at  Belleville, 
and  finally  reached  Knoxville,  yet  this  bold  achievement 
did  much  to  delay  the  movements  of  Burnside  and  Rose- 
crans  on  Knoxville  and  Tullahoma  ;  and  it  gave  time  for 
the  transfer  of  Longstreet's  troops  from  Virginia  to  Bragg 
before  a  battle  could  be  forced  by  the  Federals.  What 
it  might  have  accomplished,  if  Lee  had  only  been  vic- 
torious at  Gettysburg,  we  can  only  imagine. 

By  a  well-planned  and  well-executed  series  of  manoeu- 
vres   Rosecrans,  in   the  fortnight    between  the  23d  of 


184  THE    CIVIL    WAR 

June  and  the  6th  of  July,  forced  Bragg  to  evacuate  bis 

positions  along  Duck  Kiver  and  fall  back  upon  Chatta- 

Bragg'9  re-  ^ooga.    He  ulso  inflicted  upon  Bragg's  array, 

treat  to  Chat-   during  the  movement,  a  loss  of  some  two 

tanooga.  ^ 

thousand  men  and  much  war  material,  while 
himself  losing  not  over  five  hundred  men. 

Burnside  with  a  force  of  some  twenty  thousand  men, 
called  the  Array  of  the  Ohio,  now  advanced  frora  Lex- 
ington in  Kentucky  to  the  relief  of  East  Tennessee, 
which  district,  on  account  of  its  loyalty  to  the  Union,  had 
been  raade  to  suffer  raost  severe  hardships  during  the 
long  Confederate  occupation.  The  Confederate  General 
Buckner  was  in  comraand  of  nearly  twenty  thousand 
men  in  and  around  Knoxville.  Burnside's  raen  being 
largely  raounted  traversed  the  country  between  Lexing- 
ton and  the  gaps  of  the  Cumberland  Mountains  very 
rapidly.  He  seized  upon  these  without  much  opposi- 
tion, and  by  the  1st  of  September  he  was  at  Kingston. 
On  the  3d  he  entered  Knoxville,  Buck- 
occupation  of  ner's  forces  having  hastily  retreated  before 
hira,  one  part  of  thera,  under  the  personal 
command  of  Buckner,  going  toward  Chattanooga,  and 
the  other  part,  led  by  General  Jones,  going  toward  Ab- 
ingdon in  Virginia.  A  few  days  later  Burnside's  forces 
captured  Cumberland  Gap,  taking  the  entire  garrison 
prisoners  of  war. 

At  the  sarae  time,  Rosecrans,  by  a  series  of  clever 
movements,  which  made  Bragg  think  that  he  was  trying 
to  join  Burnside  above  Chattanooga  and  come  down 
upon  this  place  from  the  north-east,  and  drew  Bragg's 
attention  in  that  direction,  succeeded  in  throwing  his 
own  army,  almost  unmolested,  across  the  Tennessee 
River,  and  in  seizing  the  mountain  ridges  to  the  south- 
east of  Chattanooga. 

Bragg  was  thus  forced  to  evacuate  Chattanooga  in 


CHICKAMAUGA-CHATTANOOGA    CAMPAIGN      185 

order  to  prevent  the  severing  of  his  connections  with 
Dalton,  and  that  part  of  the  Confederacy  Theevacaa- 
Ivinff  east  of  the  Alleghanies.     On  Septem-  tion  of  chatta- 

J      f^  »  ....  nooga  by  the 

ber  9th,  a  brigade  of  Crittenden  s  division  confederates, 
occupied  Chattanooga. 

Rosecrans  supposed  that  Bragg  was  retreating  upon 
Atlanta.  He,  therefore,  ordered  McCook,  in  command 
of  his  right  wing,  to  march  direct  to  Sum-  Rosecrans's 
merville,  Thomas,  with  the  centre,  to  La  {"ueVi^lit  JS 
Fayette,  and  Crittenden,  with  the  left,  to  B^agg. 
Einggold.  The  length  of  the  Federal  line  from  the 
extreme  right  to  the  extreme  left  was  thus  about  fifty 
miles.  It  was  a  dangerous  situation,  and  Rosecrans 
would  never  have  placed  his  army  in  it  except  for  the 
belief  that  Bragg  was  in  full  retreat  toward  Atlanta. 
In  this  he  was  destined  soon  to  find  that  he  was  wofully 
mistaken.  In  fact,  Bragg  had  seized  on  and  was  firmly 
holding  the  first  point  at  which  Rosecrans  could  con- 
centrate his  army  after  passing  it  through  the  gaps  of 
Lookout  Ridge,  viz.,  LaFayette,  a  place  some  thirty 
miles  south  from  Chattanooga. 

It  was  at  this  juncture  that  Longstreet^s  soldiers  be- 
gan to  arrive  and  also  reinforcements  from  Johnston  in 
Mississippi.  Bragg^s  force  was  now  increased  ,J^^^^  arrival 
to  nearly  sixty  thousand  men.  He  now  out-  gt^t^g^'c^ros 
numbered  Rosecrans  by  some  five  thousand  from  Virginia, 
men.  He  had  already  attempted  to  take  advantage  of 
the  scattered  condition  of  the  Federals,  but  his  ofiicers 
were  out-manoeuvred  by  the  Union  generals,  and  Rose- 
crans succeeded  in  concentrating  his  army,  about  the 
17th  of  September,  along  the  west  bank  of  the 
Chickamauga  River  in  the  neighborhood  of  strensthofthe 
Gordon's  Mills.  Rosecrans  had  also  received 
reinforcement.  Granger's  division  had  come  to  him. 
The  two  armies  were  now  nearly  equal  in  numbers. 


186  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

On  the  18th,  Bragg  began  his  movement  for  turning 
the  Federal  left,  and  placing  himself  between  the  Fed- 
eral army  and  Chattanooga.  A  powerful  Confederate 
column  moved  down  the  east  bank  of  the  Chickamauga 
and  forced  a  passage,  thus  almost  placing  itself  between 
the  Federal  left  wing,  under  Crittenden,  and  Chatta- 
nooga. The  Federals  were,  however,  aware  of  the  peril 
which  impended.  During  the  night  of  the  18th-19th, 
the  Federal  centre,  under  Thomas,  was  brought  around 
to  the  left  of  Crittenden  and  the  Federal  right  wing  was 
moved  into  the  position  vacated  by  Thomas.  The  left 
wing  of  the  Federal  army  was  now  composed  of  Thomas's 
corps,  the  centre  of  Crittenden's  and  tlie  right  of 
McCook's.  By  this  movement  Rosecrans  again  covered 
Chattanooga.  The  Federal  army  was  now  in  order  of 
battle,  as  has  been  just  described,  with  the  modification 
that  Negley's  division  of  Tiiomas's  corps  was  on  Critten- 
den's right,  and  Granger's  division  was  in  reserve. 

The  Confederate  army  was  organized  into  two  wings, 
the  right  commanded  by  Polk,  and  the  left,  at  first,  by 

TheConfed-  Hood.  The  battle  began  about  nine  o'clock  in 
erate  line.  ^he  moming  of  the  19th.  The  Confederates 
were  still  pursuing  their  plan  for  turning  the  Federal 

Thebattieof  l^ft  and  Seizing  the  road  to  Chattanooga. 
Chickamauga.  gy|;^  g^g  ^g  havc  sccn,  it  was  right  here  that 
Rosecrans  had  succeeded  in  placing  his  best  troops, 
commanded  by  his  most  capable  lieutenant.  All  day 
long  the  battle  raged,  chiefly  at  this  point,  but  the  Fed- 
erals stood  their  ground  and  inflicted  a  decided  repulse 
upon  the  Confederates,  The  necessities  of  the  battle 
had,  during  the  day,  drawn  Palmer's  division  of  Crit- 
tenden's corps  and  Johnson's  division  of  McCook's  corps 
to  the  aid  of  Thomas,  and  in  the  night  of  the  19th-20th 
Rosecrans  sent  Negley's  division  also  to  him.  This  left 
Crittenden  with  only  two  divisions  in  the  centre  and 


CHICKAMAUGA-CHATTANOOGA   CAMPAIGN      187 

McCook  with  only  two  divisions  on  the  right.  Thomas 
had  six  divisions  on  the  left.  The  centre  and  right 
were,  however,  drawn  a  little  closer  toward  the  left, 
and  breastworks  of  felled  trees  were  constructed  chiefly 
in  front  of  Thomas.  On  the  side  of  the  Confederates, 
the  chief  change  made  during  the  night  of  the  19th  was 
in  consequence  of  the  arrival  of  Longstreet  in  person 
with  the  remainder  of  his  troops.  Bragg  placed  him  in 
command  of  his  left  wing,  instead  of  Hood,  and  sent 
Polk  reinforcements  led  by  Breckenridge.  He  still 
adhered  to  his  plan  of  turning  the  Union  left. 

The  battle  was  re-opened  about  ten  o'clock  in  the 
morning  of  the  20th.  Still  the  efforts  of  the  Con- 
federates could  effect  nothing  against  Thomas.  It 
seemed,  however,  to  both  Thomas  and  Eosecrans  that 
almost  the  whole  Confederate  army  was  assailing  that 
part  of  the  Federal  line,  and  Thomas  urgently  requested 
Eosecrans  to  strengthen  him  still  further.  Eosecrans 
now  made  the  unfortunate  move  which  lost  him  the 
battle.  He  ordered  Van  Clove's  division  of  Crittenden's 
corps  and  Sheridan's  division  of  McCook's  corps  to 
march  toward  Thomas's  position.  This  movement  left 
the  right  wing  of  the  Federal  army  weak  and  attenuated. 

Longstreet  with  his  fine  troops  from  Virginia  was  now 
opposite  this  part  of  the  Federal  line,  watching  for  the 
opportune  moment  to  overwhelm  it.  It  Thedisaster 
came  quickly,  and  as  usual  bv  a  misunder-  t9  the  Federal 

''■  •'  •'  nght  wing. 

standing  of  orders.  Eosecrans  instructed 
Wood's  division  of  Crittenden's  corps  to  close  up  on 
Eeynolds's  division  of  Thomas's  corps.  "Wood  was  con- 
fused by  the  order,  since  Brannan's  division  of  Thomas's 
corps  was  between  his  own  division  and  that  of  Eey- 
nolds's. He  at  last  interpreted  the  order  to  mean  that 
he  should  go  to  the  support  of  Eeynolds.  He  was  even 
then  skirmishing  with  the  Confederates  advancing  upon 


188  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

his  front,  but  he  suddenly  withdrew  his  division  from 
the  line  in  order  to  pass  behind  Brannan  and  go  to  the 
support  of  Eeynolds.  This  left  an  open  space  in  the 
Federal  line  between  Brannan  and  Davis's  division  of 
McCook's  corps,  the  only  division  left  on  the  right 
wing.  Davis  attempted  to  fill  it  up  by  extending  his 
line  toward  Brannan,  but  Longstreet  was  too  quick  for 
him.  He  poured  his  fresh  troops  through  the  gap  in 
the  line,  attacked  the  Federals  in  flank  and  rear,  and  in- 
flicted a  terrible  defeat  upon  the  right  wing  almost  be- 
fore its  commanders  knew  what  had  happened  to  them. 
The  column  of  fugitives  rushed  toward  Chattanooga,  by 
way  of  McFarland's  Gap,  driving  along  with  it  all  the 
officers,  who  were  struggling  in  vain  to  restore  order, 
McOook,  Crittenden,  Davis,  Sheridan,  and  the  rest. 
Even  Eosecrans  himself  was  swept  along,  and  seemed  to 
have  lost  not  only  control  of  the  army,  but  control  of 
himself.  He  stopped  at  Rossville  long  enough  to  send 
back  word  to  Thomas  to  take  full  command  on  the  battle- 
field, and  then  proceeded  to  Chattanooga  to  prepare  a 
place  of  refuge  for  his  broken  forces. 

Meanwhile  Thomas  had  gone  toward  the  right  in  per- 
son and,  ably  assisted  by  Brannan,  had  so  reformed  the 
centre  and  placed  its  detachments  in  favorable  positions 
as  to  check  somewhat  the  Confederate  advance.  At  the 
same  moment  Granger  came  up  with  his  reserve  division, 
and  with  a  fresh  supply  of  ammunition.  The  Confed- 
erates were  now  repulsed  with  considerable  loss.  They, 
however,  renewed  their  attack  on  the  Federal  left,  and 
the  battle  gradually  extended  again  along  the  whole  line. 

This  was  the  situation  when  Rosecrans's  chief  of  staff, 

General  Garfield,  delivered  to  Thomas  the  communica- 

The  Federal  tion  from  the  commander-in-chief .     Thomas 

retreat.  interpreted  these  instructions  as  a  command 

to  retreat  to  Chattanooga  as  quickly  as  the  movement 


CHICKAMAUGA-CHATTANOOGA   CAMPAIGN      189 

could  be  safely  accomplished.  During  the  night,  there- 
fore, he  brought  his  troops  successfully,  but  with  diffi- 
culty, back  to  Rossville,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  21st 
the  entire  army  was  in  temporary  safety  in  and  around 
Chattanooga. 

The  losses  on  both  sides  had  been  terrible.  The 
Federal  killed  and  wounded  numbered  nearly  twelve 
thousand  men,  and  in  addition  thereto  about 

Thfi  losses 

five  thousand  of  the  Unionists  were  captured. 
The  Confederate  killed  and  wounded  reached  a  some- 
what higher  figure.     They  lost,  however,  but  few  pris- 
oners. 

So   soon   as   Bragg  was  certain  that  Eosecrans   had 
stopped  his  retreat  behind  the  fortifications  of  Chatta- 
nooga, he  prepared  himself  to  begin  the  siege. 
On  the  23d,  the   right   of   his   army,  com-  oftheConfed- 

erateson 

manded  by  Polk,  occupied  Missionary  Eidge,  Chattanooga, 
while  Longstreet  threw  out  the  left  wing  so  vLg  of  ^fhe 
as  to  rest  upon  that  part  of  Lookout  Moun-  ^'^^^' 
tain  next  to  the  Tennessee  Eiver,  around  the  base  of 
which  ran  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Eailroad,  over 
which  line  Eosecrans^s  army  received  its  supplies.  This 
line  was  now  cut,  and  Eosecrans  was  obliged  to  haul  his 
supplies  in  wagons  from  Jasper  up  the  Sequatchie  Valley 
and  then  across  Walden  Eidge  to  Chattanooga.  This 
was  practicable  in  the  early  autumn,  but  when  the  rains 
of  the  late  autumn  and  winter  should  set  in,  the  already 
execrable  roads  would  become  entirely  impassable.  Of 
course  this  long  line  from  Jasper  would  be,  at  all  times, 
exposed  to  the  raids  of  the  Confederate  cavalry.  It  was 
thus  entirely  evident  that  Eosecrans's  army  would  be 
starved  in  Chattanooga,  unless  relieved  quickly  from 
without.  The  authorities  at  Washington  were  fully 
aware  of  the  situation,  and  they  set  themselves  to  work 
to  provide  the  relief. 


190  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

On  the  24th  of  September  they  started  Hooker  with 
the  corps  of  Howard  and  Slocum,  taken  from  the  Army 
Reinforce-  of  the  Potomac,  to  Chattanooga.  These 
Chattanooga  splendid  troops,  about  twenty  thousand 
my'^of^th'e  Strong,  arrived  at  Bridgeport,  about  thirty 
ftom™  vicks*  miles  west  from  Chattanooga,  the  last  of  the 
burg.  month.     Of  course  they  could  go  no  farther 

at  the  moment.  Longstreet's  forces  were  between  them 
and  Chattanooga. 

Already  ten  days  before  the  battle  of  Chickamauga, 
Halleck  had  telegraphed  Grant,  at  Vicksburg,  to  send 
all  the  troops  he  could  spare  to  Memphis  by  boat,  and 
march  them  from  Memphis  to  Tuscumbia  in  Alabama. 
He  appeared  to  think  that  Bragg  would  flank  Rosecrans 
by  the  south-west  and  move  up  again  into  Middle  or  West 
Tennessee.  It  was  four  days  after  the  battle  that  Grant 
received  this  order.  Grant  was  suffering  from  a  fall 
from  his  horse,  but  he  immediately  set  to  work  to  obey 
the  order.  He  collected  six  of  the  nine  divisions  of  his 
army  at  Memphis,  and  about  the  10th  of  October,  this 
large  force,  led  by  Sherman,  began  to  move  eastward. 
Meanwhile  Grant  himself  had  been  ordered  to 
Grant  ordered  go  to  Cairo.  When  he  arrived  there,  he  met 
to  Cairo.  ^j^g  Secretary  of  War,  who  had  brought  to 

him  from  the  President  his  appointment  to  the  com- 
mand of  all  the  troops  west  of  the  Alleghanies  and 
east  of  the  Mississippi.  These  were,  at  the  moment, 
organized  into  four  distinct  bodies,  viz.:  Grant's  old 
Army  of  the  Tennessee,  Eosecrans's  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland, Burnside's  Army  of  the  Ohio,  and  Hooker's 
two  corps  at  Bridgeport.  Grant  was  now  charged  with 
the  great  work  of  relieving  Chattanooga  from  Bragg's 
investment,  and  he  had  all  the  forces  of  the  Union,  be- 
tween the  Alleghanies  and  the  Mississippi,  at  his  com- 
mand for  its  accomplishment. 


CHICKAMAUGA-CHATTANOOGA   CAMPAIGN       191 

The  situation  at  Chattanooga  was,  indeed,  becoming 
very  critical.  On  the  26th  of  September,  Wheeler  started 
from  the  banks  of  the  Chickamanga  to  go 

°  o  The    sitna- 

up  the  Tennessee  in  order  to  cross  over  into  tion  at  chat- 
Rosecrans's  rear,  and  destroy  the  Federal  sup-  the  last  days 

,      .       .  -J?  T  ,  1        o         of  September, 

ply-trams  commg  from  Jasper  up  the  he-  and  wheei- 
quatchie  Valley  and  over  Walden  Eidge.  ®'"^'"*^  • 
He  drove  the  Federal  cavalry  across  the  Hiawassee  at 
Charleston  and  forced  them  back  upon  and  across 
the  Tennessee  at  Loudon.  These  actions  of  the  Fed- 
erals made  him  quite  certain  that  they  were  not  sup- 
ported by  Burnside,  and  that  Burnside  was  remaining 
quietly  in  Knoxville,  instead  of  advancing  toward 
Chattanooga  in  aid  of  Rosecrans.  Thus  assured,  he 
crossed  his  own  forces  over  the  Tennessee  about  the  1st 
of  October.  He  immediately  proceeded  to  Pikeville  in 
the  Sequatchie  Valley  and  started  down  the  Valley  tow- 
ard the  point  where  the  wagon  road  from  Jasper  turns 
out  of  the  Valley  southward,  across  Walden  Ridge,  in 
the  direction  of  Chattanooga.  The  Federals  now  di- 
vined his  purpose,  and  Crook  with  his  cavalry  brigade 
followed  from  above,  while  General  Dan  McCook  with 
another  cavalry  brigade  started  from  Bridgeport  up  the 
Sequatchie  Valley  to  meet  him.  Wheeler  now  divided 
his  force,  sending  a  part  of  it  under  Wharton  to  McMinn- 
ville,  which  place  was  also  a  depot  of  Federal  supplies. 
Wheeler  calculated  that  Crook  would  pursue  this  body 
and  leave  him  free  to  go  down  the  Sequatchie  in  search 
of  Rosecrans's  trains  from  Jasper.  In  this  jy 
he  was  correct.     He  succeeded  in  meeting,   of  the  Federal 

,       .  It,-  L    J.      •         £  supply-train. 

capturing  and  burning  a  great  tram  of  sev- 
eral hundred  wagons,  loaded  with  supplies,  before  Crook 
could  overtake  him  or  McCook  head  him  off.     McCook 
arrived  in  time  to  view  the  smoking  ruins,  and  drove 
Wheeler  back  up  the  valley.     Wheeler,  however,  soon 


192  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

turned  out  of  the  Valley  northward  toward  McMinn- 
ville.  He  rejoined  Wharton's  detachment  near  this 
place,  and  entered  the  town,  capturing  and  destroying 
the  Federal  stores  here  also.  He  now  directed  his 
course  toward  Murfreesborough,  a  still  more  important 
Federal  depot.  Crook  was,  however,  in  hot  pursuit, 
and  so  admirably  did  the  General  manoeuvre  his  forces 
as  to  get  into  Murfreesborough  in  advance  of  Wheeler. 
McCook  was  now  also  on  Wheeler's  track.  The  Confed- 
erate partisan  had,  however,  accomplished  his  work  and 
he  retreated  hastily  across  the  Tennessee  near  Florence. 
Eosecrans's  army  was,  by  the  loss  of  its  great  wagon 
train,  reduced  to  short  rations,  with  the  prospect  of 
starvation  unless  soon  relieved. 

It  was  now  the  middle  of  October.  Sherman  had 
reached  Corinth,  and  on  the  20th  he  arrived  at  East- 
Grant  and  port,  on  the  Tennessee.  About  the  same 
fouteZrChlt  t™6  Grant,  with  a  few  attendants,  started 
tanooga.  from  Cairo  to  go  to  Chattanooga  and  assume 
command  in  the  face  of  the  Confederates.  He  tele- 
graphed Eosecrans,  relieving  him  of  the  command  of 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  He  also  telegraphed  to 
Thomas,  appointing  him  to  the  vacant  position,  and 
commanding  him  not  to  abandon  Chattanooga.  On  the 
23d,  Grant  arrived  in  person  and  assumed  the  superior 
command.  He  found  the  army  reduced  to  about  fifty 
thousand  combatants,  while  the  Confederates  numbered 
about  seventy  thousand.  The  presence  of  the  hero  of 
the  Vicksburg  campaign  gave,  naturally,  new  courage  to 
the  disheartened  soldiers,  and  Grant  set  at  once  about 
the  work  of  delivery.  His  plan,  quickly  formed,  was  to 
re-open  water  and  railroad  communication  with  Bridge- 
port, by  means  of  Hooker's  troops,  then  at  Bridgeport. 
The  position  of  Longstreet  on  Lookout  Mountain  seemed 
to  prevent  this.     The  Confederates  themselves  thought 


CHICKAMAUGA-CHATTANOOGA   CAMPAIGN      193 

80.  But  Grant  learned  from  Thomas  and  W.  F.  Smith 
that  Lookout  Monntam  did  not  really  command  the 
ways  from  Bridgeport  to   Chattanoosra,  but      „     . 

J  <=>   i  .  Opening  o  f 

that  a  ran^e  west  of  the  Lookout  Eidge  did  the  line  of 

T  mi  •  II     T   T-.  ?r  communica- 

do  SO.  This  range  was  called  Kaccoon  Moun-  tion  between 
tain.  Grant  also  learned  that  Longstreet  andcia^ta- 
had  not  occupied  Raccoon  Mountain  with  ^°°^^- 
any  considerable  force.  He  now  determined  at  once  to 
bring  Hooker  from  Bridgeport  to  Eaccoon  Mountain, 
have  him  seize  this  position,  and  join  Thomas  at  a  ferry 
on  the  Tennessee,  a  few  miles  below  Chattanooga,  and 
around  the  point  of  Lookout  Mountain,  called  Brown's 
Ferry.  The  river  makes  a  great  bend  northward  at  this 
point,  and  if  Hooker  could  reach  Brown's  and  protect 
the  railroad  from  Bridgeport  to  the  neighborhood  of 
Brown's,  then  the  supplies  for  Chattanooga  could  be 
easily  transported  across  the  river  at  this  ferry  and 
hauled  to  Chattanooga  over  the  peninsula  made  by  the 
bend  in  the  river.  In  execution  of  this  plan.  Hooker 
was  ordered  to  start  from  Bridgeport  on  the  26th  with 
about  three-quarters  of  his  force,  and  advance  through 
the  defiles  of  Eaccoon  Mountain  by  way  of  Wauhatchie, 
until  he  should  reach  the  valley  separating  Eaccoon 
Mountain  from  Lookout  Mountain,  then  turn  down  this 
valley  and  march  toward  Brown's  Ferry. 

In  the  early  morning  of  the  27th,  several  hours  before 
daylight,  some  twelve  hundred  picked  men  embarked  at 
Chattanooga  in  small  boats,  built  for  the  purpose  of 
constructing  a  pontoon  bridge,  and,  dropping  quietly 
down  the  river  under  cover  of  the  darkness,  lauded  on 
the  south  side  at  Brown's.  They  ran  quickly  seizure  of 
up  the  bank,  drove  the  few  Confederate  fyb^^el^d^ 
pickets  away,  and  established  themselves  in  ^'^i^- 
a  strong  position.  The  boats  recrossed  at  once,  and 
brought  over  the  troops  of  Hazen's  brigade,  and  then  of 
Vol.  11.-13 


194  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

Turchin's,  who  repelled  the  Confederate  assault  made 
upon  the  position  first  occupied.  The  bridge  was  then 
laid  across  the  river  at  this  point.  Hooker  was  equally 
successful.  On  the  28th,  the  head  of  his  column  arrived 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Brown's.  Longstreet  now  at 
last  understood  the  Federal  movements,  and  undertook 

Battle  be-  to  strike  Hooker  in  the  flank.  In  the  night 
aTr  Lo°ng  of  the  28th,  a  short,  sharp  battle  ensued,  in 
street.  which    Uooker    was   victorious,   and   forced 

open  his  way  to  Brown's.  On  the  29th,  the  junction 
with  the  forces  at  Brown's  was  effected,  and  the  way 
from  Bridgeport  to  Chattanooga,  both  by  the  river  and 
the  railroad,  was  opened. 

Instead  of  strengthening  Longstreet,  and  making  an 
effort  to  capture  the  passes  of  Raccoon  Mountain  be- 

Lon?8treet'8  twccu  Bridgeport  and  Brown's,  Bragg  now 
against  kLox-  I'ssolved  to  scud  Longstrcct  to  destroy  Burn- 
^^'®-  side  at  Knoxville.     His  idea  was  to  accom- 

plish this  before  Sherman's  forces  should  arrive  at 
Chattanooga,  and  thus  deliver  his  army  before  Chatta- 
nooga from  the  danger  of  a  descent  of  Burnside  from 
Knoxville  upon  its  flank  and  rear.  He  also  calculated 
to  have  Longstreet's  soldiers  back  again  before  Grant 
could  be  in  a  condition  to  offer  battle.  Longstreet  set 
out  upon  this  expedition  on  the  4th  of  November.  He 
had  about  twenty  thousand  men.  He  marched  them  to 
Tyner's  Station  on  the  railroad  from  Chattanooga  to 
Knoxville,  and  transported  them  in  cars  from  this  point 
to  Sweetwater  Station,  a  place  about  fifteen  miles  south- 
west of  Loudon.  From  here  he  began  operations  against 
Burnside's  army.  Burnside  succeeded,  by  dint  of  good 
manoeuvring,  in  concentrating  most  of  his  force  in 
Knoxville,  and  in  keeping  open  his  communications 
with  the  country  east  of  Knoxville  from  which  to  draw 
supplies.     He  also  succeeded  in  fortifying  his  positions 


CHICKAMAUGA-CIIATTANOOGA   CAMPAIGN      195 

on  both  sides  of  the  Holston  River  at  Knoxville.  Be- 
sides Knoxville,  Burnside  held  Kingston,  lower  down 
the  river.  Buruside's  plan  was  to  detain  Longstreet  be- 
fore Knoxville  until  Sherman  should  arrive  at  Chatta- 
nooga, and  Grant,  thus  reinforced,  should  defeat  Bragg. 
Grant  could  then  easily  relieve  Knoxville.  On  the  19th 
Longstreet  took  his  position  in  front  of  the  fortifications 
at  Knoxville,  and  began  the  siege.  He  soon  The  siege  of 
found  that  the  place  was  too  strong  to  be  Knoxvuie. 
carried  by  an  assault,  and  he  settled  down  to  the  work 
of  advancing  by  regular  approaches.  He  was  reinforced 
by  two  brigades  from  Buckner's  division,  raising  his 
numbers  to  about  twenty-five  thousand  men,  while 
Burnside  had  less  than  twenty  thousand.  What  would 
have  been  the  outcome,  if  left  to  themselves,  it  would 
be  difficult  to  say,  but  at  this  juncture  came  the  move- 
ments around  Chattanooga  which  were  destined  to  put 
an  end  to  the  siege  first  of  Chattanooga  and  then  of 
Knoxville. 

The  head  of  Sherman's  column  arrived  at  Bridgeport 
on  the  13th  of  November,  Leaving  his  troops  there, 
Sherman  went  in  person  to  Chattanooga  to  Sherman's 
meet  Grant,  and  to  arrange  with  him  the  plan  tanooga,  and 
of  his  advance  to  Chattanoogawith  the  troops  o'^perationf 
in  Bridgeport.  He  spent  the  16th  with  ^**^- 
Grant  and  Thomas,  and  it  was  decided  by  them  that 
Sherman's  troops  should  march  around  Chattanooga 
on  the  north,  by  roads  out  of  the  reach  and  view 
of  the  Confederates,  to  the  point  on  the  Tennessee 
above  Chattanooga  at  which  the  North  Chickamauga 
flows  into  it,  and  cross  the  Tennessee  on  pontoons  at 
this  point.  This  would  place  Sherman  in  a  position  to 
attack  the  north  end  of  Missionary  Eidge,  on  which  the 
right  wing  of  Bragg's  army  rested.  The  Confederates 
had  not  occupied  this  point  of  the  ridge  in  much  force. 


196  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

and  Grant  calculated  that  Sherman  could  easily  gain  a 
foothold  here,  and  could  then  move  along  the  ridge 
southward  without  much  difficulty,  since  the  Confed- 
erate artillery  and  intrenchments  faced  westward  toward 
Chattanooga.  The  Confederates  once  flanked  in  this 
manner,  it  was  the  further  plan  to  hurl  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland  against  Bragg's  entire  line  and  com- 
plete the  victory. 

Sherman's  troops  did  not  arrive  at  the  point  on  the 
river  above  Chattanooga  until  the  evening  of  the  23d. 
The  Federal  During  the  day  Grant,  impatient  with  the 
Bance°of°the  delay,  had  been  feeling  Bragg's  position  by 
23d.  means  of  a  strong  reconnoissance.     Two  bri- 

gades of  Wood's  division  of  Granger's  corps,  led  by  Wil- 
lich  and  Hazen,  made  a  brilliant  assault  upon  a  Con- 
federate position  on  Indian  Hill,  and  captured  it.  It 
was  a  strong  advance  post,  and  Grant  ordered  it  to  be 
held  and  intrenched.  From  this  point  Grant  had  a 
good  view  of  the  Confederate  line,  and  in  assailing  it 
he  had  directed  the  attention  of  the  Confederates  away 
from  the  real  point  of  attack  to  be  made  by  Sherman. 

Grant  had  not  planned  to  have  Hooker  take  any  im- 
portant part  in  the  impending  battle.  Hooker's  troops 
were  beyond  Lookout  Mountain  from  the  contemplated 
battle-field,  and  Grant  intended  for  them  only  the  role 
of  making  such  a  demonstration  as  would  detain  the  Con- 
federates on  Lookout  Mountain  from  going  to  the  aid 
of  Bragg's  right  wing  on  Missionary  Ridge.  One  of 
Hooker's  corps,  that  commanded  by  Howard,  had  been 
moved  up  the  river  above  Chattanooga  on  the  south 
side  to  join  and  co-operate  with  Sherman  when  the  lat- 
ter should  effect  his  crossing.  But  one  of  Sherman's 
divisions,  that  commanded  by  Osterhaus,  had  been  left 
on  the  west  side  of  Lookout  Mountain  by  the  washing 
away  of  the  pontoons  at  Brown's.     This,  if  joined  with 


CHICKAMAUGA-CHATTANOOGA    CAMPAIGN      197 

Hooker,  would  so  increase  his  force,  as  to  enable  him 
to  do  something  more  than  make  a  demonstration.  On 
the  night  of  the  33d,  Grant  sent  Hooker  word,  that 
if  the  bridge  across  the  Tennessee  should  not  „^  ^  , 
be  sufficiently  repaired  to  allow  Osterhaus  to  of  Lookout 
cross  over  early  in  the  morning  of  the  24th, 
he  might  attempt,  with  the  assistance  of  Osterhaus's 
division,  to  capture  Lookout  Mountain.  The  bridge 
was  not  re-established  by  the  time  designated,  and 
Hooker  was  eager  to  undertake  the  new  role  assigned 
him.  He  caused  Osterhaus  to  make  a  strong  diversion 
at  a  point  opposite  the  northern  extremity  of  Lookout 
Mountain  both  with  infantry  and  artillery.  He  then 
sent  Geary  with  two  brigades  farther  southward  to  turn 
the  Confederate  position  by  ascending  Lookout  Ridge  at  a 
point  comparatively  undefended.  Once  gaining  the  crest 
of  the  ridge  at  this  point,  Geary  was  to  move  northward 
along  the  same  and  drive  the  Confederates  before  him. 
Geary  did  his  assigned  work  with  great  promptness 
and  thoroughness.  While  the  attention  of  the  Confed- 
erates was  attracted  to  the  bridge  across  Lookout  Creek, 
Geary  went  farther  up  the  stream,  forded  it,  turned  the 
Confederate  position  at  the  bridge,  and  rapidly  gained 
the  crest  of  the  ridge.  Nearly  a  thousand  Confederates 
were  killed,  wounded  and  captured  in  this  movement 
which  cost  the  Federals  only  a  nominal  loss.  The  Con- 
federate commander  on  the  northern  summit,  General 
Stevenson,  now  sent  reinforcements  to  his  brigadier, 
Pettus,  whose  troops  had  been  thus  routed  by  Geary's 
advance.  By  the  aid  of  these  Pettus  succeeded  in  rally- 
ing his  broken  line.  Another  sharp  contest  ensued, 
but  the  Federals  continued  to  advance  steadily,  driving 
their  adversaries  before  them  along  the  ridge.  It  was 
now  about  the  middle  of  the  afternoon.  At  this  junct- 
ure Carlin's  brigade  of  Palmer's  corps  of  the  Army  of 


198  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

the  Cumberland  advanced  from  the  east  side  of  the 
mountain  to  meet  Geary  on  the  crest.  The  junction  of 
the  two  forces  was  accomplished  about  five  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon,  and  the  Confederate  force  on  the  summit 
was  now  very  nearly  hemmed  in  upon  all  sides.  An 
hour  or  so  more  of  daylight  would  probably  have  en- 
abled the  Federals  to  capture  them.  Fortunately  for 
them,  darkness  now  intervened,  and  under  its  friendly 
cover  they  effected  their  escape  to  Eossville.  On  the 
morning  of  the  25th,  the  Union  flag  was  flying  from 
The  capture  the  summit  of  Lookout  Mountain,  and  Hook- 
Si  ouVtafn,  er  was  in  communication  with  Thomas's 
fnVoVThe  right.  In  fact,  Hooker's  troops  now  com- 
slferman^s  posed  the  right  wing  of  the  great  army  under 
troops.  the  command  of  Grant. 

Soon  after  midnight,  that  is,  in  the  morning  of  the 
24th,  Sherman  began  to  cross  his  men  over  the  Tennessee 
at  the  designated  point.  The  first  were  carried  over  in 
the  boats,  which  were  to  sustain  the  bridge,  and  then 
when  the  flooring  was  laid  over  them,  the  men  marched 
over.  In  the  early  afternoon  of  the  24th,  Sherman's 
troops,  consisting  of  three  divisions  of  his  own  corps, 
and  Davis's  division  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  were 
assembled  on  the  south  side  of  the  river.  He  imme- 
diately formed  his  men  in  order  of  battle,  and  ordered 
three  divisions  forward  up  the  northern  slopes  of  Mis- 
sionary Kidge.  They  climbed  up  to  the  crest  without 
meeting  any  resistance  worth  the  mention.  Sherman 
was  greatly  surprised  by  his  easy  victory,  but  when  he 
arrived  at  the  topmost  point  it  was  all  explained  to  him 
at  a  glance.  He  had  only  ascended  a  detached  peak. 
The  real  ridge,  upon  which  the  Confederates  lay  in- 
trenched, was  separated  from  him  by  a  deep  valley.  It 
was  evident  that  the  battle  must  now  be  deferred  until 
the  25th,  and  be  fought  on  a  somewhat  different  plan. 


CHICKAMAUGA-CilATTANOOGA    CAMPAIGN      199 

After  the  retreat  from  Lookout  Mountain  in  the  night 
of  the  24th-25th,  the  Confederate  army  was  all  gathered 
on  the  slopes  and  summit  of  Missionary  Kidge  ^^^  ^^^^^^ 
from  around  Rossville  to  the  northern  extrera-  of  Missionary 

Ridge. 

ity  of  the  Eidge.  It  numbered  about  forty 
thousand  men  with  one  hundred  pieces  of  cannon.  This 
was  now  the  position  and  the  force  against  which 
Grant  must  hurl  his  army  of  nearly  double  the  num- 
ber of  men,  on  the  25th.  Grant's  plan  was  to  have 
Hooker  attack  the  Confederate  left  near  Rossville,  and 
Sherman  attack  their  right  on  the  north  end  of  ]\[ission- 
ary  Eidge,  at  about  the  same  time,  and  then,  upon  the 
success  of  either,  to  hurl  the  vast  mass  of  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland  against  the  centi'e  of  the  Confederate 
line. 

Sherman  began  his  attack  early  in  the  forenoon.  Cle- 
burne's division  of  Hardee's  corps,  the  elite  of  the  Con- 
federate army,  occupied  the  position  against  which  he 
directed  his  advance.  He  did  not  attack  in  great  force 
owing  to  the  fact  that  the  topography  of  the  battle-field 
at  this  point  did  not  favor  the  deploy  of  large  bodies. 
The  Federals,  led  by  Corse,  almost  reached  the  summit 
of  the  ridge,  but  the  Confederates  stood  their  ground 
and  inflicted  a  repulse  upon  their  adversaries.  Both 
sides  were  reinforced,  and  an  indecisive  conflict  was 
fought  for  four  hours  at  this  point,  the  Federal  line 
now  advancing  and  now  receding  up  and  down  the  slope. 
Grant  ordered  Howard's  entire  corps  to  go  to  the  aid  of 
Sherman,  but  Sherman  did  not  use  Howard's  troops. 
He  was  waiting  for  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to  ad- 
vance to  the  attack.  That  is,  he  was  waiting  for  Thomas 
while  Thomas  was  waiting  for  him.  He,  however,  sent 
two  brigades  down  the  foot  of  the  ridge  to  try  the  ascent 
at  a  point  farther  south.  They  were  met,  however, 
by  Gist's  Confederate  division,  which  succeeded  in  tak- 


200  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

ing  the  advancing  Federals  in  the  flank,  and  routing 
them. 

With  this  Grant  turned  his  hopes  on  Hooker.  Hooker 
had  crossed  Chattanooga  Creek  and  had  so  threatened  the 
Confederate  left,  as  to  cause  Bragg  to  send  it  reinforce- 
ments from  his  centre.  He  had  not  yet,  however,  made 
the  attack  for  which  Grant  was  waiting.  The  middle 
of  the  afternoon  had  arrived,  and  the  battle  seemed 
to  be  at  a  standstill.  Grant  now  resolved  to  go  forward 
with  the  attack  upon  the  Confederate  centre. 

About  four  o'clock,  eleven  brigades  of  the  Army  of 

the  Cumberland,  containing  nearly  twenty-five  thousand 

Th       and   ^®^>  ^^^  ^J  sucli  chief s  as  Sheridan,  Wood, 

char  g  e  Johnson  and  Baird,  moved  forward  against 

against  the  " 

Confederate  the  Centre  of  the  Confederate  line,  which  was 
defended  by  fifteen  thousand  men  and  fifty 
pieces  of  cannon.  The  undertaking  seemed  almost  des- 
perate, and  it  looked  as  if  the  catastrophe  of  Marye's 
Heights  would  be  repeated.  But  such  was  not  the  case. 
These  splendid  regiments  fairly  ran  across  the  plain  and 
up  the  slopes  of  the  ridge  through  shot  and  shell  and 
bullets,  and  by  one  of  the  most  magnificent  charges 
known  to  military  history  broke  the  Confederate  centre, 
captured  its  positions,  and  drove  the  troops  which  com- 
posed it,  pell  mell  down  the  east  side  of  the  ridge.  By 
a  quick  movement,  however,  Hardee  threw  some  regi- 
ments of  Cheatham's  division  across  the  ridge,  and 
barred  the  advance  of  the  Federals  along  the  ridge  north- 
ward, and  thus  saved  the  right  wing  of  the  Confederate 
army.  But  Hooker  had  now  gained  the  crest  of  the 
ridge  on  the  flank  of  the  Confederate  left  wing,  and  was 
driving  Stewart's  division  before  him,  pressing  it  harder 
and  harder  until  it  was  completely  routed. 

With  the  exception  of  the  right  wing,  the  Confederate 
army  was  now  a  mass  of  fugitives,  trying  to  gain  the 


CHICKAMADGA-CHATTANOOGA    CAMPAIGN      201 

cover  of  the  Chickamauga  Eiver.  The  right  was  also  in 
retreat,  but  in  an  orderly  manner.  Night  had  spread  its 
protecting  mantle  over  the  battle-field,  but  The  Federal 
the  Federals  pressed  forward  by  the  light  of  ^^tory. 
a  full  mooD.  The  Confederates  succeeded,  however,  in 
crossing  the  Chickamauga  and  destroying  the  bridge  be- 
hind them. 

It  was  a  great  victory  for  the  Federals,  but  purchased 
at  a  great  loss.    Nearly  six  thousand  of  them 
had  fallen  in  killed  and  wounded.    The  Con- 
federates lost  about  seven  thousand  men,   more   than 
four  thousand  of  whom  were  captured  uninjured. 

Grant's  chief  solicitude  now  was  to  prevent  Bragg 
from  sending  any  aid  to  Longstreet  in  front  of  Knoxville. 
With  this  in  view  Long's  brigade  of  cavalry  Grant's  at- 
had  been  sent,  on  the  24th,  eastward  toward  H™e' Burn- 
Cleveland  with  orders  to  cut  the  railroad  lines  ^^'*®- 
connecting  Bragg  with  Longstreet.  Having  accom- 
plished this  on  the  2otli  and  26th,  Long  entered  Cleve- 
land on  the  26th,  and  destroyed  a  large  quantity  of 
Confederate  stores  in  depot  there. 

On  the  morning  of  the  26th,  Sherman's  soldiers  crossed 
the  Chickamauga  in  pursuit  of  Hardee's  corps.  They 
overtook  the  Confederate  rear-guard  a  little 
beyond  Chickamauga  Station  on  the  railroad  of  Bragg 's 
from  Chattanooga  to  Kinggold.  The  Confed- 
erates retreated  rapidly  in  the  direction  of  Einggold, 
skirmishing  with  the  Federal  advance.  By  the  evening 
of  the  26th,  Sherman's  advance  troops  were  near  Grays- 
ville.  Hooker  with  the  Federal  right  wing  was  also  in 
full  pursuit  by  way  of  Rossville.  In  the  early  evening 
of  the  26tli,  his  advance  reached  that  point  in  the  road 
from  Rossville  to  Ringgold,  where  the  road  from  Grays- 
ville  to  Ringgold  joins  with  it.  It  was  here  that  Hook- 
er's men  struck  the  rear  of  Breckenridge's  fleeing  soldiers 


202  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

and  scattered  them.  Then  turning  up  the  road  toward 
Graysville  they  struck  Hardee's  rear  going  out  of  Grays- 
ville  by  a  more  direct  way  to  Einggold,  and  drove  it 
along.  The  retreating  Confederates  under  Hardee  and 
Breckenridge  formed  a  junction  near  Ringgold,  and 
Cleburne  and  Gist,  with  their  divisions,  undertook  to 
delay  the  Federal  advance  until  the  scattered  forces  of 
Bragg  could  reach  the  cover  of  the  Chattooga  Mountains 
at  Dalton.  They  posted  their  soldiers  along  White  Oak 
Ridge  and  Taylor's  Ridge,  just  east  of  Ringgold,  and  held 
Hooker  at  bay  during  the  27th,  but  Howard's  corps 
moving  from  Graysville  turned  Cleburne's  position  and 
forced  him  to  retreat  hastily  toward  Dalton.  The  Con- 
federates thus  succeeded  in  gaining  the  cover  of  the  Chat- 
tooga Mountains  and  established  themselves  at  Dalton. 

On  the  28th,  Grant  deputed  Sherman  to  go  to  the  re- 
lief of  Knoxville.     It  was  understood,  from  Burnside's 

Sherman's  adviccs,  that  the  garrison  would  not  be  able 
tS'o'^KiTx^  to  hold  out  against  hunger  beyond  the  3d 
viiie.  Qf  December.     Sherman  started  from  his  po- 

sition around  Cleveland  on  the  29th  of  November.  He 
had  with  him  a  large  part  of  the  troops  of  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee,  Howard's  entire  corps,  and  detachments 
from  the  corps  of  Granger  and  Palmer.  The  army  thus 
marching  to  the  rescue  of  Knoxville  numbered  nearly 
forty  thousand  men. 

Longstreet  had  heard  of  the  disaster  of  Missionary 
Ridge,  and  he  determined  to   storm  the   town    before 

The  confed-  Sherman  could  arrive.  He  ordered  the  attack 
up^o'n  kSos^  to  begin  before  daylight  in  the  morning  of 
^^^-  the  29th.     The  point  to  be  assaulted  was  the 

strongest  part  of  the  Union  line.  Fort  Sanders.  It  was 
almost  directly  west  of  the  town  and  on  the  north  side 
of  the  river.  The  fort  was  not  entirely  finished,  indeed, 
and  its  garrison  consisted  of  only  about  one  regiment  of 


CHICKAMAUGA-CIIATTANOOGA   CAMPAIGN      203 

infantry,  and  two  batteries  of  artillery.  They  were  well 
commanded,  however,  by  General  Ferrero  and  Lieuten- 
ant Benjamin,  and  they  had  timely  warning  of  the 
Confederate  attack. 

Before  the  day  dawned  the  soldiers  of  McLaws^s  divis- 
ion rushed  upon  the  works.  They  were  met  by  a  mur- 
derous discharge  of  grape  and  canister  and  musket-balls. 
But  on  they  went.  They  even  reached  and  sprang  into 
the  ditch,  and  began  to  climb  the  parapet.  The  Fed- 
erals, however,  stood  their  ground  and  shot  down  their 
adversaries  as  they  showed  themselves  upon  the  wall.  A 
few  of  the  Confederates  got  into  the  fort,  but  they  were 
immediately  captured.  Meanwhile  the  artillery  fire  was 
kept  up  against  those  still  beyond  the  ditch,  and  lighted 
bombshells  were  thrown  down  upon  those  in  the  ditch. 
Mortal  men  could  stand  no  longer  the  iron  hail.  The 
Confederates  broke  and  fled,  after  losing  nearly  eight 
hundred  men,  killed  and  wounded,  in  a  period  of  half 
an  hour.  The  attack  on  the  fortifications  on  the  other 
side  of  the  river  was  momentarily  successful,  but  the 
Federals  soon  rallied  and  drove  the  forces  of  Longstreet 
back  again.  The  Confederate  attempt  had,  thus,  en- 
tirely failed,  and  Longstreet  now  saw  himself  necessi- 
tated to  retreat,  either  toward  Virginia,  or  toward 
Bragg  at  Dalton.  He  soon  decided  that  he  could  not 
meet  Sherman,  who  was  now  blocking  the  way  to  Dalton. 
He  must  go  toward  Virginia.  He  determined,  however, 
not  to  raise  the  siege  until  the  last  moment.  He  calcu- 
lated, by  this  means,  to  draw  Sherman  after  him,  and 
thus  relieve  Bragg. 

On  the  2d  of  December,  the  bulk  of  Sherman's 
forces   were  at   Philadelphia.     On   the   3d, 

^  '        Sherman's 

Howards  corps  was  at  Loudon,  still  thirty  march   to 

miles  from   Knoxville.      He   tried   to    warn 

Burnside  of  his  approach  by  firing  cannon.     Sherman 


204  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

also  sent  Colonel  Long  to  find  his  way  as  best  he  could 
to  the  besieged  army.  The  Confederates  had  burned 
the  bridge  at  Loudon,  and  Howard  was  therefore  obliged 
to  go  up  the  Tennessee  to  a  point  above  the  junction  of 
the  Holston  with  it  in  order  to  find  a  passable  ford.  It 
was  now,  however,  the  5th,  before  Howard  and  Sher- 
man succeeded  in  crossing  the  Tennessee.  The  Holston 
was  still  between  them  and  Knoxville,  as  well  as  the 
thirty  miles  of  land.  Blair's  corps  of  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee  now  pressed  rapidly  forward,  and  by  the  even- 
ing of  the  5th  was  within  a  dozen  miles  of  Knoxville. 
Sherman's  anxiety  for  the  besieged  was  now  dispelled 
by  reliable  news  from  Knoxville  in  regard  to  the  repulse 
inflicted  on  the  Confederates  in  front  of  Fort  Sanders, 
and  in  regard  to  the  sufficiency  of  supplies  at  Knoxville 
to  feed  Burnside's  army  for  some  days  longer, 

Longstreet  knew  of  Sherman's  approach,  and  decided 
that  the  moment  had  arrived  for  him  to  begin  his  march 

Longstreet'B  around  Knoxvillc  toward  Virginia.  In  the 
Kno^lwiie^'a^  night  of  the  4th,  his  troops  moved  quietly 
s'herm^an^B  f^om  their  positions,  and  by  daylight  were 
army.  well  out  of  immediate  danger.    Sherman  rode 

into  Knoxville  on  the  6th,  and  was  greeted  with  great 
enthusiasm  by  both  the  troops  and  the  citizens.  His 
army  was,  however,  too  much  fatigued  to  follow  Long- 
street  immediately,  and  Burnside  now  instructed  Sher- 
man to  return  to  Grant  with  his  entire  force,  less  Gran- 
ger's corps.  With  this  corps,  Burnside's  army  would 
number  thirty  thousand  men,  and  would  be  sufficiently 
strong,  in  Burnside's  view,  to  follow  Longstreet. 

A  strong  Federal    column   commanded    by  General 
Parke  pursued  Longstreet  to  Eutledge.     After  a  sharp 

The  pursuit  fight  between  Shackelford's  cavalry  and  sev- 
of  Longstreet.  q^bX  of  Longstreet's  regiments  at  Bean's  Sta- 
tion, in  which  each  side  lost  about  two  hundred  and 


CHICKAMAUGA-CHATTANOOGA   CAMPAIGN      205 

fifty  men,  killed  and  wounded,  Longstreet  withdrew  to 
Eussellville,  where  he  proposed  to  winter  his  troops. 

In  the  last  days  of  the  month,  Grant  went  in  person 
to  Knoxville,  and  having  decided  that  the  Army  of  the 
Ohio  was  in  no  condition  to  make  a  winter  campaign, 
he  ordered  its  new  commander.  General  Foster,  who 
had  succeeded  Burnside  some  days  before,  to  cease  the 
pursuit  of  Longstreet,  and  go  into  winter  quarters. 
Sherman  was  sent  to  Bridgeport  for  the  win-  Disposition 
ter,  Thomas  was  left  in  Chattanooga,  and  fn  ^^NortlTCTn 
Dodge  was  stationed  with  a  division  at  Pu-  g^^fsj^    a°^ 

,      ,  r  .         .  East   Tennes- 

laski,  m  the  southern  part  of  Middle  Ten-  see  during  the 
nessee,  to  keep  open  the  Nashville  and  De-  1863-64. 
catur  Railroad.  The  Confederate  President  displaced 
Bragg  and  put  J.  E.  Johnston  in  command  at  Dal  ton, 
where  the  defeated  army  had  established  its  winter  en- 
campment. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 

THE   MOVEMENTS   IN   NORTH-EASTERN   VIRGINIA   IN 

THE   AUTUMN   OF    1863,    AND   THE   CHARLESTON 

EXPEDITION 

Lee's  Manoeuvre  to  Turn  Meade's  Right — Meade's  Retreat  toward 
Washington — The  Retreat  of  the  Confederates  and  the  Federal 
Pursuit — Meade's  Attempt  to  Turn  Lee's  Right — Assembly  of 
Federal  Troops  on  Folly  Island — The  Attempt  to  Occupy 
Morris  Island — Fort  Wagner — The  Siege  of  Fort  Wagner — 
The  Attempt  to  Take  Fort  Sumter — The  Texas  Expedition — 
The  French  in  Mexico — The  Capture  of  Fort  Esperanza. 

When,  in  the  last  days  of  September,  Lee  learned  that 
the  corps  of  Howard  and  Slocum  had  been  detached 
from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  sent  to  Tennessee, 
he  resolved  to  take  advantage  of  the  weakened  condition 
of  his  adversary,  and  make  an  offensive  movement. 
His  plan  was  to  turn  Meade's  right,  and  place  himself 
between  the  Federal  army  and  Washington.  The  move- 
ment began  about  the  8th  of  October.  Lee 
noeuvretoturn  marched  his  troops  first  southward  in  order 
Mea  e'8  nght.  ^^  decoy  the  Federals  across  the  Rapidan. 
He  then  turned  his  columns  suddenly  westward.  Meade 
was  at  first  deceived,  and  ordered  his  troops  to  cross  the 
Rapidan,  but  before  any  of  his  infantry  had  passed  over 
he  learned  of  the  change  in  the  direction  of  the  march 
of  the  Confederates,  and  recalled  his  troops  to  Culpeper. 
He  now  saw  that  he  must  go  back  behind  the  Rappa- 
hannock. He  succeeded  in  crossing  his  infantry  over 
on  the  11th,  without  opposition,  but  his  cavalry  had  a 

206 


MOVEMENTS   IN   NORTH-EASTERN   VIRGINIA      207 

sharp  fight  to  save  itself.  At  the  same  time  Lee  occu- 
pied Culpeper  with  E well's  troops.  Meade  thought 
that  the  entire  Confederate  army  was  there,  and  was 
waiting  there  for  him.  He  sent  Warren,  now  com- 
manding Hancock's  corps,  Sykes  and  Sedgwick  back 
across  the  Eappahannock,  on  the  12th,  to  feel  of  them. 
But  Lee  was  again  pursuing  his  flanking  march.  Meade 
had  thrown  forces  out  on  his  right,  and  they  struck  the 
Confederate  column  on  the  13th,  but  strangely  enough, 
they  did  not  inform  Meade  of  the  situation  on  his  right 
until  near  midnight  of  the  12th.  He  then  became 
aware  that  Lee's  forces  had  crossed  the  Rappahannock 
at  Sulphur  Springs.  He  now  comprehended  that  Lee 
was  trying  to  anticipate  him  at  Bristoe  Station  on  the 
railroad  connecting  his  army  with  Washington,  and 
force  liim  to  attack  the  Confederates  in  a  position  chosen 
by  themselves. 

On  the  13th  Lee's  army  was  assembled  in  Warrenton, 
preparatory  to  pushing  on  to  Bristoe.  The  Federals 
were  at  the  same  time  retreating  rapidly 
along  the  railroad.  The  covering  of  the  re-  treat*  Toward 
treat  fell  to  the  lot  of  the  gallant  and  capable  Washington. 
Warren.  Just  as  Warren's  troops  arrived  at  Broad  Run 
in  the  afternoon  of  the  14th,  Heth's  division  of  Hill's 
corps  struck  them.  But  Warren  turned  and  inflicted  a 
severe  repulse  upon  the  Confederates.  He  then  pro- 
ceeded during  the  night  of  the  14th  to  Centreville, 
whither  the  whole  army  was  concentrating. 

Having  reached  the  line  of  Chantilly-Centreville  suc- 
cessfully, Meade  turned  to  give  battle,  but  Lee  now  de- 
cided that  he  could  not  hazard  a  battle  with  Meade  in 
this  position.  He  had  probably  disabled  Meade  from 
doing  anything  before  going  into  winter  quarters,  and 
had  thus  gained  a  considerable  advantage.  He  thought 
now  only  of  withdrawing  to  a  safe  position  for  his  own 


208  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

winter's  rest.  Making  a  vigorous  demonstration  with 
his  cavalry  in  order  to  cover  his  movements,  and  confuse 
Meade,  he  began  his  retreat  on  the  18th. 

So  soon  as  Meade's  mind  became  clear  as  to  Lee's 
movements,  he  set  his  army  in  pursuit,  but  the  Con- 
federates  had  gained  too  much  ground  to  be 
of  the  Confed-  overtaken.  With  only  a  sharp  cavalry  brush 
Federal  pur-  on  the  19th,  the  Confederates  got  back  Safely 
^^ '  to  Culpeper  toward  the  end  of  the  month, 

and  the  Federals  halted  at  Warren  ton  Junction. 

The  weather  was,  however,  still  fine,  and  Meade  re- 
solved to  make  another  effort  to  destroy  Lee's  army 
before  settling  down  for  the  winter.  On  the  7th  of 
November,  he  put  his  army  in  motion,  with  the  Rappa- 
hannock bridge  and  Kelly's  Ford  as  the  objective  points. 
One  of  Birney's  divisions  quickly  and  easily  captured 
the  ford  and  drove  the  Confederate  posts  away.  Farther 
up,  however,  at  the  bridge,  the  Confederates  had  some 
detachments  on  the  north  side  of  the  river,  protected 
by  some  earthworks.  Sedgwick's  troops  arrived  before 
these  intrenchments  in  the  late  afternoon,  and  in  the 
darkness  of  the  night  Russell's  brigade  scaled  the  works 
and  fairly  destroyed  the  whole  garrison,  before  Lee 
could  send  it  any  support  from  the  south  side  of  the 
river.  Lee  now  felt  that  he  must  withdraw  behind  the 
cover  of  the  Rapidan. 

On  the  9th  the  Federals  occupied  the  district  between 
the  Rappahannock  and  the  Rapidan.  Lee's  front  was 
now  protected  by  the  Rapidan,  and  by  a  creek  which 
runs  out  of  the  Wilderness  into  the  Rapidan  at  a  point 
some  fifteen  miles  above  the  confluence  of  the  Rapidan 
with  the  Rappahannock,  called  Mine  Run. 

Meade  could  not  turn  Lee's  left  without  leaving  Wash- 
ington exposed,  and  he  considered  a  front  attack  as  too 
hazardous.   The  only  course  left  to  him  was  to  cross  the 


MOVEMENTS   IN   NORTH-EASTERN   VIRGINIA      209 

Eapidan  below  the  point  of  confluence  of  Mine  Run 
with  it,  ascend  the  northern  bank  of  Mine  Run,  and, 
crossing  over  beyond  the  eastern  extremity 

Meade's   at- 

of  Lee's  line,  turn  the  Confederate  right,  tempt  to  turn 
From  the  26th  of  November  to  the  1st  of  ^^"^ 
December,  Meade  endeavored  to  execute  this  movement. 
But  Lee  discovered  his  plan  by  the  27th,  and  succeeded 
in  concentrating  his  entire  force  on  the  banks  of  Mine 
Run,  and  in  placing  them  in  such  strong  positions,  that 
the  Federals  finally  gave  up  the  enterprise  and,  covered 
by  the  darkness,  retired  across  the  Rapidan  during  the 
night  of  the  1st  of  December.  The  two  armies  now  went 
into  winter  quarters  ;  the  one  around  Culpeper,  and  the 
other  around  Orange. 

The  campaign  of  1863  had,  thus,  been  almost  every- 
where most  disastrous  to  the  Confederates.  It  seemed 
as  if  they  were  nearing  the  point  of  exhaustion.  Had 
three  months  of  good  weather  remained  after  the  battle 
of  Chattanooga,  it  does  seem  as  if  the  war  might  then 
have  been  terminated.  But  the  long,  cold  winter  of 
1863-64,  and  the  execrable  roads  of  the  South,  saved  the 
Confederacy  for  another  great  effort.  Another  year 
and  more  of  the  great  agony  was  to  be  borne,  thou- 
sands more  of  firesides  were  to  be  laid  waste,  and  those 
accustomed  to  gather  by  them  to  be  scattered  and  de- 
stroyed, while  the  hearts  of  those  away  from  the  scenes 
of  immediate  action  were  still  to  be  wrung  by  more  and 
greater  sacrifices  than  those  already  suffered.  The  hor- 
rible passions  born  of  war  were  now  running  at  their 
highest,  and  rivers  of  blood  were  still  necessary  to  quench 
them,  or  rather  to  stop  the  beatings  of  the  hearts  ani- 
mated by  them. 

The  attempt  of  Gilmore  and  Dahlgren  to  capture 
Charleston  was  the  one  note  of  failure  in  the  great  move- 
ments of  the  Federal  armies  during  the  summer  and  au- 
VoL  II.— 14 


210  THE   CIVIL    WAK 

tumn  of  1863.  Beauregard's  garrison  at  Charleston  had 
been  reduced  in  number  of  troops  in  order  to  send  rein- 
forcements to  the  armies  in  Mississippi  and  Virginia.  In 
the  middle  of  the  year  he  had  only  about  six  thousand 
men  at  Charleston.  Gilmore  began  in  June  to  gather 
Assembly  of  troops  on  Folly  Island.  This  place  is  sepa- 
on^Foiiriii-  rated  from  Morris  Island,  the  northern  por- 
*°^-  tion  of  which  commands  the  inlet  to  Charles- 

ton Harbor  on  the  south,  by  a  narrow  passage  called 
Lighthouse  Inlet.  The  plan  of  the  Federal  chiefs  was 
to  capture  Morris  Island  and  its  stronghold,  Fort  Wag- 
ner, gaining  thus  command  of  the  entrance  to  the  bay, 
and  putting  them  in  a  position  to  demolish  Fort  Sumter. 
From  about  the  middle  of  June  until  the  end  of  the 
first  week  in  July  the  Federals  worked  under  cover  of 
night,  planting  batteries  on  the  northern  end  of  Folly 
Island  to  protect  the  landing  of  their  troops  on  the  south 
end  of  Morris  Island.  They  succeeded  in  doing  this 
without  being  discovered  by  the  Confederates. 

In  the  forenoon  of  July  10th,  the  attempt  was  made 
by  Strong's  brigade  to  get  a  footing  on  Morris  Island. 
As  the  boats  on  which  they  were  loaded 
to  occupy  passed  across  Lighthouse  Inlet,  the  Federal 
batteries  on  Folly  Island  opened  fire,  and 
Dahlgren's  monitors  shelled  the  Confederate  works  from 
the  sea  side.  Under  this  cover.  Strong's  troops  were 
quickly  landed.  They  seized  the  Confederate  batteries 
on  the  south  end  of  Morris  Island  and  pushed  forward 
to  the  very  front  of  Fort  AVagner.  Up  to  this  point 
the  movement  had  been  successful.  By  making  a  dem- 
onstration against  James  Island,  which  lies  between 
Charleston  and  Morris  Island,  the  Federal  General 
Terry  had  prevented  Beauregard  from  sending  aid  to 
the  Confederates  on  Morris  Island. 

The  Federal  troops  now  held  possession  of  Morris 


FORT   WAGNER  211 

Island  up  to  within  a  half  mile  of  Fort  Wagner,  and  Gil- 
more  was  anxious  to  storm  the  works  before  reinforce- 
ments could  come  from  Charleston.  He  p^jt  ^^, 
planned  his  attiick  for  the  morning  of  the  '^®'■• 
11th,  but  to  his  surprise  he  found,  as  his  troops  rushed 
to  the  attack,  that  they  were  met  by  a  resistance  which 
showed  plainly  that  the  aid  had  already  arrived.  The 
assault  was  repulsed  with  heavy  loss  to  the  assailants. 
On  the  evening  of  the  18th,  a  second  attempt  was  made 
by  Strong's  brigade,  with  the  black  regiment,  led  by  Colo- 
nel Shaw,  in  the  advance.  The  artillery  fire  from  the 
Federal  batteries  and  monitors  silenced  the  guns  of  the 
fort,  but  the  Confederate  marksmen  mounted  the  para- 
pets, on  the  approach  of  the  Federals,  and  mowed  them 
down  with  a  murderous  fire  of  musketry.  The  officers 
fell  with  the  men.  Both  Strong  and  Shaw  were  killed. 
The  Federals  were  again  repulsed  with  great  loss. 

Gilmore  now  saw  that  he  could  take  the  fort  only  by 
regular  approaches,  and  began  at  once  the  siege.  From 
the  18th  of  July  to  the  10th  of  August,  the  The  siege  of 
Federals  pushed  forward  their  intrenched  ^°^  wagner. 
lines,  until  by  the  latter  date  they  were  within  range 
of  Fort  Sumter  and  other  Confederate  works.  It  was 
now  necessary  to  silence  these  before  advancing  farther 
on  Fort  AVagner.  On  the  17th  the  firing  on  Fort  Sum- 
ter, from  both  the  land  batteries  and  the  monitors,  was 
commenced.  For  five  or  six  days  the  walls  of  the  fort 
were  battered  down  by  the  enormous  projectiles  hurled 
at  them.  On  the  33d  it  had  been  reduced  to  a  com- 
plete ruin,  and  all  of  its  guns  were  silenced.  The  gar- 
rison was  still,  however,  within  the  place,  and  was  de- 
termined to  defend  it  against  assault.  They  knew  that 
the  cross  fire  from  the  Confederate  batteries  all  around 
them  would  render  their  capture  next  to  impossible. 

In  order  to  prevent  the  Confederates  from  making  any 


212  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

further  use  of  the  ruins  as  shelter  for  mounting  new 
guns  the  fort  was  again  bombarded  in  the  last  days  of 
August.  It  was  thought  best  by  the  Federal  command- 
ers, however,  to  take  Fort  Wagner  before  making  the 
assault  upon  Sumter.  The  approaches  upon  Wagner 
were  now  pushed  forward  until  by  the  6th  of  September 
the  Federal  intrenchments  were  within  a  few  feet  of  the 
Confederate  works.  The  assault  was  planned  for  the 
next  day,  but  during  the  night  of  the  6th  the  garri- 
son quietly  and  stealthily  withdrew  and  escaped  to 
Charleston. 

Dahlgren  now  made  his  attempt,  in  the  night  of  the 

8th,  to  capture  the  garrison  in  Sumter,  but,  although 

he  succeeded  in  landing  an  attackinff  party 

The  attempt    .      „         ,      «    .^       e      .     ^  ,  i   ,i      .    ,, 

to  take  Port  lu  irout  ot  the  lort,  he  soon  found  that  they 
°™  ^''  could  not  climb  over  the  ruins  in  the  face  of 

the  musketry  fire  from  the  garrison  and  of  the  artillery 
fire  from  Sullivan's  Island.  On  the  26th  of  October  the 
ruins  were  again  bombarded  by  the  monitors  and  the 
Federal  guns  now  mounted  on  Fort  Wagner.  But  the 
result  only  proved  to  the  Federals  that  they  could  not 
yet  get  into  Charleston.  From  their  position  on  Morris 
Island  they  had  effectually  closed  the  harbor,  and  re- 
leased the  blockading  fleet  from  the  duty  of  watching 
the  inlet.  With  this  advantage  they  had  to  be  con- 
tented for  the  time  being. 

During  this  same  period  the  Government  undertook  to 
organize  an  expedition  for  penetrating  Texas.  It  was 
The  Texas  moved  thereto  chiefly  by  the  French  invasion 
expedition.  ^f  Mexico,  which,  beginning  as  a  movement 
for  forcing  satisfaction  for  certain  claims,  had  now  de- 
veloped into  a  settled  purpose  of  conquest,  or  at  least  of 
The  French  imposing  a  ucw  sovereignty  upon  the  Mex- 
in  Mexico.  icaus.  The  French  forces  were  advancing 
toward  the  boundaries  of  this  country  and  the  Govern- 


THE   TEXAN    EXPEDITION"  213 

ment  deemed  it  wise  to  prevent  them  from  reaching  a 
point  from  which  they  might  be  of  service  to  the  Con- 
federacy. General  Banks  was  placed  in  charge  of  the 
expedition.  He  sent  a  force  under  General  Franklin, 
supported  by  some  vessels  commanded  by  Lieutenant 
Crocker,  to  effect  a  landing  at  Sabine  Pass.  The  at- 
tempt was  made  on  the  8th  of  September,  but  the  Fed- 
erals suffered  a  repulse.  An  attempt  was  then  made, 
during  the  month  of  October,  to  reach  Texas  overland 
from  the  Mississippi,  by  way  of  Bayou  Teche  and  Vermil- 
lionville.  This  proved  a  failure  also.  At  last,  however, 
having  obtained  proper  naval  support.  Banks  succeed- 
ed, in  the  early  part  of  November,  in  occupying  the 
towns  and  the  country  about  the  mouths  of  the  Nueces 
and  the  Rio  Grande.  On  the  last  day  of  November,  he 
captured  Fort  Esperanza,  the  only  Confeder- 
ate work  of  any  importance  in  the  section,  of  Port  Espe- 
With  this  he  secured  command  of  a  large 
part  of  the  Texan  coast.  During  this  same  period,  also, 
Schofield  cleared  Missouri  and  Kansas  largely  of  the  Con- 
federate guerilla  bands  infesting  them,  and  Steele  took 
possession  of  Little  Rock  in  Arkansas,  while  Sibley  and 
Sully  punished  the  Sioux  Indians  severely  for  the  Min- 
nesota raid  of  the  preceding  year. 


CHAPTER    XXVIII 

INTERPRETATION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION  UNDER  THE 
STRESS  OF  THE  MILITARY  EVENTS  OF  1862  AND  1863 

The  Congressional  Act  of  March  3,  1863,  Suspending  the  Privilege 
of  the  Writ  of  Habeas  Corpus — The  Extent  of  the  Power 
Conceded  to  the  President  by  the  Act — The  Meaning  of  the 
Statute  as  an  Interpretation  of  the  Constitution — The  Presi- 
dent's Proclamation  of  September  15,  1863 — The  President's 
Acts — The  Milligan  Decision — The  Control  over  Property  As- 
sumed by  the  General  Government — The  Ordinary  Power  of 
the  Government  to  Tax — The  Power  of  Congress  to  Exempt 
Property  from  the  Operations  of  a  Given  Law  of  Taxation — 
The  Tendencies  to  an  Exaggeration  of  Governmental  Power  in 
the  Act — The  Revenue  Act  of  July  1.  1862— The  Measures  for 
the  Collection  of  the  Revenue — The  Government  and  the  Free- 
dom of  the  Press— Opinion  of  the  Postmaster-General  on  the 
Subject — Opinion  of  the  Judiciary  Committee  of  the  Senate  on 
the  Subject — War  Powers  of  the  Government  in  Respect  to 
the  Raising  and  Holding  of  Armies — The  Act  of  March  3, 
1863 — The  Transformation  of  the  Monetary  System  under  the 
Stress  of  War — Financial  Situation  in  the  First  Part  of  1863 — 
The  National  Banking  Act  of  February  25,  1863— The  Chief 
Distinction  between  the  Borrowing  System  of  the  United  States 
and  that  of  the  Southern  Confederacy — Congressional  Power 
in  the  Government  of  the  Territories  and  in  the  Admission  of 
New  States  into  the  Union — The  Creation  of  the  Commonwealth 
of  West  Virginia — Return  of  Congress  to  the  Doctrine  that  it 
may  Lay  upon  New  Commonwealths,  as  the  Price  of  their  Ad- 
mission, Conditions  not  Resting  on  the  Old  Commonwealths. 

The  Emancipation  Proclamation  and  the  Confiscation 
Act  have  been  already  sufficiently  treated.  This  chapter 
will  therefore  be  largely  devoted  to  the  development  of 
the  powers  of  the  Government  in  the  loyul  North,  at 

214  2 


INTERPRETATION   OF   THE   CONSTITUTION      215 

the  expense  both  of  individual  liberty  and  of  "  States' 
rights."  Of  course  the  natural  avenue  of  approach  to 
the  personal  liberty  of  individuals  in  the  loyal  section 
was  through  the  fixing  and  administering  of  the  crim- 
inal law.  If  the  Government  could,  by  virtue  of  its  war 
powers,  set  aside  the  constitutional  defences  of  the  in- 
dividual in  criminal  prosecution,  then  might  it  claim 
to  be  vested,  during  the  period  of  war,  with  absolute 
power.  Keference  has  been  made  to  the  suspension  of 
the  privilege  of  the  writ  of  Habeas  Corpus  by  the  order 
of  the  President.  There  was  no  question  that  it  might 
be  constitutionally  suspended  in  time  of  war  and  public 
danger.  The  questions  were,  who  should  determine 
when  and  where  war  or  public  danger  existed,  who 
should  suspend  the  privilege  of  the  writ,  and  what  were 
the  effects  of  the  suspension  upon  the  other  elements 
of  personal  liberty.  The  Congressional  legislation  of 
this  period  gave  some  answers  to  these  questions,  which 
must  be  considered  constitutional  precedents  in  regard 
to  this  subject. 

The  Act  of  March  3,  1863,  may  be  considered  as  rep- 
resenting the  fulness  of  the  claims  of  the  Government 
in  reference  to  its  power  to  suspend  the  guar-  The  con- 
antees  of  personal  liberty  during  a  period  of  ir^MScL^s! 
civil  war.  That  Act  authorized  the  Presi-  -^^tbrprfi' 
dent  to  suspend  the  privilege  of  the  writ  of  ^f^ofHabeas 
Habeas  Corpus  throughout  the  whole  United  corpus. 
States,  or  any  part  thereof,  during  the  existing  rebellion, 
whenever  in  his  opinion  the  public  safety  should  require 
it ;  and  it  made  the  certificate  under  oath  of  any  oflQ- 
cer  that  he  held  any  person  prisoner  under  authority 
from  the  President  a  sufficient  answer  to  the  writ.  It 
furthermore  made  an  order  issued  by  the  President,  or 
under  his  authority,  a  snflBcient  defence  in  all  courts 
against  prosecution  for  acts  done  or  omitted  by  virtue 


216  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

of  such  order.  A  law  of  Congress  was  also  declared  to 
be  equal  defence  against  such  prosecutions.  The  Act 
then  commanded  that  a  list  of  all  persons  so  seized  and 
held  in  the  loyal  States  should  be  furnished  by  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  or  the  Secretary  of  War  to  the  judges  of 
the  Circuit  and  District  Courts  of  the  United  States 
and  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  and  that  unless  the 
grand  juries  in  the  respective  jurisdictions  of  these  courts 
should  find,  before  the  termination  of  their  sessions,  in- 
dictments or  presentments  or  unless  other  proceeding 
should  be  taken  against  the  persons  whose  names  ap- 
peared upon  these  lists,  such  persons  should  be  dis- 
charged by  these  courts  from  further  custody  upon  tak- 
ing the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  United  States,  and,  in 
case  the  courts  should  see  fit  to  require  it,  giving  bonds 
with  surety  "  to  keep  the  peace  and  be  of  good  behavior 
toward  the  United  States."  It  also  protected  the  officer 
acting  under  order  of  the  President  or  by  his  authority 
against  processes  in  the  "  State  "  courts  by  providing  for 
the  removal  or  appeal  of  such  cases  to  the  courts  of  the 
United  States.  While,  therefore,  the  suspension  of  the 
privilege  of  the  writ  of  Habeas  Corpus  did  not,  strictly 
speaking,  authorize  arbitrary  arrest  or  delay  in  trial,  or 
any  unusual  procedure  in  trial,  but  simply  prevented  the 
arrested  person  from  having  a  judicial  determination  as 
to  the  continuance  of  his  confinement,  yet  it  is  easy  to 
see  that  the  individual  who  might  suffer  arbitrary  arrest 
would  have  no  remedy,  if  the  privilege  of  having  his 
body  brought  before  a  judicial  officer  should  be  suspend- 
ed, and  if  an  order  of  the  President  should  be  a  suffi- 
cient answer  to  any  prosecution  for  unlawful  arrest. 

This  Congressional  Act  was  therefore  virtually  an  in- 
demnification of  the  President's  orders,  suspending  the 
privilege  of  the  writ  and  authorizing  military  arrest 
and  trial  by  military  commissions.     It  was  especially  the 


INTERPKETATION   OF   THE   CONSTITUTION      217 

President's  proclamation  of  September  24,  18G2,  which 
was  thus  pronounced  lawful.  This  proclamation  made 
all  rebels  and  insurgents,  their  aiders  and  ^^^ 
abettors  in  the  United  States,  and  all  persons  of  the  power 
discouraging  volunteer  enlistments,  resist-  the  President 
ing  militia  drafts  or  guilty  of  any  disloyal  ^  ®  ^  ■ 
practice,  or  affording  any  aid  and  comfort  to  rebels 
against  the  United  States,  subject  to  martial  law,  that 
is,  to  arrest  by  executive  order,  detention  without  the 
privilege  of  Habeas  Corpus  or  bail,  and  trial  by  military 
commissions  or  courts-martial. 

It  is  true,  as  we  have  seen,  that  the  Act  provided  for 
the  transmission  of  lists  of  the  names  of  persons  held 
under  an  order  of  the  President  or  by  his  authority  to 
the  courts  of  the  United  States,  and  for  indictment  or 
discharge  of  such  persons  by  the  grand  juries  in  said 
courts,  but  it  did  not  forbid  their  trial  by  military  com- 
missions, and  it  did  not  provide  any  method  for  the  re- 
vision of  the  decisions  of  said  commissions  by  the  United 
States  judiciary  or  any  other  body. 

It  may,  therefore,  be  claimed  that  it  is  the  precedent 
of  the  Constitution  in  civil  war  that  the  President  may 
suspend  all  of  the  safeguards  of  the  Consti-     ^^ 

■■■  °  The  meaning 

tution  in  behalf  of  personal  liberty  anywhere  of  the  statute 

.  ■,  •        1  1  .  I'lffi        as  an  interpre- 

withm  the  country,  taking  upon  himself  the  tation  of  the 

.1  .i.,       ,1  <•        .       /^  1   ii      I     Constitution. 

responsibility  therefor  to  Congress,  and  that 
subsequent  authorization   by  Congress   to   do    the  like 
things  in  future  works  indemnification,  and  makes  the 
preceding  Presidential  assumptions  legitimate  and  law- 
ful, if  they  lacked  anything  of  being  so  before. 

It  is  evident  that  the  President  considered  himself 
now  fully  authorized  to  continue  to  act  as  he  had  done. 
He  issued  his  proclamation  of  September  15,  1863,  sus- 
pending the  privilege  of  the  writ  of  Habeas  Corpus 
throughout  the  whole  country  in  all  cases  where  persons 


218  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

were  held  by  the  civil,  military  or  naval  authorities  un- 
der the  orders,  or  by  the  authority,  of  the  President  as 
.    "  prisoners  of  war,  spies,  or  aiders  or  abettors 
dent's  procia-  of  the  enemy  "  or  for  having  resisted  anv 

mationofSep-     ,»,-,,  „  •  ,  ., 

tember  15,  drait  or  for  any  other  onence  agamst  the  mil- 
itary or  naval  service.     The  suspension  also 
naturally  applied  to  all  persons  belonging  to  the  military 

The  Presi-  ^^^  naval  service.  The  President  also  con- 
dent's  acts.  tinned  his  military  arrests,  that  is,  his  arrests 
without  any  civil  warrant,  and  his  trials  by  military  com- 
missions ;  and  those  commissions,  as  well  as  the  officers 
arresting  and  holding  persons,  gave  the  most  liberal  in- 
terpretation to  the  words  aiders  and  abettors  of  the 
enemy,  so  that  almost  any  criticism  of  the  policy  of  the 
Administration  was  in  danger  of  being  construed  as 
giving  aid  and  comfort  to  the  enemy. 

After  the  war  was  ended,  indeed,  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  in  the  case  of  ex  parte  Milligan, 

The  Mim-  l>y  ^  bare  majority,  the  Chief  Justice  being 
gau  decision,  among  those  dissenting,  ruled  that  the  sus- 
pension of  the  privilege  of  the  writ  of  Habeas  Corpus 
only  authorized  detention  under  arrest,  but  did  not  work 
the  suspension  of  the  other  guarantees  of  personal  lib- 
erty, and  that  martial  law  could  not  be  established  at 
any  time  in  those  parts  of  the  country  where  the  regular 
courts  were  open  "  and  in  the  proper  and  unobstructed 
exercise  of  their  jurisdiction."  There  is  no  question 
that  the  practices  of  the  Administration  and  the  opinion 
of  the  Court  were  at  variance,  and  there  is  little  doubt 
that  in  spite  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  the  practices  of 
the  Administration  would  be  repeated  under  like  cir- 
cumstances. The  practices  of  the  Administration  are, 
therefore,  to  be  considered  as  the  precedents  of  the  Con- 
stitution in  civil  war  rather  than  the  opinion  of  the 
Court.     They  are  justified  by  the  necessity  under  which 


INTERPRETATION    OF   THE   CONSTITUTION      219 

the  Government  must  act  in  executing  its  powers  during 
a  state  of  civil  war. 

The  action  of  the  Government  in  making  the  property 
of  citizens  in  the  loyal  Commonwealths  subject  to  its  use 
was  also  thoroughgoing,  if  not  despotic.     In      „ 

*=    °  .  1  The  control 

August  of  1801,  Congress  imposed  a  tax  on  over  property 
real  estate  of  twenty  millions  of  dollars,  and  the    General 

,•         j'j.  iucij-i-  J"        J.       Government. 

apportioned  it  among  the  states  according  to 
population.  The  Act  exempted  the  real  estate  of  any 
person  whose  whole  property  of  this  nature  did  not  ex- 
ceed five  hundred  dollars  in  value.  It  provided  for  the 
appraisal  of  the  property  subject  to  this  tax  and  for  the 
levy  and  collection  of  the  tax  by  officers  of  the  General 
Government,  but  if  any  Commonwealth  government 
would  anticipate  these  operations  by  paying  the  amount 
apportioned  to  it  beforehand,  it  might  do  so,  and  would 
be  allowed  a  rebate  of  fifteen  per  centum  on  its  apportion- ' 
ment  for  cost  of  collection.  There  was  nothing  in  this 
part  of  the  Act  which  could  be  regarded  as  The  ordina- 
straining  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution.  uie**Govern* 
The  Constitution  vests  the  Government  ex-  ment  to  tax. 
pressly  with  the  power  to  levy  and  collect  taxes  upon 
any  object  except  exports  from  a  Commonwealth,  and 
the  court  has  added  to  this  exemption  only  the  neces- 
sary instrumentalities  of  a  Commonwealth  government. 
The  Constitution  only  requires  that  capitation  and  other 
direct  taxes  shall  be  distributed  among  the  Common- 
wealths according  to  population,  and  that  rule  was  fol- 
lowed in  this  Act  in  regard  to  this  tax,  since  tax  on  real 
estate  has  been  always  regarded  in  our  jurisprudence  as 
a  direct  tax. 

The  question  may,  indeed,  be  mooted  whether  the 
Congress  has  the  power  to  exempt  real  estate  to  the 
value  of  five  hundred  dollars,  or  to  any  amount,  from 
a  tax  which  it  may  vote  to  levy  and  collect.     Such  a 


220  THE  CIVIL   WAR 

power  in  government  is  not  strictly  democratic  in  its 

nature.     Exemptions  from  the  burdens  of  the  state  are 

The  power  ^^^^rally  Connected  with  exclusions  from  the 

ofcongressto  privileges,  if  not  the  rights,   which   it  be- 

exempt  prop-    ^  o   mi  /-T         ■ 

erty  from  the  stows.  Still,  as  the  Constitution  of  the 
a  given  law  of  United  States  is  not  a  strictly  democratic 
body  of  law,  it  can  hardly  be  held  that  it  dis- 
ables Congress  from  making  such  exemptions,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  democratic  theory.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  is  quite  certain  that  an  excessive  use  of  this 
power  by  Congress  would  lead  to  results  which  would 
provoke  loud  protests.  An  unregulated  power  in  gov- 
ernment to  make  exemptions  from  taxation  is  a  dan- 
gerous power.  A  fairly  perfect  constitution  will  not 
intrust  government  with  such  a  power. 

It  cannot  be  so  positively  asserted  that  the  other 
parts  of  the  Act  do  not  show  an  exaggeration  of  con- 
Thetenden-  stitutional  powers  by  Congress.  For  ex- 
aggeratfon^of  ample,  the  income  tax  introduced  by  it,  not 
power°hf°t*he  ^^^J  ©tempted  incomes  of  eight  hundred 
■^<='-  dollars  and  under,  but  the  tax  was  imposed 

upon  the  proceeds  of  all  property  and  labor,  and  was 
levied  according  to  the  rule  of  uniformity,  that  is,  the 
rule  of  the  same  rate  upon  the  same  thing  everywhere, 
instead  of  according  to  population.  That  is.  Congress 
assumed  this  tax  to  be  a  duty,  an  excise,  or  an  impost, 
rather  than  a  direct  tax,  as  it  has  recently  been  decided 
by  the  Court  to  be,  in  so  far  as  it  is  levied  upon  the  in- 
come from  property.  The  Government  can  get  at  prop- 
erty with  more  facility  through  the  principle  of  the 
duty  or  excise  than  through  that  of  the  direct  tax,  and 
hence  the  tendency  of  the  Congress  has  been  to  expand 
the  domain  of  the  duty  and  the  excise  at  the  expense 
of  that  of  the  direct  tax. 

The  Act  of  July  1,  1862,  was  an  advance  upon  that 


INTERPRETATION   OF   THE   CONSTITUTION      221 

of  August,  1861.  It  did  not  provide  for  any  tax  on  real 
estate,  but  it  developed  the  excise  until  it  covered  almost 
everything  produced,  sold  or  consumed, 
and  forbade  the  pursuit  of  almost  any  busi-  nue  Act  of 
ness  unless  under  heavily  taxed  license.  It  ^  ' 
retained  the  income  tax  as  a  duty  or  excise,  reduced  the 
amount  exempted  to  six  hundred  dollars,  introduced 
the  sliding  scale  of  rates  upon  incomes  in  accordance 
^  with  the  amount  of  the  income,  three  per  centum  on  all 
incomes  over  six  hundred  and  up  to  ten  thousand  dol- 
lars, and  five  joer  centum  upon  those  above  ten  thousand 
dollars.  It  introduced  the  system  of  stamp  duties,  and 
imposed  them  upon  almost  every  kind  of  agreement 
and  legal  document,  as  well  as  upon  innumerable  ar- 
ticles of  property.  And  it  introduced  a  tax  upon  leg- 
acies and  distributive  shares  of  personal  property,  grad- 
ing the  same  according  to  the  degree  of  kinship  between 
the  parties,  from  seventy-five  cents  to  five  dollars  on 
each  hundred  dollars'  worth  of  property  so  left  or  dis- 
tributed. Naturally  the  Congress  treated  these  taxes  as 
excises  or  duties,  and  ordered  their  levy  and  collection 
by  the  rule  of  uniformity. 

The  Congress  also  invented  and  applied  the  most  vig- 
orous measures  for  the  levy  and  collection  of  all  of  these 
imposts,  among  the  more  questionable  of  The  meas- 
which  was  that  requiring  certain  corpora-  ^u|c«on  'of 
tions,  such  as  railroads  and  banks,  to  deduct  t^e  revenue, 
the  amount  of  the  income  tax  from  dividends  and  inter- 
est paid  by  them  to  stockholders  and  bondholders,  and 
pay  the  same  over  to  the  United  States  Government. 

Such  a  sweeping  use  of  the  power  of  taxation  had 
never  before  been  made  by  Congress.  In  most  respects 
what  it  did  was  strictly  within  its  constitutional  pow- 
ers, but  some  of  the  provisions  of  this  law  could  not 
now  stand  before  the  recent  decisions  of  the  Supreme 


222  THE   CIVIL    WAli 

Court  of  the  United  States,  as  for  instance,  the  provision 
in  regard  to  the  income  tax,  and  that  authorizing  and 
requiring  corporations  to  deduct  the  amount  of  the  in- 
come tax  from  the  interest  payable  to  bondholders.  The 
fact  is  that  the  Act  of  July  1,  1862,  practically  nulli- 
fied some  of  the  most  important  limitations  placed  by 
the  Constitution  upon  the  taxing  powers  of  the  Govern- 
ment. It  marks  quite  an  advance  toward  absolutism 
as  well  as  nationalism  in  the  powers  of  the  Government 
over  the  property  of  the  loyal  citizen. 

The  Government  advanced  no  less  radically  upon  the 
domain  of  the  freedom  of  the  press.    In  August  of  1861, 

The  Gov-  Postmaster-General  Blair  gave  orders  exclud- 
the"fteedo°m  ^^S  Certain  New  York  and  Brooklyn  papers 
of  the  Press,  from  the  mails.  These  papers  had  been  in- 
dicted by  United  States  grand  juries  for  rebellious  ut- 
terances. At  the  same  time  the  United  States  Marshal  in 
New  York  seized  the  copies  of  one  of  these  papers,  the 
New  York  Daily  Neius,  addressed  to  Philadelphia  and  to 
other  cities  west  and  south.  These  vigorous,  not  to  say 
high-handed,  acts  of  the  Administration  caused  an  inves- 
tigation to  be  set  on  foot  in  the  year  1862-63  in  Con- 
gress concerning  the  executive  powers  in  time  of  war 
over  the  public  press.  The  report  of  the  Judiciary  Com- 
mittee of  the  House  of  Representatives,  made  January 
20,  1863,  upon  the  subject,  contains  a  statement  from 
the  Postmaster-General,  the  Hon.  Montgomery  Blair,  of 
the  powers  claimed  by  the  Administration  in  regard  to 

Opinion  of  the  exclusion  of  mail  matter  from  the  mails. 
ter-GTneraJoii  ^^  "^^^  "  *^^^  ^  powcr  and  a  duty  to  prevent 
the  subject.  hostilc  printed  matter  from  reaching  the  ene- 
my, and  to  prevent  such  matter  from  instigating  others 
to  co-operate  with  the  enemy,  by  the  aid  of  the  United 
States  mails,  exist  in  time  of  war,  and  in  the  presence  of 
treasonable  and  armed  enemies  of  the  United  States, 


INTERPRETATION   OF  THE   CONSTITUTION      223 

which  do  not  exist  in  time  of  peace,  and  in  the  absence 
of  criminal  organizations."  The  Postmaster-General  de- 
clared this  to  be  a  constitutional  power  ;  and  he  distin- 
guished his  doctrine  on  the  subject,  from  that  advanced 
in  the  year  1835  in  regard  to  the  exclusion  of  the  aboli- 
tionist literature  from  the  mails,  in  that  he  held  that 
the  power  could  not  be  exercised  during  a  time  of  peace, 
but  only  during  a  time  of  war,  and  in  that  he  held  that, 
not  the  individual  postmasters  concerned  could  deter- 
mine what  should  be  excluded  from  transmission  through 
the  mails,  but  only  the  Postmaster-General  himself. 

The  Judiciary  Committee  sustained  the  view  of  the 
Postmaster-General,  and  thus  the  freedom  of  the  press 
was  placed  at  the  mercy  of  the  Government      _  .  . 

^  .      •'  Opinion    Of 

in  time  of  war,  despite  the  words  of  the  Con-  the  Judiciary 
stitution  that  '*  Congress  shall  pass  no  law  the  Senate  on 
abridging  the  freedom  of  the  press."  The  ®^'*3^'=- 
precedent  of  the  Government  in  civil  war  is,  therefore, 
that  this  part  of  the  Constitution  may  be  suspended  by 
order  of  the  Administration,  when  in  the  judgment  of 
the  President  the  public  safety  demands  it. 

Naturally  the  necessities  of  the  war  forced  the  Govern- 
ment to  use  its  powers  for  raising  and  organizing  armies 
and  the  navy  to  a  very  high  degree,  if  not  to      ™. 
the  utmost.     Down  to  the  beginninar  of  the  of  the  Govern- 

iri6iiti     in    r6~ 

year  1863,  the  Government  had  relied  upon  spect  to  the 
volunteers  or  militia  calls.  The  unfavorable  holding  of  ar- 
military  situation  during  the  latter  half  of  ™*^^' 
1862,  and  the  early  part  of  1863,  had  thrown  a  great 
damper  upon  volunteering,  and  the  constitutional  and 
legal  limitations  in  regard  to  the  call  and  employ- 
ment of  the  militia  had  rendered  this  arm  of  the  ser- 
vice ineffective.  The  Constitution  confers  on  Congress 
the  power  to  raise  and  support  armies  without  any 
limitations  as  to  the  form  and  manner  in  which  this 


224  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

may  be  done.  The  Conscription  Act  of  March  3,  1863, 
was  therefore  both  necessary  and  constitutional.  The 
Confederates  had  been  compelled  to  have  recourse  to 
this  means  of  maintaining  the  strength  of  their  armies 
nearly  a  year  before  this.  Their  Conscription  Act 
was  passed  on  April  16,  1862. 

The  United  States  Act  of  March  3,  1863,  provided 
that  all  able-bodied  male  citizens  of  the  United  States 
The  Act  of  between  the  ages  of  twenty  and  forty-five, 
March  3, 1863.  ^nd  all  ablc-bodicd  foreigners  of  the  male  sex 
between  these  ages,  who  had  declared  on  oath  the  pur- 
pose to  become  citizens  of  the  United  States,  should 
constitute  the  National  forces,  and  should  be  "  liable  to 
perform  military  duty  when  called  out  by  the  President 
for  that  duty."  For  the  execution  of  this  law  the 
United  States  was  divided  into  enrollment  districts,  by 
the  provisions  of  the  Act  for  the  most  part,  but  also  in 
part  by  the  President  at  his  own  discretion,  and  United 
States  enrollment  officers,  appointed  and  controlled  by 
the  President,  were  put  in  charge.  The  President  was 
authorized  to  assign  the  quota  of  each  district,  and  to 
call  them  forth  and  organize  them  at  his  own  discre- 
tion ;  and  it  was  provided  that  after  such  call,  any  per- 
son disobeying  the  summons  might  be  dealt  with  as  a 
deserter,  unless  he  had  furnished,  as  he  might  do,  an 
acceptable  substitute,  or  paid  the  sum  of  three  hundred 
dollars  into  the  treasury  of  the  United  States  for  the 
purpose  of  enabling  the  Government  to  hire  such  a  sub- 
stitute for  him.  The  machinery  of  the  Commonwealth 
governments  was  thus  entirely  ignored  in  the  whole 
procedure.  The  Nation  claimed  the  military  service  of 
all  its  citizens,  as  a  paramount  duty  on  their  part,  and 
provided  for  their  organization,  equipment  and  control 
without  any  regard  to  the  Commonwealths,  and  their 
powers  over  the  militia,  whatsoever. 


INTERPRETATION   OF   THE   CONSTITUTION      225 

The  Act  was  pronounced  nnconstitutional  in  many 
quarters,  because  it  was  held  to  destroy  the  militia  of  the 
Commonwealths,  and  its  execution  was  openly  defied  in 
some  places,  but  the  argument  against  its  constitution- 
ality is  certainly  sophistical,  and  was  so  considered  by 
the  Government  at  the  time,  since  the  rule  of  interpre- 
tation had  been  long  established  that  where  the  United 
States  Government  and  the  Commonwealths  may,  by  the 
Constitution,  operate  upon  the  same  subject,  the  claims 
of  the  United  States  must  be  satisfied  first,  although 
they  may  exhaust  the  subject ;  and  the  resistance  to  the 
execution  of  the  law  was  put  down  by  military  power. 
The  precedent  shows  the  Government  to  be  completely 
national  in  the  domain  of  the  military  system,  at  its  own 
option. 

The  nationalization  of  the  currency  and  bank  of  issue 
systems  belongs  also  to  the  legislation  of  the  year  1863. 
Down  to  the  1st  of  March,  1863,  after  the  ac-  The  trans- 
cession  of  Lincoln,  Congress  had  authorized  the^mon^tary 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  borrow  five  the'^ed^ss^of 
hundred  millions  of  dollars  on  bonds,  two  ^"• 
hundred  millions  on  bonds  or  interest-bearing  Treasury 
notes,  and  fifty  millions  on  bonds,  interest-bearing  Treas- 
ury notes,  or  non-interest-bearing  Treasury  notes  paya- 
ble on  demand,  and  to  issue  four  hundred  millions  of 
dollars  in  non-interest-bearing  notes  of  the  United  States 
payable  to  bearer,  which  should  be  a  legal  tender  in  all 
cases,  except  for  duties  on  imports  and  interest  on  the 
public  debt.  Five  hundred  millions  of  dollars  of  these 
loans  were  intended  to  fund  the  Treasury  notes  and  float- 
ing debt  in  bonds ;  and  fifty  millions  of  dollars  of  the 
United  States  notes  were  intended  to  be  substituted  for 
the  fifty  millions  of  dollars  of  demand  Treasury  notes, 
previously  authorized. 

The  condition  of  the  finances  of  the  United  States  in 
Vol.  II.— 15 


226  THE   CIVIL   WAK 

the  first  month  of  the  year  1863 — a  condition  partly  real- 
ized and  partly  still  in  process  of  realization — was,  so  far 

Financial  ^s  indebtedness  was  concerned,  a  bonded  obli- 
the'^tot  part  g^tion  of  fivc  hundred  millions  of  dollars  and 
of  1863.  a  currency  obligation  of  four  hundred  mill- 

ions of  dollars,  and  the  problem  was  how  to  keep  up  the 
value  of  these  bonds  and  notes.  The  pillars  of  support 
at  that  moment  were  the  facts  that  interest  on  the  bonds 
was  payable  in  coin,  and  that  the  notes  were  convertible 
into  the  bonds.  The  receipts  from  the  duty  on  imports, 
which  must  be  paid  in  coin,  placed  the  Government  in 
the  position  to  discharge  its  coin  obligation  in  respect  to 
the  interest  on  the  bonds.  Naturally  the  Government 
preferred  to  sell  its  bonds  for  coin,  although  it  could  re- 
issue the  notes,  simply  because  it  could  buy  more  with 
the  coin  than  with  the  notes.  How  to  sell  the  bonds  for 
coin  and  still  keep  up  the  value  of  the  notes  in  circula- 
tion was  the  question. 

The  National  Banking  Act  of  February  25, 1863,  was 
the  answer  to  this  question.     Briefly  considered  from 

The  Nation-  this  point  of  view,  the  Act  provided  that  any 
Act  o? p'e'bru^  number  of  persons,  numbering  not  less  than 
ary25, 1863.  gye^  might  Organize  a  banking  association, 
having  a  capital  stock  of  not  less  than  one  hundred  thou- 
sand dollars  in  cities  of  more  than  ten  thousand  inhabi- 
tants, and  of  not  less  than  fifty  thousand  dollars  in  cities 
and  towns  having  less  than  ten  thousand  inhabitants  ; 
that  every  such  association,  after  having  fulfilled  the  re- 
quirements of  the  Act  in  regard  to  organization,  should, 
before  beginning  business,  transfer  and  deliver  to  the 
Treasurer  of  the  United  States  interest-bearing  United 
States  bonds  to  the  amount  of  at  least  one-third  of  the 
capital  stock  paid  in,  to  be  held  by  the  Treasurer  on  de- 
posit for  the  purpose  of  executing  the  other  provisions  of 
the  Act ;  that  upon  making  this  transfer  and  delivery 


INTERPRETATION   OF   THE   CONSTITUTION      227 

of  bonds  to  the  Treasurer  of  the  United  States,  the 
said  association  should  receive  from  the  Comptroller  of 
the  Currency  circular  notes,  equal  in  amount  to  ninety 
per  centum  of  the  current  market  value  of  the  bonds  so 
transferred  and  delivered;  that  such  notes  when  put  into 
circulation  by  the  said  association  should  be  received  at 
par  in  all  parts  of  the  United  States  in  payment  of  any 
dues  to  the  United  States  except  duties  on  imports,  and 
in  payment  of  all  debts  and  obligations  owed  by  the 
United  States,  except  interest  on  the  public  debt ;  and 
that  such  notes  must  be  redeemed  by  the  association 
issuing  them  in  the  lawful  money  of  the  United  States, 
that  is  in  coin  and  United  States  notes,  or  such  clearing- 
house certificates  or  bank  balances  in  certain  of  the  larger 
cities  as  might  be  readily  converted  into  such  lawful 
money  of  the  United  States,  and  that  for  this  purpose 
every  such  association  must  keep  on  hand  lawful  money 
of  the  United  States  to  an  amount  equal  to  twenty-five 
per  centum  of  its  outstanding  circulating  notes  and  its 
deposits. 

The  Act  furthermore  provided  that  the  banking  asso- 
ciations formed  under  it  might,  at  the  discretion  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  be  used  by  the  Government 
as  depositories  of  United  States  funds,  "  except  the  re- 
ceipts from  customs." 

The  demand  thus  created  for  the  bonds  and  notes  of 
the  United  States  was  very  great,  and  the  national  bank- 
ing system  became  the  strong  support  of  the  national 
currency  system  and  the  national  bond  system. 

A  result  had  been  thus  reached  in  the  nationaliza- 
tion of  the  currency  system  of  the  United  States  un- 
der the  necessities  of  war,  which  was  of  immense  benefit 
to  the  country.  This  Act,  as  re-enacted  and  developed 
by  the  Act  of  June  3,  .1864,  and  supplemented  by  the 
Act  of  March  3,  1865,  imposing  a  tax  of  ten  per  centum 


228  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

on  the  notes  of  State  banks  paid  out  by  any  bank  after 
July  1,  1866,  put  an  end  to  what  may  be  called  the 
*'  State  "  bank  of  issue  system,  if  it  could  be  called  a  sys- 
tem at  all,  in  the  United  States.  Originating  primarily 
in  a  necessity  for  providing  ways  and  means  for  floating 
Government  loans,  the  national  banking  system  was  a 
great  step  forward  in  the  solution  of  the  money  and 
currency  problems  of  the  Government,  a  greater  advance 
than  had  been  made  from  the  foundation  of  the  Govern- 
ment to  the  date  of  its  enactment.  It  is  another  great 
example  of  the  solution  of  a  great  question  by  a  flank 
movement,  rather  than  by  a  front  attack.  Of  course, 
this  kind  of  a  solution  may  leave  the  question  still  un- 
solved, at  least  in  part,  from  the  point  of  view  of  scien- 
tific merits,  but  in  this  case  the  new  system  was,  from 
this  point  of  view  also,  a  great  advance  for  this  country, 
and  it  certainly  was  a  great  help  to  the  Government 
in  floating  the  immense  loans  of  1863,  1864  and  1865, 
which,  with  what  had  been  authorized  before,  made  a 
governmental  debt  of  huge  proportions,  some  2,600,000,- 
000  of  dollars,  an  amount  which  no  man  in  1861  believed 
that  the  Government  could  possibly  borrow.  Naturally 
the  supervision  of  the  new  banking  system  was  placed  in 
the  hands  of  United  States  officials,  chief  of  whom,  un- 
der the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  was  the  new  official 
created  by  the  Act,  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency. 

The  Confederate  government  did  not  create,  or  make 

use  of,  any  banking  system  to  sustain  its  loans.     It  sim- 

chief  P^y  issued  Treasury  notes  bearing  interest, 

distinction  and  then  Confederate  notes  bearing  no  inter- 

bstWGfiD     t  Q  6 

borrowing  est,  and  provided  for  the  funding  of  these 
United  States  notes  in  bonds,  the  interest  on  which  should 
the  soutiieni  be  paid  in  coin  or  legal  tender  money  ob- 
confederacy.  ^^^^^^^  from  the  export  duty  on  cotton.  The 
blockade  ruined  cotton  exportation  and  knocked  the 


INTERPRETATION    OF   THE   CONSTITUTION      229 

foundation  from  under  the  whole  system.  By  the  end 
of  the  year  1862  about  300,000,000  dollars  of  Confeder- 
ate notes  had  been  paid  out,  and  after  that  they  were 
issued,  on  a  rough  guess,  at  the  rate  of  about  500,000,000 
pe7'  annum.  No  attempt  to  fund  or  restrict  them  was  suc- 
cessful, or  could  be,  since  the  coin  basis  for  sustaining 
the  interest  on  the  bonds  was  destroyed  by  the  blockade 
of  the  Southern  ports. 

It  would  be  hazardous  to  say  that  a  banking  system 
similar  to  that  invented  by  the  United  States  would  have 
saved  the  Confederacy  from  any  of  its  financial  difficul- 
ties, though  it  is  easy  to  see  that  the  coin  already  in  the 
Southern  communities  might  have  been  placed,  in  this 
way,  more  completely  within  the  grasp  of  the  Govern- 
ment. 

Lastly,  the  nationalization  of  our  legislation  in  1863 
is  manifest  in  the  attitude  which  the  Con-  congres- 
gress  took  in  reference  to  slavery  in  the  Ter-  i"°'ifj  goveru^ 
ritories  and  in  reference  to  the  admission  of  Ten'ito/ies 

new  Commonwealths  into  the  Union.     As  and  in. the  ad- 
mission of 

we  know,  it  was  the  chief  tenet  of  the  Ke-  P^w    states 

intothe 

publican  party  that  Congress  had  the  power  Union. 

to  prohibit  or  abolish  slavery  in  a  Territory,  and  that  it 

was  its  duty  to  do  so. 

After  the  repeal  by  the  Kansas-Nebraska  Act  of  that 
part  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  which  related  to 
the  prohibition  of  slavery  in  the  territory  received  from 
France  and  after  the  Dred  Scott  decision  upholding  the 
Kansas-Nebraska  Act  by  pronouncing  the  repealed  Act 
unconstitutional,  the  measures  of  Congress  establishing 
Territorial  governments  contained  nothing  upon  the  sub- 
ject of  slavery  down  to  the  Act  of  February  24,  1863, 
establishing  the  Territory  of  Arizona.  In  this  act  the 
prohibition  is  outspoken,  and  Congress  thus  asserted  the 
nullity  of  the  Dred  Scott  decision.    Of  course  such  an  as- 


230  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

sertion  by  the  legislative  department  of  the  Government 
over  against  the  judicial  department  is  itself,  in  the  or- 
dinary relations  of  authority  in  our  system,  a  nullity.  It 
can  only  be  upheld  upon  the  theory  of  the  military  ab- 
solutism of  the  Government  in  a  period  of  civil  war.  If 
the  Civil  War  had  not  been  followed  by  the  Thirteenth 
Amendment  to  the  Constitution,  the  prohibition  upon 
slavery  in  Arizona  by  Congressional  Act  would  have 
lapsed,  or  at  least  have  become  questionable,  with  the 
return  to  the  status  of  peace. 

The  growth  of  governmental  power  is  also  to  be  ob- 
served in  legislation  concerning  the  establishment  of  the 
The  ere  a-  new  Commonwealth  of  West  Virginia.  The 
c  o'm  m  o  n^  Constitution  of  the  United  States  permits  the 
w^eVt*^  Vir-  erection  of  a  new  Commonwealth  within  the 
ginia.  jurisdiction   of   an  existing   Commonwealth 

with  the  consent  of  Congress  and  of  the  legislature  of 
the  existing  Commonwealth.  The  establishment  of  West 
Virginia  proceeded  formally  upon  the  basis  of  a  petition 
for  admission  into  the  Union  by  a  convention  of  the  peo- 
ple of  those  counties  of  old  Virginia  wishing  to  form  a 
new  Commonwealth,  the  consent  of  the  legislature  of  old 
Virginia,  sitting  at  Alexandria,  and  recognized  by  the 
United  States  Government  as  the  legitimate  legislature 
of  Virginia,  and  the  consent  of  Congress.  Formally  the 
letter  of  the  Constitution  had  been  fulfilled.  The  West 
Virginia  convention  formed  the  constitution  for  the 
Commonwealth  of  West  Virginia  in  November  of  1861. 
On  the  3d  of  May,  1862,  the  voters  in  the  section  de- 
siring to  become  a  new  Commonwealth  ratified  it.  On 
the  13th  of  May,  1862,  the  Alexandria  legislature  gave 
its  consent  to  the  dismemberment  of  the  old  Common- 
wealth, and  on  December  31,  1862,  the  President  ap- 
proved the  Congressional  Act  for  the  admission  of  West 
Virginia  into  the  Union.     Congress,  however,  attached 


INTERPRETATION    OF   THE   CONSTITUTION      231 

the  condition  that  the  admission  should  not  take  effect 
until  after  a  proclamation  of  the  President  so  declaring, 
and  that  this  proclamation  should  not  be  issued  until 
after  certain  changes  should  be  made  in  the  constitution 
of  the  new  Commonwealth,  which  changes  should  make 
the  children  of  all  slaves  born  in  the  new  Commonwealth 
after  the  4th  of  July,  1863,  free,  and  all  slaves  under  ten 
years  of  age  at  that  date  free  at  twenty-one,  and  all  slaves 
over  ten  and  under  twenty-one  at  that  date  free  at  twen- 
ty-five, and  should  prohibit  the  immigration  of  slaves 
into  the  new  Commonwealth  for  permanent  residence. 
The  convention  and  the  people  of  the  forty-eight  coun- 
ties seeking  to  be  made  the  Commonwealth  of  West  Vir- 
ginia complied  with  the  condition,  and  on  the  20th  of 
April,  1863,  the  President  issued  his  proclamation  pro- 
nouncing West  Virginia  a  member  of  the  Union  in  sixty 
days  from  the  date  of  the  issue  of  the  proclamation. 

As  we  have  seen,  the  legal  forms  were  all  observed,  but 
when  we  examine  into  the  real  facts  of  the  case,  the 
forms  must  appear  rather  hollow.  The  legislature  of 
Virginia,  at  Alexandria,  represented  chiefly  that  part  of 
the  old  Commonwealth  which  was  seeking  to  become 
the  new  and  separate  Commonwealth.  That  is,  two  of 
the  nominal  parties  to  this  tri-partite  agreement  re- 
quired by  the  Constitution  were  virtually  the  same 
party,  viz.,  the  people  of  the  forty-eight  western  coun- 
ties of  Virginia.  Eeally,  they  were  simply  dealing  with 
themselves.  The  new  Commonwealth  was  created  there- 
fore by  the  joint  act  of  themselves  and  Congress.  In 
other  words,  Congress  assumed,  by  and  with  the  co- 
operation of  the  majority  of  the  people  resident  within 
a  part  of  the  Commonwealth  whose  secession  from  the 
Union  had  been  declared,  to  detach  that  part  from  the 
old  Commonwealth  and  establish  it  as  a  new  Common- 
wealth.    This   is   good  doctrine   as   well  as  true  fact. 


232  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

When  a  Commonwealth  proclaims  its  connection  with 
the  Union  dissolved  it  is  no  longer  to  be  considered  a 
*'  State  "  of  the  Union,  but  a  territory  lawfully  subject 
to  the  Union  and  inhabited  by  a  rebellious  population. 
Congress  may  then  erect  any  part  of  this  territory  into 
a  new  "  State,"  with  the  co-oi:)eration  of  the  people  in- 
habiting that  part,  without  regard  to  those  inhabiting 
any  other  part.  Congress  may  even  establish  Territorial 
Government  in  such  territory,  without  the  co-operation 
of  anybody  in  the  creative  Act.  From  the  point  of 
view  of  a  sound  political  science,  it  is  a  great  pity  that 
this  doctrine  was  not  put  into  practice  formally  in  the 
establishment  of  West  Virginia.  It  is  a  pity  that  the 
legislature  at  Alexandria  was  consulted  at  all.  Two 
years  later,  when  the  minds  of  men  had  become  clearer 
in  regard  to  the  effect  of  attempted  secession  and  rebel- 
lion upon  the  relations  of  a  Commonwealth  to  the  Union, 
it  would  hardly  have  happened. 

One  other  thing  is  to  be  noticed  in  the  process  of  ad- 
mitting West  Virginia  as  a  Commonwealth  into  the  Union, 
Return  of  ^^^  ^^^^^  ^^  ^^^^^  Congress  here  assumed  to  lay 
t'he^'doctrine  Conditions  upon  the  new  Commonwealth  as 
that  it  may  lay  the  price  of  its  admission  which  the  Consti- 

conditions  .,.,  ,         ,  «, 

upon  new  tution  did  not  then  lay  upon  any  oi  theexist- 
weaithsasthe  ing  Commonwealths.  The  people  seeking 
adhesion  not  to  bccomc  the  Jiew  Commonwealth  were  re- 
otd'^common-  quircd  to  adopt  the  gradual  emancipation  of 
wealths.  ^j|  gjayes  in  the  Commonwealth  under  twenty- 

one  years  of  age,  declare  the  immediate  freedom  of  all 
children  born  of  slave  parents  in  the  new  Common- 
wealth after  the  4th  of  July,  1863,  and  prohibit  the 
immigration  of  slaves  for  permanent  residence,  before 
they  could  be  admitted  as  a  Commonwealth  into  the 
Union,  while  the  Constitution  laid  no  such  restrictions 
as  these  on  the  old  Commonwealths.     In  a  word,  the 


INTERPRETATION    OF   THE   CONSTITUTION      233 

doctrine  which  prevailed  in  1820,  and  which  was  ad- 
hered to  from  1820  to  1861,  viz.,  that  Congress  could 
lay  no  restrictions  upon  new  "States"  as  the  price  of 
their  entrance  into  the  Union  which  the  Constitution 
did  not  impose  on  the  original  States,  or  which  the 
Constitution  did  not  expressly  authorize  Congress  to  im- 
pose on  the  new  organizations,  was  here  again  cast  aside 
by  the  Government  in  its  advance  toward  unlimited 
power.  This  is  hardly  the  place  to  discuss  anew  this 
question  from  the  point  of  view  of  constitutional  law. 
The  reader  is  referred  for  that  to  the  chapter  on  the 
**  Creation  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Missouri "  in  the 
''Middle  Period."  Here  the  fact  of  the  actual  in- 
crease of  governmental  powers  under  the  influence  of 
civil  war  is  the  thing  to  be  emphasized. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 

THE   CAPTURE   OF   ATLANTA 

The  Expedition  against  Meridian  and  Selma — Capture  of  Merid- 
ian—Fort Pillow — The  Massacre — The  Expedition  up  the 
Red  River — The  Battle  of  Sabine  Cross  Roads — Retreat  of  the 
Federals,  and  the  Fight  at  Pleasant  Hill— Peril  of  the  Fleet— 
The  Florida  Expedition — The  Comprehensive  Plans  of  General 
Grant — Grant's  Orders  for  the  Accomplishment  of  His  Plan — 
The  Beginning  of  the  Movements— Relative  Strength  of  the 
Forces  of  Sherman  and  Johnston — Sherman's  Capture  of  Dal- 
ton — The  Occupation  of  Resaca— The  Battle  at  New  Hope 
Church — The  Battle  of  Kenesaw  Mountain— Retreat  of  the 
Confederates  from  Kenesaw — Crossing  of  the  Chattahoochee 
by  the  Federals — The  Command  of  the  Confederates  Trans- 
ferred to  Hood — Federals  Closing  Around  Atlanta — The  Bat- 
tle of  Peach  Tree  Creek— First  Battle  before  Atlanta— The 
Battle  of  Ezra  Church — The  Capture  of  Atlanta. 

Before  entering  upon  the  history  of  the  two  grand 
movements  of  the  campaign  of  1864,  viz.,  the  advance 
of  Grant  upon  Petersburg  and  Richmond,  and  the  capt- 
ure of  Atlanta  by  Sherman,  and  his  march  through 
Georgia,  it  will  be  necessary  to  relate  briefly  the  minor 
enterprises,  in  the  Mississippi  region  especially,  which 
preceded  or  accompanied  them. 

In  the  early  part  of  January,  1864,  Sherman  went 
from  Chattanooga  or  Bridgeport  to  Memphis,  in  order 
The  expedi-  to  prepare  an  expedition  against  Meridian  in 
Meridian^Mid  Mississippi  and  Selma  in  Alabama.  The  ob- 
Seima.  jg^^  gf  it  was  to  destroy  the  system  of  trans- 

portation in  the  middle  of  the  Confederacy.  Meridian 
is  the  point  where  the  railroad  running  from  Vicksburg 

234 


THE   CAPTURE   OF   MERIDIAN  235 

through  Jackson  and  Selnia  into  Georgia  is  intersected 
by  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  road.  The  Confederate  troops 
in  and  around  Meridian  and  Selnia  numbered  some  ten 
or  fifteen  thousand  infantry,  and  from  seven  to  ten 
thousand  cavalry.  General  Polk  was  in  command  of 
these  forces,  with  his  head-quarters  at  Meridian.  The 
Federal  expedition  was  to  start  from  two  points  at  about 
the  same  time,  the  first  days  of  February. 

Sherman's  two  columns  of  infantry,  one  commanded 
by  Hurlbut,  and  the  other  by  McPherson,  set  out  from 
Vicksburg,  and  a  division  of  cavalry,  commanded  by 
Sooy  Smith,  went  from  Memphis.  On  the  14th  of  the 
month  Sherman's  troops  entered  Meridian,  having 
driven  the  Confederate  cavalry  before  them  capture  of 
all  the  way  from  Jackson.  They  met  with  Meridian, 
little  resistance  at  Meridian,  and  succeeded  in  destroy- 
ing everything  about  the  place  except  the  inhabited  pri- 
vate houses,  which  they  were  ordered  to  spare.  Hear- 
ing nothing  of  Sooy  Smith's  force,  Sherman  now 
brought  his  troops  back  to  Vicksburg.  Sooy  Smith's 
part  of  the  undertaking  was  an  entire  failure.  He  did 
not  start  on  time,  and  was  met  by  the  Confederate  cav- 
alry, led  by  Forrest,  at  Okalona,  and  driven  back.  In- 
stead of  Smith  going  to  Selma,  Forrest  entered  Ten- 
nessee, and  advanced  almost  to  Paducah  in  Kentucky, 
where  he  met  with  a  repulse  at  the  hands  of  Colonel 
Hicks  and  the  Federal  garrison  in  that  place. 

Forrest  then  fell  back  upon  the  Mississippi,  and  made 
an  attack  on  Fort  Pillow,  some  thirty  or  forty  miles 
above  Memphis,  on  the  12th  of  April.  The  j,  ^p^, 
fort  was  garrisoned  by  about  five  hundred 
men,  half  of  them  negroes,  under  the  command  of  Major 
Booth,  and  after  he  was  killed,  of  Major  Bradford.  They 
were  at  first  supported  by  a  gun-boat  in  the  river,  but 
for  some  reason,  probably  the  heating  of  her  guns,  the 


236  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

boat  drew  off  in  the  midst  of  the  fight.  Forrest  demand- 
ed a  surrender,  bnt  Bradford  refused.  He  then  carried 
the  works  by  storm,  when  what  was  left  of  the  garrison 
threw  down  their  arms.  The  assailants  now  refused  to 
spare  them,  and  massacred  them  almost  to  the  last  man. 
The  mas-  They  afterward  sought  to  excuse  themselves 
sacre.  jjy  pointing  to  the  refusal  to  surrender,  but 

this  refusal  was  made  by  the  Federal  commander  before 
the  Confederates  got  into  the  fort.  The  cry  of  the 
men  for  quarter  they  chose  not  to  consider  as  a  surren- 
der. The  truth  of  the  matter  undoubtedly  was  that 
the  Confederates  were  excited  to  this  horrible  deed  by 
the  presence  of  negroes  in  the  service  of  the  United 
States.  They  recognized  no  duty  of  protecting  such 
foes  when  captured,  and  they  regarded  white  men  when 
taken  with  them  as  also  outlawed. 

After  his  return  from  the  Meridian  expedition,  Sher- 
man  went  to  superintend  in  person  the  expe- 

tion  up  the  dition  up  the  Red  River.  The  military  pur- 
Red  River  . 

pose  of  this  movement  was  the  capture  of 

Shreveport,  the  chief  strategic  point  west  of  the  lower 

Mississippi. 

The  first  troops  sent  forward  from  New  Orleans  were 

under  the  immediate  command   of  General  Franklin. 

General  Banks,  who  had  the  superior  command,  followed 

later,  while  Sherman  sent  General  A.  J.  Smith  with  some 

ten  thousand  men  to  assist.     Porter's  fleet  co-operated 

with  the  land  forces.     General  Steele  was  ordered  to 

advance  from  Little  Rock  toward  the  point  of  attack. 

Some  forty  to  fifty  thousand  men  and  a  fleet  of  twenty 

vessels  were,  thus,    moving  toward  Shreveport.     The 

Confederates  had  a  force  of  about  thirty  thousand  men 

with  which  to  meet  them.     They  were  commanded  by 

Generals  Kirby  Smith  and  Richard  Taylor.     They  were 

good  soldiers,  and  well  commanded. 


THE   RED   RIVER   EXPEDITION  237 

The  Federals  advanced  successfully  to  Natchitoches. 
From  this  place  to  Shreveport  the  way  lay  through  an 
almost  unbroken  forest  of  pine.  Suddenly  The  battle  of 
on  the  8th  of  April,  when  nearing  a  place  SaWne  cross 
called  Sabine  Cross  Koads,  Banks's  army  was 
attacked  by  the  Confederates  hidden  in  the  forest,  and 
was  driven  back  in  great  disorder.  Eeinforcements 
under  General  Emory  came  up  and  checked  the  Confed- 
erate onslaught.  With  this  the  battle  ended.  The 
Federals  lost  three  or  four  thousand  men  and  a  very 
large  amount  of  supplies  in  this  short  battle. 

Banks  now  retreated  to  a  place  called  Pleasant  Hill, 
where  he  was  again  attacked  by  the  Confederates,  on  the 
9th.     The  attack  was   repulsed,  but   Banks     ^  ,    , 

„  ,  -r,  .  T  Retreat     of 

resolved  to  retreat  to  Grand  Ecore,  in  order  the    Federals 

,     .  ,  .  1 »    .     ,  , .  • ,  1      n        and  the   fight 

to  bring  himself  into  connection  with  the  at  Pleasant 
fleet.  He  succeeded  in  effecting  this,  but  his 
army  was  so  dispirited  by  the  heavy  losses  already  sus- 
tained that  both  the  men  and  the  commander  were  will- 
ing to  abandon  the  expedition.  They  retreated  down 
the  river  to  Alexandria,  which  place  was  reached  in  the 
last  days  of  April. 

The  water  in  the  river  now  fell  so  fast  that  the  fleet 
was  caught  above  the  falls  at  Alexandria,  and  was  for  a 
time  in  imminent  peril ;  but  the  ingenuity  The  peril  of 
of  Colonel  Bailey,  one  of  the  best  engineers  ^^^  ^^*- 
in  the  army,  contrived  a  way  of  escape  by  means  of  a 
series  of  dams  for  raising  the  water  high  enough  over 
the  falls  to  allow  the  vessels  to  pass. 

Banks's  army  now  returned  to  New  Orleans,  and  Por- 
ter's fleet  steamed  into  the  Mississippi,  while  Steele  was 
forced  to  retreat  to  Little  Kock,  leaving  all  of  South- 
western Arkansas  in  the  hands  of  the  Confederates  com- 
manded by  Price. 

The  attempt,  made  a  little  before  this,  to  occupy  Flor- 


238  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

ida  was  equally  unsuccessful.     The  expedition  went  in 
February  from  Hilton  Head.     It  consisted  of  some  five  or 

The  Florida  six  thousand  men  under  the  immediate  com- 
expedition.  ^^^^  ^f  General  Seymour.  The  division 
landed  at  Jacksonville  and  marched  inland.  It  was  am- 
bushed at  a  place  called  Olustee  and  completely  routed. 
Seymour  returned  to  Jacksonville  with  what  was  left  of 
his  little  army,  and  the  expedition  was  abandoned. 

The  year  1864  did  not  thus  begin  very  auspiciously  for 
the  Union  cause.     These  movements  were  all,  however. 

The  com-  ot  minor  importance,  and  were  soon  forgotten 
pians'of^Gen^  ^^  *^^^  great  campaigns  led  by  Grant  and 
erai  Grant.  Sherman,  whicli  now  opened.  From  the  date 
of  Grant's  appointment  to  be  Lieutenant-General  of  all 
the  armies  of  the  United  States,  March  2,  1864,  he  had 
been  revolving  the  plan  for  the  combined  movements 
of  all  of  the  forces  of  the  Union.  The  purpose  which 
he  had  in  view  was  the  destruction  of  Lee's  army  in 
Virginia  and  of  Johnston's  army  in  Georgia.  All  move- 
ments must  contribute  to,  or  be  subordinated  to,  these 
results,  and  the  blows  were  to  be  struck  simultaneously 
in  all  quarters  in  order  to  prevent  either  of  the  Confed- 
erate armies  from  going  to  the  assistance  of  any  other. 

The  main  orders  issued  by  Grant  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  these  objects  were  directed  to  Banks,  Gilmore, 

Grant's  or-  ^^^tlfir,  Sigcl  and  Sherman.  Banks  should 
ders  for  the  return  Sherman's  troops  to  the  latter,  and 

accompueh-  '■ 

ment  of  his  should  himself  retire  with  his  forces  to  New 
Orleans,  abandoning  all  Texas,  except  the 
Kio  Grande  district,  and  make  ready  for  an  attack  on 
Mobile.  Gilmore  should  join  forces  with  Butler  and  the 
army  thus  constituted  should  operate  from  Fortress 
Monroe  along  the  south  side  of  the  James  River  against 
Eichmond.  Sigel  should  move  from  his  position  in  West 
Virginia  against  the  railroad  running  from  Knoxville  to 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA        239 

Lynchburg.  Sherman  should  move  direct  upon  John- 
ston, while  Grant  himself  would  undertake  battle  with 
Lee. 

The  three  armies  commanded  by  Meade,  Butler,  and 
Sherman,  all  now  under  the  supreme  command  of  Grant, 
started  forward  almost  at  the  same  moment.      _.     .    . 

The  begm- 

Meade  and  Butler  took  up  their  line  of  march  ning  of  the 

movsmciits 

on  the  4th  day  of  May,  while  Sherman  set  out 
only  two  days  later.    Sherman's  movement  was,  however, 
successful  first,  and  we  will,  therefore,  follow  him  first. 
His  army  consisted  of  the  three  old  armies  of  the  Cum- 
berland, the  Tennessee  and  the  Ohio,  and  numbered 

about   one    hundred    thousand   men.      The      „  ,   .. 

Rela  ti  ve 

distinction  between  the  old  armies,  as  grand   strength  of 

the  forces   of 

corps,  so  to  speak,  continued.     Thomas  com-  Sherman  and 
manded   the  first,    McPherson    the  second, 
and  Schofield  the  third.    Opposed  to  this  force  Johnston 
had  from  fifty  to  seventy-five  thousand  men,  immediate- 
ly commanded  by  Hood,  Polk,  and  Hardee. 

As  we  have  just  seen,  Sherman  put  his  troops  in  mo- 
tion on  May  6th.  The  first  point  of  attack  was  Dalton, 
the  Confederate  stronghold.     It  could  not  be 

°  Sherm  a  n '  s 

takenby  a  front  movement,  and  Sherman  sent  capture  of 
McPherson  down  the  west  side  of  the  ridge 
covering  Dalton  to  Snake  Creek  Gap,  through  which  he 
could  threaten  Resaca  and  cut  the  railroad  communica- 
tion between  Dalton  and  Atlanta.  Thomas  made  a  strong 
demonstration  on  the  8th  and  9th,  in  order  to  cover  Mc- 
Pherson's  movement.  McPherson  succeeded  in  passing 
through  the  Gap,  but  found  the  Confederates  so  strongly 
intrenched  around  Resaca  that  both  Thomas  and  Scho- 
field had  to  go  to  his  aid.  When  Johnston  discovered 
that  his  left  was  being  turned,  he  abandoned  Dalton  in 
the  night  of  the  12th,  and  retreated  with  his  entire 
force  to  Resaca. 


240  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

On  the  13th,  the  Federal  army  arrived  in  front  of 
Kesaca.  Sherman  now  adopted  the  same  tactics  to  force 
the  evacuation  of  Resaca  that  had  been  suc- 
tion of  Resa-  cessful  at  Dalton.  He  laid  pontoons  across 
*^"  the  Oostenaula  some  four  miles  southward 

from  the  town,  and  threw  a  strong  division  of  troops 
across  the  river  to  threaten  the  railroad  between  Resaca 
and  Atlanta,  at  Calhoun,  On  the  14th,  a  little  after 
midday,  Sherman  attacked  the  Confederates  in  front  of 
Resaca.  At  first  the  Confederates  held  their  ground  and 
the  Federals  were  compelled  to  fall  back  ;  but,  finally, 
being  heavily  reinforced,  McPherson  succeeded  in  throw- 
ing a  strong  detachment  into  a  position  which  com- 
manded the  chief  part  of  the  Confederate  works,  and 
also  the  bridge  across  the  river.  On  the  next  day  the 
struggle  was  renewed,  and  although  the  Confederates 
fought  desperately,  the  Federals  succeeded  in  capturing 
their  most  important  works.  Driven  in  on  the  front 
and  threatened  in  the  rear,  Johnston  abandoned  Resaca 
during  the  night  of  the  15tli,  and  retreated  along  the 
railroad  southward.  The  Federals  had  paid  heavily  for 
their  victory.  They  had  lost  some  three  thousand  men 
killed  and  wounded.  The  Confederates  had  escaped 
with  about  half  as  many. 

They  retreated  behind  the  Etowah  River.  Sherman 
thought  that  they  would  make  a  stand  at  the  strong  po- 
sition of  Allatoona  Pass,  some  five  miles  south-eastward 
from  the  Etowah.  Sherman  again  repeated  his  flank 
movement,  and  marched  rapidly  toward  Dallas.  John- 
ston had  divined  Sherman's  purpose.  He  did  not,  there- 
fore, make  any  real  stand  at  Allatoona,  but 

The  battle  .    . 

of  New  Hope  endeavored  to  anticipate  Sherman  at  Dallas. 

^^^  ■  The  two  armies  met  at  New  Hope  Church, 

some  three  miles   to   the  north-east  of   Dallas,   and  a 

sharp  engagement  was  fought.     It  was  now  the  25th 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA        241 

of  May,  and  the  Federals  had  not  been  halted  in  their 
advance.  The  battle  at  New  Hope  Church  was,  how- 
ever, indecisive,  although  tlie  Confederates  gave  way, 
and  the  Federals  held  the  battle-ground.  But  the  Con- 
federates succeeded  in  placing  themselves  in  a  good  po- 
sition between  Dallas  and  Marietta,  which  they  fortified 
strongly,  and  seemed  determined  to  hold. 

Sherman  now  resolved  to  shift  his  flanking  movement 
over  to  the  other  side  and  turn  the  Confederate  right. 
He  planned  to  strike  the  railroad  behind  them 

The   battle 

at  or  about  Acworth.  During  the  first  week  of  Kenesaw 
of  June  he  was  occupied  with  this  movement, 
and  with  the  reconstruction  of  bridges  over  the  Etowah 
necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  his  communication  with 
Chattanooga.  Johnston,  meanwhile,  retired  his  line 
somewhat,  and  rested  it  now  more  strongly  on  Lost 
Mountain  westward  from  Marietta  and  on  Kenesaw 
Mountain  northward  from  the  place.  The  main  diffi- 
culty of  the  line  was  its  length,  and  the  Confederates 
finally  abandoned  Lost  Mountain  and  the  other  knobs 
and  concentrated  on  Kenesaw.  These  movements  were 
attended  with  constant  skirmishing,  in  which  there  were 
considerable  losses  on  both  sides.  The  Confederates  lost 
one  of  their  chief  officers,  General  Polk.  It  looked, 
however,  as  if  they  had  now  made  their  stand  and  were 
determined  to  defend  the  country  against  any  further 
advance  on  the  part  of  the  Federals.  The  Federals, 
however,  pressed  continually  forward.  On  the  22d, 
while  Hooker^s  men  were  working  around  the  Confed- 
erate left.  Hood's  soldiers  made  a  fierce  attack  upon 
them  at  a  place  called  Kulp's  House.  The  attack  was 
at  first  successful,  but  finally  the  Federals  rallied  and 
drove  the  assailants  back.  Sherman  now  decided  to  at- 
tack the  positions  on  Kenesaw  Mountain  in  front.  On 
the  27th,  the  attempt  was  made  to  carry  the  Confeder- 
VOL.  II.— 16 


242  THE   CIVIL  WAR 

ate  works  by  Thomas  and  McPherson,  but  the  loss  in- 
flicted upon  their  advancing  columns  was  so  dreadful 
that  they  were  compelled  to  withdraw. 

Sherman  returned  to  his  old  tactics  of  flanking  his 
enemy  out  of  position.     Leaving  a  division  of  cavalry 

Retreat  of  Under  General  Garrard  in  front  of  Kenesaw 
a^fer^f^ro^m  ^^  covcr  his  movements,  Sherman  directed 
Kenesaw.  }ijg  columns  toward  Turner's  Ferry  on  the 
Chattahoochee,  turning  the  Confederate  left  again.  This 
was  the  2d  of  July.  So  soon  as  the  Confederates  de- 
tected the  movement,  they  abandoned  Kenesaw  ;  and  so 
soon  as  Sherman  learned  of  their  retreat  he  ordered 
Thomas  to  pursue  vigorously,  with  the  purpose  of  bring- 
ing on  a  battle  while  the  Confederates  should  be  engaged 
in  crossing  the  Chattahoochee.  But  Johnston  handled 
his  army  with  so  much  real  military  skill  that  he  suc- 
ceeded in  making  the  passage  of  the  river  with  the  great 
bulk  of  his  army  during  the  night  of  the  5th  of  July. 
He  now  posted  his  troops  in  a  strong  position  on  the 
south  side  of  the  river,  with  a  deep  ravine,  called  Peach 
Tree  Creek,  protecting  his  right.  He,  also,  still  held  the 
work  on  the  north  side  of  the  river  covering  the  railroad 
bridge. 

Sherman  now  so  manoeuvred  his  forces  as  to  make 
Johnston  think  he  was  endeavoring  to  cross  the  Chatta- 

crossina;  of  hoochce  at  Turner's  Ferry  on  the  left  flank 
chee'^by  the  ^f  the  Confederates,  and  then  threw  Scho- 
Federais.  field's  troops  across  the  river  around  the  right 
flank  of  the  Confederates,  over  pontoons  laid  across  the 
river  some  seven  or  eight  miles  eastward  from  the  rail- 
road bridge.  He  also  caused  McPherson's  troops  to  move 
around  to  near  the  same  point,  and  to  construct  a  sec- 
ond bridge.  On  the  17th  (July)  he  succeeded  in  cross- 
ing his  entire  army  over.  Thomas  crossed  at  points 
north  of  the  mouth  of  Peach  Tree   Creek,  and  then 


THE  CAPTUKE  OF  ATLANTA        243 

forced  the  passage  of  this  ravine  in  a  sharp  fight.  Mc- 
Pherson  and  Schofield  went  farther  eastward,  striking  in 
at  Decatur  on  the  Atlanta  and  Augusta  Railroad,  and 
thus  approaching  Atlanta  from  the  east,  while  Thomaa 
advanced  upon  the  place  from  the  north. 

At  this  juncture  President  Davis  transferred  the  com- 
mand of  the  Confederate  army  from  Johnston      „    , 

•^  Hood  Buper- 

to  Hood,  on  account  of  the  dissatisfaction  sedes  John- 
with  Johnston's  inability  to  check  Sherman. 

The  Federal  army  was  now  closing  upon  Atlanta, 
McPherson  was  on  the  left,  approaching  At-  Federals 
lanta  from  the  east.  Schofield's  troops  were  ^osingaround 
in  the  centre,  approaching  from  the  north- 
east, and  Thomas's  troops  formed  the  right,  and  were 
advancing  nearly  southward. 

Hood  placed  his  forces  so  that  Cheatham's  corps  con- 
fronted McPherson,  Hardee's  corps  confronted  Scho- 
field, and  Stewart's  corps,  Polk's  old  troops,  confronted 
Thomas.  The  weak  point  in  the  Federal  line  was  be- 
tween Thomas  and  Schofield.  Sherman  was  endeavoring 
to  strengthen  this  part  of  the  line  by  sending  some  of 
Thomas's  divisions  toward  Schofield,  when  Stewart's 
troops  issued  from  their  intrenchments  and  threw  them- 
selves furiously  upon  this  part  of  the  line.  It  was 
Hooker's  men  chiefiy  that  were  attacked.  They  stood 
their  ground,  and  after  a  sharp  battle,  the 
battle  of  Peach  Tree  Creek,  drove  the  Con-  of  Peach  Tree 
federates  back.     This  was  the  20th  of  July. 

Hood  now  drew  a  large  portion  of  his  army  toward 
Decatur  in  order  to  allow  Sherman  to  advance  on  At- 
lanta, and  thus  leave  his  left  fiank  exposed.  Sherman 
fell  into  the  trap.  Finding  the  works  on  Peach  Tree 
Creek  deserted,  he  pushed  on  toward  Atlanta,  now  only 
a  few  miles  distant.  Near  midday  of  the  22d,  Hood 
began  his  attack  on  Sherman's  left  flank.     This  was  the 


244  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

position  of  McPherson's  troops.  The  brave  General 
rode  down  his  lines  to  discover  the  meaning  of  the  firing 
First  battle  ^^^  ^^i^  left,  and  rushed  straight  into  the  ad- 
before Atlanta,  yuncing  Confederates.  He  was  almost  un- 
attended, and  was  shot  down  before  he  could  turn  away 
from  the  approaching  foe.  The  death  of  McPherson 
was  an  exceedingly  great  loss  to  the  army  and  to  the 
country.  He  was  one  of  the  most  capable  soldiers  de- 
veloped in  the  school  of  Grant  and  Sherman,  and  one  of 
the  most  manly  characters  America  has  ever  produced. 

The  attack  on  the  left  developed  into  a  general  battle 
of  a  very  serious  nature.  At  one  time  the  pressure  of 
the  Confederates  upon  this  part  of  the  line  was  so  strong 
that  Sherman  felt  it  necessary  to  go  there  in  person. 
Under  his  guidance,  and  with  the  aid  of  some  of  Scho- 
field's  artillery,  the  left  flank  was  now  able  to  restore 
its  line  of  defence.  With  this  the  battle  turned  against 
the  Confederates  at  every  point,  and  they  were  repulsed, 
with  great  loss,  all  along  the  line.  Nearly  eight  thou- 
sand of  them  were  placed  hors  de  combat.  The  Union 
loss  was  only  about  half  that  number. 

Sherman  now  sent  Garrard,  with  his  cavalry,  to  de- 
stroy the  railroad  between  Atlanta  and  Augusta,  and 
Stoneman  to  destroy  that  between  Atlanta  and  Macon. 
Garrard's  expedition  was  successful,  but  that  of  Stone- 
man  was  substantially  a  failure.  At  the  same  time  Sher- 
man began  his  movement  for  flanking  Atlanta  by  the 
west  and  south. 

The  Army   of   the   Tennessee,  now  commanded  by 

Howard,  was  moved  from  the  left  around  to  the  extreme 

right.     On  the  28th,  the  Confederates,  hav- 

T  h  e  battle    .  . 

of      Ezra  iug  discovered  the  movement,  came  out  of 

^'^  '  Atlanta,  and  sought  to  strike  Howard's  flank 

while  his  forces  were  performing   the  evolution   just 

mentioned.     The  Federals  were,  however,  prepared  for 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA        245 

them.  They  had  not  only  succeeded  in  facing  their  line 
eastward,  but  had  thrown  up  some  intrenchments  to 
protect  themselves.  The  Confederate  attack  was  re- 
pulsed repeatedly.  This  conflict,  which  is  known  as  the 
battle  of  Ezra  Church,  lasted  some  four  or  five  hours, 
and  ended  in  the  complete  discomfiture  of  the  Confed- 
erates, who  lost  nearly  five  thousand  men,  while  the 
Federal  loss  was  less  than  one  thousand. 

Sherman  now  continued  his  movement  around  Atlanta 
by  the  west,  endeavoring  to  reach  the  railroad  between 
Atlanta  and  Macon.  Down  to  the  25th  of  The  capture 
August  he  pursued  this  course,  while  still  of  Atlanta, 
maintaining  the  siege  of  the  city.  Being  now  convinced 
that  he  must  make  a  wider  sweep  westward  and  south- 
ward, he  abandoned  the  investment  of  the  city,  in  order 
to  make  this  more  extended  movement.  The  Confed- 
erates thought  that  he  was  retreating,  and  failed  to  take 
precautions  against  his  true  movement.  On  the  29th, 
his  forces  struck  the  railroad  from  Atlanta  to  West  Point 
at  Ked  Oak,  a  place  some  ten  miles  south-westward  from 
the  junction  of  the  Atlanta  and  West  Point  Eailroad  with 
the  Atlanta  and  Macon  road.  He  destroyed  this  road 
and  pushed  on  for  the  Macon  branch.  On  the  30th, 
Howard's  forces,  who  now  composed  the  right  wing,  were 
in  sight  of  Jonesborough  on  this  branch.  After  learn- 
ing the  true  course  of  Sherman's  movement.  Hood  sent 
Hardee's  corps  to  Jonesborough.  On  the  31st,  Hardee 
iindertook  to  stop  Howard's  advance,  but  his  own  forces 
suffered  a  repulse.  Meanwhile  the  right  and  centre  of 
Sherman's  army  had  reached  the  railroad  above  Jones- 
borough, and  had  thus  inserted  themselves  between 
Hardee  and  Atlanta.  The  whole  Federal  army  was  now 
between  the  two  parts  of  the  Confederate  army.  As  a 
result  of  this  splendid  manoeuvre,  the  Confederates  now 
saw  themselves  necessitated  to  evacuate  both  Jonesbor- 


246  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

ough  and  Atlanta.  The  Federals  turned  on  Jonesbor- 
ough  first,  and  Thomas  and  Schofield  went  down  the 
railroad,  destroying  it  as  they  passed  along.  Hardee 
retreated  precipitately  on  the  1st  of  September,  and  on 
the  2d,  in  the  early  morning.  Hood  abandoned  Atlanta, 
destroying  his  magazines,  stores  and  railroad  material. 
Sherman  immediately  occupied  both  places,  but  later 
withdrew  from  Jonesborough,  and  located  his  troops  at 
Atlanta,  East  Point  and  Decatur.  He  now  sent  the 
people  of  Atlanta  away  from  their  homes,  and  burned 
the  city,  except  the  churches  and  private  dwellings. 
He  then  settled  down  to  rest  and  recuperate  his  forces. 
He  had  lost  about  thirty  thousand  men  in  the  movement 
from  Chattanooga  to  Atlanta.  The  Confederates  had 
lost  about  ten  thousand  more. 


CHAPTER  XXX 

THE    WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN    AND    EARLY'S    DASH 
FOR  WASHINGTON 

Strength  of  the  Federal  Armies  in  Virginia  in  Comparison  with 
the  Forces  of  the  Confederates — Position  and  Organization 
of  the  Respective  Armies — First  Battle  in  the  Wilderness — 
Second  Battle  in  the  Wilderness — Grant's  Despatch  to  the 
President — The  Cavalry  Battle  at  Yellow  Tavern,  and  the  Ad- 
vance of  Butler's  Army  toward  Richmond — The  Third  Battle 
in  the  Wilderness — The  Fourth  Battle  in  the  Wilderness — The 
Crossing  of  the  North  Anna  and  the  Critical  Position  of  the 
Federals — Cold  Harbor — Grant's  Determination  to  Change  his 
Base  of  Operations — Destruction  of  the  Railroads  Leading  from 
Richmond  into  the  Shenandoah  Valley — The  Transfer  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  across  the  James — Relative  Strength  of 
the  Armies  on  July  1st — The  Confederates  in  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  again — The  First  Attack  on  Petersburg — The  Beginning 
of  the  Siege  of  Petersburg — The  Petersburg  Mine — Early's 
Raid  through  the  Valley  toward  Washington  —  Failure  to 
Enter  Washington — Early  in  Pennsylvania  and  the  Burning  of 
Chambersburg — Destruction  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley  by 
Sheridan— The  Battle  of  Opequon— The  Battle  of  Fisher  Hill 
— The  Battle  of  Cedar  Creek — Grant  Tightening  his  Lines 
around  Petersburg  and  Richmond, 

As  has  been  said,  the  movements  against  Lee*s  army 
in  Virginia  were  contemporaneous  with  those  of  Sher- 
man against  Johnston,  for  the  purpose  of  preventing 
either  of  the  Confederate  armies  from  sending  aid  to  the 
other,  and  of  thus  reaping  the  benefit  of  superiority  of 
numbers  in  each  of  the  Federal  armies.  Grant,  while 
personally  present  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  wisely 

247 


248  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

left  the  immediate  command  of  it  to  Meade.  He  thus 
secured  the  co-operation  of  a  most  capablvi  lieutenant 
and  quieted  the  jealousies  of  the  Eastern  troops  agains*;. 
a  AVestern  commander.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  in- 
cluding Burnside's  corps,  numbered  about  one  hundred 

stifeiigth  of  and  fifty  thousand  men,  while  Butler's  force 
Mmfesin  vfr-  advancing  up  the  James  counted  some  thirty 
pirison  wiTh  thousand  more.  The  Confederate  army 
the  coi^eder*  ^^^^^  ^^^c  numbered  only  about  sixty  thou- 
»te8.  sand  men,  with  from  ten  to  fifteen  thousand 

more  on  the  James  to  face  Butler. 

On  the  4th  day  of  May  the  Federal  forces,  led  by 
Meade  and  Grant,  crossed  the  Eapidan,  and  entered  the 

„    .  .         fatal  Wilderness  region.     The  Confederates, 

Positions  •       1   •    .      .1  ,    J     1 

and  organiza-  organized  into  three  cordis,  were  posted  along 
respective  ar-  the  river,  and  at  Orange  Court  House  and 
°"^^'  Gordonsville.     Ewell  was  at  the  first  point ; 

Hill  was  at  the  second ;  and  Longstreet  at  the  third. 
The  Federal  army  was  also  organized  into  three  corps 
of  infantry  commanded  by  Hancock,  Warren  and  Sedg- 
wick, and  one  corps  of  cavalry  led  by  Sheridan.  The 
cavalry  was  in  the  advance  and  the  infantry  marched  in 
two  columns.  Hancock's  corps  constituting  one  column 
crossed  at  Ely's  Ford,  and  the  corps  of  Warren  and 
Sedgwick  crossed  at  Germania  Ford. 

The  movement  threatened  to  flank  Lee  by  his  right. 
Instead  of  retreating,  however,  Lee  resolved  to  face  east- 
ward and  strike  the  Federal  army  in  the 
in  the  Wilder-  flank  while  it  was  marching  through  the 
^il(je-i'ness.  Ewell  and  Hill  moved  rapidly 
along  the  two  parallel  roads  leading  from  Orange  Court 
House  to  the  Wilderness  Tavern,  called  the  Orange 
Turnpike  and  the  Plank  Eoad.  On  the  morning  of  the 
5th  (May)  Ewell  ran  up  against  Warren's  corps,  which 
composed  the  Federal  right,  and  attacked  it.     At  first 


THE    WILDERNESS    CAMPAIGN  249 

Warren's  men  were  driven  in,  but,  by  the  aid  of  rein- 
forcements from  Sedgwick,  they  were  at  last  able  to 
make  a  stand.  Hancock's  corps,  which  formed  the 
Federal  left,  had  been  ordered  to  swing  around  by  the 
Brock  Eoad  to  the  Plank  Road.  Getty's  division  of  Sedg- 
wick's corps  had  already  occupied  the  position,  and  had 
met  and  halted  Hill's  men  coming  up  the  Plank  Road. 
Getty  held  his  position  under  heavy  fire  until  Hancock 
arrived.  After  receiving  Hancock's  support,  he  under- 
took to  drive  Hill  back,  but  was  not  successful.  The 
Federals  had  now  succeeded  in  establishing  their  line 
so  as  to  meet  the  Confederate  advance.  Moreover,  Burn- 
side,  with  twenty  thousand  men,  was  rapidly  approaching 
from  the  Rappahannock  Bridge.  On  the  other  side  Long- 
street's  corps  was  nearing  the  scene  of  action. 

In  the  early  morning  of  the  6th,  the  battle  was  re- 
sumed. The  heaviest  of  the  fighting  was  on  the  Union 
left,  commanded  by  Hancock.  Hancock  attacked  Hill's 
corps  in  front,  and  Wadsworth's  division  of  Warren's 
corps  attacked  Hill's  flank  at  the  same  time.  The  battle 
was  severe,  but  the  Confederates  were  finally  routed  and 
driven  back  until  they  met  reinforcements  from  Long- 
street's  corps.  The  Federals  had  become  badly  scat- 
tered in  the  pursuit  through  the  tangled  woods,  and 
when  they  struck  the  re-established  Confederate  line, 
they  were  brought  to  a  halt,  and  then  driven  back  in 
turn.  It  was  at  this  juncture  that  the  gallant  Wads- 
worth  fell,  and  that  the  able  Confederate  leader.  Long- 
street,  was  dangerously  wounded.  The  Federal  centre, 
under  Warren,  and  the  right,  led  by  Sedgwick,  had  not 
met  with  any  better  success.  The  Confederates  held 
their  ground  against  large  odds.  They  now  advanced 
to  attack  Hancock's  new  line  along  the  Brock  Road, 
but  they  were  repulsed  with  great  loss.  Taking  ad- 
vantage of  some  movements  on  the  Federal  right,  which 


250  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

exposed  the  flank  of  the  troops,  the  Confederates  made 
a  sharp  assault  on  this  part  of  the  line  just  at  night- 
fall, and  came  very  near  turning  the  right  wing  of  the 
army.  It  was  at  this  juncture  that  Generals  Shaler  and 
Seymour  were  captured  by  the  Confederates.  Sedgwick 
finally  succeeded  however  in  restoring  his  line,  and  in 
checking  the  assault  upon  it.  With  this  the  battle 
ended.  It  had  been  simply  a  slaughter  with  no  definite 
result.  Twenty  thousand  Federals  and  ten  thousand 
Confederates  had  been  placed  liors  de  combat. 

Grant  now  resumed  his  movement  for  turning  Lee's 

right  and  placing  his  army  between  the  Confederates  and 

Second  bat-  *^®^^  capital.     During  the  night  of  the  7th 

tie  in  the  wii-   (May)  he  headed  his  columns  for  Spottsylva- 

demess.  .  i.  j 

nia  Court  House,  but  Lee  anticipated  the 
movement,  and  when  Warren's  men  approached  the 
place,  they  found  Longstreet's  corps,  now  commanded 
by  Anderson,  in  line  of  battle  across  their  path.  After 
sharp  fighting  Warren  succeeded  in  forcing  the  Confed- 
erates back  a  little,  but  the  Federals  had  received  such 
a  check  as  to  make  it  necessary  to  delay  their  main  at- 
tack for  several  days. 

While  establishing  his  lines  for  his  movement  against 
the  Confederate  position  around  Spottsylvauia  Court 
House,  Grant  sent  Sheridan  with  the  main  body  of  the 
cavalry  to  strike  at  the  railroads  between  the  Confeder- 
ate army  and  Richmond.  By  the  evening  of  the  9th, 
Grant  had  finished  his  preparations  for  the  battle.  The 
evolutions  performed  by  the  troops  were  diflBcult  and 
dangerous.  The  brave  and  capable  Sedgwick  was  killed 
while  superintending  some  of  them.  On  the  10th  the 
attack  was  made.  The  Union  line  was  formed  with 
Hancock  on  the  right,  Warren  in  the  centre,  and  Wright, 
now  in  command  of  Sedgwick's  old  corps,  on  the  left. 
Warren  fell  upon  Lee's  centre  with  such  violence  and 


THE   WILDERNESS   CAMPAIGN  251 

persistence  that  the  Confederates  were  finally  driven  out 
of  their  intrenchments,  not,  however,  until  they  had  in- 
flicted terrible  loss  upon  the  Federals.  Nearly  thirteen 
thousand  of  them  were  placed  Jio7's  de  combat  in  this  con- 
flict. The  Confederate  loss  was,  indeed,  not  much  less. 
It  was  the  day  following  this  battle  that  Grant  sent 
his  famous  despatch  to  the  President  announcing  that 
the  result  of  the  six  days  of  fighting  was  fav- 
orable to  the  Union  army,  and  declaring  that  epatch  to  the 
he  should  fight  it  out  on  that  line,  though  it 
should  take  all  summer.  Sheridan's  movement  had 
greatly  aided  Grant  at  this  point  in  the  struggle.  He 
had  succeeded  in  destroying  all  of  the  railroads  behind 
Lee  and  in  drawing  off  the  Confederate  cavalry  in  pursuit 
of  him,  and  in  a  battle  with  Stuart  at  Yellow     „,         , 

'  The  cavalry 

Tavern,  lust  outside  of  Richmond,  he  de-  J>attie  at  Yei- 

•'  low      Tavern 

feated  the  flower  of  the  Confederate  horse,  and  the  ad- 
and  killed  their  famous  commander.  He  ler's  army  tow- 
even  pierced  the  first  line  of  the  fortifications  " 
around  Eichmond,  and  succeeded  in  placing  himself  in 
communication  with  Butler,  who  had  arrived  at  Ber- 
muda Hundred  and  City  Point,  and  was  pushing  his 
troops  out  toward  the  Richmond  and  Petersburg  Rail- 
road. Fearing  for  the  safety  of  the  capital,  the  Confeder- 
ate President  now  called  Beauregard  with  a  strong  force 
from  the  Carolinas  to  its  defence.  Butler  found  him- 
self obliged  to  call  his  troops  back  to  Bermuda  Hundred 
and  await  the  movements  of  Grant  on  the  north  side. 

In  the  early  morning  of  the  12th  (May),  aided  by  a 
heavy  mist,  Hancock's  corps  on  the  Federal  right  made 
a  sudden  attack  on  the  Confederate  left. 
The  attack  was  unexpected  and  one  of  the  battle  in  the 
divisions  of  Ewell's  corps  was  very  nearly  de- 
stroyed by  it.  It  seemed  for  a  moment  as  if  Hancock 
would  break  the  Confederate  line  in  two,  but  reinforce- 


262  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

ments  came  qnickly  from  right  and  left,  and  enabled 
Ewell  to  ward  off  this  danger  and  drive  Hancock  back. 
By  this  time  the  battle  was  raging  all  along  the  entire 
front  of  both  armies.  The  Confederate  assaults  were 
very  vigorous,  but  not  successful.  The  struggle  lasted 
during  the  entire  day,  and  was  stopped  only  by  the  com- 
ing of  the  night.  It  was  again  a  slaughter  without  any 
definite  result.  From  twenty  to  twenty-five  thousand 
men  were  placed  hors  de  combat  in  this  day's  work, 
about  the  same  number  on  each  side. 

For  seven  days  the  two  armies  now  lay  in  speaking 

distance  of   each  other,  watching  and  preparing  for  a 

„     ,     ,^   renewal  of   the   attack;     On   the    19th,  the 

The   fourth 

battle  in  the  Confederates,    led   by  Ewell,  made   an   on- 

WildemesB.  '  j  ' 

slaught  on  the  Federal  right,  but  were  re- 
pulsed with  great  loss. 

Grant  now  made  another  effort  to  turn  Lee's  flank, 
and  reach  the  line  of  the  North  Anna  River.  Lee  again 
The  cross-  anticipated  him,  and  reached  and  crossed  the 
Nofth°  Anna  fivcr  first,  and  made  it  his  line  of  defence. 
cafpoaiM;ionof  Grf^-nt  succccded,  liowcvcr,  in  forcing  a  pas- 
the  Federals,  sage  at  two  points.  One  at  a  bridge  about  a 
mile  above  the  railroad  bridge  of  the  Richmond  and  Po- 
tomac Railroad,  the  other  at  Jericho  Bridge  still  farther 
up.  AVarren  and  Wright  crossed  at  Jericho,  and  Han- 
cock at  the  other  point.  But  the  Federal  army  now 
found  that  it  was  cut  into  two  parts  by  a  strongly  forti- 
fied position  held  by  Lee's  troops  and  reaching  down  to 
the  river  between  the  two  crossings.  Burnside  endeav- 
ored to  cross  and  drive  the  Confederates  from  this  posi- 
tion, but  he  was  himself  repulsed.  Warren  now  made  a 
movement  against  it,  but  was  unsuccessful.  At  last 
Grant  reluctantly  gave  the  order  for  his  troops  to  recross 
to  the  north  side.  The  loss  suffered  in  this  movement 
was  not  at  all  so  great  as  that  of  the  preceding  day,  but 


THE    WILDERNESS   CAMPAIGN  253 

it  was  serious,  reaching  nearly  two  thousand  men  on 
each  side. 

After  bringing  his  army  back  to  the  north  side  of  the 
North  Anna,  G-rant  moved  eastward,  and  around  the 
Confederate  right  flank.     His  troops  marched 

,  ,     ,  r       .  •  r.    ,1       TkT      .1  T      Cold  Harbor. 

down  below  the  junction  oi  the  JSlorth  and 
South  Anna,  forming  the  Pamunkey,  and  then  crossed 
the  Pamunkey  at  Hanover  Town,  on  the  28th  (May). 
The  whole  army  now  pressed  forward,  fighting  continu- 
ally, until  it  reached  Cold  Harbor,  which  place  was  en- 
tered by  Sheridan  with  the  cavalry  on  the  31st.  Grant 
now  made  his  final  attempt  to  bring  the  Confederates  to 
battle  before  they  could  get  into  the  fortifications  around 
Kichmond.  On  the  1st  of  June,  before  Grant's  arrival 
in  person  at  Cold  Harbor,  Wright's  corps  and  the  troops 
brought  over  from  Bermuda  Hundred  under  General 
W.  F.  Smith  made  an  attack  upon  the  Confederates, 
and  drove  them  out  of  their  advanced  works,  but  could 
not  break  their  second  line.  The  Confederates,  on  their 
side,  delivered  several  assaults,  but  were  repulsed  with 
severe  loss. 

Grant  himself  now  arrived  on  the  scene,  and  on  the 
next  day,  June  2d,  drew  up  his  army  in  battle  array  for 
the  decisive  conflict.  Burnside's  corps  was  placed  on 
the  right  of  the  line,  then  came  Warren's  corps,  then 
Smith's,  then  Wright's,  while  Hancock's  troops  formed 
the  left.  It  was  an  enormous  force,  nearly,  if  not  quite, 
one  hundred  and  flf ty  thousand  men,  while  the  Confed- 
erates had  scarcely  half  so  many  with  which  to  oppose 
them.  On  the  morning  of  the  3d,  the  battle  of  Cold 
Harbor  began.  Grant  threw  the  corps  of  Hancock, 
Smith  and  Wright  against  the  Confederate  works  on  the 
right  of  their  line.  At  first  the  attack  promised  suc- 
cess, but  at  last  it  failed.  The  Federals  were  repulsed. 
The  battle  did  not  last  an  hour,  but  in  that  short  period 


254  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

the  Federals  lost  between  seven  and  eight  thousand 
men.  The  Confederate  loss  had  not  been  half  so  many. 
From  the  3d  to  the  13th,  the  two  armies  lay  eying 
each  other  across  the  narrow  space  separating  their 
works. 

Grant  was  now  at  last  convinced  of  the  almost  insur- 
mountable difficulties  in  the  way  of  entering  Richmond 
f  fl  .  from  the  north  side,  and  he  resolved  to  cross 
termiuationto  the  James,  join  Butler  and  operate  from 
base  of  opera-  City  Point  agaiust  Petersburg,  and,  by  way 
of  Petersburg,  against  Richmond  and  the 
rear  of  the  Confederate  army. 

Before  making  this  movement,  however.  Grant  felt  it 

necessary  to  destroy  the  railroads  between  Richmond 

and  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  in  order  to  pre- 

of  the  rail-  vent  any  sudden  advance  of  the  Confederates 

roads  leading  "i  m       •  t 

from  Rich-  toward  Washmgton.     He  sent  Sheridan  with 

mund  into  the     .  i-    •   •  <•  i  i        in-  i 

Shenandoah  two   divisions  of  cavalry  to  do   this  work. 
*  ^^'  The  Confederate  cavalry  soon  discovered  this 

movement  and  followed  Sheridan  northward.  Several 
sharp  collisions  occurred,  in  which  the  Federals  gained 
the  advantage,  and  accomplished  their  purpose  of  sever- 
ing railroad  communication  between  Richmond  and  the 
Shenandoah  Valley.  Sheridan  now  returned  to  Grant, 
although  the  plan  had  been  to  proceed  farther  and  join 
the  Federal  troops  operating  around  Charlottesville. 
This  was  the  second  week  in  June. 

Sheridan's  expedition  and  other  minor  diversions  en- 
abled Grant  to  conceal  his  intention  of  transferring  his 
army  to  the  south  side  of  the  James.    He  ac- 

TnG  tr&iisicr 

oftheArmyof  complished  this  critical  movement  most  sue- 
across  the  cessfully  between  the  15th  and  20th  of  the 
James.  month  (Juuc).     The  crossing  was  made  at 

Windmill  Point  some  eight  or  ten  miles  below  Bermuda 
Hundred.     The  Appomattox  River  now  lay  between 


THE   WILDERNESS   CAMPAIGN  265 

Grant's  forces  and  Richmond,  thongh  not  between  them 
and  Petersburg. 

After  the  junction  thus  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
with  Butler's  forces  at  Bermuda  Hundred,  Grant  found 
his  army  to  number  about  one  hundred  and  Relative 
fifty  thousand  men.  The  Confederates  had  fJ^^fe^^^J'n 
about  half  that  number  in  Eichmond  and  J^iyist. 
Petersburg  with  which  to  oppose  him.  During  the 
campaign  north  of  the  James,  Grant  had  lost  some  sixty 
thousand  men,  and  the  Confederates  had  lost  some  forty 
thousand.  Grant  was  simply  giving  two  men  for  one,  a 
thing  which  he  could  do  and  still  have  some  left  after 
the  last  Confederate  should  have  perished. 

At  this  juncture  Grant  learned  that  the  Confederates 
under  Breckenridge  had  forced  the  Federal  troops  out 
of  the  Shenandoah  Valley  and  had  opened  TheConfed- 
this  line  of  advance  toward  Washington  |henan<foah 
again.  Grant  now  determined  to  make  a  Vauey  again, 
very  strong  diversion  to  the  south  of  Richmond  imme- 
diately. He  went  in  person  up  to  Bermuda  Hundred 
while  his  troops  were  crossing  the  James,  and  ordered  an 
assault  to  be  made  at  once  on  Petersburg  by  Butler's 
troops.     Late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  loth,      _ 

mi      -n    1  The  first  at- 

Smith's  corps  made  the  attempt.  The  Feder-  tack  on  Pe- 
als rushed  gallantly  forward  and  captured  the  ^^  °^^' 
fortification  on  the  north-east  side  of  the  town.  Had 
they  continued  to  advance  they  could  probably  have 
taken  the  place.  Hancock's  corps  had  come  to  Smith's 
support,  and  the  way  seems  to  have  been  open.  But 
Smith  resolved  to  delay  further  operations  until  the  next 
morning.  During  the  night  strong  reinforcements  for 
the  Confederates  arrived  from  Richmond  ;  and  when  the 
Federals  renewed  the  attack  they  met  with  repulse. 

It  was  now  seen  that  the  works  around  Petersburg 
could  not  be  carried  by  assault,  but  that  a  regular  siege 


256  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

must  be  resorted  to.     The  Federals  advanced  to  Deep 
Bottom  on  the  north  side  of  the  James  about  a  dozen 

The  begin-  miles  from  Richmond,  and  established  a  good 
^ese  *o£  p'e^  Connection  between  the  troops  located  here, 
teriburg.  ^nd  those  at  Bermuda  Hundred.  They  then 
made  an  attempt  to  cut  the  Weldon  Railroad  a  few 
miles  below  Petersburg.  In  this  they  were  not  success- 
ful and  suffered  a  loss  of  from  three  to  four  thousand 
men.  The  troops  used  in  this  movement  were  infantry. 
Between  the  22d  and  the  29th  Grant  made  another  at- 
tempt upon  the  Confederate  lines  of  communication. 
This  time  he  sent  the  cavalry  divisions  of  Wilson  and 
Kautz.  They  succeeded  in  destroying  parts  of  the  three 
railroads  leading  from  Petersburg  southward  and  south- 
westward. 

Then  followed  on  the  morning  of  the  30th  (June)  the 
attempt   to   make   a   breach    through  the  Confederate 

The  Peters-  works,  by  exploding  a  mine,  which  had  been 
burg  mine.  ^j^^g  un(ier  them  at  an  important  point  in 
their  line.  The  plan  was  to  assault  through  the  breach 
in  the  moment  of  confusion  caused  by  the  explosion, 
and  reach  a  certain  commanding  position  which  had 
been  designated,  and  from  which  the  city,  it  was  thought, 
could  be  easily  captured.  After  a  little  difficulty  with 
the  fuse,  the  mine  exploded,  blowing  up  the  fortifica- 
tions above  it,  together  with  some  pieces  of  artillery, 
and  quite  a  number  of  men.  The  Federal  assaulting 
column  rushed  into  the  opening,  but  as  they  did  not  ad- 
vance promptly  enough,  the  Confederates  succeeded  in 
bringing  troops  forward  to  meet  them,  before  they  could 
press  through.  The  Confederates  poured  a  murderous 
musketry  fire  upon  them  in  their  embarrassed  position, 
and  finally  drove  them  to  retreat  with  very  heavy  loss, 
some  four  to  five  thousand  men  being  placed  hors  de 
combat. 


Early's  raid  on  Washington  257 

Lee  now  conceived  the  idea,  or  rather  felt  that  the 
moment  was  opportune  for  the  execution  of  the  idea, 
of  relieving  Petersburg  and  Richmond  by  a  Early's  raid 
diversion  against  Washington.  He  selected  ^fjef  toward 
for  this  purpose  General  Jubal  Early,  one  Washington. 
of  his  most  capable  lieutenants,  and  the  fine  division  of 
troops  under  his  command.  The  movement  was  by 
way  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  On  the  3d  of  July, 
the  Confederates  drove  Sigel  out  of  Martinsburg.  The 
retreating  Federals  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Shepards- 
town,  while  the  garrison  at  Harper's  Eerry  withdrew  to 
Maryland  Heights.  The  Confederates  crossed  over,  oc- 
cupied Hagerstown  on  the  6th,  and  pushed  on  imme- 
diately for  Washington.  They  now  numbered  some  fif- 
teen or  twenty  thousand  men.  On  the  9th,  they  met 
and  defeated  a  considerable  Federal  force,  led  by  Gen- 
eral Wallace,  in  the  valley  of  the  Monocacy.  On  the 
10th,  they  were  within  a  very  few  miles  of  the  city. 
They  did  not,  however,  push  forward  prompt- 
ly, and  the  two  corps  sent  by  Grant  to  Wash-  enter  Wash- 
ington reached  the  city  in  time  to  defend 
it  against  any  attack  which  might  be  made  after  that 
day.  On  the  11th,  the  danger  was  over,  and  the  Con- 
federates were  retreating  from  their  perilous  position, 
before  the  advance  of  General  Wright.  On  the  20th, 
they  got  back  across  the  river  into  the  Valley  and  were 
gathered  about  Winchester. 

Grant  now  ordered  Wright  to  bring  the  two  corps 
back  to  the  position  before  Petersburg.  So  soon  as 
Early  learned  of  their  departure,  he  marched  j     .  ^^ 

his  troops  back  into  Maryland.  He  ad-  Pwinsyivania 
vanced  to  Chambersburg  in  Pennsylvania,  ing  of  cham- 
and  burned  the  place,  in  default  of  the  pay- 
ment of  a  contribution  of  two  hundred  thousand  dollars 
in  gold  levied  upon  it.  This  occurred  on  the  30th. 
Vol.  II. -17' 


258  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

Early  now  found  himself  in  a  perilous  position,  with 
Federal  troops  gathering  around  him  and  threatening 
to  cut  him  off  from  Virginia.  He  therefore  beat  a 
hasty  retreat  from  Chambersburg.  General  Kelly  suc- 
ceeded, however,  in  striking  him  at  Cumberland  and  in 
inflicting  a  severe  blow  upon  him.  Early  escaped,  how- 
ever, to  Winchester,  while  General  Hunter  was  waiting 
for  him  near  Frederick. 

Grant  now  transferred  the  command  of  the  troops 
opposing  Early  from  Hunter  to  Sheridan,  and  ordered 

Destruction  ^jhcridau  to  destroy  what  he  could  not  con- 
andoahwitry  sume  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  so  as  to 
by  Sheridan,  make  any  future  raids  through  that  Valley 
impossible.  It  was  not,  however,  until  after  the  middle 
of  September  that  Sheridan  was  in  position  to  strike 
the  Confederates  at  Winchester.  He  learned,  about  the 
17th,  that  Early  had  divided  his  force,  and  had  sent 
nearly  half  of  it  to  Martinsburg.  He  determined,  at 
once,  to  attack  the  part  left  at  Winchester.  Early,  how- 
ever, divined  his  purpose,  and,  before  Sheridan  began 
the  attack,  marched  his  troops  headed  for  Martins- 
burg back'  to  Winchester.  When  the  battle  began  the 
entire  strength  of  the  Confederates  was  present.  The 
firing    opened    about   the   middle  of   the   forenoon  of 

The  battle  the  19th,  and  lasted  until  about  the  middle 
ofopequon.  of  tlic  aftcmoon.  The  fate  of  the  day  was 
long  undecided.  At  last,  however,  one  of  the  Federal 
divisions  succeeded  in  striking  the  Confederates  in 
the  left  flank,  and  in  tlirowing  this  part  of  their  line 
into  complete  confusion.  The  pressure  on  the  front 
was  renewed  at  the  same  time  with  great  vigor.  The 
Confederates  now  gave  way  all  along  the  line,  and  re- 
treated in  great  haste  and  disorder  to  Fisher  Hill,  some 
ten  miles  south  of  AVinchester.  This  battle,  called  the 
battle  of  Opequon,  from  the  creek  on  whose  banks  it 


SHERIDAN    IN   THE   VALLEY  259 

was  fought,  was  a  bloody  contest.  It  cost  the  Federals 
some  five  thousand  men,  and  the  Confederates  about  a 
thousand  more. 

On  the  23d,  Sheridan  attacked  the  Confederates  in 
their  strong  position  on  Fisher  Hill.  He  sent  one  of 
his  corps  around  the  Confederate  left  flank  rj-jje  battle 
into  their  rear,  and  when  he  began  his  at-  of  Fisher  au. 
tack  on  the  front  of  the  Confederate  line,  these  troops 
threw  themselves  with  terrible  force  upon  the  rear  of  it. 
The  defeat  of  the  Confederates  was  instantaneous  and 
complete.  They  fled  to  Staunton,  and  then  through 
the  passes  of  the  Blue  Eidge  toward  Richmond.  Half 
of  Early's  force  had  perished  or  been  captured.  After 
reducing  the  Valley  to  a  waste,  in  order  to  prevent  fut- 
ure raids  through  it  on  Washington,  Sheridan  drew  his 
troops  back  to  Strasburg.  Early  gathered  the  remnants 
of  his  scattered  forces  together,  and  being  reinforced  by 
Kershaw's  entire  division,  sent  from  Lee's  army,  pur- 
sued Sheridan  down  the  Valley. 

On  the  19th  of  October  Early  took  the  Federals  quite 
by  surprise  at  Cedar  Creek.  The  battle  began  in  the 
morning  a  little  after  daylight.    Both  the  first 

The   battle 

and  second  lines  of  the  Federals  were  forced  of  cedar 
back  in  great  confusion.  The  commander  on 
the  field.  General  Wright,  strove  manfully  to  bring  up 
reinforcements  and  rally  the  fleeing  troops.  Even  after 
he  was  wounded  he  still  directed  the  battle.  He  had 
succeeded  partially  in  stemming  the  tide  of  defeat,  when 
Sheridan  himself,  by  the  famous  ride  which  has  become 
poetry  as  well  as  history,  brought  himself  from  Win- 
chester to  the  scene  of  the  struggle.  The  Confederates 
had  now  become  demoralized  by  their  victory,  and  were 
plundering  the  Federal  property  which  had  been 
reached.  It  was  at  this  juncture  that  Sheridan  led  the 
noted  attack,  Avhich  completely  routed  them  and  sent 


260  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

them  reeling  np  the  Valley.  Early's  army  was  now  com- 
pletely wrecked.  He  had  lost  nearly  twenty-five  thou- 
sand men,  in  killed,  wounded,  and  captured.  The  Fed- 
erals had  also  suffered  severely,  but  their  losses  hardly 
reached  twenty  thousand,  and  there  was  now  no  further 
danger  of  a  raid  on  Washington  byway  of  the  Shenandoah. 
During  the  campaign  in  the  Valley,  Grant  had  re- 
mained comparatively  quiet.  In  the  latter  part  of 
August  he  had  succeeded  in  fighting  his  way 
ening    his  around  Petersburg  to  the  Weldon  Railroad, 

lines     around  .  ,  .     ,.  ,  .         . 

Petersburg  and  in  destroying  this  line  of  communication 
■  between  Petersburg  and  the  south.  He  also 
succeeded,  during  the  latter  half  of  September,  in  capt- 
uring Fort  Harrison  on  the  north  side  of  the  James,  and 
in  placing  some  of  his  troops  in  a  position  so  threatening 
to  Richmond  as  to  make  it  very  hazardous  for  Lee  to  send 
any  troops  away  from  the  capital  on  outside  expeditions. 
After  the  battle  of  Cedar  Creek,  Grant  determined  to 
take  a  more  decided  offensive.  He  had  extended  his  in- 
trenched lines  from  City  Point  around  Petersburg  almost 
as  far  as  he  could  without  making  them  thin  and  weak, 
and  still  they  did  not  reach  quite  to  the  Weldon  Road. 
The  South-Side  and  Danville  Roads  were  still  open,  and 
Petersburg  and  Richmond  were  being  supplied  over 
them.  Grant  now,  therefore,  resolved  to  send  a  power- 
ful column  of  troops  across  to  these  roads  and  destroy 
them.  In  fact.  Grant  and  Meade  led  this  column  them- 
selves. This  was  the  last  week  in  October.  The  expe- 
dition was,  however,  a  failure,  and  the  troops  returned, 
with  a  loss  of  some  two  thousand  men,  into  the  intrench- 
ments.  The  winter  was  now  approaching  and  Grant 
resumed  the  work  of  extending  and  strengthening  his 
fortified  line,  with  the  purpose  of  cutting  communication 
as  far  as  possible  between  Richmond  and  Petersburg  and 
the  south. 


CHAPTER  XXXI 

SHERMAN'S  MARCH  THROUGH  GEORGIA,  AND  HOOD'S 
MARCH  TO  NASHVILLE 

The  Confederate  Movements  in  Georgia  after  Sherman's  Capture 
of  Atlanta — Sherman's  Plan  to  Meet  these  Movements — Sher- 
man's Disposition  of  his  Troops — The  Order  of  March — The 
March  through  Georgia  to  Savannah— The  Investment  of 
Savannah — The  Opening  of  Communication  between  the 
Army  and  the  Fleet  off  Savannah — The  Evacuation  of 
Savannah  by  the  Confederates — Hood's  Movements — Relative 
Strength  of  Hood  and  Thomas — Retreat  of  the  Federals  from 
Pulaski  toward  Nashville— The  Battle  at  Franklin — The  Battle 
at  Nashville — The  Rout  of  the  Confederates. 

During  the  period  comprehending  these  last  move- 
ments in  Virginia,  Sherman  was  making  his  great 
march  through  Georgia  to  the  sea.  The  idea  of  it 
seems  to  have  been  suggested  to  Sherman  by  the  move- 
ments of  the  Confederates  after  they  abandoned  Atlanta. 
They  retreated  to  a  point  on  the  railroad  about  twenty- 
live  miles  below  Atlanta,  and  in  the  latter  part  of 
September  began  to  move  westward  around  ^^  ^^^ 
Sherman's  right  toward  the  Chattahoochee  federate move- 

-r>.  -ii  <.  •  -r\n  mentsin 

Kiver  With  the  purpose  of  going  to  Dallas,  Georgia  after 
and  from  there  striking  the  railroad  back  of  capture  of 
Marietta,  and  thus  destroying  Sherman's 
communication  with  Chattanooga.  Sherman's  first  step 
in  meeting  this  movement  was  the  sending  of  General 
Tliomas  back  to  Nashville  to  inaugurate  a  resistance  to 
Hood's  advance  through  Alabama  into  Tennessee. 

261 


262  THE    CIVIL    WAPw 

During  the  first  week  in  October  the  Confederates 
reached  Dallas,  and  Hood  sent  his  cavalry  toward  the 
railroad  east  of  him.  They  captured  both  Acworth 
and  Big  Shanty  with  their  garrisons,  and  cut  Sherman's 
railroad  and  telegraphic  communications  with  Chatta- 
nooga. On  the  5th  of  October,  French's  division  of  Con- 
federates attacked  General  Corse  at  Allatoona,  but  they 
were  finally  repulsed.  Sherman  himself  had  gone  to 
Kenesaw  Mountain,  from  which  point  he  sent  succor  to 
Corse.  On  the  12th,  Hood's  forces  approached  Resaca, 
and  Hood  demanded  surrender  under  threat  of  giving 
no  quarter,  if  the  garrison  resisted.  The  Federals,  how- 
ever, refused  to  surrender  and  repelled  successfully  the 
Confederate  assault.  Hood  now  attacked  Dalton,  and 
captured  the  place  and  the  garrison.  He  then  marched 
westward  around  the  south  end  of  Lookout  Ridge. 

Sherman  followed  him  as  far  as  Gaylesville,  and  then 
seeing  clearly  that  Hood  would  not  fight  him,  but  was 
Sherman's  ^^^^Y  enticing  him  away  from  Georgia,  he 
these  "move-  determined  to  destroy  the  railroad  between 
ments.  Chattanooga    and  Atlanta   himself,    confide 

the  task  of  destroying  Hood's  army  to  Thomas,  and 
march  his  own  immediate  army  from  Atlanta  to  Savan- 
nah or  Charleston.  He  would  thus  cut  the  Confederacy 
in  two  again,  and  lay  the  territory,  which  at  this  time 
was  the  remaining  source  of  supply  to  the  Confederate 
armies,  in  waste.  He  had  already  two  weeks  before  this 
time  written  to  Grant  asking  his  opinion  of  the  plan. 
Grant  now  approved  it,  after  considerable  hesitation, 
with  the  preference  of  Savannah  over  Charleston  as  the 
destination  of  the  march. 

Sherman  now  sent  Stanley,  Schofield  and  Wilson 
with  their  corps  to  report  to  Thomas,  and  gave  Thomas 
command  of  all  the  troops  subject  to  his  orders,  except 
the  four  corps  which  he  reserved  for  the  march  through 


Sherman's  march  through  Georgia    263 

Georgia  and  Kilpatrick's  division  of  cavalry.  He  was 
at  this  date  at  Kingston,  and  from  this  place  he  issued 
his  orders.  He  commanded  the  garrisons  Sherman's 
from   Kingston  northward  to   Chattanooga  dispoeitiou  of 

'^  °       his  troops. 

to  go  back  to  Chattanooga,  and  report  to 
General  Thomas,  destroying  the  railroad  as  they  went. 
He  then  organized  his  own  troops  into  two  grand  wings 
of  infantry  and  a  divieion  of  cavalry.  Each  wing  was 
composed  of  two  corps.  Each  corps  numbered  about 
fifteen  thousand  men,  and  carried  about  fifteen  pieces 
of  artillery.  The  cavalry  division  numbered  about  five 
thousand  men.  The  command  of  the  right  wing  was 
intrusted  to  General  Howard,  and  that  of  the  left  to 
General  Slocum.  The  cavalry  was  commanded  by  Gen- 
eral Kilpatrick. 

The  order  of  the  march  was  in  four  columns  by  roads 
as  nearly  parallel  as  possible,  and  converging  at  certain 
designated  points.  The  army  was  com-  -^,6  order 
manded  to  forage  liberally  on  the  country,  of  the  march, 
but  the  soldiers  were  forbidden  to  enter  any  inhabited 
dwelling,  or  to  commit  any  trespass.  Destruction  of 
property  was  also  forbidden  in  districts  where  the  troops 
should  be  unmolested,  but  in  districts  where  they  should 
be  attacked  either  by  the  inhabitants  or  by  bands  of 
guerillas,  the  corps  commanders  were  authorized  to  or- 
der the  country  devastated.  Horses,  mules  and  wagons 
might  be  taken,  and  negroes  when  they  could  be  made 
serviceable. 

This  entire  force,  of  some  sixty-five  thousand  men, 
was  back  in  Atlanta  about  the  middle  of  November,  and 
on  the  16th,  after  thoroughly  destroying  the  The  march 
place,  it  set  out  for  Savannah.  The  left  STI^s^a°n: 
wing  followed  the  railroad  from  Atlanta  to  '^*''- 
Augusta,  and  the  right  followed  the  railroad  from  At- 
lanta to  Macon.     The  cavalry  was  divided  and  moved 


264  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

along  both  flanks.  At  Jouesborough,  Howard  left  the 
railroad,  and  took  the  more  direct  route  of  the  valley 
of  the  Oemnlgee  River  toward  Macon.  He  then  left 
Macon  on  his  right,  and  struck  the  railroad  from  Macon 
to  Savannah  between  Griswold  and  Gordon,  some  twenty- 
five  or  thirty  miles  east  of  Macon.  A  Confederate  force 
was  waiting  for  the  Federals  at  Macon,  and  while  How- 
ard's men  were  engaged  in  tearing  up  the  railroad,  this 
force  advanced  from  Macon  and  attacked  them.  It  con- 
sisted, however,  of  not  more  than  six  thousand  men  and 
was  easily  beaten  off.  Slocum  followed  the  Atlanta  and 
Augusta  Road  to  Covington  and  Madison,  and  then 
struck  into  the  valley  of  the  Oconee,  which  leads  toward 
Milledgeville,  at  that  time  the  capital  of  Georgia.  On 
the  21st  (November)  his  troops  entered  the  town  on  the 
heels  of  the  fleeing  legislators.  Howard  continued  to 
march  along  the  road  from  Macon  to  Savannah.  He 
found  some  opposition  at  the  bridge  over  the  Oconee, 
but  he  quickly  overcame  it. 

Slocum's  columns  now  converged  toward  Howard's 
line  of  march,  and  on  the  27th,  the  two  wings  met  at 
Sandersville  on  the  Macon  and  Savannah  Railroad. 
From  this  point  the  Federals  moved  in  the  direction  of 
Millen,  the  place  where  the  railroad  from  Macon  to  Sa- 
vannah is  intersected  by  the  railroad  from  Augusta  to 
Savannah.  Wheeler,  the  chief  of  the  Confederate  cav- 
alry, who  was  attempting  to  hinder  the  advance  as  much 
as  possible,  was  made  to  think  that  the  Federals  were 
aiming  at  Augusta ;  and  when  he  marched  his  men 
toward  Augusta,  the  Ogeechee  River  was  left  free  for 
Sherman  to  cross  without  molestation,  which  he  did 
most  successfully.  The  whole  Federal  army  now  moved 
straight  on  Millen,  and  when  it  reached  this  point,  it 
swung  around  to  the  south,  and  struck  out  for  Savannah, 
leaving  the  Confederate  cavalry  behind  it  in  the  direc- 


Sherman's  march  through  Georgia    265 

tion  of  Augusta.  It  was  now  the  3d  of  December,  but 
the  weather  was  good  and  the  men  were  in  good  health 
and  high  spirits.  The  march  was  from  this  point  down 
the  tongue  of  land  lying  between  the  Ogeechee  and  Sa- 
vannah Eivers.  The  Confederates  now  for  the  first  time 
discovered  the  true  destination  of  the  Federal  army. 
Genei'al  Hardee  was  in  command  at  Savannah,  and  had 
some  twelve  or  fifteen  thousand  men.  The  Confederates 
undertook  to  make  a  stand  at  the  canal  which  connects 
the  two  rivers,  but  they  were  quickly  beaten  back,  and 
the  canal  promptly  bridged  and  passed  over. 

The  Confederates  now  retreated  into  the  works  around 
the  cit}^  and  on  the  10th  of  December  the  city  was  fairly 
invested  on  the  north  and  west.     Both  the      „^    . 

The  invest- 

Savannah  and  Charleston  Eailroad  and  the  ment  of  Sa- 
Savannah  and  Gulf  Railroad  were  held  by  the 
Federals,  who  were  now  stretched  around  the  city  from 
the  Savannah  River  to  the  Savannah  and  Gulf  Road,  form- 
ing a  line  from  three  to  ten  miles  distant  from  the  city. 
The  fleet  was  now  notified  of  Sherman^s  arrival  before 
Savannah  by  the  enterprise  of  Captain  Duncan  and  two 
companions,  who  succeeded  in  slipping  down  ^^^  ^ 
the  Ogeechee  River,  past  Fort  McAllister,  mg  of  com- 
into  Ossabaw  Sound.     Sherman  at  once  re-  between  the 

^       1     ,  .         .  ,      ,  ^        army  and  the 

solved  to  open  communication  between  the  fleet  off  Sa- 
army  and  tlie  fleet  at  the  mouth  of  the  Ogee- 
chee. In  order  to  do  this  he  must  capture  the,  to  that 
time,  impregnable  fortress  of  Fort  McAllister.  This  fort 
was  located  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Ogeechee  some  five 
miles  above  its  mouth.  His  troops  must,  therefore,  cross 
the  river  above  the  fort.  A  bridge  was  constructed  in 
a  single  night,  and  the  troops  selected  for  the  assault 
passed  over.  Sherman  intrusted  this  hazardous  under- 
taking to  General  Hazen,  in  whose  ability  and  courage 
he  had  the  greatest  confidence.     Hazen  made  the  attack 


266  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

with  his  division  about  sundown  in  the  afternoon  of 
December  13th.  In  less  than  half  an  hour  from  the 
time  the  charge  was  sounded,  the  brave  General  had 
planted  the  Union  flag  on  the  fortress,  which  had  so 
long  defied  attacks  from  the  sea.  Sherman  now  went 
down  the  river  in  person  and  boarded  Dahlgren's  vessel. 
The  fleet  and  the  army  could  now  operate  together 
against  Savannah. 

Siege  guns  were  immediately  brought  over  from  Hil- 
ton Head,  and  Hardee  was  summoned  to  surrender.     He 

The  evacua-  declined  to  do  so,  but  when  the  Federals  be- 
Mb'^by^The  S'^^^  to  put  their  siege  guns  in  position  to 
Confederates,  bombard  the  city,  he  evacuated  the  place 
during  the  night  of  the  20th  of  December  and  retreated 
across  the  Savannah  River  toward  Charleston.  Sher- 
man immediately  occupied  the  city,  and  the  great  march 
to  the  sea  was  ended.  The  army  had  marched  over  three 
hundred  miles  in  a  little  more  than  a  month's  time,  and 
had  laid  waste  a  region  thirty  miles  in  width  from 
Atlanta  to  Savannah,  destroying,  thus,  the  only  re- 
maining railroad  connection  between  Virginia  and  the 
Carolinas  and  the  country  west  of  Georgia.  Sherman 
reported  that  he  had  taken  about  twenty  millions  of  dol- 
lars worth  of  property  and  had  destroyed  about  eighty 
millions  of  dollars  worth  more,  and  had  brought  away 
with  him  thousands  of  negroes.  It  was  the  severest 
blow  which  the  Confederacy  had  received.  Its  lu-st 
great  source  of  supplies  was  nearly  completely  destroyed. 
During  this  same  period.  Hood  pursued  his  course 
northward  through  Northern  Alabama.    Ha  reached  the 

Hood's  Tennessee  River  at  Decatur  in  the  last  days 
movementa.  ^f  October.  He  met  with  such  stout  resist- 
ance here,  however,  that  he  was  compelled  to  seek  an- 
other crossing.  He  succeeded  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Florence.     In  the  first  days  of  November  General  Sciio- 


hood's   march   to   NASHVILLE  267 

field,  with  his  corps,  took  position  at  Pulaski  in  Tennes- 
see, near  the  Alabama  border,  with  the  purpose  of  hin- 
dering Hood's  advance.  He  was  ordered  by  Thomas  not 
to  engage  in  battle  with  Hood  until  largely  reinforced. 
The  Confederate  army  remained  for  some  days  at  Flor- 
ence, gathering  men  and  supplies. 

Hood  succeeded  in  organizing  an  army  of  some  forty 
thousand  men  for  his  enterprise  of  expelling  the  Fed- 
erals from  Tennessee,  while  Thomas  had,  as  Relative 
yet,  only  about  thirty  thousand  with  whom  h^oo^^^  and 
to  oppose  him.  Thomas's  plan  of  action  Thomas, 
was,  therefore,  delay  and  slow  retreat  toward  Nashville, 
where  he  expected  to  be  able  to  gather  a  much  larger 
army  before  the  end  of  the  month. 

Schofield  held  his  position  at  Pulaski  until  the  23d  of 
November,  when  he  withdrew  toward  Columbia,  while 
Granger  gathered  the  garrisons  eastward  from  „  .  . 
Florence  into  Stevenson,  where  they  could  the  Federals 
take  rail  for  Nashville.  On  the  25th,  Hood  toward  Nash- 
was  in  front  of  Columbia  fighting  with  Scho- 
field's  outposts.  Schofield  crossed  over  to  the  north  side 
of  Duck  River,  on  which  the  town  is  situated.  The  Con- 
federates succeeded  in  forcing  their  way  across  the  river 
also,  and  Schofield  retreated  toward  Franklin.  The  Con- 
federate cavalry  made  a  bold  attempt  to  cut  off  the  line 
of  retreat  and  capture  the  Federal  trains  at  Spring  Hill, 
a  place  about  half  way  between  Columbia  and  Franklin, 
but  they  were  finally  beaten  off,  and  the  troops  succeeded 
in  getting  safely  into  Franklin  on  the  morning  of  the 
30th. 

Hood  reported  that  this  was  the  great  mistake  of  the 
campaign,  and  threw  the  blame  of  it  on  his  corps  com- 
manders, Cheatham  and  Stewart,  who  had  or-     The  battle  at 
ders  to  support  the  cavalry,  and  throw  their  Frankim. 
troops  across  the  turnpike  in  Schofield's  rear,  but  re- 


268  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

mained  inactive  in  plain  sight  of  the  retreating  Fed« 
erals.  It  is  quite  possible  that,  outnumbering  Schofield 
so  greatly  as  they  did,  they  could  have  captured  his  small 
army  of  twelve  or  fifteen  thousand  men,  if  they  had 
obeyed  strictly  the  orders  of  their  chief  commander.  As 
it  was  they  pressed  Schofield  so  hard  that  he  felt  obliged 
to  stop  and  give  battle  at  Franklin.  He  formed  his  little 
army  in  line  of  battle  in  front  of  the  town,  the  liarpeth 
River  behind  it  protecting  his  flanks,  and  waited  under 
cover  of  the  earthworks  with  the  main  body  of  his  men 
for  the  attack.  Two  small  brigades  only  had  been  thrown 
out  in  front  of  the  works.  The  attack  began  in  the  mid- 
dle of  the  afternoon  of  the  30th.  The  two  brigades  in 
front  of  the  fortifications  quickly  gave  way.  They  were 
in  the  centre  of  Schofield's  line,  and  the  confusion  caused 
here  threatened  the  Federals  with  complete  disorder. 
At  this  juncture  the  brave  and  capable  General  Opdycke 
assumed  the  responsibility  of  ordering  his  brigade  to 
charge  the  advancing  Confederates.  His  example,  cour- 
age and  good  judgment  saved  the  day.  The  Confeder- 
ates were  repulsed,  Schofield's  line  of  battle  was  restored, 
and  the  Confederates  threw  themselves  against  it  with 
desperate  valor,  but  with  no  effect.  It  was  midnight 
before  they  desisted  from  their  fierce  attempts  to  break 
the  Federal  line.  They  seemed  to  understand  that 
this  was  their  last  opportunity.  Five  of  their  generals, 
among  them  Cleburne  and  Gist,  were  killed,  six  were 
wounded,  and  one  was  taken  prisoner.  More  than  five 
thousand  of  their  men  were  placed  hors  de  combat.  Scho- 
field had  lost  heavily  also,  but  not  the  half  of  this  num- 
ber. The  Confederates  had  received  such  a  staggering 
repulse  that  Schofield  was  able  to  bring  his  army  with  all 
its  trains  and  supplies  safely  back  to  Nashville,  where 
Thomas  had  gathered  a  considerable  force  for  the  defence 
of  the  capital. 


hood's   march   to   NASHVILLE  269 

On  the  1st  of  December  Thomas  formed  his  line  of 
battle.  He  had  between  fifty  and  sixty  thousand  men. 
The  line  rested  along  the  hills  around  Nash-  Thebattieat 
ville  on  the  south,  Schofield  on  the  left.  Wood  Nashville. 
in  the  centre,  and  A.  J.  Smith  on  the  right.  The  Con- 
federates advanced  to  Montgomery  Hill  about  half  a 
mile  south  of  Thomas's  line  and  formed  their  line  from 
the  Hillsborough  Pike  to  the  Granny  White  Pike. 
Stewart's  corps  was  on  the  left,  S.  D.  Lee's  in  the 
centre,  and  Cheatham's  corps  was  on  the  right. 

Thomas  soon  saw  that  the  Confederate  left  could  be 
easily  turned,  as  the  distance  between  its  extreme  point 
and  the  river  below  Nashville  was  so  great  that  the  Con- 
federates could  not  prevent  the  passage  of  troops  around 
it.  From  the  3d  to  the  15th  of  December  the  two  armies 
lay  eying  each  other.  On  the  15th,  at  last,  Thomas  made 
his  attack.  He  began  with  a  diversion  toward  Hood's 
right  drawing  his  attention  in  that  direction,  and  then 
threw  the  troops  commanded  by  Smith  and  Wilson 
around  the  Confederate  left,  striking  Stewart's  corps 
in  the  flank.  Wood  at  the  same  time  assaulted  the 
Confederates  on  Montgomery  Hill.  The  movement  was 
successful  at  all  points,  and  the  Confederates  were 
forced  back  to  a  second  line  along  the  Harpeth  Hills. 
Cheatham's  corps  was  now  sent  over  from  his  position  on 
the  Confederate  right  to  the  left  of  Hood's  line,  where 
the  Federal  attack  had  been  most  severe.  The  strong 
point  in  the  Confederate  line  was  now  Overton  Hill.  It 
covered  the  road  to  Franklin.  Thomas  desired  to  reach 
this  road  in  order  to  cut  off  the  Confederate  retreat. 
On  the  next  day  he  ordered  that,  while  the  movement 
should  be  continued  against  the  left  of  the  Confederate 
line,  Overton  Hill  should  be  carried.  Two  brigades  of 
Wood's  corps,  commanded  by  Post  and  Streight,  were 
selected  for  the  purpose.     The  attack  was  at  the  outset 


270  THE   CIVIL   "WAR 

repulsed,  but  Smith  and  Schofield  moving  forward  at  the 
same  time  broke  the  left  and  centre  of  the  Confederate 
line,  and  "Wood's  soldiers  renewed  the  attack  on  Overton 
Hill  with  entire  success.     The  Confederates  were  now 

routed  all  along  the  line,  and  a  scene  of  con- 
the  confeder-  fusion  and  flight  followed.     Only  the  corps 

commander,  General  S.  D.  Lee,  stood  and  ral- 
lied around  himself  a  handful  of  brave  men  and  formed  a 
rear-guard  to  protect  the  retreat.  He  was  strengthened 
some  hours  later  by  Forrest's  cavalry,  and  they  succeeded 
in  so  hindering  the  Federal  pursuit  as  to  save  a  remnant 
of  Hood's  army.  There  was  but  one  way  out  for  the 
Confederates,  and  that  was  the  Franklin  Pike ;  all 
others  had  been  closed.  Through  Franklin,  Columbia, 
Pulaski  to  Bainbridge  on  the  Tennessee,  the  fleeing 
Confederates  went,  suffering  untold  hardships  and  hor- 
rors on  the  way.  Their  ranks  were  depleted  at  almost 
every  step,  until  at  last  scarcely  a  moiety  remained. 
Hood  had  lost  over  twenty  thousand  men.  His  army 
was  hopelessly  ruined.  After  getting  the  remnant  of 
his  troops  across  the  Tennessee,  he  retired  in  disgrace 
from  the  command.  The  Confederacy  west  of  the  Alls- 
ghanies  was  destroyed. 


CHAPTER  XXXII 

THE  LAST  BLOWS 

The  Plan  for  Ending  the  War— The  Capture  of  Fort  Fisher  and  Wil- 
mington— The  Occupation  of  Mobile — The  Beginning  of  Sher- 
man's March  through  South  Carolina — The  Crossing  of  the 
Salkehatchie — The  Fight  at  Orangeburg,  and  the  Crossing  of  the 
Edistos — The  Capture  and  Burning  of  Columbia — The  Destruc- 
tion of  Charleston,  and  its  Occupation  by  the  Federals — Sher- 
man's Entrance  into  North  Carolina — The  Fights  at  Averysboro 
and  Bentonville — The  End  of  the  March— The  Movements  of 
Grant  around  Petersburg — Lee's  Communication  of  the  2d  of 
March  to  Grant — Grant's  Answer — Confederate  Attack  on  Fort 
Steadman — Five  Forks— The  Assault  on  Petersburg — The 
Abandonment  of  Richmond  by  the  Confederates — The  Occupa- 
tion of  Richmond  by  the  Federals — The  Pursuit  of  Lee's  Army — 
Sheridan's  Occupation  of  Lee's  Line  of  Retreat  toward  Danville 
— Lee's  Columns  Headed  for  Lynchburg — The  Capture  of 
Ewell's  Corps  and  Pickett's  Division — Grant's  Demand  of  Sur- 
render— The  Reply  of  Lee,  and  the  Terms  Offered — Lee's  Propo- 
sition— Appomattox— The  Surrender — Johnston's  Movements, 
and  Sherman's  Counter-movements — The  Assassination  of  Lin- 
coln— The  Meeting  of  Sherman  and  Johnston — The  Sherman- 
Johnston  Memorandum — The  Repudiation  of  the  Memorandum 
by  the  Washington  Authorities — Johnston's  Surrender — The 
Surrender  of  the  Last  of  the  Confederate  Forces  under  Taylor 
and  Smith — The  Capture  of  Mr.  Davis. 

DuRiN"G  the  winter  of  1864-65,  Grant  and  Sherman 
were  preparing  to  give  the  Confederacy  its  final  blows. 
The  plan  was  for  Sherman  to  march  through      ^    ,    , 
the  Carolmas,  ana  join  Grant  south  of  Rich-  ending    the 
mond.     It  was  felt  that  a  necessary  prelim- 
inary to  the  accomplishment  of  this  purpose  was  the 

271 


272  THE   CIVIL    WAU 

capture  of  Wilmington,  the  last  Confederate  port  of  any 
importance,  the  last  point  of  communication  with  the 
outside  world. 

The  place  was  defended  from  the  side  of  the  sea 
chiefly  by  a  strong  work  called  Fort  Fisher.  This  work 
The  capture  must,  therefore,  be  taken.  In  November  of 
er  Md  ^wn-  1^^^'  Admiral  Porter  collected  a  strong  fleet 
mington.  ^t  the  mouth  of  the  Chesapeake,  and  General 
Butler  gathered  a  land  force  with  which  to  operate  in 
conjunction  with  the  fleet.  These  forces  started  from 
Hampton  Eoads  on  the  13th  of  December.  They  ap- 
proached Fort  Fisher  on  the  15th.  The  fleet  bombarded 
the  fort  on  the  24th,  and  reduced  it  to  earth  heaps. 
These  were,  however,  still  protection  for  the  garrison, 
and  Butler,  after  examining  the  situation,  decided  that 
he  could  not  take  the  place  by  assault,  and  ordered  his 
troops  to  re-embark,  and  then  to  return  to  the  place  of 
departure.  The  fleet,  however,  remained,  and  Porter 
informed  General  Grant  that  the  fort  could  be  taken,  if 
an  able  commander  of  land  forces  should  be  sent  to  do 
the  work.  Thereupon  Grant  ordered  Butlers  troops 
back  to  the  neighborhood  of  the  fort,  and  reinforced 
them  a  little.  The  command  of  them  was  now  given  to 
General  Terry,  a  most  capable  and  courageous  officer. 
On  the  ]3th  of  January  these  troops  were  landed,  under 
the  protection  of  Porter's  guns,  on  the  neck  of  the  pen- 
insula, on  which  the  fort  was  located  lower  down  tow- 
ard the  inlet.  The  plan  was  to  assault  the  works  at  two 
points,  simultaneously  ;  on  the  north-east  by  the  troops, 
and  on  the  south-east  by  the  marines.  In  the  middle  of 
the  afternoon  of  the  15th,  the  troops  and  the  marines 
having  worked  themselves  up  to  within  about  five  hun- 
dred feet  of  the  fortifications,  the  signal  for  assault  was 
given  and  both  rushed  bravely  forward.  The  marines 
were  repulsed,  but  the  troops,  under  the  lead  of  the  in- 


THE   LAST   BLOWS  273 

trepiu  Ames,  and  covered  by  Porter's  guns,  pressed  for- 
ward, gained  a  foothold,  and  in  an  almost  hand-to-hand 
struggle,  of  five  or  six  hours'  length,  succeeded  in  capt- 
uring the  works  and  the  garrison.  It  numbered  about 
two  thousand  men,  under  the  command  of  General 
Whiting.  The  Federals  lost  about  one  hundred  killed 
and  about  five  hundred  wounded  in  the  engagement. 
The  blow  to  the  Confederacy  was  heavy.  The  entrance 
to  the  Cape  Fear  Eiver  was  now  lost  to  it,  and  the  last 
channel  of  intercourse  with  foreign  countries  was  at 
last  blocked.  Wilmington  was  now  at  the  mercy  of  the 
fleet.  The  town  was  occupied  on  the  22d  of  February  by 
Schofield's  troops,  sent  from  Nashville  for  that  purpose. 
It  was  now  thought  that  the  time  had  come  for  the 
occupation  of  Mobile  also.  It  had  long  been  at  the 
mercy  of  the  fleet,  but  the  Washington  Gov-  Theoccnpa- 
ernment  had  to  that  time  thought  best  to  tion  of  Mobile, 
keei^  a  Confederate  corps  occupied  with  its  defence, 
rather  than  use  a  Federal  corps  in  holding  it.  The 
destruction  of  Hood's  army  now  left  several  Federal  di- 
visions unemployed,  and  the  authorities  at  Washington 
ordered  the  occupation  of  Mobile,  On  the  27th  of 
March,  General  Canby,  who  was  charged  with  the  en- 
terprise, sent  Generals  Granger  and  A.  J.  Smith  with 
some  twenty-five  thousand  men  to  make  the  assault  on 
the  Spanish  Fort,  the  work  which  defended  the  city  on 
the  east  side.  General  Carr  succeeded,  however,  in 
planting  a  battery  in  such  a  position  as  to  force  the  evacua- 
tion of  the  Fort  without  an  assault.  This  was  the  8th 
of  April.  The  troops  of  Granger  and  Smith  now  joined 
those  of  Steele,  who  were  operating  against  Fort  Blake- 
ly.  On  the  day  following  the  evacuation  of  the  Span- 
ish Fort,  Fort  Blakely  was  carried  by  assault,  and  the 
garrison,  consisting  of  nearly  four  thousand  men,  was 
captured.  The  Confederate  forces,  commanded  by 
Vol.  IL— 18 


274  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

General  Maury,  now  evacuated  the  city  and  retreated 
toward  Meridian.  The  Federals  occupied  the  place  on 
the  12th. 

Meanwhile   Sherman   was   making  his  way  through 

the  Carolinas  toward  Goldsboro,  the  point  selected  as 

his  obiective.     It  was  Grant's  idea  that  Sher- 

The    begin-  *^ 

ning  of  Sher-  man's  army  should  be  brought  from  Savan- 
through South  nah  to  City  Point  by  sea,  but  Sherman  pro- 
carouna.  tested  against  this,  as  being  demoralizing  to 
his  troops,  and  as  preventing  him  from  carrying  the  war 
into  South  Carolina.  His  views  prevailed,  and  after  a 
good  rest  in  Savannah,  he  set  out  on  his  second  great 
march.  It  was  the  1st  of  February  when  it  began. 
The  army  numbered  about  sixty  thousand  men,  and 
was  still  marched  in  two  wings,  Howard  commanding 
the  right  and  Slocum  the  left.  They  could  no  longer 
follow  the  water-courses,  as  on  their  way  to  Savannah. 
They  must  now  cross  them.  This  made  their  work 
much  more  difficult.  The  country  was,  moreover,  for 
some  distance  from  Savannah  one  vast  marsh,  so  that  the 
soldiers  were  often  obliged  to  wade  in  water  up  to  their 
waists,  and  sometimes  to  their  armpits.  Wheeler's  cav- 
alry was  the  chief  Confederate  force  in  front  of  them, 
and  its  principal  work  was  felling  trees  across  the 
roads  and  making  all  kinds  of  obstructions  to  the  Fed- 
eral advance.  By  a  clever  diversion  toward  Charleston, 
Sherman  made  the  Confederates  think  he  intended  an 
attack  on  that  city,  and  thus  prevented  the  Confederate 
troops  there  from  coming  out  to  molest  him  in  his  march. 
The  Confederates  undertook  to  make  a  stand  on  the 
bank  of  the  Salkehatchie  and  dispute  the  crossing,  but 
Howard  drove  them  off  in  a  combat  on  the 
ingofthesai-  3d  of  February.  They  then  retired  to  the 
ehatchie.        ^.^^  ^^  ^^^  Edisto,  to  prevent  the  passage 

of  the  Federals  over  the  ris-er.     The  whole  army  now 


THE   LAST   BLOWS  275 

concentrated  on  the  South  Carolina  Eailroad  between 
Midway  Station  and  Graham^s.  They  destroyed  the 
railroad  for  a  long  distance  and  kept  the  Confederates 
in  utter  ignorance  of  their  destination,  Hardee  was 
expecting  them  to  come  toward  Charleston  ;  Hill  and 
Smith,  on  the  other  hand,  were  awaiting  them  at  Au- 
gusta. But  Sherman  turned  his  columns  from  Branch- 
ville  toward  Columbia.  He  struck  the  Confederates 
at  Orangeburg.  A  vigorous  charge  from 
Blair's  corps  drove  them  off,  and  opened  the  Orangeburg, 
way  into  Orangeburg.  The  Edisto,  south  ing  of  the 
and  north  branches,  were  crossed  without 
much  difficulty,  and  on  the  16th  (February),  the  Fed- 
eral advance  arrived  in  front  of  Columbia. 

The  Congaree,  however,  lay  between  them  and  the 
city.  Sherman  ordered  Howard  to  go  up  above  Colum- 
bia and  cross  the  branches  of  the  Congaree. 
Slocum  followed  the  same  course,  and  natu-  and  bunuDg 
rally  went  still  higher  up,  in  order  to  cut  off 
the  Confederate  retreat.  These  movements  were  suc- 
cessful, and  on  the  17th,  Columbia  surrendered.  The 
mayor  was  the  official  who  delivered  up  the  place.  The 
Confederate  troops  escaped.  Hampton's  cavalry  left 
the  town  last.  They  cut  and  fired  hundreds  of  bales  of 
cotton  in  the  town  before  leaving.  There  was  a  high 
wind  at  the  time,  and  the  burning  cotton  was  blown  in 
every  direction,  setting  fire  to  the  houses  in  many  quar- 
ters at  once.  The  Confederates  accused  Sherman  of 
burning  the  city,  but  he  declared  that  the  charge  was 
false.  He  ordered  generally  all  public  buildings  to  be 
burned,  but  he  solemnly  affirmed  that  before  the  torch 
had  been  applied  to  one  of  them  in  Columbia,  the  city 
was  ablaze  from  the  flying  cotton  which  Hampton  had 
fired.  He  affirmed  that  what  was  saved  of  Columbia 
was  done  by  the  exertions  of  his  own  troops. 


276  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

Havdee  now  quickly  abandoned  Charleston  in  order  to 
prevent  his  retreat  being  cut  off.  He  applied  the  torch 
Thedestruc-  to  all  the  cotton  In  the  city,  and  to  the 
Charleston  buildings  in  which  it  was  housed.  This 
pafion^by'^the  started  a  terrible  conflagration,  which  raged 
Federals.  until  the  city  was  almost  entirely  destroyed. 
On  February  18th,  General  Gillmore  occupied  the  place, 
and  restored  order. 

Sherman's  march  from  Columbia  was  toward  Cheraw 
beyond  the  Catawba  or  Wateree  Elver.     The  river  was 
Sherman's  Successfully  passed   without    much    opposi- 
Norfh  car°o"  t^^n,  and  the  town  was  reached  on  the  3d  of 
^*-  March.      The  army  arrived  at  the  North 

Carolina  boundary  on  the  8th  of  the  month.  The  army 
now  ceased  devastating  the  country  through  which  it 
passed,  since  North  Carolina  had  never  played  the  role 
in  secession  history  that  South  Carolina  had  done. 
Fayetteville  was  the  next  objective  point  of  the  march. 
With  only  a  cavalry  skirmish  to  impede,  the  army  ar- 
rived at  that  place  on  March  10th.  The  Confederates 
now  began  to  concentrate  their  forces  on  Charlotte,  and 
General  Johnston  was  again  put  in  command,  dis- 
placing Beauregard.  At  Fayetteville  Sherman  was  able 
to  communicate  with  Schofield  at  Newnam.  Sherman 
informed  Schofield  that  he  should  threaten  Ealeigh,  but 
should  march  on  Goldsboro,  where  he  desired  the  forces 
commanded  by  Schofield  and  Terry  to  meet  him. 

On  the  15th  Sherman's  army  started  from  Fayetteville 
for  Goldsboro.     On  the  16th,  the  left  wing  struck  the 

The  fight  at  Confederates  in  the  neighborhood  of  Averys- 
and'^Benton-  ^^^'^  ^^^  ^^^  ^  sharp  contcst,  but  drove  them 
^"«-  away.     On  the  19th  Slocum  struck  the  Con- 

federates again  at  Bentonville.  This  time  they  nearly 
equalled  him  in  numbers,  and  were  commanded  by 
Johnston  himself.     But  the  Federal  commander  formed 


THE   LAST   BLOWS  277 

his  line  quickly,  and  drove  the  Confederates  away  again, 

with  considerable  loss  to  them.     In  a  few  days  more 

Sherman  made  his  junction  witli  Schofield  and  Terry  at 

Goldsboro  and  along  the  Neuse.     The  great      The  end  of 

march   was    accomplished,    and    Grant   and   t^^*"^<='»- 

Sherman   could   now   operate   together.     On   the  27th 

Sherman  was  at  City  Point  with  Grant  arranging  for  the 

final  blow  at  the  Confederacy. 

Meanwhile  Grant  had  been  gradually  extending  his 

lines  around  Petersburg  by  the  south.     The 

The  move- 
Confederate  commanders  were  becoming  con-   m  e n  t  s    of 

»    ,,       J.    ,  1  •    1  1      •  1       Grant  around 

scious  of  the  late  which  was  surely  impend-  Petersburg, 
iug  over  them. 

On  the  2d  of  March,  Lee,  who  had  a  month  before 
been  promoted  to  the  command  of  all  the  Confederate 
armies,  wrote  to  Grant  asking  him  for  an  in- 
terview to  consider  a  settlement  of  difficul-  municationof 
ties,  declaring  that  he  was  fully  authorized  March  to 
to  act  in  the  premises.  Grant  submitted  the  ^^^^' 
letter  to  Stanton  asking  instructions.  Stanton  replied 
that  the  President  directed  him  to  say  that  he  wished 
General  Grant  to  have  no  conference  with  General  Lee, 
except  in  regard  to  the  capitulation  of  Lee's  army  or 
some  purely  military  matter.  Grant  declined  Grant's  an- 
Lee's  proposal,  therefore,  on  the  ground  that  ^^®'^■• 
the  matter  referred  to  by  General  Lee  belonged  to  the 
President  alone  to  consider.  Grant  was  also  directed  by 
tlie  President  to  press  his  military  advantages  to  tli'> 
utmost. 

Lee  now  saw  that  he  must  evacuate  Richmond  and 
Petersburg  and  join  Johnston,  and  must  do  so  before 
Grant  should  reach  the  Danville  Railroad.  Grant  knew 
that  Lee  would  make  this  move  and  prepared  to  foil  it. 
Lee  tried  to  cover  his  movement  by  attacking  Grant's 
right  in  order  to  draw  troops  from  tlie  Federal  left,  and 


278  THE   CIVIL   WAK 

thus  let  the  Confederates  out.  In  the  morning  of  March 
25th,  before  daylight,  a  number  of  Confederates,  pre- 
tending to  be  deserters,  came  over  into  the 
attack  on  Fort  Federal  picket  lines  in  front  of  Fort  Stead- 
a  man.  ^ng^n^  They  had  their  arms,  but  they  were  not 
suspected  of  treachery.  Once  inside,  however,  they  over- 
powered the  sentinels,  and  before  anybody  could  recover 
from  the  surprise,  the  Confederate  General  Gordon,  with 
a  force  of  five  thousand  men,  rushed  into  the  works,  and 
took  possession  of  them,  capturing  a  considerable  num- 
ber of  prisoners.  Gordon  was  not,  however,  supported 
as  he  expected  to  be,  and  his  men  found  themselves 
massed  together  in  the  advanced,  works  with  the  Federal 
artillery  on  the  heights  behind  playing  upon  them. 
They  could  go  no  farther,  and  they  simply  remained 
there  until  more  than  half  of  them  were  killed  or 
wounded.  The  remainder  at  last  fled  in  every  direction 
open  to  them.  The  Federals  now  pressed  forward,  and 
captured  the  first  line  of  the  Confederate  intrench- 
ments. 

On  the  29th  of  March,  the  army  renewed  its  move- 
ment around  to  the  southwest  of  Petersburg,  in  order  to 
entrap  Lee.  It  was  now  about  one  hundred 
and  twenty-five  thousand  strong,  while  the 
Confederates  numbered  only  about  half  as  many.  Sheri- 
dan with  about  ten  thousand  cavalry  was  on  the  extreme 
left,  and  was  directed  to  get  into  the  Confederate  rear, 
that  is  to  cut  off  their  line  of  retreat  toward  the  south- 
west or  the  west.  To  meet  this  movement,  the  Confed- 
erates extended  their  line  a  little  distance  beyond  Five 
Forks,  a  place  which  was  still  some  three  miles  eastward 
from  the  South-Side  Eailroad,  but  they  had  not  the  troops 
to  prolong  their  line  any  farther.  It  was  Hill's  men 
who  were  in  this  position.  Gordon's  troops  were  in  the 
trenches  at  Petersburg  ;  Longstreet's  occupied  the  line 


THE   LAST   BLOWS  279 

from  Petersburg  to  and  across  the  James  below  Rich- 
mond ;  and  Ewell's  men  were  holding  the  works  around 
Eichmond. 

On  the  30th  Sheridan,  followed  by  Warren's  corps  of 
infantry,  pushed  on  from  Dinwiddle  Court  House  to  Five 
Forks  and  struck  the  Confederates.  Lee  now  thought 
that  Grant  was  aiming  at  the  railroads  still  farther  west. 
He,  therefore,  sent  troops  from  Petersburg  to  reinforce 
Hill.  Petersburg  was  thus  left  weak.  The  Confeder- 
ates now  attacked  Sheridan  at  Five  Forks  and  drove  him 
back  toward  Dinwiddle  Court  House.  Grant  sent  War- 
ren's corps  to  support  Sheridan,  and  the  Confederates 
retreated  back  to  Five  Forks.  The  next  day,  April  1st, 
Sheridan  and  Warren  attacked  the  Confederates  at  Five 
Forks.  Sheridan,  with  the  cavalry,  went  around  one 
flank,  and  the  infantry  went  around  the  other.  The 
Confederates  were  deceived  by  the  movement  of  the 
cavalry  and  were  fairly  bagged.  A  desperate  battle  en- 
sued, in  which  the  Confederates  were  overpowered  and 
routed,  with  the  loss  of  nearly  half  of  their  force  of  fif- 
teen thousand  men.  Sheridan's  loss  was  not  a  fifth  part 
of  that  of  the  Confederates. 

The  Federals  were  now  nearly  in  the  only  line  of  Lee's 
retreat  southward  or  south-westward.  He  must  now 
act  with  great  promptness  or  the  Danville  ^he  aesauit 
road  would  be  closed  to  him.  Grant  sent  on  Petersbmg. 
more  men  to  Sheridan  to  hold  his  position,  and  in  the 
early  morning  of  April  2d  ordered  the  grand  assault  all 
along  the  line.  The  onslaught  was  terrific  and  success- 
ful everywhere.  By  noon  the  whole  line  of  outer  works 
had  been  taken  and  the  Confederate  army  was  a  routed 
wreck. 

President  Davis  was  informed  of  the  situation  while 
at  church,  and  began  preparations  at  once  for  the  aban- 
donment of  Richmond  by  the  Confederate  Government. 


280  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

He  ordered  all  the  coin  in  the  banks  to  be  sent  to  Dan- 
ville, and  the  archives  of  the  Government  to  be  sent  to 

The  aban-   ^^®  Same  place  or  destroyed, 
donment  of       The  tiimult  raised  in  the  capital  by  the 

Richmond  by  •  -,     p 

the  confeder-  news   01   the  great  disaster  increased  from 

ates 

moment  to  moment,  and  the  mob  burned  and 
pillaged  while  the  soldiers  of  the  Confederacy  were  flee- 
ing. Against  the  protest  of  the  municipal  government 
and  many  of  the  best  citizens,  Ewell  ordered  all  the 
storehouses  and  bridges  to  be  burned.  The  whole  city 
seemed  to  take  fire  from  these.  It  was  a  terrible  con- 
clusion of  the  four  years  of  Confederate  reign  in  the 
fair  city  on  the  James.     The  Federals  entered  on  the 

Theoccupa-  morning  of  the  3d,  and  succeeded  in  quench- 
mond*'*b^'the  ^"S  ^^^^  flames  and  quelling  the  disorder. 
Federals.  Petersburg  was  occupied  about  the  same 
time.  The  Confederate  troops  abandoned  the  place, 
and  the  municipal  authorities  surrendered  it  to  the 
Federals. 

Lee's  plan  of  retreat  was  for  the  forces  from  Rich- 
mond and  Petersburg  to   unite  at   Chesterfield   Court 

The  pursuit  Housc,  a  place  about  half-way  between  the 

of  Lee's  army.    ^^^^^  ^^^  ^  jj^^jg  ^^  ^j^g  ^gg|.  ^f  ^^q  Eichmond 

and  Petersburg  Railroad,  and  then  move  westward  to 
Burksville  Junction,  the  point  where  the  railroad  from 
Petersburg  to  Lynchburg  crosses  the  Richmond  and 
Danville  Road.  From  here  he  might  reach  Johnston. 
Grant  understood  the  plan,  and  he  immediately  set  his 
army  in  motion  for  Burksville  Junction  to  intercept 
the  Confederates.  Sheridan  was  some  twenty  miles  west 
of  Petersburg  with  the  cavalry,  and  upon  him  devolved 
the  chief  work  in  the  pursuit.  The  infantry  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  pushed  on  after  him,  while 
Ord's  corps  marched  along  the  railroad  from  Peters- 
burg to  Lynchburg. 


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THE   LAST   BLOWS  281 

On  the  4tli  of  April,  Lee  reached  Amelia  Court  House, 
a  place  on  the  Richmond  and  Danville  Road  about 
twenty  miles  northeast  of  Burksville  June-      ^^     .^    , 

•'  ,  S  h  e  r  man's 

tiou.  His  army  had  now  dwindled  to  about  occupation  of 
fifty  thousand  men.  He  expected  to  supply  retreat  tow- 
his  troops  at  this  point,  but  when  he  reached 
the  place,  he  found  that  the  train  containing  the  sup- 
plies had  gone  on  to  Richmond  several  days  before  by 
order  of  the  Government,  and  had  done  so  without 
unloading  the  food  for  his  starving  soldiers.  This 
necessitated  his  remaining  for  twenty-four  hours  at 
Amelia  to  forage.  The  halt  of  the  Confederates  gave 
Sheridan  his  opportunity.  He  reached  Burksville 
ahead  of  Lee.  The  infantry  led  by  Meade  soon  arrived 
on  the  line  of  the  Danville  Road,  and  Lee  found,  on  the 
6th,  any  further  advance  in  this  direction  impossible. 

Lee  now  undertook  to  march  around  the  Federal  left 
and  go  toward  Lynchburg,  crossing  the  Appomattox 
River  at  Farmville.  But  Sheridan  was  Lee's  coi- 
immediately  on  his  track  again.  He  at  F^^Lj^nch^ 
once  informed  Grant  of  Lee's  new  move.  ^'^^• 
Grant  directed  Ord  to  move  from  Burksville  to  Farm- 
ville, and,  dividing  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  into  three 
columns,  he  sent  one  north  of  Lee,  one  south  of  him, 
and  the  third  in  direct  pursuit  while  Sheridan  was  to 
gain  his  front.  Crook's  brigade  of  the  cavalry  struck 
the  staggering  Confederate  column  at  Dea- 
tonsville,  and,  supported  by  Custer  and  Dev-  of  Eweira 
in,  cut  Ewell's  corps  and  Pickett's  division  pfcketrs^di- 
of  Longstreet's  corps  off,  and  forced  them  to  ^^'°°' 
surrender.  Lee's  army  was  now  in  a  most  deplorable 
condition.  Not  more  than  thirty  or  thirty-five  thou- 
sand men  remained,  starving,  in  tatters  and  perfectly 
demoralized. 

Ord's  advance  reached  Farmville   in   time  to  strike 


282  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Lee's  column,  but  the  Confederates  fought  desperately 
to  reach  the  bridge  and  cross,  and  succeeded  in  doing 
so.  Lee's  generals  now  advised  him  to  sur- 
mand  of  sur-  render.  At  the  same  time  Grant  sent  him 
a  note  demanding  the  surrender  of  "  that 
portion  of  the  Confederate  States  army  known  as  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia."  This  was  April  7th. 
The  Federal  advance,  under  Humphreys,  now  crossed 
the  river,  the  Appomattox,  in  hot  pursuit,  and  came 
upon  the  Confederates  a  few  miles  north  of  Farmville, 
where  they  had  stopped  and  thrown  up  some  earth- 
works. Humphreys  attacked  them  but  was  repulsed. 
The  reply  ^^  ^^^  under  the  influence  of  this  little 
t*he^te'rm8  succcss,  that  Lcc  auswcrcd  Grant's  letter, 
offered.  and,  instead  of  offering  to  surrender,  asked 

terms.  Grant  replied,  on  the  8th,  that  his  terms  were 
surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  on  the 
condition  that  "^the  men  and  officers  surrendered  shall 
be  disqualified  from  taking  up  arms  again  against  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  until  properly  ex- 
Lee's  prop-  changed."  Lee's  reply  was  substantially  a 
osition.  declination,  and  a  proposition   to  treat  for 

peace.     Grant  answered  this  proposition  on  the  9th,  de- 
claring that  he  had  no  authority  to  treat  for  peace. 

Sheridan  now  pushed  his  cavalry  forward  for  Appo- 
mattox Station,  on  the  railroad  to  Lynchburg  ;  and  the 
troops  of  Ord  and  Griffin  followed  him  rap- 
ppoma  ox.  ^^j^^  urged  on  by  Sheridan's  request.  In 
the  middle  of  the  night  of  the  8th-9th,  Sheridan's  ad- 
vance arrived  at  the  station  ahead  of  the  Confederates, 
captured  the  trains  waiting  for  Lee  there,  and  cut  off 
the  retreat  to  Lynchburg.  By  daylight  of  the  9th, 
Sheridan's  entire  corps,  supported  by  Ord's  and  Griffin's 
infantry,  were  posted  square  across  the  line  of  retreat  of 
the  Confederates.     Thinking  that  he  had  only  cavalry 


THE   LAST   BLOWS  283 

in  front  of  him,  Lee  ordered  Gordon  to  charge  and  clear 
the  way.  But  when  Sheridan  drew  his  cavalry  aside  and 
revealed  the  line  of  infantry  behind  him,  the  Confeder- 
ates gave  up,  at  last,  in  despair  and  raised  the  white  flag. 

Lee  now  requested  an  interview  with  Grant  for  the 
purpose  of  arranging  terms  of  surrender.  They  met  at 
the  house  of  a  Mr.  McLean  at  Appomattox  ^he  Eurren- 
Court  House,  where  Grant  put  his  terms  in  ^^'■• 
writing.  They  were  surrender,  and  release  on  parole 
not  to  take  up  arms  against  the  United  States  again 
until  properly  exchanged ;  the  arms,  artillery,  and 
public  property  to  be  delivered  up  to  officers  designated 
by  himself ;  the  Confederate  officers  to  retain  their 
side  arms  and  their  private  property,  horses  and  bag- 
gage. Lee  immediately  accepted  these  terms  in  writing. 
Grant  afterward  allowed  the  men,  as  well  as  the  officers, 
to  retain  their  horses  where  they  were  their  private 
property.  This  was  highly  appreciated  at  the  time  as 
a  genuine  act  of  mercy  and  kindness. 

On  the  12tli  of  May,  the  stipulations  were  formally 
executed.  A  few  more  than  twenty-seven  thousand 
men,  not  more  than  the  third  of  them  having  arms  in 
their  hands,  a  few  pieces  of  artillery  and  three  or  four 
hundred  wagons,  were  surrendered,  the  last  of  the  proud 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  which  for  nearly  four  years 
had  kept  the  forces  of  the  Union  at  bay.  Grant  him- 
self had  lost  an  army  of  nearly  one  hundred  thousand 
men  in  destroying  it.  It  was,  however,  at  last  accom- 
plished, and  the  Confederacy  was  now  in  ruins. 

Johnston's  army  was  at  this  moment  at  Smithfield, 
North  Carolina,  covering  Ealeigh.  On  the  Johnston's 
10th  of  April,  Sherman  set  his  troops  in  rao-  fnA^SY^Ti- 
tion  from  Goldsboro  to  attack  him.  John-  ™e?'.^mo  ve- 
ston  immediately  began  retreating.  Cross-  '"«°*^- 
ing  the  Neuse,   he  went  to  Hillsboro.     In  the  midst 


284  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

of  this  movement  the  news  of  Lee's  surrender  reached 
both  armies,  and  Johnston  decided  to  make  overtures 
to  Sherman.  On  the  14th,  Sherman  received  John- 
ston's letter,  asking  cessation  of  hostilities  and  terms  of 
surrender.  Sherman  immediately  replied  that  he  was 
willing  to  confer  and  would  offer  the  same  terms 
accorded  by  Grant  to  Lee.  Sherman  was  at  Raleigh 
when  he  received  the  letter,  and  Johnston  was  at 
Hillsboro. 

On  the  morning  of  the  15th  Sherman  set  out  to  meet 

Johnston.     Just   as   he   was   starting   a    telegram   was 

handed  him  informing  him  of  the  assassina- 

The  assaa-  ° 

rination  of  tion  of  President  Lincoln,  whicli  occurred  the 
night  before  at  Ford's  Theatre  in  Washington, 
by  the  hand  of  the  actor  J.  Wilkes  Booth.  Ordering  the 
telegraph  operator  who  had  given  him  the  despatch  to 
keep  silent,  he  put  the  fatal  message  in  his  pocket  and 
went  on  to  meet  Johnston.  He  went  by  train  to  Dur- 
The  meet-  ^^sixn  Station,  and  then  rode  some  six  or  seven 
man'  a^nd  "^iles  farther  toward  Hillsboro,  when  he  met 
Johnston.  Johnston.  They  went  into  a  small  farm- 
house, and  requested  the  use  of  a  room  from  its  owner. 
When  they  were  alone  behind  closed  doors  Sherman 
handed  Johnston  the  telegram  announcing  the  Presi- 
dent's assassination.  Johnston  was  deeply  affected  and 
spared  no  words  in  denunciation  of  the  foul  deed. 
Johnston  told  Sherman  that  he  could  procure  the  surren- 
der of  all  the  Confederate  troops  everywhere,  and  asked 
for  time  to  find  Mr,  Davis,  and  secure  the  orders  to  that 
effect.  Sherman  wanted  Johnston  to  surrender,  at 
once,  the  troops  under  his  command,  but  consented  to 
delay  matters  one  day.  On  the  next  day  Sherman  re- 
paired again  to  the  place  of  conference.  Mr.  Davis  had 
not  been  found,  but  the  Confederate  Secretary  of  War, 
Mr.  John  C.  Breckenridge  was  brought  in,  and  John- 


THE   LAST   BLOWS  285 

ston  declared  that  Brecken ridge's  order  would  be  univer- 
sally obeyed.  Sherman,  however,  was  not  satisfied.  He 
even  objected  to  the  presence  of  Breckenridge,  as  being 
a  civil  officer,  Johnston  urged  that  Breckenridge  was 
a  major  general  also,  and  Sherman  withdrew  his  ob- 
jection. 

Johnston  insisted  on  putting  things  into  the  agree- 
ment which  were  political  rather  than  military.  He 
wanted  to  secure  some  pledges  in  regard  to 
the  political  future  of  the  South.  At  last  man-Johnsto'n 
Sherman  agreed  to  draw  up  a  memorandum  '^^'^'>'^^^'^- 
providing  not  only  for  the  surrender  of  the  Confederate 
troops,  but  agreeing  to  the  deposit  of  the  arms  held  by 
the  Confederates  in  the  capitals  of  the  several  "  States  " 
forming  the  Confederacy,  recognizing  the  existing 
''State"  governments  in  the  ''States"  forming  the 
Confederacy  upon  the  taking  of  the  oath  of  allegiance 
by  the  executives  and  legislators  of  these  several 
"States,"  to  the  United  States,  and  guaranteeing  the 
political  rights  and  franchises  of  the  people  of  these 
"States." 

Sherman  signed  this  memorandum  with  Johnston, 
and  sent  it  to  Washington  for  approval.  He  also  sent 
a  letter  urging  its  acceptance.  The  date  of  The  repudi- 
the  paper  was  April  18th.  It  was  sent  directly  memorandum 
to  General  Grant,  to  be  submitted  by  him  to  P^J^^  '^'■[l^^ 

.  '  •'  ington  author- 

the  President.  The  President,  Mr.  Johnson,  »ti«8. 
instantly  disapproved  it,  and  Grant  in  transmitting  the 
President's  reply  ordered  Sherman  to  notify  Johnston 
of  the  termination  of  the  armistice,  and  to  resume  mili- 
tary operations  against  the  Confederates.  The  position 
taken  by  the  President  was  undoubtedly  correct.  The 
matters  contained  in  the  memorandum,  beyond  the  sur- 
render of  the  troops  and  their  parole,  were  matters  for 
Congress  and  the  President  as  legislators  to  determine. 


286  THE  CIVIL   WAR 

and  were  not  proper  subjects  for  a  military  capitulation. 
Sherman  had  been  unwittingly  led  too  far  in  his  desire 
to  see  peace  and  good-will  restored  to  the  country,  but  he 
was  entirely  honest  and  patriotic  in  his  purpose  and  ac- 
tions, and  the  denunciation  of  him  by  some  of  the  more 
radical  newspapers,  and  the  actions  of  some  of  the  au- 
thorities, especially  of  General  Halleck,  toward  him, 
were  outrages  upon  the  grand  old  soldier,  who  had  done 
more  than  ail  of  them  put  together  to  uphold  and  main- 
tain the  Constitution  and  the  Union. 

Grant  went  in  person  to  Raleigh  to  see  Sherman,  and 
talk  over  the  situation  with  him.     After  this  interview, 

Johnston's  Sherman  immediately  notified  Johnston  of 
Burrender.  ^.j^g  failure  of  the  memorandum  and  de- 
manded his  surrender  on  the  same  terms  accorded  by 
Grant  to  Lee.  Johnston  now  felt  obliged  to  yield,  and 
on  the  26th  of  April,  the  agreement  was  signed  between 
them  and  approved  by  Grant. 

The  fear  that  the  remaining  Confederate  forces  would 
break  up  into  guerilla  bands  and  wage  partisan  war  in- 

The  enrren-  definitely  was  happily  not  realized.  On  the 
S'theco^ed-  4th  of  May,  General  Richard  Taylor  surren- 
unde'/  Taylor  dercd  all  of  the  remaining  Confederate  forces 
and  Smith.  gj^g^  ^f  ^^g  Mississippi;  and  on  the  26th, 
General  Kirby  Smith  surrendered  all  remaining  west  of 
the  great  river.  The  last  shot  of  the  war  was  fired  on 
the  13th  of  May,  at  a  point  on  the  Rio  Grande. 

In  the  early  morning  of  the  10th  of  May,  the  fugitive 
President,  or  rather  now  ex-President,  of  the  Confed- 

The  capture  eracy  was  captured  near  Irwinville,  Georgia, 
of  Mr.  Davis,  ^y  some  detachments  of  cavalry  command- 
ed b^  Colonels  Harnden  and  Pritchard,  sent  out  by 
General  Wilson  from  Macon.  He  had  made  his  way 
from  Richmond  to  Danville,  and  thence  to  Greensboro, 
and  seeing  that  Johnston's  surrender  was  inevitable. 


THE   LAST    BLOWS  287 

he  had  proceeded  toward  the  Gulf  attended  at  first  by  a 
troop  of  cavalry,  and  at  last  by  a  few  friends.  He  was 
taken  with  his  family,  consisting  of  his  wife  and  infant 
daughter  and  his  wife's  sister,  to  Savannah,  and  thence 
alone  to  Fortress  Monroe,  where  he  was  kept  in  rigor- 
ous, not  to  say  severe,  confinement  for  two  years,  and 
then  liberated  on  bond.  He  was  popularly  accused  of 
complicity  in  the  assassination  of  Lincoln,  and  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  repeated  this  libel,  for  such  it 
doubtless  was,  in  his  proclamation  offering  one  hundred 
thousand  dollars  for  his  apprehension ;  but  he  was  never 
tried  for  this  alleged  offence,  nor  for  treason  against 
the  United  States.  The  war  was  over.  The  South  was 
exhausted  and  ruined,  and  it  remained  for  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  to  do  what  it  would  in  the 
establishment  of  a  new  order  of  things  in  that  section. 


CHAPTEE  XXXIII 

THE    INTERNATIONAL    COMPLICATIONS    DURING  THE 
LATTER  YEARS   OF   THE    CIVIL   WAR. 

Seward — Unfriendliness  of  Two  of  the  Leading  Governments  of 
Europe — The  Two  Serious  Questions  of  a  Diplomatic  Nature 
Arising  During  the  War — Diplomatic  Situation  at  the  Beginning 
of  the  Year  1862— Mr.  Bulloch's  Mission  to  England— The 
Foreign  Enlistment  Act  of  Great  Britain — The  Interpretation  of 
this  Act  by  British  Lawyers — The  Building  of  Ships  for  the 
Confederates  in  Great  Britain — The  Proceedings  against  the 
Alexandra — Gist  of  the  Contention  between  Mr.  Adams  and  the 
British  Ministry — The  Case  of  the  Attorney-General  vs.  Sillem 
— The  Decision  and  its  Effects — The  Steam-Rams — Earl  Rus- 
sell's Views — The  French  Invasion  of  Mexico— The  Situation 
of  Mexico  in  the  Period  between  1820  and  1860 — The  Advent  of 
Juarez — European  Demands  against  Mexico  and  the  Seizure 
of  Vera  Cruz — Tlie  Interposition  of  the  United  States  in  the 
Question— The  French  Occupation  of  the  City  of  Mexico— Mr. 
Seward's  Reticence — The  Empire  of  Maximilian — Seward's 
Continued  Patience — The  Hope  of  the  Confederates — Seward's 
Answer  to  the  French  "  Feeler" — The  President's  Firm  Stand 
— Maximilian's  Acceptance  of  the  Throne — The  Sending  of 
Sheridan  to  the  Texan  Border — The  Policy  of  President  Johnson 
— Seward's  Note  of  the  16th  of  December,  1865,  to  the  French 
Government — The  Departure  of  the  Frencii  Troops  from  Mexi- 
co, and  the  Downfall  of  Maximilian's  Empire — The  Success  of 
the  Diplomacy  of  the  Administration — Mr.  Seward  and  the 
Monroe  Doctrine — France  and  the  United  States — United  States 
and  Great  Britain — United  States  and  Canada — United  States 
and  Russia — United  States  and  the  German  States. 

The  genius  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Seward, 
was  pre-eminently  diplomatic.     He  was  so  courteous  and 

288 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   COMPLICATIONS       289 

conciliatory  in  manner  and  character  as  to  impress  many 
with  the  idea  that  his  mental  structure  was  a  compo- 
sition of  craft  and  cowardice.  Whatever  it 
may  have  been,  it  was  certainly  just  what 
the  United  States  needed  at  the  head  of  the  Department 
of  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  momentous  period  between 
1861  and  1865.  Nothing  could  have  been  more  fatal  to 
the  interests  of  this  country,  at  that  time,  than  to  have 
a  bullying  chauvinist  in  that  position. 

There  can  be  no  reasonable  doubt  now  that  two  of  the 
then  three  leading  governments  of  Europe  were  rather 
inclined  to  the  view  that  the  success  of  the  The  nn- 
Confederates  in  their  attempt  to  destroy  the  Pw  o^oH  h'e 
American  Union  would  be  beneficial  to  their  ernmenfs'of 
interests.  Let  it  be  remarked  that  it  is  not  Europe, 
said  that  the  mass  of  the  people  of  Great  Britain  or  of 
France  were  of  this  opinion,  or  felt  any  sympathy  with 
the  Confederate  cause.  Its  identification  with  the  in- 
terests of  slaveholding  repelled  them,  more  than  the  radi- 
cal democracy  of  the  North  did.  The  proposition  ap- 
plies only  to  the  existing  governments  of  these  countries, 
the  one  of  which  was  exceedingly  aristocratic  in  its  char- 
acter, and  the  other  that  curious  mixture  of  democracy 
and  despotism,  which  is  termed  Cffisarism  or  Bonapart- 
ism.  "While  they  probably  intended  to  preserve  gener- 
ally the  attitude  of  neutrality  between  the  parties  to 
the  great  contest,  they  certainly  felt  a  strong  impulse,  in 
all  doubtful  cases,  to  give  the  Confederates  the  benefit  of 
the  doubt,  and  they  felt  no  scruples  of  conscience  in 
taking  advantage  of  the  embarrassments  of  the  United 
States  to  realize  plans  of  their  own  unfavorable  to  the 
interests  of  the  United  States. 

Under  such  circumstances  and  conditions,  and  with 
such  a  disposition  animating  the  diplomacy  of  Great 
Britain  and  France,  it  was  certainly  most  fortunate  fot 
Vol.  II.— 19 


290  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

this  conntry  that  just  such  a  character  as  Mr.  Seward 
directed  its  business  with  foreign  states.  If,  for  ex- 
ample, the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  who  so  instantly 
and  highly  applauded  the  action  of  Captain  Wilkes  in 
the  Trent  affair,  had  occupied  Mr.  Seward's  chair,  there 
can  be  little  doubt,  so  far  as  the  wit  of  man  can  forecast 
anything,  that  this  country  would  never  have  passed 
through  the  Civil  War  without  suffering  under  the  dis- 
aster of  foreign  war  at  the  same  time. 

As  it  was,  and  with  all  of  Mr.  Seward's  judgment, 

learning,  urbanity  and  conservatism,  the  country  emerged 

„^  ,  from  the  Civil  War  with  two  most  serious  for- 

The  two  se-       .  ,  •        .  ■  i        ^  •    ^ 

rious  ques-  eigu  Complications  with  which  to  deal :  viz., 
diplomatic  the  violations  of  neutrality  permitted  by  the 
darhig*"the  British  Government  in  the  creation  of  a  Con- 
'^^'  federate  navy  in  the  ports  of  that  country, 

and  the  attempt  of  the  French  Government  to  establish 
imperial  government  in  Mexico.  It  is  the  purpose  of 
this  chapter  to  deal  briefly  with  these  two  subjects.  The 
other  questions  of  a  diplomatic  character  belonging  to 
this  period,  while  all  of  more  or  less  importance  in  dip- 
lomatic history,  are  too  secondary  in  their  character  and 
results  to  demand  attention  in  the  general  review,  which 
the  concise  nature  of  these  volumes  makes  necessary. 

The  recognition  of  the  belligerency  of  the  Confeder- 
ates by  the  European  states  has  been  already  referred  to 
.  in  a  preceding  chapter  of  this  work,  and  the 
situation  at  so-callcd  Trent  affair  has  been  treated  at 
of*' the^'y e'af  somc  length.  We  have  therefore  to  begin 
^^^^'  here  with  the  diplomatic  situation   at  the 

opening  of  the  year  1862,  which  was,  briefly,  recogni- 
tion of  the  belligerency  of  the  Confederates,  and  an  at- 
titude of  neutrality  between  the  Federals  and  Confeder- 
ates by,  and  on  the  part  of,  the  European  states,  with 
some  irritation  on  the  part  of  the  British  Government  as 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   COMPLICATIONS       291 

the  result  of  the  controversy  over  the  Trent  affair,  some 
chagrin  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  over  the  out- 
come of  this  matter,  and  a  general  disposition  on  the 
part  of  both  the  British  and  French  Governments  to 
favor  the  Confederates  so  far  as  the  rather  loosely  con- 
structed rules  concerning  neutrality  would  allow,  and 
to  make  use  of  the  domestic  embarrassments  of  the 
United  States  to  further  their  own  interests  in  so  far  as 
these  same  rules  would  permit. 

Immediately  after  the  governments  of  Europe  recog- 
nized the  belligerency  of  the  Southern  Confederacy, 
that  is,  in  the  summer  of  1861,  Mr.  Davis 
sent  a  naval  officer,  one  James  D.  Bulloch,  to  loch's  mission 
England  for  the  object  of  procuring  war-  '°  England, 
ships  and  naval  supplies  in  the  ports  of  Great  Britain. 
This  very  intelligent  man  began  his  work,  as  he  himself 
tells  us  in  his  book  on  the  "Secret  Service  of  the 
Confederate  States,"  by  an  inquiry  into  the  neutrality 
laws  of  Great  Britain  with  the  purpose  of  going  to  the 
very  limits  of  those  laws  without  overstepping  them. 
He  procured  eminent  counsel,  who  submitted  a  series 
of  propositions  in  interpretation  of  these  laws  to  two  of 
England's  most  able  barristers.  The  law  to  be  inter- 
preted was  the  Act  of  Parliament  of  59th  The  For- 
George  III.,  chapter  69,  entitled,  in  common  ^^^f  A^'^o^i 
parlance,  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act.  Its  Great  Britain, 
exact  title  is  "  an  Act  to  prevent  the  enlistment  or 
engagement  of  His  Majesty's  subjects  to  serve  in  for- 
eign service,  and  the  fitting  out  or  equipping  in  His 
Majesty's  dominions  of  vessels  for  warlike  purposes  "  ; 
and  its  seventh  section  provides  that  if  any  person 
Avithin  the  United  Kingdom  should  equip,  furnish,  fit 
out,  or  arm,  or  attempt  or  endeavor  to  equip,  etc.,  or 
procure  to  be  equipped,  etc.,  or  should  knowingly  aid, 
assist,  or  be  concerned  in  equipping,  etc.,  with  intent 


292  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

that  such  ship  should  be  employed  in  the  service  of  any 
foreign  state,  etc.,  as  a  transport  or  store  ship,  or  with 
intent  to  cruise  or  commit  hostilities  against  any  state, 
etc.,  with  whom  His  Majesty  shall  not  then  be  at  war, 
every  person  so  offending  should  be  guilty  of  a  mis- 
demeanor. 

Mr.  Bulloch  says  that  these  learned  British  lawyers 
advised  him  that  it  was  no  offence,  under  the  act,  for 

British  subjects  to  fit  out  and  equip  a  vessel 
pretation  of  outsicU  of  Her  Majesty's  dominions,  even 
Britfeh*  coun-   tliougli  it  was  intended  for  warlike  purposes 

against  a  state  friendly  to  Great  Britain  ; 
that  it  was  also  no  offence,  under  the  act,  for  any  per- 
son to  fit  out  and  equip  a  vessel  luithin  Her  Majesty's 
dominions,  if  it  were  not  with  a  warlike  intent  against 
a  state  friendly  to  Great  Britain  ;  and  that  the  mere 
building  of  a  ship  within  Her  Majesty's  dominions  by 
any  person  was  no  offence,  under  the  act,  no  matter 
what  might  be  the  intent  with  which  it  was  done. 
He  says,  furthermore,  that  they  drew  the  conclusion 
that  "any  shipbuilder  may  build  any  ship  in  Her 
Majesty's  dominions,  provided  he  does  not  equip  her 
within  Her  Majesty's  dominions,  and  he  has  nothing  to 
do  with  the  acts  of  the  purchasers  done  within  Her 
Majesty's  dominions  without  his  concurrence,  or  tvith- 
out  Her  Majesty's  dominions  even  with  his  concur- 
rence." 

Armed  with  this  legal   opinion  from  high  authority, 

Mr.  Bulloch  found  little  difficulty  in   persuading  the 

build    shipbuilders  on  the  Mersey  and  the  Clyde  to 

ing  of  ships   undertake   the   construction    of   war- vessels 

federates  in  for  the  Confederate  navy.     The   first  ship 

built  was  the  Florida.  She  was  constructed 
during  the  latter  part  of  the  year  1861  and  the  first 
part  of  1862,  by  Laird  &  Sons,  at  Birkenhead  on  the 


THE   INTERNATIONAL    COMPLICATIONS        293 

Mersey.  It  was  pretended  that  she  was  being  built  for 
the  Italian  Government.  Her  real  destination  was, 
however,  suspected  by  the  United  States  Consul  at 
Liverpool,  Mr.  Dudley,  who  immediately  imparted  his 
suspicions  to  the  United  States  Minister,  Mr.  Charles 
Francis  Adams.  Mr.  Adams  drew  the  attention  of  the 
British  Government  to  the  work  being  done  at  Birken- 
head, but  the  Government  did  not  see  its  way  to  inter- 
fere on  the  ground  of  mere  suspicion.  It  wanted  facts 
which  would  be  accepted  as  evidence  in  a  court  of 
justice.  The  Florida  left  Birkenhead  during  the  latter 
part  of  March,  1862.  She  cleared  for  the  Italian  waters 
with  a  British  crew  on  board.  She  had  no  guns  or 
munitions  on  her.  These  were  shipped  from  Hartle- 
pool on  the  steamer  Bahama.  The  two  vessels  met  at 
Nassau  according  to  agreement,  and  the  Florida  re- 
ceived her  armament  in  the  waters  near  that  place. 
The  British  crew  now  clearly  understanding  the  situa- 
tion refused  to  serve  longer,  and  her  commander,  after 
trying  in  vain  to  ship  another  crew  in  Cuba,  ran  her 
through  the  blockading  squadron  off  Mobile  into  th^t 
port. 

At  the  same  time  that  these  events  were  occurring 
the  Lairds  were  building  another  ship  of  the  same  pat- 
tern as  the  Florida.  This  was  the  famous.  The  ^^o- 
or  rather  the  notorious,  Alabama.  Although  ''""*"• 
the  builders  kept  her  destination  a  strict  secret,  the 
United  States  Consul  at  Liverpool  was  on  the  watch, 
and  he  reported  his  well-grounded  suspicions  to  Mr. 
Adams  in  regard  to  her  ownership  and  purpose.  Mr. 
Adams  immediately  requested  the  British  Government 
to  detain  her.  The  ministers  consulted  the  crown 
lawyers.  After  considerable  delay,  caused  by  the  illness 
of  the  chief  advocate,  a  legal  opinion  was  furnished  the 
Government  advising  the  detention  of  the  vessel.    Mean- 


294  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

while,  under  pretext  of  a  trial  trip,  she  had  slipped 
away  in  the  latter  part  of  July.  She  was  not  equipped 
with  her  armament  and  munitions  when  she  left  Bir- 
kenhead, but  they  were  conveyed  to  her  from  the  waters 
of  the  Mersey  in  two  other  ships.  The  three  vessels 
met  by  arrangement  in  the  waters  of  the  Azores.  Here 
the  Alabama  was  armed  and  equipped,  and  Semmes  took 
command  of  her.  She  immediately  began  her  destructive 
cruise  against  the  commerce  of  the  United  States.  She 
robbed  and  burned  the  merchant  vessels  captured,  with- 
out any  regard  to  the  rules  of  condemnation  by  prize 
courts.  At  last,  in  the  summer  of  1864,  she  was  brought 
to  bay  just  ofE  the  French  port  of  Cherbourg  by  the 
United  States  war-ship  Kearsarge,  commanded  by  the 
brave  and  skilful  Winslow,  and  was  sunk. 

A  third  ship,  the  Georgia,  contracted  for  by  Mr. 
Bulloch,  was,  about  the  same  time,  being  constructed 
on  the  Clyde.  She,  too,  escaped  the  watch- 
ful United  States  consuls  on  account  of  the 
slowness  of  the  British  officials,  and  sailed  in  the  early 
part  of  the  year  1863.  She  left  the  Clyde  without  her 
armament.  But  it  was  conveyed  to  her  from  Liverpool 
on  the  steamer  Alar,  and  transferred  to  her  near  the 
French  coast.  After  cruising  in  the  Confederate  ser- 
vice for  about  twelve  months,  she  steamed  into  the 
Mersey  and  was  sold  by  Mr.  Bulloch  to  parties  in 
Liverpool. 

At  last  the  representatives  of  the  United  States  were 
successful  in  bringing  the  British  officials  to  action.  A 
Theproceed-  vcssel,  named  the  Alexandra,  was  in  process 
th^e  l^a^  of  construction  at  Liverpool  for  the  Confed- 
•**■"•  erate  service,  during  the  winter  of  1862-63. 

Mr.  Dudley  secured  sufficient  evidence  of  this  to  ground 
a  case  upon  before  the  courts,  and  the  British  officers 
were  thus  driven,  on  the  basis  of  their  own  interpreta- 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   COMPLICATIONS       295 

tion  of  their  duties,  to  proceed  against  the  builders, 
Messrs.  Sillem  &  Co. 

Mr.  Adams  and  Mr.  Dudley  had,  all  along,  in  their 
controversies  with  the  British  ministers,  contended  that 
tlie  general  principles  of  international  law  Gist  of  the 
made  it  incumbent  upon  neutral  states  to  tw°eTn°M'f' 
prevent  either  belligerent  from  making  any  ^e  B^i^utsh 
place  subject  to  their  jurisdiction  a  base  of  ministry, 
hostile  operations  against  the  other.  But  the  British 
officials  said  that  the  British  Parliament  was  the  exclu- 
sive interpreter  of  the  principles  of  international  law  for 
the  British  executive,  and  that  what  were  called  the 
general  principles  of  international  law  had  no  validity 
for  the  British  executive  unless  expressed  in  an  act  of 
Parliament.  This  was  sound  jurisprudence.  The  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States  had  long  before  this 
decided  that  there  is  no  international  law  for  the  United 
States  except  as  formulated  in  the  acts  of  Congress. 
Mr.  Adams  contended,  however,  that  if  the  Parliament- 
ary statute  was  not  sufficient  to  give  force  to  the  gen- 
eral principle,  the  ministers  of  the  crown  could  always 
procure  from  Parliament  the  proper  amendment  of  its 
act.  The  ministers  thought,  on  their  side,  that  the 
act  was  sufficient  for  everything  that  could  be  reasonably 
required  of  the  Government,  and  that  the  representatives 
of  the  United  States  had  only  to  offer  evidence  instead 
of  suspicions  and  it  would  be  shown  that  it  was. 

This  last  contention  was  now  to  be  tested  in  the  case 
of  the  Attorney-General  against  Sillem  and  others, 
more  popularly  known  as  the  "Alexandra  case."  The 
seizure  of  the  vessel  was  made  on  the  6tli  of  April,  1863, 
at  Liverpool,  by  an  officer  of  the  British  customs,  and 
the  Attorney-General  immediately  filed  an  information 
against  the  defendants,  charging  them  with  ''furnish- 
ing," ''equipping,"  and  "fitting  out"  the  vessel,  but 


296  THE  CIVIL   WAR 

not  with  "  arming  it."  The  defendants  promptly  en- 
tered their  plea  of  not  guilty,  and  the  case  came  to  trial 
before  the  Chief  Baron  of  the  Exchequer  Court,  Baron 
Pollock,  and  a  jury  specially  drawn  for  the  occasion,  in 
the  last  days  of  June,  1863.  In  summing  up  the  case 
Baron  Pollock  said  that  the  evidence  showed  that  when 
this  vessel  was  seized  she  Avas  simply  in  course  of  build- 
ing, and  that  it  was  no  offence  under  the  neutrality  laws 
of  Great  Britain  to  build  a  vessel  for  a  belligerent  power ; 
that,  in  his  opinion,  the  words  of  the  Parliamentary  act, 
**  equip,"  '*  furnish,"  "fit  out,"  or  "arm"  meant  the 
same  thing ;  and  that  unless  the  jury  could  find  that  the 
intent  was  to  equip  or  arm  the  vessel  at  Liverpool  or  on 
British  territory,  he  did  not  think  the  neutrality  laws  had 
been  violated  in  any  manner  or  degree.  This  was  simply 
an  instruction  to  the  jury  to  find  for  the  defendant,  un- 
less they  should  decide  that  there  was  sufficient  evidence 
of  an  intent  to  arm  the  vessel  on  British  soil.  There 
were  naturally  no  specific  facts  in  proof  of  such  an 
intent.  There  was  only  the  suspicion,  however  well 
grounded.  While  this  was  sufficient  to  justify  a  de- 
mand for  greater  watchfulness  on  the  part  of  the  police, 
it  was  not  evidence  in  a  court  of  justice. 

The  jury  found,  therefore,  for  the  defendant.     The 
Attorney-General  first  prepared  and  tendered  a  bill  of 
The  case  of  exceptions,  and  when  this  was  not  allowed, 
Gene"*a?»».'  ^^  moved  for  a  new  trial  on  the  ground  that 
siiiem.  ^\^Q  judge  had  misdirected  the  jury,  and  the 

jury  had  found  against  the  evidence.  Eule  nisi  for  a 
new  trial  was  granted,  and  argument  was  had  before  the 
full  bench,  in  the  latter  part  of  November,  on  the  ques- 
tion as  to  whether  the  rule  should  be  discharged  or  made 
absolute.  The  court  was  equally  divided  on  this  point, 
and  according  to  the  practice  of  the  court  in  such  a  di- 
vision, the  junior  member  withdrew  his  judgment,  and 
the  rule  for  a  new  trial  was  thus  discharged. 


THE   INTERl^ATIONAL    COMPLICATIONS       297 

The  Attorney- General  took  an  appeal  from  this  deci- 
sion to  the  court  of  error  in  such  cases,  the  Exchequer 
Chamber  ;  and  early  in  February  of  1864  the  The  appeal 
appeal  came  up  for  argument.  The  counsel  °h  e^^ExcLq" 
for  the  defendants  now  challenged  the  juris-  ner  chamber, 
diction  of  the  court  on  the  technical  ground  that  the 
Court  of  Exchequer  had  no  legal  power  to  invent  the 
rule  under  which  the  appeal  had  been  taken  to  the 
Exchequer  Chamber.  The  argument  went  off  on  this 
point  and  the  merits  of  the  question  were  entirely  lost 
sight  of.  After  long  and  able  argument  from  counsel 
on  both  sides  in  regard  to  the  powers  of  the  Court  of 
Exchequer  to  create  by  its  rules  rights  of  appeal,  the 
Exchequer  Chamber  decided,  four  to  three,  that  they 
could  not  hear  the  appeal. 

The  Attorney-General  appealed  against  their  decision 
to  the  highest  court  of  law  known  to  the  British 
judicial  system,  the  House  of  Lords.  The  Appeal  of 
question  before  the  Lords  was  in  regard  h^jTsV^^oI 
to  the  power  of  the  Exchequer  Chamber  Lords, 
to  hear  the  appeal  from  the  decision  of  the  Court  of 
Exchequer  discharging  the  rule  for  a  new  trial  of  the 
case.  After  long  and  able  arguments  from  counsel 
on  both  sides,  the  Lords  rendered  their  decision  on 
the  6th  of  April,  1864,  by  a  majority  of  four  to  two. 
They  held  that  the  judges  of  the  Court  of  Exchequer 
did  not  have  the  authority,  under  the  power  to  regulate 
the  practice  of  their  court,  to  invent  new  rights  of 
appeal,  and  that  such  power  had  not  been  conferred  on 
them  by  any  act  of  Parliament ;  that  the  appeal  which 
they  had  allowed  in  this  case  was  a  novel  procedure  ;  that 
the  Exchequer  Chamber  was  correct  in  refusing  to  hear 
it ;  and  that,  therefore,  the  appeal  from  the  decision  of 
the  Exchequer  Chamber  should  be  dismissed. 

Thus  ended  this  famous  test  case  in  discussions  and 


298  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

decisions  in  regard  to  the  technicalities  of  judicial  prac- 
tice. The  practical  outcome  of  it,  however,  was  a  notice 
T  h  deci  ^^  ^^^®  Confederate  agents  that  they  might, 
Bionanditsef-  under  the  neutrality  laws  of  Great  Britain, 
procure  all  the  vessels  and  munitions  of 
war  which  they  had  the  means  to  purchase,  provided 
they  would  only  bring  the  vessels  and  their  war  equip- 
ment together  somewhere  without  the  dominions  of  Her 
Majesty. 

Still,  it  can  hardly  be  questioned  that  the  British  Gov- 
ernment did  all  that  it  could  under  existing  statutes  and 
judicial  practice  to  convict  and  punish  the  defendants 
in  this  case.  Its  members  had  come  to  see  more  clearly 
that  the  United  States  Government  was  going  to  con- 
quer the  rebellion  against  its  authority,  and  that  neutral 
duties  must  be  more  strictly  enforced.  They  had  re- 
sisted the  importunities  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon  to 
join  with  him  in  recognizing  the  independence  of  the 
Southern  Confederacy,  and  they  had  recognized  the 
lawful  validity  of  the  Federal  blockade,  despite  the  fact 
that  it  was  not  well  maintained  in  a  number  of  places, 
and  in  the  face  of  the  suifering  caused  in  the  manufact- 
uring districts  of  England  in  consequence  of  it.  It  is 
true  that  the  Act  of  Parliament  in  regard  to  neutrality 
was  not  sufficiently  strong  and  wide  to  enable  the  Gov- 
ernment to  cope  with  the  commercial  greed  of  British 
subjects,  but  it  was  the  statute  under  which  the  Gov- 
ernment had  long  acted,  and  it  was  by  no  means  directed 
specifically  against  the  United  States.  Moreover,  it  must 
be  remembered  that  the  neutrality  laws  of  the  United 
States  were  not  much,  if  any,  stricter.  In  this  very 
case  of  the  Alexandra  Baron  Pollock  quoted  both  Kent 
and  Story  in  justification  of  the  proposition  that  it  was 
not  a  breach  of  neutrality  by  a  State  for  its  citizens  to 
sell  contraband  of  war  to  belligerents.    The  articles  were 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   COMPLICATIONS       299 

simply  subject  to  the  right  of  seizure  in  transit,  and 
to  confiscation. 

About  the  time  of  the  hearing  of  the  Alexandra  case, 
the  British  Government  gave  another  proof  of  its  good 
faith.  It  was  brought  to  the  attention  of  The  steam- 
the  ministers  that  the  Lairds  were  building  '■*™^- 
a  number  of  steam-rams.  The  representatives  of  the 
United  States  charged  that  they  were  intended  for  the 
Confederate  service,  and,  although  they  could  not  fur- 
nish the  Government  with  any  very  good  evidence  of  it, 
yet  the  ministers  caused  them  to  be  seized. 

They  were  pretty  severely  arraigned  for  it  in  Parlia- 
ment, and  finally  escaped  further  embarrassment  by 
purchasing  the  vessels  for  the  British  navy.  Eari  Eus- 
It  was  during  the  debate  in  Parliament  upon  ^^'^'^  ^^"'^• 
this  subject  that  Earl  Eussell,  the  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs  in  the  Palmerston  Government,  said  that  he  was 
convinced  that  the  steam-rams,  which  had  been  declared 
by  the  builders  to  be  for  the  French  Government,  were 
intended  for  the  Confederate  service,  and  that  he  agreed 
with  Mr.  Adams  that  the  arming  and  equipping  of 
vessels  in  the  Queen^s  dominions,  and  sending  them  forth 
to  attack  a  power  with  which  Her  Majesty  was  at  peace, 
would  be  an  infringement  of  Her  Majesty's  proclamation, 
and  a  virtual  participation  in  hostilities  in  behalf  of  the 
Confederate  States.  Earl  Russell  has  been  very  severely 
criticised  by  the  Americans  both  North  and  South, 
which  is  some  evidence,  at  least,  that  he  was  striving  to 
walk  the  straight  and  narrow  path.  He  and  his  col- 
leagues were  also  exposed  to  severe  criticism,  from  both 
points  of  view,  in  the  Parliament.  While  Sir  Thomas 
Baring,  Mr.  Bright,  Mr.  Cobden  and  Mr.  Shaw  Lefevre 
accused  them  of  winking  at  the  violations  of  the  Queen's 
neutrality  proclamation,  in  the  matters  of  the  furnish- 
ing of  ships  and  war  materials  to  the  Confederate  govern- 


300  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

ment,  and  allowing  the  Confederate  war-vessels  to  enter 
British  ports  almost  at  will  and  supply  themselves  to 
almost  any  extent,  the  Earl  of  Derby,  Lord  Eobert 
Cecil  and  Mr.  Eoebuck  accused  the  Government  of  un- 
warranted interference  with  the  rights  of  British  citi- 
zens and  of  cowering  before  the  insults  offered  them  by 
the  United  States  Government. 

Such  was,  in  substance,  the  status  of  the  question  at 
the  close  of  the  rebellion  ;  and  the  victorious  Union  had 
no  reasons  to  fear  any  serious  difficulty  in  its  settlement. 
If  there  were  any  in  1865,  they  were  all  removed  by  the 
accession  of  the  liberal  party  to  power  in  1867.  From 
this  moment  forward  the  adjustment  of  the  claims  made 
by  the  United  States  upon  Great  Britain  through  arbi- 
tration became  from  month  to  month  more  and  more 
certain.  The  history  of  its  consummation  belongs,  how- 
ever, to  a  later  volume  of  this  series. 

The  second  important  question  of  the  foreign  rela- 
tions of  the  United  States  during  the  Civil  War  was  the 
^   ^      ,_  French  invasion  of  Mexico  and  the  establish- 

The  French 
invasion    of  meut  of  the  Maximilian  Empire   over  that 

unhappy  country.  For  forty  years,  i.e., 
from  the  date  of  Mexican  independence  to  the  out- 
break of  the  Civil  War  in  the  United  States,  Mexico  had 
been  practically  in  a  condition  of  revolution,  rebellion 

and  anarchy.  It  had  suffered  almost  annual 
tion  of  Mexico  upheavals  and  almost  semi-annual  changes 
between  1820  in  the   head  of   the  Government.      It  had 

become  impoverished  and  bankrupt,  both  po- 
litically and  financially.  The  reign  of  law  was  almost 
entirely  set  aside,  and  the  public  peace  was  almost  de- 
stroyed. Thieving,  robbery  and  murder  were  the  order 
of  the  day,  and  the  nation  seemed  on  the  point  of 
breaking  up.  During  this  long  period  of  lawlessness,  cit- 
izens and  subjects  of  foreign  states,  residing  or  sojourn- 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   COMPLICATIONS        301 

ing  in  Mexico  for  pleasure  or  for  business,  were  exposed 
to  outrages  of  every  kind,  and  suffered  severely.  The 
foreign  officials  were  not  even  protected.  It  is  a  well- 
authenticated  fact  that  robbers  entered  the  British  em- 
bassy in  the  city  of  Mexico  and  carried  away  more  than 
a  half  million  of  dollars.  During  the  war  between  the 
United  States  and  Mexico  in  the  last  half  of  the  fifth 
decade  of  the  century,  the  idea  had  been  broached  of  a 
dismemberment  of  the  miserable  sham  of  a  state. 

Nevertheless  Mexico  had  succeeded  in  borrowing 
some  money  from  the  citizens  and  subjects  of  foreign 
powers,  and  these  debts,  together  with  the  Mexico's 
claims  for  damages  by  foreign  powers,  ^*'^*^^- 
amounted  in  1860  to  nearly  one  hundred  millions  of 
dollars,  a  sum  entirely  beyond  the  ability  of  the  poverty- 
stricken  country  to  pay. 

During  the  period  between  1857  and  1860  the  Liberal 
party  under  the  leadership  of  Comonfort  had  succeeded 
in  vanquishing  the  conservative  or  clerical  party  and  in 
forcing  their  chief,  Miramon,  to  seek  refuge  in  flight 
from  the  country,  and,  when  Comonfort  was  -nje  advent 
apparently  on  the  point  of  assuming  dicta-  of  Juarez, 
torial  powers  again,  had  recognized  Comonfort's  Minister 
of  the  Interior,  Benito  Juarez,  as  leader,  and  under  his 
direction  had  expelled  Comonfort  also.  Juarez  was  a 
full-blooded  Indian,  born  in  poverty  and  ignorance,  but 
by  the  aid  of  a  discriminating  and  generous-minded 
Spanish  gentleman,  whom  he  served  faithfully  in  his 
youth,  he  had  been  highly  educated,  and  when  he  was 
proclaimed  President  of  Mexico  in  January  of  1858,  he 
was  undoubtedly  one  of  the  strongest  characters,  both  in- 
tellectually and  morally,  that  Mexico  possessed.  He  suc- 
ceeded during  1859  and  1860  in  suppressing  the  rebellion 
against  his  Government,  and  in  holding  regular  elec- 
tions in  the  spring  of  1861,  both  for  the  presidency  and 


802  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

for  the  members  of  Congress,  and  was  himself  chosen 
president  thereat.  The  Treasury  was  now,  however,  so 
completely  exhausted  that  the  Congress  enacted  a  law 
suspending  for  two  years  the  payment  of  any  foreign 
obligations,  either  principal  or  interest. 

It  was  this  act  that  gave  the  foreign  powers  a  fair  oc- 
casion for  intervention.  In  the  autumn  of  1861,  pleni- 
The  Lon-  potcntiaries  of  the  three  interested  powers, 
men"  a|amlt  Creat  Britain,  France  and  Spain,  assembled 
Mexico.  jj-^  London  and  agreed  to  make  a  joint  de- 

maud  upon  Mexico  for  the  discharge  of  its  obligations 
to  the  three  countries  so  represented  and  for  better  pro- 
tection of  the  persons  and  property  of  their  respective 
subjects  in  Mexico.  They  at  the  same  time,  however, 
disavowed  any  intention  of  acquiring  any  territory  from 
Mexico  or  any  undue  advantage,  or  any  control  over  the 
internal  government  of  Mexico.  What  they  demanded 
was  simply  their  pay,  and  the  reasonable  protection  of 
their  subjects  in  Mexico  by  the  Mexican  Government. 
European  ^^  the  early  part  of  the  year  1862,  the  fleet 
tX^et  Mex^  composed  of  vessels  of  the  three  contracting 
ico._and^the  parties  appeared  off  Vera  Cruz,  and  the  offi- 
VeraCruz.  ccrs  respectively  representing  the  three  gov- 
ernments made  their  demands  upon  the  Mexican  Gov- 
ernment. The  latter  could,  of  course,  promise  better 
protection  for  the  subjects  of  the  respective  powers  in 
Mexico,  but  it  could  not  pay  anything,  and  the  foreign 
forces  proceeded  to  take  possession  of  Vera  Cruz  for  the 
purpose  of  satisfying  the  claims  of  their  respective  gov- 
ernments by  collecting  and  appropriating  the  customs 
duties. 

Down  to  this  point,  the  Government  at  Washiiigton, 
while  watching  with  much  concern  the  movements  of 
the  allies  toward  Mexico,  had  not  felt  itself  able,  or 
called   upon,    to   interpose.     These  powers  had   made 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   COMPLICATIONS       303 

only  legitimate  demands  on  Mexico,  and  had  disavowed 
any  ulterior  purposes,  and  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  had  its  hands  full  with  the  re-      ^^     .  , 

The     mter- 

bellion  at  home.    In  the  middle  of  the  sprmsr  position    of 

.      ^  1  1-  T,-,tlie     United 

of  18(j3,  however,  things  occurred  which  put  states  in  the 
a  very  different  phase  upon  the  matter.  The  ^"^^  '"'*" 
Mexican  Government  had  at  last  met  the  demands  of 
tlie  powers  in  such  a  way  as  to  satisfy  Great  Britain  and 
Spain.  France,  however,  would  not  settle  on  the  terms 
offered,  although  they  were  identical  with  those  accepted 
by  Great  Britain  and  Spain.  The  representatives  of  the 
two  latter  powers  now  began  to  suspect  that  the  French 
were  entertaining  purposes  in  which  they  could  not  hon- 
orably join.  They  quickly  settled  matters  with  Mexico, 
and  withdrew  their  forces  from  Mexico  altogether.  The 
French,  however,  remained,  and  now  began 

'  '  „  .    .  °  The  scheme 

to  press  their  scheme  for  seizing  the  govern-  of  the  French 
ment  of  the  country.  They  demanded 
twelve  millions  of  dollars  in  payment  of  damages  which 
French  citizens  were  claimed  to  have  suffered  ;  and  they 
espoused  the  famous  Jecker  bond  swindle,  which  was  a 
bond  issue  of  fifteen  millions  of  dollars  made  by  the 
Miramon  Government  and  taken  by  the  Swiss  banker 
Jecker  at  five  cents  on  the  dollar.  Notwithstanding  this 
well-known  fact  the  French  demanded  the  payment  of 
these  bonds  at  the  full  face  value.  The  Mexican  Gov- 
ernment could  not  pay,  if  it  had  been  willing  to  do  so, 
and  the  French  troops  were  headed  from  Vera  Cruz  tow- 
ard the  capital.  They  did  not  have  so  easy  a  The  French 
time,  however,  as  General  Scott  did  fifteen  tTe'^^dt^"  o1 
years  before.  It  took  them  more  than  a  Mexico, 
year,  with  an  army  three  times  the  size  of  Scott's,  to 
reach  the  gates  of  the  city. 

This  year,  from  June,  1862,  to  the  same  month  in 
1863,  was,  as  we  have  seen,  the  period  of  greatest  de- 


304  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

pression  in  the  fortunes  of  the  Union  during  the  Civil 
War.  It  behooved  the  Government  at  "Washington, 
therefore,  to  move  very  discreetly  in  its  diplomacy  with 
France.  If  the  "  Monroe  Doctrine"  is  to  be  regarded  as 
a  continuing  principle  in  the  conduct  of  our  relations 
with  the  European  states,  and  not  as  a  special  declara- 
tion to  meet  a  specific  situation,  here  was  certainly  a 
plain  and  palpable  violation  of  its  principle.  Here  was 
the  attempt  of  a  European  state  to  impose  a  govern- 
ment of  its  own  making  upon  an  American  state.     Mr. 

Seward  still  held  back,  however,  although  it 
ard'B  reti-  was  entirely  evident  that  no  other  theory 

would  explain  the  French  movements  after 
the  spring  of  1862.  During  all  this  time,  he  simply 
inquired,  in  a  mild  way,  of  the  French  Government 
what  its  intentions  in  Mexico  were,  saying  indeed 
that  the  United  States  could  not  remain  indifferent  to 
intervention  in  Mexico  by  any  European  power  for 
political  purposes,  but  professing  satisfaction  with  the 
French  assurances. 

So  soon,  however,  as  the  French  army  was  established 

in  the  Mexican  capital,  the  French  commander,  General 

.    Forev,  and  the  French  Minister  to  Mexico, 

The  provi-  *^ 

eionai  govern-  Couut  dc   Salignv,  proceeded  to  set  up  a 

m  e  n  t    estab-  ..         i.-i  ,      r         ■»»•• 

lished  by  the  provisional   civil    government   for   Mexico, 
^"^^  '  composed  of  less  than  fifty  persons  chosen 

by  themselves.  This  government  then  elected  three 
regents.  The  regents  selected  some  two  hundred 
persons  as  members  of  a  national  constituent  assembly  ; 
The  empire  ^"^^  ^^^^  assembly  votcd  the  establishment 
of  Maximilian.  Qf  ^  Mexican  empire  with  Maximilian, 
one  of  the  archdukes  of  Austria,  as  hereditary  em- 
peror. 

The  Government  at  Washington  must  act  now,  or  ac- 
quiesce in  this  utter  disregard  of  the  "  Monroe  Doctrine." 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   COMPLICATIONS        30i5 

Still  Seward  delayed  to  take  a  decided  position.  He 
simply  would  not  endanger  the  life  of  this  Union  at  the 
moment  of  great  crisis  in  its  affairs  for  the 
sake  of  maintaining  a  stubborn  adherence  to  continued  pa- 
the  "Monroe  Doctrine."  He  did  not  even  ^^^^^' 
assume  the  offensive  in  the  diplomatic  correspondence 
about  the  matter.  It  was  nearly  six  months  before  a 
distinct  utterance  was  made  by  him,  and  then  it  was 
in  reply  to  a  "  feeler "  from  the  French  Government 
itself  in  regard  to  recognition  of  the  Maximilian  Em- 
pire in  Mexico  by  the  Government  of  the  United 
States.  The  French  Government  held  out,  as  an  in- 
ducement, the  continuance  of  cordial  relations  and  an 
early  withdrawal  of  the  French  soldiers  from  Mex- 
ican soil. 

There  is  no  question  that  the  virtual  silence  of  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  between  July  and  De- 
cember had  encouraged  the  French  Government  to  give 
this  intimation  of  its  wishes.  It  is  hardly  to  be  be- 
lieved that  the  French  Government  wanted  war  with 
the  United  States,  if  it  could  secure  its  aims  in  Mexico 
without  it,  but  it  is  pretty  certain  that  if  the  United 
States  had  undertaken  to  thwart  those  purposes,  the 
French  would  have  seized  upon  the  advantages  of  the 
moment  to  strike  down  any  opposition  which  the  Union 
might  have  undertaken. 

The  Confederates  were,  of  course,  on  the  tip-toe  of 
expectancy,  and  were  doing  everything  in  their  power 
to  excite    the   French    against   the  United 

The  hope  of 

States,  hoping  to  have  thus  the  aid  of  the  the  con&der- 
French  in  defeating  the  military  power  of 
the  Union.  The  Confederates  did  not  see  how  the 
United  States  could  fail  to  come  to  blows  with  France, 
without  a  cowardly  backdown  from  a  long-established 
policy.  But  Mr.  Lincoln  and  Mr.  Seward  were  both 
Vol.  II.— 20 


306  THE  CIVIL   WAR 

men  who  looked  far  ahead.  They  were  both  calm  and 
cool  and  self-contained.  The  order  of  conduct  to  which 
they  both  adhered  was  "  one  thing  at  a  time  and  the 
big  things  first."  If  the  " Monroe  Doctrine"  could  not 
be  upheld  at  the  moment  without  endangering  the  suc- 
cess of  the  Union  arms  in  maintaining  the  integrity  of 
the  country,  then  the  *' Monroe  Doctrine"  must  wait 
until  a  more  convenient  time  for  vindication. 

Mr.  Seward,  therefore,  answered  the  intimation  from 
the  French  Government  evasively.  He  said  the  United 
Seward's  States  would  still  maintain  its  neutrality  in 
French  "Vei^  regard  to  the  conflict  between  France  and 
<''•"  Mexico,  and  would  recognize  the  sovereignty 

of  the  people  of  Mexico  under  any  governmental  form 
which  they  might  see  fit  to  give  themselves.  He  re- 
iterated the  opinion  that  it  would  be  found  very  dif- 
ficult, if  not  impossible,  for  a  foreign  government  to 
establish  itself  in  Mexico,  or  for  a  monarchical  gov- 
ernment to  exist  there  permanently,  and  he  repeated 
his  declaration  that  either  of  these  would  be  disagreeable 
to  the  United  States,  but  he  did  not  say  a  word  about 
the  *' Monroe  Doctrine,"  and  he  refrained  from  giving 
the  slightest  intimation  which  could  be  interpreted  as 
a  threat. 

Naturally  the  Confederates  sneered  and  jeered  at  the 

arrant  cowardice,  as  they  viewed  it,  of  the  Washington 

Government,  and  quite  unnaturally  for  sen- 

Theunpopu-      .,  ,     ,         ,  ^        «  ,,         ,  '',  ^t-    . 

larity  of  Sew-  siblc  loyal  men  many  of  the  strongest  Union- 
ists in  and  out  of  Congress  did  the  same 
thing.  At  the  beginning  of  the  year  1864,  it  seemed  as 
if  the  Congress  would  take  the  matter  out  of  the  hands 
of  the  President,  and  declare  war  on  France.  Eesolu- 
tions  were  introduced  to  this  effect  in  both  Houses. 
The  Senate  resolutions  proposed  an  immediate  demand 
upon.  France  to  remove  her  troops  from  Mexico,  and 


THE  intp:unational  complications     307 

the  assumption  of  an  obligation  by  the  United  States  to 
protect  Mexico  against  European  intervention  in  her 
internal  affairs.  The  House  resolutions  declared  the 
erection  of  a  monarchical  government,  by  European  in- 
tervention, upon  the  ruins  of  an  American  Eepublic,  to 
be  in  entire  disaccord  with  the  traditional  policy  of  the 
United  States.  The  House  passed  its  resolutions,  but 
the  friends  of  the  Administration  in  the  Senate  suc- 
ceeded in  tabling  the  propositions  presented  in  that 
body.  The  feeling  everywhere  was  that  the  United 
States  was  on  the  point  of  delivering  an  ultimatum  to 
France,  and  Mr.  Seward  felt  it  necessary  to  call  the  at- 
tention of  the  French  Government  to  the  fact  that  the 
President  was  directing  the  diplomacy  of  the  United 
States,  and  that  the  President  would  seasonably  inform 
the  Emperor  of  the  French  whenever  he  con- 

The  Preei- 

templated  any  change  in  the  policy  of  neu-  dent's  firm 
trality.  Had  the  President  taken  a  less  posi- 
tive stand,  there  is  little  question  that  Congress  would 
have  committed  the  blunder  of  declaring  war  on  France, 
the  result  of  which  upon  the  fate  of  the  Union  only 
almighty  wisdom  could  then  have  foretold,  and  only 
eternal  wisdom  knows  now. 

In  the  meanwhile,  the  French  army  had  overrun  a 
considerable  portion  of   the   country,   and  had  placed 
garrisons  in  many  of  the  chief  places.     The     „    .  ...    , 
conquered  people  seemed  to  acquiesce  in  the  acceptance  of 

'    •  1     Tir      •      •!•  1        1      -.       ,     the  throne. 

new  regime,  and  Maximilian,  who  had  at 
first  made  his  acceptance  of  the  throne  conditional  upon 
a  plebiscite  in  his  favor,  overcame  his  scruples,  and  on 
April  10,  1864,  formally  signified  to  the  deputation  of 
Mexicans  who  sought  him  at  Miramar  on  the  Adriatic 
his  willingness  to  have  the  crown  of  Montezuma  placed 
upon  his  brow.  In  June  following  he  arrived  in  the 
City  of  Mexico,  and  assumed  the  government  of  Mexico, 


308  THE   CIV^IL   WAR 

no  one  can  doubt,  with  a  sincere  heart,  a  liberal  mind, 
and  a  noble  purpose. 

But  he  was  a  poetic  dreamer,  without  statesmanship, 

administrative  ability,  or  political   tact.      He  tried   a 

policy  of  conciliation,  and  lost  thereby  friends, 

the  new  Em-  without  winning  over  enemies.     Before  the 

peror.  ^^^^^  ^,^^^,  ^^  j^.^  Tcigu  had  passcd,  he  found 

himself  without  any  sufficient  Mexican  support,  and  de- 
pendent upon  both  French  bayonets  and  French  money; 
and  before  this  first  year  had  passed  the  United  States 
had  emerged  triumphantly  from  the  long  rebellion  of 
the  Confederates,  and  had  free  hand  to  deal  with  the 
threatening  foreign  question  on  the  southern  border. 

The  United  States  Government  now  sent  Sheridan  to 
South-western  Texas.  He  quickly  put  an  end  to  the 
The  Bending  remnant  of  the  rebellion  there,  and  gath- 
the^exan*bor*^  ©^cd  a  large  army  about  him  for  the  inva- 
***'•  sion  of  Mexico.     The  victorious  army  could 

hardly  be  restrained. 

Johnson,  who  had  just  succeeded  Lincoln  in  the 
presidency,  was  confident,  however,  that  he  and  his  as- 
tute Secretary  of  State  would  be  able  to  get  France  out 
of  Mexico  without  a  war  with  her,  and  was  determined 
not  to  have  war.  He  concealed  his  determination,  of 
course,  from  the  French  Government.     He 

The    pohcy  .  .  .  i  .,., 

of  President  evcu  Went  SO  far  as  to  send  a  military  man  to 
Paris  to  act  with  the  American  minister  there 
in  bringing  pressure  upon  the  French  Emperor  to 
withdraw  his  troops  from  Mexico.  As  the  summer  of 
1865  passed  without  any  result,  however,  the  President 
and  Mr.  Seward  began  to  grow  restless.  Public  opinion 
was  most  decidedly  demanding  a  stern  policy  toward 
France  in  the  Mexican  question.  Under  its  pressure 
Mr.  Seward  began,  in  September  of  1865,  to  make  rep- 
resentations to  the  French  Government  looking  toward 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   COMPLICATIONS        309 

a  withdrawal  of  the  French  forces  from  the  American 
continent.  Still  the  Emperor  evaded  these  mild  re- 
monstrances. By  the  end  of  the  year  patience  had 
ceased  to  be  a  virtue,  even  in  Seward's  mind.  On  the 
IGth  of  December,  he  sent  the  French  Gov-  se ward's 
ernment  a  note,  which  informed  France  that  of  December! 
she  must  withdraw  from  her  attempt  to  set  ^^^cji'°  (^y, 
up  a  foreign  government  in  Mexico.  The  emment. 
Emperor  now  saw  that  the  time  for  final  determination 
had  come.  He  procrastinated  a  few  days  more,  and  at 
last  gave  in.  He  announced  his  intention  of  with- 
drawing his  troops  in  three  detachments.  The  first 
should  go  in  November  of  the  current  year,  1866,  and 
the  other  two  in  March  and  November  of  1867.  When 
November  arrived,  the  Emperor  still  procrastinated,  and 
announced  that  he  would  withdraw  the  whole  army 
the  following  spring.  The  Government  at  Washington 
remonstrated,  and  insisted  that  the  French  me  depait- 
should  go  at  once.  Napoleon  saw  his  danger  Frenchtooops 
in  further  delay,  and  yielded  to  the  inevi-  inTthe^down- 
table.  In  the  early  part  of  March,  the  mliia^i-s ^Em- 
French  army  evacuated  the  City  of  Mexico,  pi'^- 
and  set  its  face  toward  the  seaport  where  it  was  to  em- 
bark for  home. 

Maximilian  was  now  left  to  his  Mexican  support, 
which  proved  to  be  entirely  worthless  in  the  face  of  the 
impetuous  advance  of  the  forces  of  Juarez  from  the 
North.  It  required  only  a  few  weeks  to  destroy  the 
Maximilian  Empire,  and  to  make  away  with  the  Emperor 
and  all  his  Mexican  advisers.  On  the  19th  of  April, 
1867,  the  last  scene  in  this  tragedy  was  enacted  in  the 
execution  of  the  Emperor,  if  so  fair  a  name  can  be  used 
to  designate  so  foul  an  act.  Thanks  to  the  astuteness 
of  Mr.  Seward  and  the  firmness  of  the  President,  the 
diplomacy  of  the  United  States  in  this  critical  period 


310  THE   CIVIL   WAK 

was  entirely  successful.     It  did  not  suit  those  military 

men,  naturally,  who  were  thirsting  for  more  blood,  but 

it  was  an  immense  boon  to  the  people  of 

of  the  dipio-  the  country,  althousrh  the  people  themselves 

macy   of    the  i  •  i         i 

Administra-  Were  ready  to  incur  new  burdens  and  dangers. 

It  showed  what  a  President  and  a  Secre- 
tary of  State,  who  are  able  and  firm,  can  do  in  prevent- 
ing the  country  from  entering  upon  a  foreign  war.  It 
raises  a  strong  presumption  that  such  a  President  and 
Secretary  can  always  do  so,  if  they  will. 

Mr.  Seward  had  not  used  the  phrase  "  Monroe  Doc- 
trine "  at  all  in  this  controversy,  but  had  simply  fallen 

back  upon  the  general  principle  that  the  in- 
and  the  Mon-  tcrcsts  of  the  United  States  were  threatened 

roe  Doctrine.     ^      .^  .•  *  i  •      i 

by  the  creation  of  a  monarchical  government 
on  the  ruins  of  a  neighboring  republic  by  European  armed 
intervention.  This  was  a  well-recognized  warrant  for 
interference,  and  Mr.  Seward  had  the  good  sense  to  base 
himself  upon  it,  and  not  invoke  a  doctrine  which  was 
not  recognized  by  any  of  the  European  states,  except 
perhaps  Great  Britain.  He,  therefore,  forestalled  any 
controversy  in  regard  to  his  right  to  interfere  between 
France  and  Mexico,  and  no  controversy  was  attempted 
by  any  foreign  state. 

The  amity  which  had  existed  for  so  long  a  period  be- 
tween France  and  the  United  States  received,  notwith- 
standing the  final  compliance  of  the  Emperor 
the  United  with  the  wishes  of  the  Washington  Govern- 
ment, a  rude  shock.  The  conduct  of  Spain, 
and  especially  of  Great  Britain,  stood  out  in  bold  con- 
trast with  the  insincerity  and  the  craft  of  the  French 
in  this  whole  matter.  It  cannot  be  said  that  the  up- 
rightness of  the  British  diplomacy  and  conduct  at  this 
juncture  disarmed  the  traditional  ill-will  of  the  peo- 
ple of  the  United  States  against  Great  Britain,  but,  with 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   COMPLICATIONS       311 

the  soon  manifestly  increasing  willingness  of  that  power 

to  arbitrate  the  claims  of  the  United  States  upon  her,  it 

operated  powerfully  in  that  direction.     At  any  rate,  the 

whole  experience  in  the  Mexican  crisis  served 

to  convince  the  people  of  the  United  States,   states  and 

fully  and  finally,  that  their  European  friends 

in  time  of  need  were  no  longer  to  be  found  where  they 

were  thought  to  be.     It  certainly  cleared  the  way  for 

new  friendships  in  the  future. 

The  final  action  of  the  Canadian  Government  in 
regard  to  the  St.  Albans  raid  tended  in  the  same  direc- 
tion. From  the  beginning  of  the  war,  Can- 
ada had  been  a  willing  asylum  for  Copper-  states  and 
heads,  Confederates,  and  traitors.  At  last,  in 
October  of  1864,  the  crisis  in  the  relations  of  the  United 
States  to  its  northern  neighbor  was  reached.  A  number 
of  men  in  the  garb  of  ordinary  travellers,  and  conducting 
themselves  as  such,  came  together  at  the  village  of  St. 
Albans  in  Vermont,  near  the  Canadian  line.  They 
robbed  the  banks,  killed  a  man,  and  attempted  to  fire 
the  place.  Failing  in  this,  they  fled  before  the  rapidly 
gathering  force  of  citizens  into  Canada,  taking  their 
plunder  with  them.  Some  of  them  were  arrested  on 
Canadian  soil  by  Canadian  police.  The  Government  at 
Washington  took  the  ground  that  these  men  were  com- 
mon criminals  and  requested  their  extradition.  The 
Canadian  court,  on  the  other  hand,  decided  that  the 
deeds  committed  by  them  were  acts  of  war  against  the 
United  States,  and  refused  to  surrender  them  to  the 
officials  of  the  United  States.  The  court  even  ordered 
the  police  to  return  the  money  to  them  which  they 
had  taken  from  the  St.  Albans  banks,  and  which  the 
police  had  seized.  There  was  not  the  slightest  evi- 
dence that  the  Confederate  government  had  ordered  this 
movement,  or  given  anybody  discretionary  powers  in  re- 


312  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

gard  to  it.  It  was  never  shoAvn  that  anyone  connected 
with  it  held  a  regular  commission  from  the  Confederate 
government,  or  was  regularly  a  soldier  in  the  Confeder- 
ate service.  They  were  probably  simply  freebooters, 
that  is,  common  criminals.  The  Canadian  Government 
soon  became  convinced  of  this  fact.  Its  courts  had  re- 
leased the  men  under  the  view,  as  we  have  seen,  that 
they  were  soldiers  in  the  Confederate  service,  making 
regular  war,  but  the  Canadian  Parliament  commanded 
the  money,  which  by  order  of  the  court  had  been  re- 
stored by  the  police  to  the  thieves,  to  be  made  good  to 
the  St.  Albans  banks  in  gold  coin ;  that  is,  the  Cana- 
dian Government  repudiated  the  action  of  its  courts,  in 
so  far  at  least  as  the  action  of  the  court  affected  the 
disposition  of  the  money  captured  from  the  thieves  by 
the  police. 

In  decidedly  severe  contrast  with  the  conduct  of  Great 
Britain  and  France  stood  that  of  Russia  and  of  the  states 
of  the  German  Confederation.  From  the 
states  and  time,  in  the  spring  of  1861,  when  Russia  re- 
vealed to  the  United  States  the  movements 
of  France  and  Great  Britain  to  establish  a  concert  of 
action  of  the  European  powers  toward  the  United  States 
in  the  impending  struggle  and  her  own  refusal  to  have 
anything  to  do  with  such  an  understanding,  this  great 
Power  had  maintained  as  cordial  relations  with  the 
Union  as  the  principles  of  neutrality  would  allow.  In 
fact,  Russia  seemed  to  follow  the  theory,  in  her  dealings 
with  the  United  States,  that  the  Union  was  engaged  in 
suppressing  an  unjustifiable  rebellion  against  its  own 
rightful  authority.  At  last,  in  the  early  summer  of 
1863,  when  the  fortunes  of  the  Union  seemed  to  be  run- 
ning very  low,  and  it  seemed  only  a  matter  of  a  little 
time  when  Great  Britain  and  France  would  recognize 
the  independence  of  the  Southern  Confederacy,  the  Czar 


TIIK   INTERNATIONAL   COMPLICATIONS        313 

sent  a  fleet  of  war-vessels  into  the  harbor  of  New  York 
and  another  into  the  Golden  Gate.  This  was  under- 
stood by  all  parties  to  mean  that  Kussia  would  regard 
such  an  act  on  the  part  of  France  and  Great  Britain  as 
an  intervention  in  American  affairs,  and  that  her  influ- 
ence and  power  in  such  a  contingency  would  be  thrown 
with  the  Union.  After  this  manifestation,  and  the  vic- 
tories at  Vicksburg  and  Gettysburg,  the  possibilities  of 
European  intervention  in  the  contest  became  practically 
zero.  What  were  exactly  the  motives  which  influenced 
Russia  to  take  the  attitude  which  she  assumed  at  the 
outset,  and  held  consistently  to  the  end,  it  is  not  easy 
to  divine.  The  sympathy  of  the  Eussian  Czar  with 
the  Government  of  the  Union  in  its  work  of  emancipa- 
tion may  have  been  the  force  from  the  ideal  side,  and 
the  hope  of  getting  American  gold  for  the  rocks  and  ice 
of  Alaska  may  have  been  a  financial  motive.  But  it 
is  probable  that  Eussia  had  not  recovered  from  the  bit- 
terness of  the  defeat  which  she  had  suffered  at  the  hands 
of  France  and  Great  Britain  in  1854-56,  and  that  she 
saw  great  danger  to  herself  in  allowing  the  Anglo- 
French  alliance  for  the  protection  of  Turkey  to  develoj) 
into  a  general  alliance  upon  many,  if  not  all,  subjects. 
This  is  the  more  rational  explanation  of  her  conduct 
in  American  affairs,  during  this  period. 

Likewise  the  German  Confederation,  and  the  States 
composing  it,  and  especially  the  leading  State  of  the 
Union,  Prussia,  maintained  sincere  and  cor-  united 
dial  relations  with  the  United  States  through-  fh*e*'^^™an 
out  the  time  of  trial.  Both  principles  for  states, 
which  the  United  States  fought,  namely,  union  and 
liberty,  had  the  sympathy  of  the  German  heart,  and 
tens  of  thousands  of  Germany's  children  bore  arms  in 
the  great  struggle,  and  many  thousands  gave  up  their 
lives  for  the  cause  represented  by  these  principles.     So 


314  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

large,  indeed,  were  Germany's  contributions  to  the 
strength  of  the  Union  armies  and  to  their  military  sci- 
ence and  discipline  that  the  complaint  was  frequently 
expressed  by  the  defeated  Confederates  that  the  North 
owed  its  victories  to  its  German  ''mercenaries/' 

When,  by  the  close  of  1864,  the  triumph  of  the  Union 
became  an  assured  fact,  all  of  the  European  States  grew 
much  more  respectful  and  cordial  toward  the  United 
States,  and  the  Union  emerged  from  the  great  trial  in 
possession  of  a  naval  and  military  power  and  prestige 
which  secured  it  against  any  serious  complications  with 
any  foreign  State.  France  and  England  soon  yielded, 
as  we  have  seen,  and  despite  the  desires  of  certain  army 
and  navy  officers  to  prolong  the  opportunities  for  their 
preferment  and  entertainment,  the  diplomacy  of  Seward 
was  entirely  able  to  cope  with  all  foreign  questions 
through  the  forms  of  peaceful  adjustment. 


CHRONOLOGY 

Biggs's  repudiation  of  Helper April  5,  1858 

Brown's  raid  at  Harper's  Ferry October  16,  17,  1859 

Democratic  National  Convention,  Charleston,  S.  C, 

April  23,  1860 

Constitutional  Union  Convention May  9,  1860 

Republican  National  Convention,  Chicago,  111. .  .May  16,  1860 
Democratic  National  Convention,  Baltimore,  Md., 

June  18,  1860 

Buchanan's  message  on  secession December  3,  1860 

Ma'nifesto  of  southern  congressmen December  13,  1860 

South  Carolina  ordinance  of  secession December  20,  1860 

Caucus  of  southern  senators January  5,  1861 

President's  special  message January  8,  1861 

Star  of  the  West  fired  on January  9,  1861 

Mississippi  secedes January  9,  1861 

Florida  secedes January  10,  1861 

Alabama  secedes January  11,  1861 

Georgia  secedes January  19,  1861 

Convention  at  Montgomery,  Ala February  4,  1861 

Jeflferson  Davis  inaugurated  as  president  of  the  Confed- 
eracy   February  18,  1861 

Fort  Sumter  attacked April  12,  1861 

First  call  for  troops April  15,  1861 

Virginia  convention  adopts  secession  ordinance,  April  17, 1861 

Lincoln's  first  blockade  proclamation April  19,  1861 

Troops  mobbed  at  Baltimore,  Md Apiil  19,  1861 

Blockade  extended  to  Virginia  and  North  Carolina, 

April  27,  1861 

Lincoln  calls  for  three-year  volunteers May  3,  1861 

Arkansas  secedes May  6,  1861 

Convention  at  Wheeling,  W.  Va May  13,  1861 

315 


316  CHRONOLOGY 

North  Carolina  secedes May  20,  1861 

Virginia  secedes  by  popular  vote May  23,  1861 

Engagement  at  Philippi,  W.  Va June  3,  1861 

Tennessee  secedes June  8,  1861 

Engagement  at  Big  Bethel,  Va June  10, 1861 

Engagement  at  Vienna  Station,  Va June  17,  1861 

Special  session  of  Congress July  4,  1861 

Engagement  at  Carthage,  Mo July  5,  1861 

Engagement  at  Laurel  Hill,  W.  Va July  8,  1861 

Engagement  at  Eich  Mountain,  W.  Va July  11,  1861 

Engagement  at  Carrick's  Ford,  W.  Va July  14,  1861 

Statute  authorizing  loan  of  ^250,000,000 July  17,  1861 

Engagement  at  Blackburn's  Ford,  Va July  18,  1861 

Battle  of  Bull  Eun,  Va July  21,  1861 

Statute  authorizing  500,000  volunteers July  22,  1861 

Statute  authorizing  President  to  call  militia! . .  .July  29,  1861 

Engagement  at  Dug  Springs,  Mo August  2,  1861 

Statute  on  confiscation August  6,  1861 

Engagement  at  Wilson's  Creek,  Mo August  10,  1861 

Capture  of  Fort  Hatteras August  28,  29,  1861 

Engagement  at  Drywood  Creek,  Mo September  2,  1861 

Capture  of  Fort  Scott,  Mo September  2,  1861 

Engagement  at  Carnifex  Ferry,  W.  Va September  10,  1861 

Engagements  at  Cheat  Mountain,  W.  Va . .  Sept.  12, 13,  15, 1861 

Engagement  on  the  Greenbrier October  3,  1861 

Engagement  at  Ball's  Bluff,  Va October  21,  1861 

Davis  chosen  president  of  Confederacy  at  general  election, 

November  6,  1861 

Battle  of  Belmont,  Mo November  7,  1861 

Capture  of  Port  Eoyal,  S.  C November  7,  1861 

The  Trent  stopped November  8,  1861 

Engagement  at  Fort  Pickens,  Fla November  23,  1861 

Battle  at  Mill  Springs,  Ky January  19,  20,  1861 

Capture  of  Fort  Heniy,  Tenn February  6,  1862 

Engagement  at  Roanoke  Island,  N.  C February  8,  1862 

Capture  of  Fort  Donelson,  Tenn February  16,  1862 

Engagement  at  Valverde,  N.  M February  21,  1862 

Davis  inaugurated  president  under  permanent  constitu- 
tion  February  22,  1862 


CHRONOLOGY  317 

Engagement  at  Pea  Ridge,  Ark March  6,  1862 

Engagement  at  New  Madrid,  Mo March  13,  1862 

Engagement  at  Newberne,  N.  0 March  14,  1862 

Engagement  at  Kernstown,  Va March  23,  1862 

West  Virginia  adopts  state  constitution April  3,  1862 

Battle  of  Shiloh,  Tenn April  6,  7,  1862 

Capture  of  Island  No.  10 April  8,  1862 

Capture  of  Fort  Pillow,  Tenn April  14,  1862 

New  Orleans  occupied  by  federals April  28,  1862 

Engagement  at  Eltham's  Landing,  Va May  7,  1862 

Lincoln's  proclamation  on  Hunter's  order May  19,  1862 

Battle  of  Winchester,  Va  May  25,  1862 

Engagement  at  Hanover  Court  House,  Va May  27,  1862 

Corinth  occupied  by  Grant May  30,  1862 

Battle  of  Seven  Pines  ;  Fair  Oaks,  Va . .  May  31,  June  1,  1862 

Pope  given  command  of  Ai-my  of  Virginia June  26,  1862 

Battle  of  Gaines's  Mill,  Va June  27,  28,  1862 

Battle  of  Glendale,  Va. ;  Frazier's  Farm June  30,  1862 

Battle  of  Malvern  Hill,  Va July  1,  1862 

Statute  authorizing  ^150,000,000  treasury  notes..  July  11,  1862 

Battle  of  Cedar  Mountain,  Va August  9,  1862 

Capture  of  Manassas  Junction,  Va August  27,  1862 

Battle  of  Groveton,  Va August  28,  1862 

Second  battle  of  Manassas,  Va August  30,  1862 

Battles  on  South  Mountain,  Md , . . .  September  14,  1862 

Engagement  at  Munf ordsville,  Ky ....  September  14-16,  1862 

Battle  of  Antietam,  Md September  17,  1862 

Battle  of  luka,  Miss September  19,  1862 

Battle  of  Corinth,  Miss October  3,  4,  1862 

Battle  of  Perryville,  Ky October  8,  1862 

McClellan  removed  from  command November  7,  1862 

Battle  of  Fredericksburg.  Va December  13,  1862 

Battle  of  Murfreesborough,  Tenn December  31,  1862- 

January  2,  1863 

Emancipation  Proclamation January  1,  1863 

Statute  on  Currency  and  National  Banks . .  .  February  25,  1863 

Statute  on  Writ  of  Habeas  Corpus March  3,  1863 

Engagement  at  Port  Gibson,  Miss May  1,  1863 

Battle  of  Chancellorsville,  Va May  1-4,  1863 


318  CHRONOLOGY 

Arrest  of  Vallandigham May  5,  1863 

Engagement  at  Champion  Hill,  Miss May  16,  1863 

Engagement  at  Winchester,  Va June  13,  15,  1863 

Lincoln  calls  for  100,000  volunteers June  15,  1863 

Battle  of  Gettysburg,  Pa July  1-3,  1863 

Fall  of  Vicksburg,  Miss July  4,  1863 

Surrender  of  Port  Hudson,  La July  7,  1863 

Draft  Riots  begin  at  New  York July  13,  1863 

Capture  of  Fort  Wagner,  S.  C September  7,  1863 

Battle  of  Chickamauga,  Ga September  19,  20,  1863 

Battle  of  Perryville October  8,  1863 

Call  for  300,000  volunteers October  17,  1863 

Battle  of  Chattanooga,  Tenn November  23-25,  1863 

Sherman  enters  Knoxville,  Tenn December  6,  1863 

Thirty-eighth  Congress  meets . . . . : December  7,  1863 

Occupation  of  Meridian,  Miss February  14,  1864 

Statute  authorizing  loan  of  $200,000,000 March  3,  1864 

Nevada  enabling  act March  21,  1864 

Colorado  enabling  act March  21,  1864 

Engagement  at  Sabine  Cross  Roads,  La April  8,  1864 

Massacre  at  Fort  Pillow April  12,  18G4 

Nebraska  enabling  act April  19,  1864 

First  battle  in  the  Wilderness May  5,  6,  1864 

Engagement  at  Dalton,  Ga May  9,  1864 

Second  battle  in  the  Wilderness May  10,  1864 

Third  battle  in  the  Wilderness May  12,  1864 

Engagements  at  Resaca,  Ga May  13-16,  1864 

Engagement  at  Rome,  Ga May  18,  1864 

Fourth  battle  in  the  Wilderness May  19,  1864 

Engagement  at  Kingston,  Ga May  24,  1864 

Statute  organizing  territory  of  Montana May  26,  1864 

Fr6mont  convention,  Cleveland,  O May  31,  1864 

Battle  of  Cold  Harbor June  2,  1864 

Statute  on  Currency  and  National  Banks June  3,  1864 

Engagements  near  Dallas,  Ga May  25,  June  4,  1864 

Republican  National  Convention,  Baltimore,  Md.  June  17,  1864 

Kearsarge  meets  the  Alabama June  19,  1864 

Battle  of  Kenesaw  Mountain,  Ga June  27,  1864 

Congress  adjourns July  2,  1864 


CHRONOLOGY  319 


Lincoln's  reconstruction  proclamation July  8 

Battle  of  Peach  Tree  Creek,  Ga July  20^ 

First  battle  before  Atlanta July  22 

Battle  of  Ezra  Church,  Ga July  28; 

Capture  of  Mobile  Harbor,  Ala August  5 

Democratic  National  Convention,  Chicago,  111 .  August  29 

Capture  of  Atlanta,  Ga September  2 

Engagement  at  Ironton,  Mo September  26,  11. 

Battle  at  Allatoona,  Ga October  5, 

Lincoln  reelected November 

Battle  of  Franklin,  Tenn November  30, 

Battle  of  Nashville,  Tenn December  15,  16, 

Call  for  300,000  volunteers December  19 

Evacuation  of  Savannah,  Ga December  20, 

Capture  of  Fort  Fisher,  N.  C January  15, 

Peace  conference  at  Hampton  Boads February  2,  3 

Tennessee  ratifies  new  constitution February  22 

Occupation  of  Wilmington,  N.  C February  22, 

Statute  authorizing  loan  of  S600, 000,000 March  3 

Engagement  at  Averysboro,  N.  C March  16 

Occupation  of  Goldsboro,  N.  C March  21 

Battle  at  Five  Forks,  Va April  1 

Occupation  of  Petersburg,  Va April  2, 

Occupation  of  Richmond,  Va April  3, 

Surrender  of  Lee  at  Appomattox April  9, 

Occupation  of  Mobile,  Ala April  12 

Assassination  of  Lincoln    April  14 

Final  surrender  of  Johnston April  26 


1864 
1864 
1864 
1864 
1864 
1864 
18(54 
1864 
1864 
1864 
1864 
1864 
1864 
1864 
1865 
1865 
1865 
1865 
1865 
1865 
1865 
1865 
1865 
1865 
1865 
1865 
1865 
1865 


INDEX 

Material  in  the  Appendices  is  not  included  in  this  Index. 


Abolitionists, in  Republican  party, 
i.  148 ;  ii.  72 ;  attitude  to  Lincoln, 
77 

Adams,  Charles  Francis,  the  Trent 
affair,  i.  272 ;  the  Alabama  affair, 
ii.  293,  295,  299 

Adams,  James  H.,  Commissioner 
from  South  Carolina,  i.  90 

Alabama,  slavery  in,  1858,  i.  34 ; 
delegates  leave  Charleston  conven- 
tion, 54  ;  legislature  calls  conven- 
tion, 87 ;  senators  advise  seces- 
sion, 102 ;  secedes,  104 ;  character 
of  seizure  of  forts  in,  106 ;  men- 
tioned in  call  for  troops,  172 

Alabama,  the,  controversy  over,  ii. 
298,  294 

Alar,  the,  ii.  294 

Albuquerque,  N.  M.,  occupied,  iL  6 

Alexandra,  the,  case  of,  ii.  294-299 

Alexandria,  Va.,  occupied  by  North- 
ern troops,  L  205 

Allatoona,  Ga. ,  engagement  at,  ii. 
262 

Allen,  Charles,  in  peace  conference, 
i.  124 

AUstadt,  captured  by  John  Brown, 
i.  38 

"  American  Conflict,"  the,  cited,  i. 
146,  167 

American  party,  i.  67 

American- Union  party,  includes  op- 
ponents of  slavery,  i.  30,  31 

Ames,  Adelbert,  Gettysburg  cam- 
paign, ii.  159 ;  at  Port  Fisher,  273 

Anderson,  J.  Fatten,  at  Bowling 
Green,  ii.  23 ;  Perryville  campaign, 
120 

Anderson,  Richard  H.,  Chancellors- 
ville  campaign,  ii.  137,  138 ;  at 
Gettysburg,  171 

Anderson,  Robert,  orders  from 
Floyd,  i.  92 ;  moves  from  Moultrie 


to  Sumter,   93 ;  report.   105 ;    re- 
fuses to   surrender,   108 ;    report, 
155 ;  declines  to   surrender,    166 ; 
withdraws   to    New    York,    171  : 
sent  to  Ohio  to  enlist  volunteers, 
193 ;    in   command   at   Louisville. 
236 ;  superseded,  237,  252  ;  activity 
in  Kentucky,  251 
Andrews,  S.  J. ,  Douglas  with,  i.  12 
Annapolis,  Md.,  i.  199,  200,  201 
Anthony,  Henry  B.,  speech  in  Sen- 
ate, i.  132 
Antietam,  Md.,  battle  of,  ii.  92-96 
Apache  Pass,  engagement  at,  ii.  6 
Appomattox,  Va.,  Lee  surrenders  at, 

ii.  283 
Arizona,  organized  as  territory,  ii. 

229 
Arkansas,  delegates  leave  Charleston 
convention,  i.  54  ;  senators  advise 
secession,  102  ;  attitude  to  call  for 
troops,  175 
Arlington,  Va.,  occupied  by  North- 
em  troops,  i.  205 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  surren- 
der, ii.  282 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  ii.  190, 

192,  196,  198,  200,  239 
Army  of  the  Mississippi,  i.  318 
Army  of  the  Ohio,  i.  305,  318 ;  ii. 
119:  Rosecrans  supersedes  Buell, 
124,  125;  in  Tennessee,  184,  190, 
205,  239 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  McClellan 
given  command,  ii.  12 ;  its  with- 
drawal ordered,  23,  27;  retreat 
secured,  39,  40;  plan  as  to,  42; 
withdrawal,  47,  50,  52,  61 ;  McClel- 
lan restored  to  command,  87 ; 
efforts  of,  101 ;  Hooker  super- 
sedes Bumside,  113,  134.  146 ;  at 
Gettysburg,  157 ;  weakened.  178, 
179,  190,  247,  248,  281 


Vol.  II.— 21 


321 


322 


INDEX 


Army  of  the  Tennessee,  i.  318 ;  ii. 
190,  203,  204,  239,  244 

Army  of  Virginia,  formed  under 
Pope,  ii  41 

Arnold,  Samuel  G. ,  in  peace  confer- 
ence, i.  184 

Arnold,  William,  i.  11 

Asboth,  Alexander,  Pea  Ridge  cam- 
paign, i.  308-310 

Atlanta,  Ga. ,  capture  of,  iL  244,  345 

Attorney-General  against  Sillem,  ii. 
395.  298 

AveriU,  WiUiam  W. ,  at  Glendale,  ii. 
35 ;  ChanceUorsville  campaign, 
135,  145 

Avery,  William  W. ,  presents  plat- 
form at  Charleston,  i.  51  ;  speech, 
52-53 ;  his  platform  adopted  at 
Baltimore,  70 

Averysboro,  N.  C,  engagement  at, 
ii.  276 

Bahama,  the,  ii.  293 

Bahamas,  blockade-running  to,  i. 
267 

Bailey,  Theodorus,  at  New  Orleans, 
ii.  4  ;  on  the  Red  River,  237 

Baird,  Absalom,  at  Chattanooga,  ii. 
200 

Baker,  Edward  D.,  engagement  at 
Ball's  Bluff,  i.  263  ;  death,  264 

Baldwin,  Roger  S.,  in  peace  confer- 
ence, i.  124 

Ball's  Bluff,  Va.,  manoeuvres  at,  i. 
261,  262;  the  engagement  at,  2163, 
264 

Baltic,  the.  brings  Anderson  to  New 
York,  i.  171 

Baltimore,  Md. ,  Democratic  conven- 
tion at,  i.  54 ;  danger  to  Lincoln 
in,  139;  Massachusetts  troops 
mobbed  in,  178  ;  secessionists  in 
control,  185 ;  occupied  by  Butler, 
204 

Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  train 
held  up  by  Brown,  i.  37 ;  208, 
256,  258 ;  ii  9,  90 

Banks,  Nathaniel  P.,  before  Wash- 
ington, i.  259  ;  in  the  Shenandoah, 
ii.  13.  19-20  ;  battle  of  Winches- 
ter, 21  ;  placed  under  Pope,  41, 
50 ;  near  Gordonsville,  44 ;  battle 
of  Cedar  Mountain,  46 ;  in  com- 
mand at  Washington,  89  ;  occupies 
Opelousas,  148 ;  Vicksburg  cam- 
paign, 149  ;  capture  of  Port  Hud- 


son, 155  ;  takes  Fort  Esperanza, 
213 ;  Red  River  expedition,  236- 
237 ;  ordered  to  abandoa  Texas, 
238 

Baiboursville,  Kj'. ,  occupied  by 
ZoUicoffer,  i.  251  ;  abandoned,  279 

Barmg,  Tiiomas,  opinion  on  the 
steam  rams,  ii.  299 

Barksdale,  William,  at  Gettysburg, 
ii.  170 

Barnwell,  Robert  W.,  commissioner 
from  South  Carolina,  i.  90 

Barron,  Samuel  C. ,  surrender  at 
Hatteras,  i.  269 

Bates,  Edward,  political  possibility 
in  1860,  i.  66  ;  policy  in  cabinet. 
149 ;  attitude  to  Missouri  seces- 
sionists, 189  ;  opinion  on  the  Mer- 
ryman  case,  235,  236 ;  attitude  to 
emancipation  proclamation,  ii.  86 

Baton  Rouge,  La. ,  occupied,  ii.  6 

Battelle,  Robbins,  in  peace  confer- 
ence, i.  124 

Bayard,  James  A.,  at  Charleston  con- 
vention, i.  55 

Beach  Grove,  occupied  by  ZoUicoffer, 
i.  279 

Beaufort,  N.  C. ,  fort  seized  near,  i. 
184 

Beauregard,  Pierre  G.  T.,  invests 
Sumter,  i .  1 55  ;  message  to  Camp- 
bell, 159 ;  despatch  from  Craw- 
ford, 162 ;  formal  notice  served, 
163,  163  ;  report  and  orders  as  to 
Sumter,  164  ;  demands  surrender, 
165 ;  in  command  at  Manassas, 
210  ;  opposing  Scott,  215  ;  joined 
by  Johnston,  218  ;  engaged  at 
Manassas,  220-223,  239;  trans- 
ferred to  the  Mississippi,  289 ;  re- 
inforced, 294 ;  Shiloh  campaign, 
295-297,  303,  306;  Corinth  cam- 
paign, 318-319 ;  at  Charleston,  ii. 
210 ;  the  Wilderness,  251  ;  dis- 
placed, 276 

Beauregard,  Fort,  S.  C. ,  captured,  i. 
270 

Beaver  Dam  Creek,  Va.,  engagement 
at,  ii.  31,  32 

Bell,  John,  Whig  leader,  i.  31 ;  nom- 
inated for  presidency,  68  ;  results 
of  election,  73  ;  his  apostacy,  180- 
182 

Belmont,  Mo.,  engagement  at,  i.  253 

Benham,  Henry  W.,  at  Carnifez 
Ferry,  i.  256 


INDEX 


323 


Benjamin,  Judah  P.,  opinion  of 
Buchanan,  i.  95  ;  omission  to  vote, 
111;  telegram  as  to  compromise, 
111  ;    in   cabinet  of  Confederacy, 

Benjamin,  Samuel  N. ,  at  Knoxville, 
ii.  203 

Bentonville,  N.  C. ,  engagement  at, 
ii  27i3 

Bermudas,  blockade-running  to,  i. 
2B7 

Berry,  William,  Lincoln's  partner, 
i.  7 

Big  Bethel,  Va.,  engagement  at,  i.  215 

Biggs,  Asa,  repudiates  Helper,  i.  '62 

Bigler,  William,  committee  on  con- 
ciliation, i.  96;  committee  on 
peace  conference  resolutions,  124 

Birney,  David  B. ,  operations  against 
Lee,  ii.  208 

Bissell,  J.  W.,  at  Island  No.  10,  i. 
315 

Black,  Jeremiah  S.,  opinion,  as  at- 
torney-general, on  secession,  i.  80, 
81  ;  becomes  secretary  of  state, 
89 ;  influence,  93 

Black-Hawk  war,  i.  2,  7 

Blaine,  James  Gillespie,  opinion  on 
election  of  1860,  i.  64 

Blair,  Francis  Preston,  Jr.,  work  in 
Missouri  against  secession,  i.  187- 
190  ;  Knoxville  expedition,  ii.  204 ; 
at  Orangeburg,  375. 

Blair,  Montgomery,  policy  in  Cab- 
inet, i.  149 ;  opinion  as  to  Sumter, 
155,  161 ;  relations  with  Lincoln, 
1 60 ;  opinion  on  control  of  mails, 
ii.  222 

Blairs,  the.  political  possibilities  in 
1860,  L  66 

Blenker,  Louis,  before  Washington, 
i.  259 

Booneville,  Mo.,  engagement  at,  i. 
243 

Booth,  John  Wilkes,  i.  9  ;  assassin- 
ates Lincoln,  ii.  284 

Booth,  Lionel  F.,  at  Fort  Pillow,  ii. 
335 

Boston,  the,  used  by  Lefferts,  i.  300 

Boutwell,  George  b.,  in  peace  con- 
ference, i.  124 

Bowen,  John  S.,  Vicksburg  cam- 
paign, ii.  149 

Bowling  Green,  Ky.,  occupied  by 
Johnston,  i.  252,  275,  278  ;  evacu- 
ated, 284,  289 


Boyle,  J.  T.,  demoralized,  ii.  63 

Bradford,  at  Fort  Pillow,  ii.  235-236 

Bragg,  Braxton,  sent  to  Beauregard, 
i.  294 ;  Shiloh,  296-298,  riOO,  3(i2- 
304;  Van  Dom's  report  to,  313; 
invasion  of  Kentucky,  ii.  61-71  ; 
Perryville  campaign,  120-121; 
Murfreesborongh  campaign,  125; 
operation  against  Rostcrans,  181, 
183-187,  189;  orders  against  Burn- 
side,  194 ;  at  Chattanooga,  195,  196, 
201  ;  superseded,  205 

Braman,  John  M.,  at  Chickamauga, 
ii.  187,  188 

Branch,  L.  O'Brien,  in  the  penin- 
sula, ii.  23-24 

Brandon,  Vt.,  birthplace  of  Doug- 
las, i.  10 

Brandy  Station, Va.,  battle  of,  ii.  160 

Brashear  City,  La.,  taken  by  Taylor, 
ii.  155 

Brazil,  its  constitution,  i.  232 

Breckenridge  Democrats,  i.  149,  191 

Breckenridge,  John  C,  nominated 
for  presidency,  i.  70 ;  results  of 
campaign,  73 ,  presents  peace  con- 
ference resolutions  to  Senate,  l'J7 ; 
joins  the  Confederates,  252 ;  Shi- 
loh, 296,  298,  306;  Murfrees- 
borongh, ii.  127 ;  at  Chickamauga, 
187;  near  Chattanooga,  201,202; 
in  the  Shenandoah,  255 ,  negotia- 
tions with  Sherman,  284,  285 

Bright,  John,  opinion  on  the  steam 
rams,  ii.  399 

Bristol  Station,  Va.,  Jackson  at,  ii. 
51 

Brooks,  William  T.  H.,  under  Burn- 
side,  ii.  113 

Brown,  Albert  Gallatin,  resolutions 
in  Senate,  i.  50 ;  criticism  of  the 
Davis  resolutions,  i.  50  ;  departure 
from  Senate,  112 

Brown,  George  William,  actions  at 
Baltimore,  i.  196-198 ;  conference 
with  Lincoln,  199 

Brown,  John,  at  Harper's  Ferry,  i. 
36-44,  72 

Browning,  Orville  H.,  defeated  by 
Douglas,  i.  15 ;  works  for  Lincoln, 
65 

Brownlow,  William  G.,  attitude  to 
secession  of  Tennessee,  i.  183 

Buchanan,  Franklin,  resigns,  i.  203  ; 
in  command  of  the  Virginia,  iL 
10,  11 


324 


INDEX 


Buchanan,  James,  attitude  to  Dong- 
las,  i.  46 ;  Kansas  policy  attacked 
in  Republican  platform,  59  ;  atti- 
tude to  secession,  80;  his  message 
to  Congress,  83-87 ;  his  handling 
of  the  problem,  89  ;  relations  with 
the  "  commissioners,"  90-95;  spe- 
cial message,  Jan.,  1861,  105  ;  atti- 
tude to  use  of  force,  107  ;  dealings 
with  Southerners,  108 ;  relations 
with  Commissioner  Crawford,  153 

Buchanan,  Bobert  C,  at  Manassas, 
ii.  58 

Buchanan  Democrats,  i.  46 

Buckner,  Simon  B.,  aids  Magoffin, 
i.  194 ;  239 ;  occupies  Bowling 
Green,  252;  Fort  Donelson  cam- 
paign, 284,  286-288;  Perryville 
campaign,  ii.  120,  122 ;  operations 
around  Knoxville,  184,  195 

Buell,  Don  Carlos,  in  command  at 
Louisville,  i.  237 ;  operations 
against  Zollicoffer,  279 ;  against 
Crittenden,  281 ;  relations  with 
Halleck  and  Grant,  289 ;  at  Nash- 
ville, 290  ;  order  to  Smith,  291  ; 
relation  to  Shiloh  campaign,  295- 
298,  303-305  ;  Corinth  campaign, 
317-319  ;  operations  against  Bragg 
in  Kentucky,  ii.  62-70  ;  the  Perry- 
ville campaign,  119-123 ;  super- 
seded, 124 

Buffalo  Hill,  engagement  at,  i.  257 

Buford,  John,  Gettysburg  campaign, 
ii.  159,  160,  166,  167,  176 

Bull  Run,  See  Manassas 

Bulloch,  James  D. ,  work  in  Eng- 
land, ii.  291,  292,  294 

Burnside,  Ambrose  E.,  at  Roanoke 
Island,  ii.  8 ;  at  Aquia,  47 ;  Antie- 
tam  campaign,  91,  94,  95;  super- 
sedes McClellan,  104;  the  Freder- 
icksburg campaign,  106-113;  his 
division  system  abolished,  134; 
occupation  and  siege  of  Knoxville, 
182-184, 194,  195,  202-205  ;  Wilder- 
ness campaign,  249,  252,  253 

Butler,  Benjamin  F.,  in  Charleston 
convention,  i.  53  ;  at  Philadelphia, 
200 ;  at  Annapolis.  201  ;  com- 
mands Department  of  Annapolis, 
203 ;  at  Baltimore,  204 ;  force  at 
Fortress  Monroe,  215,  259;  expe- 
dition to  Hatteras,  268;  expedi- 
tion against  New  Orleans,  ii.  1-5, 
71 ;     theory  of    contraband    ap- 


proved by  Congress,  75 ;  opera- 
tions against  Richmond,  23»,  239, 
248,  251 ,  254  ;  at  Petersburg,  255  ; 
attempt  at  Fort  Fisher,  '^T^ 
Byrne,  captured  by  John  Brown,  i. 
38 

Cadwalader,  George,  action  in 
the  Merrj'man  case,  i.  235 

Cairo,  111.,  Preutiss  in  command  at, 
L  236 ;  Fremont  at,  247 ;  McCler- 
nand  sent  from,  281 ;  Foote  at, 
282 

Calhoun,  John,  county  surveyor,  i.  7 

Calhoun,  John  C. ,  views,  i.  17 

California,  democrats  of,  L  51 ;  troops 
at  Ball's  Bluff,  263-264 

Cameron,  Simon,  secures  cabinet 
position,  i.  66 ;  motion  to  recon- 
sider Clark  resolutions,  1 12 ;  policy 
in  cabinet,  149 ;  order  for  Stone's 
arrest,  265 

Campbell,  John  A.,  relations  with 
southern  commissioners,  L  155-162 

Canada,  relations  with  United 
States,  ii.  311 

Canandaigua,  N.  Y. ,  Douglas  at,  i.  12 

Canby,  Edward  R.  S.,  operations 
against  Sibley,  ii.  6;  at  Mobile, 
273 

Cape  Hatteras,  See  Hatteras,  Fort 

CarUle,  John  S. ,  elected  to  Senate,  L 
210 

Carlin,  William  P.,  at  Chattanooga, 
u.  197 

Carnifex  Ferry,  W.  Va.,  engagement 
at,  i.  256 

Carondelet,  the,  at  Fort  Donelson,  L 
284;  at  Island  No.  10,  316 

Carr,  Eugene  A.,  Pea  Ridge  cam- 
paign, i.  308,  310,  311 ;  at  Mobile, 
ii.  273 

Carrick's  Ford,  W.  Va.,  engagement 
at,  i.  212 

Caruthers,  Robert  L. ,  in  peace  con- 
ference, i.  124 

Casey,  Silas,  at  Williamsburg,  iL  16 ; 
at  Seven  Pines,  25,  26 

Cass,  Lewis,  resigns  as  secretary  of 
state,  i.  89 

Castle  Pinckney,  seized  by  South 
Carolina,  i.  94 

Catlett's  Station,  Va.,  Stuart  at,  ii. 
49 

Cecil,  Robert,  opinion  on  the  steam 
rams,  ii.  30O 


INDEX 


325 


Cedar  Creek,  Va.,  battle  of,  ii.  259 

Cedar  Mountain,  Va.,  battle  of,  ii. 
46 

Census  of  1850,  i.  28 

Centreville,  Va.,  objective  of  Mc- 
Dowell, i.  216 ;  McDowell  at,  218, 
239;  Johnston  at,  259,  260,  274. 
See  Bull  Run 

Chalmette  battery,  silenced,  ii.  5 

Chambersburg,  Pa.,  burning  of,  ii. 
257 

Champion  Hill,  Miss.,  battle  of,  ii. 
1.51-1.53 

Chancellorsville,  Va. ,  battle  at,  ii. 
137-145 

Chantilly,  Va. ,  battle  at,  ii.  58 

Chapmanville,  W.  Va. ,  engagement 
at,  i.  257 

Charleston,  S.  C. ,  Democratic  con- 
vention of  1860,  i.  50-54  ;  control 
of  its  harbor,  93,  94;  Beauregard 
in  command  at,  1.55  ;  hostilities  at, 
168,  271 ;  occupation  by  Sherman, 
ii  276.     See  Sumter,  Fort 

Charlotte,  N.  C,  mint  seized  at,  i. 
184 

Chase,  Salmon  Portland,  in  peace 
conference,  i.  124 ;  policy  in  Cab- 
inet, 149 ;  opinion  as  to  Sumter, 
1.55,  161 

Chatham,  Canada,  John  Brown  at, 
i.  37 

Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  Confederates 
retire  to,  i.  289,  295  ;  objective  of 
Bragg,  ii.  61 ;  Confederate  base, 
63,  64  ;  battles  near,  189,  191,  197- 
201 

Cheat  Mountain,  W.  Va. ,  Lee  at,  i. 
255 ;  engagement  at,  257 

Cheat  River,  W.  Va. ,  engagement 
at,  i.  212 

Cheatham,  Benjamin  F.,  engagement 
at  Belmont,  i.  253 ;  Perryville 
campaign,  ii.  120,  121 ;  at  Chatta- 
nooga, 200 ;  Atlanta  campaign, 
243;  at  Franklin,  267;  at  Nash- 
ville, 269 

Chesnut,  James,  Jr.,  at  secession 
conference,  i.  79 ;  resignation  from 
Senate,  79 

Chew,  R.  S.,  sent  to  Charleston,  L 
193 

Chicago,  111. ,  Republican  convention 
at,  i.  58 

Chickamauga,  Ga.,  battle  of,  ii. 
185-188 


Chickasaw  Bluflfs,  Miss.,  Sherman 
repulsed  at,  ii.  113 

Chittenden,  Lucius  B. ,  in  peace  con- 
ference, i.  124 

Cincinnati,  O. ,  Douglas  at,  i.  12; 
Democratic  platform  of  1856 
adopted  at,  46 

Clark,  Fort,  attacked,  i.  268 

Clark,  Daniel,  offers  substitute  for 
Crittenden  resolutions,  i.  110,  111 ; 
vote  on  resolutions  reconsidered, 
112 

Clark,  John  B. ,  resolution  in  House, 
i.  47 

Clarksburg,  W.  Va.,  Rosecrans  at, 
i.  256 

Clarksville,  Tenn. ,  i.  290-291 ;  gar- 
rison captured,  ii.  65 

Clay,  Cassius  M.,  political  possibility 
in  1860,  i.  67 ;  in  peace  confer- 
ence, 124 

Clay,  Henry,  i.  9,  31 

Cleburne,  Patrick  R.,  at  Chatta- 
nooga, ii.  199,  202 ;  at  Franklin, 
268 

Clingman,  Thomas  L.,  repudiates 
Helper,  i.  32 

Cobden,  Richard,  opinion  on  the 
steam  rams,  ii.  299 

Cochrane,  John,  under  Burnside,  ii 
113 

Cogswell,  Milton,  at  Ball's  Bluff,  L 
264 

Colburn,  A.  V.,  orders  to  Stone,  i 
261 

Cold  Harbor,  Va.,  battle  of,  ii.  253 

Collamer,  Jacob,  on  Harper's  Ferry 
committee  of  Senate,  i.  37 ;  on 
committee  on  conciliation,  96 

Columbia,  S.  C,  burning  of,  ii.  275 

Columbus,  Ky.,  occupied  by  Polk,  i. 
250 ;  threatened  by  McClernand, 
281 ;  evacuated,  252,  275,  279,  289 

Committee  of  House  of  Representa- 
tives on  Conciliation,  i.  108,  128 

Committee  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives on  the  Judiciary ;  re- 
port on  control  of  mails,  ii.  222- 
223 

Committee  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives on  Territories,  Doug- 
las chairman,  i.  15 

Committee  of  the  Senate  on  concili- 
ation, i.  96  ;  unable  to  agree,  100 

Committee  of  the  Senate  on  Harper's 
Ferry  Investigation,  i.  37,  39-41 


326 


INDEX 


Committee  of  the  Senate  on  the  Ju- 
diciary, report,  ii.  75 

Committee  of  the  Senate  on  Peace 
Conference  Resolutions,  appoint- 
ed, i.  127;  report,  128 

Committee  of  the  Senate  on  Terri- 
tories, Douglas  chairman,  i.  15 

Confederate  States  of  America,  pro- 
visional constitution,  i.  117,  118  ; 
election  of  federal  oflBcers,  119 ; 
first  cabinet,  121,  122;  inaugura- 
tion of  president,  123 ;  prepar- 
ations for  war,  135 ;  adoption  of 
laws,  137 ;  demands  for  recogni- 
tion, 149;  commissioners  in  Wash- 
ington, 153-165 ;  action  as  to 
Sumter,  165 ;  military  arrange- 
ments with  Tennessee,  183  ;  bellig- 
erency recognized,  ii.  291 

Confederation  of  1781,  i.  117 

Congress  of  Paris,  i.  266 

Congress  of  the  Confederate  States, 
authorizes  commissioners,  ii.  151  ; 
resolution  as  to  Lincoln's  procla- 
mation, 185  ;  adjournment,  209  ; 
authorizes  loan,  238 ;  authorizes 
enlistments,  239  ;  financial  system, 
ii.  228,  229 

Congress  of  the  United  States,  spe- 
cial session  called,  i.  174 ;  meets, 
229  ;  authorizes  president  to  act, 
220-232  ;  slavery  question  in,  47  ; 
Seward's  leadership  in,  64 ;  Bu- 
chanan's message  to,  82  ;  effect  of 
Crittenden  resolutions  on  power 
of,  97  ;  Buchanan  appeals  to,  105  ; 
message  to,  2.27  ;  statutes  of,  229- 
232,  248  ;  message  to,  274  ;  passes 
constitutional  amendment,  ii.  73  ; 
resolution  on  the  war,  74-75 ;  con- 
fiscation act,  75 ;  message  to, 
March  6,  1862,  78-79 ;  members 
of,  confer  with  Lincoln,  80 ;  de- 
bates in,  80-81 ;  pass  law  on  slav- 
ery in  District  of  Columbia,  82 ; 
legislation  of,  discussed,  215-233. 
See  Statutes  of  the  United  States 

Congress,  the,  destroyed,  ii.  9, 10 

Conrad's  Ferry,  Baker  at,  L  263, 
264 

Constitution  of  the  Confederate 
States,  provisional  form.  i.  117- 
118;  adopted  by  Tennessee,  183 

Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
as  viewed  by  Davis,  i.  16-17;  as 
viewed  by  Douglas,  21 ;  effect  on 


slavery  in  territories,  27  ;  interpra> 
tation  of,  ii.  214-233 

Constitutional  Union  Party,  conven- 
tion of  1860,  i.  68 

Cook,  John  E. ,  with  John  Brown,  i. 
37 

Corcoran,  Michael,  treatment  by 
Davis,  i.  267 

Corinth,  Miss.,  Confederates  retire 
to,  i.  289 ;  operations  near,  294- 
297,  305,  306,  317-320;  battle  of, 
ii.  124 

Coming,  Erastus,  in  peace  confer- 
ence, i.  124 

Corse,  John  M. ,  at  Chattanooga,  ii. 
199  ;  at  AUatoona,  2o2 

Corwin,  Thomas,  makes  report  of 
conciliation  committee,  i.  108 

Couch,  Darius  N.,  at  Williamsburg, 
ii.  16;  at  Seven  Pines,  25,  26 ;  at 
Malvern  Hill,  38,  39;  Antietam 
campaign,  91 ;  Chancellorsville 
campaign,  134,  137,  138,  142  ;  Get- 
tysburg campaign,  163 

Covington,  Ky.,  defended  by  Wal- 
lace, ii.  67 

Cox,  Jacob  D.,  in  western  Virginia, 
i.  212-213 

Crampton's  Pass,  Md. ,  engagement 
at,  ii.  91 

Crawford,  Martin  J.,  commissioner 
to  Washington,  i.  151  ;  relations 
with  Buchanan,  152  ;  at  Washing- 
ton, 153-165 

Crittenden,  Ge  >rge  B.,  at  Mill 
Springs,  i.  279;  join.s  Johnston, 
289  ;  Shiloh,  296,  304 

Crittenden,  John  J.,  Whig  leader, 
i.  31  ;  committee  on  conciliation, 
96;  compromise  resolutions,  97- 
98 ;  Georgia  telegram  to,  102 ; 
resolutions  again  presented,  110, 
112;  report  on  peace  conference 
resolutions,  127 ;  his  resolutions 
again  moved,  128  ;  speech  in  Sen- 
ate, 130;  resolutions  to  be  amend- 
ed, 132 ;  opinion  as  to  Kentucky, 
192;  letter  to  Scott,  192,  193; 
presides  over  border  peace  confer- 
ence, 195 ;  introduces  resolution 
on  the  war,  ii.  74 

Crittenden,  Thomas  L.,  force  capt- 
ured by  Forrest,  ii.  65 ;  oper- 
ations against  Bragg,  68 ;  Per- 
ryville  campaign,  120-122 ,  at 
Chickamauga,  185-188 


INDEX 


327 


Crittenden,  Thomas  T. ,  at  Murfrees- 

borough,  ii.  126-129 
Crocker,  Frederick,  at  Sabine  Pass, 

u.  213 
Crook,   George,    operations  against 

Wheeler,  ii.   191,  193 ;  pursuit  of 

Lee,  281 
Cross  Lanes,  engagement  at,  i.  256 
Crowninshield,  Francis  B. ,  in  peace 

conference,  i.  124 
Crump's  Landing,  Term, ,  Wallace  at, 

i.  294,  395,  298,  301 
Cuba,  in  Charleston  platform,  i.  52 
Cumbetland,  the,  destroyed,  ii.  9,  10 
Cumberland  Gap,   camp  at,  i.  324; 

occupied  by  Zollicoffer,  251 
Curtin,  Andrew  G.,  elected  governor 

of  Pennsylvania,  i.  71,  72 
Curtis,    Benjamin    R.,    opinion    in 

Dred  Scott  case,  i.  56 
Curtis,  Samuel  R.,  operations  against 

Price,  i.  307  ;  battle  of  Pea  Ridge, 

308-311 
Gushing,  Caleb,   chairman    Charles- 
ton convention,  i.  51 ;  at  Baltimore 

convention,  69 ;   chairman  of  se- 

ceders'  convention,  70 
Custer,  George  A.,  pursuit  of  Lee, 

ii.  281 
Cynthiana,  Ky.;  occupied  by  Mor- 
gan, ii.  63 

Dahlgren,  John  A.,  at  Morris  Isl- 
and, ii.  210 ;  attempt  on  Sumter, 
212;  off  Savannah,  266 

DaUon.  Ga. ,  capture  of,  iL  239 

Davis,  Charles  Henry,  at  Fort  Pil- 
low, i.  320 

Davis.  David,  works  for  Lincoln,  i. 
65-66 

Davis,  Henry  Winter,  political  pos- 
sibility in  1860,  i.  67 

Davis,    Jeffenson,    compared     with 
Lincoln,  i.   2 ;  with  Lincoln  and 
Douglas,  3-4  ;  early  life,  4,  5  ;  con- 
trasted   with    Douglas    and   Lin- ! 
coin.  16,  17  ;  political  position,  27  ; 
on  Harper's  Ferry  Committee  of 
Senate,  37 ;  resolutions  in  Senate. 
47-.50;    his  resolutions    discussed 
by    Wigfall.    55-56  ;     speech    on 
"  Popular    Sovereignty,"   .08,    68 ;  i 
speech  on  secession,  88 ;  attitude  i 
to  conciliation,  96,  98  ;  opinion  on  j 
caucus  resolution,   103,  104;     de- ! 
parture  f  rom  Senate,  112;  elected 


president  of  Confederacy,  1 19, 120 ; 
inaugurated,  123  ;  cites  Lincoln's 
inaugural,  144 ;  appoints  commis- 
sioners, 151  ;  opinion  quoted,  163  ; 
sends  arms  to  Missouri,  188 ;  moves 
to  Richmond,  209  ;  sends  aid  to 
Porterfield,  210 ;  orders  to  John- 
ston, 217  ;  at  Manassas,  222 ;  esti- 
mate of  resources,  240-241  ;  author- 
izes privateers,  265  ;  treatment  of 
federal  prisoners,  267  ;  commissions 
Mason  and  Slidell,  270 ;  sends 
Bragg  to  Beauregard,  294 ;  military 
plans,  ii.  19,  20,  22,  28  ;  conference 
with  Jackson,  30  ;  at  Glendale,  37  ; 
at  Murfreesborough,  126  ;  dis- 
places Bragg,  205  ;  removes  John- 
ston, 243  ;  prepares  to  leave  Rich- 
mond, 279 ;  capture,  286 ;  confine- 
ment, 287  ;  sends  Bulloch  to  Eng- 
land, 291 

Davis,  Jefferson  C. ,  f aDs  to  aid  Mul- 
ligan, i.  249  ;  Pea  Ridge  campaign, 
308-311  ;  at  Murfreesborough,  ii. 
128  ;  at  Chickamauga,  188 ;  at 
Chattanooga,  198 

Davis,  Reuben,  manifesto  on  con- 
ciliation, i.  101-102 

Dayton,  T.  F.,  at  Port  Royal,  i.  270 

Delaware,  slavery  in,  18.58,  i.  34 ; 
delegates  in  Chicago  convention, 
66  ;  attitude  to  call  for  troops,  175 

Democratic  Party,  work  of  Douglas 
in,  i.  13  ;  relation  to  slavery,  31 ; 
platform  of  18.56,  46 ;  division 
threatened,  47  ;  formation  of 
creed,  50  ;  convention  at  Charles- 
ton, 50-.54 ;  successes  in  1862,  ii. 
103 

Dennison,  WiUiam,  appoints  Mc- 
CleUan  to  command  Ohio  troops, 
i.  206 

Department  of  Annapolis,  Butler  in 
command,  i.  203 

Department  of  Pennsylvania,  Pat- 
terson in  command,  i.  203 

Department  of  the  Ohio,  McClellan 
in  command,  i.  207 

Department  of  the  Potomac,  Mc- 
Clellan in  command,  i.  295 

Department  of  the  South,  proclama- 
tion of  Hunter  in,  ii.  82 

Department  of  the  West,  Fremont 
in  command,  ii.  76 

Department  of  Washington,  Mc- 
Clellan in  command,  i.  336 


328 


INDEX 


Department,  Mountain,  Fremont  in 
command,  i.  1295 

Derby,  Earl  of,  opinion  on  the  steam 
rams,  ii.  300 

De  Trobriand,  P.  Regis,  at  Gettys- 
burg, ii.  1?0 

Devens,  Charles,  occupies  Harrison's 
Island,  i.  261 ;  engagement  at  Ball's 
Bluff,  203,  263;  at  Chancellors- 
ville,  ii.  144 

Devin,  Thomas  C,  pursuit  of  Lee, 
ii.  281 

District  of  the  West,  Fremont  in 
command,  i.  236 

Dix,  John  A. ,  enters  cabinet,  i.  105, 
107 

Dodge,  Grenville  M.,  at  Pulaski,  ii. 
205 

Dodge,  William  E.,  in  peace  confer- 
ence, i.  124 

Donelson,  Daniel  S. ,  PerryvUle 
campaign,  ii.   120 

Donelson,  Fort,  Tenn.,  capture  of,  i. 
283-288 

Doniphan,  Alexander  M. ,  in  peace 
conference,  i.  124 

Doolittle,  James  R. ,  on  Harper's 
Ferry  committee  of  Senate,  i.  37 ; 
committee  on  conciliation,  96 

Doubleday,  Abner,  at  Fredericks- 
burg, ii.  Ill  ;  at  Gettysburg,  167, 
168 

Douglas,  Stephen  Arnold,  compared 
with  Lmcoln  and  Davis,  i.  2-4 ; 
early  life,  ]  1-13  ;  in  politics,  13- 
15;  in  congress,  15;  contrasted 
with  Davis  and  Lincoln,  16,  17 ; 
personal  traits,  18,  19 ;  Lincoln- 
Douglas  debates,  19, 24  ;  his  politi- 
cal position,  25-2'3  ;  relations  with 
Buchanan,  46  ;  in  Charleston  con- 
vention, 51,  54  ;  attacked  by  Davis, 
58 ;  nominated  for  presidency  by 
Baltimore  convention,  69,  70 ;  re- 
sults of  campaign,  73;  on  committee 
on  conciliation,  90 ;  Georgia  tele- 
gram to,  102 ;  request  in  Senate, 
128  ;  speech  in  Senate,  130  ;  action 
on  the  call  for  troops,  175 

Douglas  Democrats,  i.  46,  149 

Dranesville,  Va.,  McCall  at,  i.  260, 
2til ;  engagement  at,  265 

Died  Scott  decision,  i.  1,  19,  20, 
21,  24,  46,  47,  56,  133,  182,  ii. 
229 

Dred  >^cott  Democrats,  i.  51 


Dry  Tortugas.  Pla. ,  fortifications  not 
seized  by  Confederacy,  i.  135 

Dry  wood  Creek,  Mo.,  engagement 
at,  i.  246 

Dudley,  Thomas  H. ,  work  at  Liver- 
pool, ii.  293-295 

DufEe,  Alfred  N.,  Gettysburg  cam- 
paign, ii.  160 

Dug  Springs,  Mo.,  engagement  at,  L 
245 

Duncan,  Johnson  K.,  at  New  Or- 
leans, ii.  2.  4,  5 

Duncan,  William,  near  Savannah,  ii 
265 

Du  Pont,  Samuel  F.,  in  command  of 
South  Atlantic  Squadron,  i .  237 ; 
Port  Royal  expedition,  270 ;  fail- 
ure at  Charleston,  ii.  133 

Early,  Jdbal  A.,  operations 
against  Pope,  ii.  48-50  ;  at  Freder- 
icksburg, 111 ;  at  Chancellors ville, 
139,  142-144;  Gettysburg  cam- 
paign, im,  164,  168,  171;  move- 
ment against  Washington,  257- 
260 

Edward's  Ferry,  Stone  at,  i.  263,  264 

Ellet,  Alfred  W.,  at  Fort  Pillow,  i. 
320 

Elliott,  Washington,  L.,  in  Corinth 
campaign,  i.  318,  319 

Ellis,  John  W.,  attitude  to  secession, 
i.  183,  184 

Eltham's  Landing,  Va.,  engagement 
at,  ii.  17,  18 

Emancipation,  proclamation  of,  ii. 
72-88,  97-100. 104,  114-118,  214 

Emerson,  Ralph  Waldo,  i.  76 

Emory,  William  H. ,  at  Sabine  Cross 
Roads,  ii.  237 

Esperanza,  Fort,  taken  by  Banks, 
ii.  213 

Etheridge,  Emerson,  attitude  to  se- 
cession of  Tennessee,  i.  183 

Evans,  Nathan  G.,  at  Leesburg,  i. 
2.59  ;  at  Ball's  Bluff,  264 

Everett,  Edward,  nominated  for 
vice-presidency,  i.  ti8 

Ewell,  Richard  S.,  in  the  Shenan- 
doah, ii.  20 ;  engaged  by  Hooker, 
.53  ;  wounded,  55 ;  at  Aiitietam, 
94;  Gettysburg  campaign,  1.58- 
163,  168-171,  173;  occupies  Cul- 
peper,  207  ;  Wilderness  campaign, 
248,  251,  2.52;  Petersburg  and 
Richmond,  2:9-281 


INDEX 


329 


Ewing,  Thomas,  in  peace  conference, 

i.  124 
Ezra  Church,  Ga.,  battle  of,  ii.  244 

Fair  Oaks,  Va.,  battle  at,  ii.  25-26 

Fairfax,Donald  M.,  boards  the  Trent, 
i.  271 

Farragut,  David  G.,  expedition 
against  New  Orleans,  ii.  1-5  ;  as- 
cends Mississippi,  6 

Fayetteville,  Ark.,  operations  at,  i. 
307 

Fayetteville,  N.  C. ,  arsenal  seized  at, 
i.  184 

Federal  Hill,  Md.,  seized  by  Butler, 
i.  204 

Felton,  S.  M.,  i.  139,  199 

Ferrero,  Edward,  under  Burnside,  ii. 
113;  at  Knoxville,  203 

Fessenden,  William  P.,  in  peace  con- 
ference, i.  124 

Field,  David  Dudley,  in  peace  con- 
ference, i.  124 

Fillmore,  Millard,  i.  31 

Fisher,  Fort,  N.  C,  capture,  ii.  272- 
273 

Fisher  Hill,  Va.,  battle  of,  ii.  259 

Fitch,  Graham  N. ,  on  Harper's 
Ferry  committee  of  Senate,  i.  37 

Fitzpatrick,  Benjamin,  declines 
nomination  to  vice-presidency,  i. 
70 

Five  Forks,  Va.,  battle  at,  ii.  -78- 
279 

Flotida,  delegates  leave  Charleston 
convention,  i.  54 ;  legislature  calls 
state  convention,  87 ;  senators 
advise  secession,  102 ;  secedes,  104 ; 
mentioned  in  call  for  troops,  172 ; 
blockade  running,  267 

Florida,  the  controversy  over,  ii, 
292,  293 

Floyd,  John  B. ,  orders  to  Anderson, 
i.  93 ;  resignation  from  cabinet, 
94 ;  shipments  to  south,  185,  238, 
240 ;  sent  to  the  Kanawha,  255 ; 
engagement  at  Carnifex  Ferry, 
256;  relations  with  Wise,  2.57; 
driven  from  the  Greenbrier,  258  ; 
Fort  Donelson  campaign,  284,  287 
288 

Foote,  Andrew  H. ,  Fort  Henry  cam- 
paign, i.  281,  282 ;  Fort  Donelson, 
283-287 ;  at  New  Madrid,  316 

Forbes,  Hugh,  relations  with  John 
Brown,  i.  40 


Forbes,  John  M.,  in  peace  confer- 
ence, i.  124 

Forrest,  Nathan  B.,  retires  from 
Donelson,  i.  288 ;  raid  to  Mur- 
freesborough,  ii.  64 ;  movement  in 
Tennessee,  125,  130;  at  Okalona, 
235;  Fort  Pillow,  236;  after  Nash- 
ville, 270 

Forsyth,  John,  commissioner  to 
Washington,  i.  151 ;  dealings  at 
Washington,  153-164 

Foster,  John  G. ,  in  North  Carolina, 
ii.  132,  133  ;  supersedes  Burnside, 
205 

Fox,  Gustavus  V.,  plan  to  relieve 
Sumter,  i.  160 

France,  Confederate  mission  to,  i. 
271;  in  Mexico,  ii.  212,  3C0-3C9  ; 
attitude  to  United  States,  289,  290 

Frankfort,  Ky. ,  legislature  meets  at, 
i.  2.52 

Franklin,  Thomas  E.,  in  peace  con- 
ference, i.  124 

Franklin,  William  B.,  before  Wash- 
ington, i.  259 ;  at  Williamsburg, 
ii.  16 ;  at  Eltham's  Landing,  17- 
18;  at  Gaines's  Mill,  23;  at 
Frazier'a  Farm,  36 ;  at  Malvern 
Hill,  37,  38  ;  in  the  Potomac,  50  ; 
at  Alexandria,  52  ;  at  Centerville, 
58,  .59 ;  Antietam  campaign,  91, 
92,  94 ;  operations  under  Burn- 
side, 110-113;  in  Texas,  213;  on 
the  Red  River,  236 

Franklin,  Tenn.,  battle  of,  ii.  267, 
268 

Frazier's  Farm,  Va.,  Keyes  at,  ii.  34 

Frederick,  Md.,  legislature  meets  at, 
i.  204 

Fredericksburg,  Va.,  campaign 
around,  ii.  106-113 

Freeport,  111.,  Lincoln's  question  at, 
L  46 

Free-soil  democrats,  i.  10,  63 

Frelinghuysen,  Frederick  T.,  in 
peace  conference,  i.  124 

Fremont,   John  C,  in  command  at 
St.  Louis,  i.  236  ;  superseded,  237 
plan  for  security  of  Missouri,  247 
proclaims  martial  law,    247,   248 
order  disavowed  by  Lincoln,  248 
fails    to    relieve    Mulligan,    249 
headquarters  at  Springfield,  Mo., 
249 ;  in  charge  of   Mountain  De- 
partment, 295 ;  in  the  Shenandoah, 
ii.  i'.t,  :.0  ;    dfclines  to  serve  under 


330 


INDEX 


Pope,  41 ;  proclamation  as  to 
slaves,  76 ;  disapproved  by  Lin- 
coln, 77 

French,  Samuel  G. ,  at  AUatoona,  ii. 
263 

French,  William  H. ,  at  Gaines's 
Mill,  ii.  33  ;  Gettysburg  campaign, 
165 

Frost,  D.  M.,  secessionist  leader  in 
Missouri,  i.,  188-190 

Fugitive  Slave  Law,  Charleston  plat- 
form on,  i.  52 ;  Buchanan's  mes- 
sage on,  84  ;  aim  of  Toombs  as  to, 
97 ;  Crittenden  resolutions  as  to, 
98;  109,  113,114;  attitude  of  Re- 
publicans to,  133,  182  ;  repeal  ad- 
vocated, ii.  78 

Gaines's  Mill,  Va.,  McClellan's 
headquarters,  ii.  23 ;  battle  at,  32 

Gamble,  Hamilton  R. ,  elected  gov- 
ernor of  Missouri,  1.  247 

Gardner,  Frank,  surrenders  Port 
Hudson  ii.  155 

Garfield,  James  Abram,  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  i.  IBS  ;  engagement  at  Mid- 
dle Creek.  278 

Garnett,  Robert  Selden,  sent  to 
Western  Virginia,  i.  210  ;  at  Bev- 
erly, 211 ;  killed,  212 

Garrard,  Kenner,  at  Kenesaw,  ii. 
242 ;  near  Atlanta,  244 

Geary,  John  W.,  at  Chattanooga,  ii. 
197 

Georgia,  slavery  in,  1858,  i.  34  ;  acts 
of  secession,  79-80 ;  legislature 
calls  convention,  87  ;  senators  ad- 
vise secession,  102 ;  character  of 
seizure  of  forts  in,  106  ;  recedes, 
112  ;  mentioned  in  call  for  troops, 
172 

Georgia,  the,  contention  over,  ii.  284 

German  Confederation,  relations 
with  United  States,  ii.  313 

German  Empire,  its  constitution,  i. 
232 

Getty,  George  W. ,  Wilderness  cam- 
paign, ii.  249 

Gettysburg.  Pa.,  battle  at,  ii.  166-176 

Gibbon,  John,  at  Fredericksburg,  ii. 
Ill;  at  Gettysburg,  173 

Gilbert,  Charles  C. ,  Perry ville  cam- 
paign, ii.  120,  122 

Giilmore,  Quincy  A. ,  at  Fort  Wag- 
ner, ii.  209-211 ;  ordered  to  join 
Butler,  338 


Gist,  S.  R. ,  at  Chattanooga,  ii.  199, 
202 ;  at  Franklin,  268 

Gist,  William  H.,  at  secession  con- 
ference, i.  79 

Glendale,  Va. ,  operations  near,  iL 
34-36,  38  ;  battle  at,  37 

Goldsborough,  Louis  M. ,  in  com- 
mand of  North  Atlantic  Squadron, 
i.  237 ;  at  Roanoke  Island,  iL  8 ; 
in  the  James,  18, 19 

Gordon,  John  B. ,  at  Fort  Steadman, 
ii.  278 ;  surrenders,  283 

Gordonsville,  Va.,  Pope's  objective, 
ii.  44 

Gorman.  Willis  A. ,  near  Ball's  Bluff, 
i.  263-264 

Gosport  Navy  Yard,  Va. ,  captured 
by  Taliaferro,  i.  178 

Grand  Gulf,  Miss.,  capture  of,  ii. 
149 

Granger,  Gehazi,  step-father  of 
Douglas,  i.  12 

Granger,  Gordon,  at  Chickamauga, 
ii.  186,  1S8;  at  Chattanooga,  196; 
Knoxville  operations,  202,  204 ; 
operations  against  Hood,  267 ;  at 
MobUe.  273 

Grant,  Ulysses  Simpson,  in  com- 
mand at  Cairo,  i.  237 ;  occupies 
Paducah  and  Smithfield,  2.50 ; 
manoeuvres  against  Polk,  252-253  ; 
engagement  at  Belmont,  253  ;  Ken- 
tucky campaign,  281  ;  Fort  Henry, 
282,  283  ;  Fort  Donelson,  283.  288  ; 
relations  with  Halleck  and  Buell, 
289  ;  at  Nashville,  291  ;  "  Me- 
moirs "  cited,  292  ;  relations  with 
Halleck,  293 ;  situation  at  Pitts- 
burg Landing,  294 ;  Shiloh  cam- 
paign, 295-307 ;  Corinth  cam- 
paign, 317,  318,  ii.  71  ;  stores 
captured,  113  ;  luka  campaign, 
124 ;  Vicksburg  campaign,  146- 
155 ;  operations  around  Chatta- 
nooga. 1 90-202  ;  plans  against  Lee 
and  Johnston,  238,  239;  Wilder- 
ness campaign,  247-2.54  ;  at  Peters- 
burg, 2.55,  256,  260 ;  displaces  But- 
ler, 272  ;  final  campaign,  277-283  ; 
relation  to  Sherman  -  Johnston 
memorandum,  285,  286 

Great  Britain,  ships  secured  in,  i. 
266 ;  the  Trent  affair,  271-274  ; 
attitude  to  United  States,  ii.  289, 
290,  311 ;  controversy  over  enlist- 
ment act,  291,  292 ;  the  Alabama 


INDEX 


331 


398-291 ;  the  Alexandra  case,  294- 
299 

Greeley,  Horace,  opposition  to  Sew- 
ard, i.  65 ;  editorial  of  Nov.  9, 
1860,  146,  147,  148;  his  "Ameri- 
can Conflict,"  146,  167 

Greenbrier  River,  W.  Va.,  engage- 
ment near,  i.  257-258 

Gregg,  David  McM.,  Gettysburg 
campaign,  ii.  160 

Grierson,  Benjamin  H. ,  raid  near 
Vicksburg,  ii.  148 

Griffin,  Charles,  pursuit  of  Lee,  ii. 
282 

Grimes,  James  VV. ,  committee  on 
conciliation,  i.  96;  in  peace  con- 
ference, 124 

Groesbeck,  William  S.,  in  peace  con- 
ference, i.  124 

Groveton,  Va.,  battle  of  ii.  55 

Guthrie,  James,  in  peace  conference, 
i.  124 

Haines,  Richard,  governor  of  Ken- 
tucky, ii.  120 

Halleck,  Henry  W.,  in  command  at 
St.  Louis,  i.  237,  254 ;  relation  to 
Fort  Henry  campaign,  281,  282  ; 
relations  with  Grant  and  Buell, 
289  ;  attitude,  292  ;  relations  with 
Grant,  298 ;  orders  to  Smith,  '^93, 
294 ;  authority  increased,  295 ; 
orders  to  Pope,  313  ;  Corinth 
campaign,  317-319;  in  command 
of  entire  army,  ii.  41 ;  at  Harri- 
son's Landing,  42 ;  orders  Mc- 
Clellan's  return  from  peninsula, 
43  ;  ignorance  as  to  Pope,  50 ;  plan 
as  to  Chattanooga,  61-62;  com- 
munications with  McClellan,  101 ; 
relations  with  Burnside,  106,  107 ; 
relations  with  Hooker,  159,  161, 
162,  165;  attitude  to  Sherman, 
286 

Hamilton,  Schuyler,  at  New  Madrid, 
i.  215 

Hamlin,  Hannibal,  nomination  to 
vice-presidency,  i.  67  ;  election,  72, 
73  ;  letter  from  Lincoln  to,  ii  100 

Hammond,  James  H.,  at  secession 
conference,  i .  79  ;  resignation  from 
Senate,  79 

Hampton,  Wade,  Carolina  campaign, 
ii.  275 

Hancock,  Winfield  S. ,  at  Williams- 
burg, ii.   17;  at  Gettysburg,  168- 


171,  174,  176;  Wilderness  cam- 
paign, 248-253;  at  Petersburg, 
255 

Hanks,  Lucy,  i.  5 

Hardee,  William  J.,  at  Shiloh.  i. 
296,  298,  300;  sent  to  Chatta- 
nooga, ii.  62  I  Perryville  campaign, 
120;  Murfreesborough  campaign, 
126;  at  Chattanooga,  189-1-02; 
Atlanta  campaign,  239,  243.  245, 
246  ;  Georgia  campaign,  265-266  ; 
Carolina  campaign,  275,  276 

Hardin,  John  J.,  defeated  by  Doug- 
las, i.  13 

Harlan,  James,  in  peace  conference, 
i.  124 

Harlan,  John  M.,  checks  Morgan,  ii. 
130 

Harnden,  Henry,  capture  of  Davis, 
ii.  286 

Harney,  William  8.,  in  command  at 
St.  Louis,  i.  189;  relieved,  190 

Harper's  Perry,  W.  Va.,  massacre,  i. 
29, 36-44,  47  ;  seized  by  Virginians, 
178  ;  Johnston  in  command  at,  209 ; 
occupied  by  McClellan,  ii.  9 ;  capt- 
ured by  southerners,  91,  92 

Harris,  B.  D.,  in  peace  conference, 
i.  124 

Harris,  Isham  G.,  character,  i.  181  ; 
authorized  to  appoint  negotiators, 
182 

Harris,  L.  A.,  Perryville  campaign, 
ii.  121 

Harrison's  Island,  occupied  by  Dev- 
ens,  i.  261  ;  and  by  Lee,  262 

Harrison's  Landing,  Va. ,  McClellan's 
army  at,  ii.  40 ;  Lincoln  at,  41  ; 
Halleck  at,  42 ;  withdrawal  of 
army  from,  47 

Hartsnff,  George  L.,  operations  in 
Tennessee,  ii.  181 

Hatteras,  Fort,  N.  C. ,  attacked,  1. 
268;  taVen,  269 

Havana,  Cuba,  i.  271 

Haxall's  Landing,  Va.,  ii.  34,  36,  37, 
38 

Hayne,  Isaac  W.,  mission  to  Wash- 
ington, i.  108 

Haynie,  Isham  N. ,  at  Fort  Donelson, 
i.  285 

Hayti,  recognition  advocated  by 
Lincoln,  ii.  78;  provision  for  col- 
onization in,  82 

Hayward,  shot  at  Harper's  Ferry,  i. 
38 


332 


INDEX 


Hazen,  William  B. ,  at  Chattanooga, 
ii.  193,195;  capture  of  Fort  Mc- 
Allister, 265 

Heiman,  Fort,  Ky. ,  abandoned,  i. 
282     . 

Heintzelman,  Samuel  P.,  engaged  at 
Manassas,  i.  319,  220,  223 ;  before 
Washington,  259 ;  in  the  penin- 
sula, ii.  23 ;  at  Glendale,  36 ;  at 
Malvern  Hill,  37  ;  under  Pope,  50 

Helper,  Hinton  Rowan,  the  "Im- 
pending Crisis,"  1.  32-34,  47,  72 

Hemphill,  John,  omission  to  vote,  L 
111 

Henderson,  John  B. ,  answers  to 
Lincoln's  plan,  ii.  84 

Henry,  Fort,  Tenn.,  threatened  by 
Smith,  i.  281  ;  captured,  283 

Henry  Hill,  Va.,  defence  of,  i.  231, 
233 ;  ii.  58 

Herndon,  William  H.,  Lincoln's 
partner,  i.  9 

Herndon  Brothers,  sale  to  Lincoln, 
i.  7 

Heth,  Henry,  retires  from  before 
Covington,  ii.  67;  at  Gettysburg, 
167 ;  engagement  witti  Warren, 
207 

Hickman,  Ky.,  occupied  by  Polk,  i. 
350 

Hicks,  Thomas  H. ,  speech  at  Balti- 
more, i.  196 ;  relations  with  na- 
tional government,  197-201  ;  calls 
legislature,  204;  declares  for  the 
Union,  204 

Hill,  Ambrose  P.,  Antietam  cam- 
paign, ii.  94,  95;  at  Chancellors- 
ville,  141 ;  Gettysburg  campaign, 
158-174 ;  Wilderness  campaign, 
248,  249  ;  at  Five  Forks,  278 

Hill,  Daniel  H.,  at  Seven  Pines,  ii. 
24-26  ;  at  M[echanic8ville,  32 ;  at 
Gaines's  Mill,  32 ;  near  Glendale, 
35-37  ;  at  Malvern  Hill,  38,  39  ; 
operations  against  Pope,  47,  53, 
54  ;  Antietam  campaign,  90,  91 ; 
in  North  Carolina,  132,  133;  Car- 
olina campaign,  275 

Hobson,  Edw.  H.,  operations  against 
Morgan,  ii.  182,  183 

HoUins,  George  N.,  work  in  the 
Mississippi,  i.  268;  at  New  Ma- 
drid, 313 

Holmes,  Theophilus  H. ,  near  Centre- 
ville,  i.  259 ;  Vicksburg  campaign, 
ii.  1.54 


Holt,  Joseph,  supports  Buchanan,  i. 
89 ;  influence,  93 ;  becomes  secre- 
tary of  war,  107 

Hood,  John  B.,  operations  against 
Pope,  ii.  47,  57  ;  at  Antietam,  94  ; 
at  Ohickamauga,  186,  187  ;  Atlanta 
campaign,  239,241,  243,346;  op- 
erations against  Thomas,  261,  262, 
266,  267,  269,  270 

Hooker,  Joseph,  before  Washington, 
i.  3.59;  at  Williamsburg,  ii.  16, 17; 
engaged  at  Oak  Grove,  39 ;  en- 
gaged at  Malvern  HiU,  43  ;  oper- 
ations under  Pope,  52-.56,  59;  An- 
tietam campaign,  91,92,  94,95; 
operations  under  Burnside,  108, 
111;  supersedes  Burnside,  113; 
the  Chancellorsville  campaign, 
134-145 ;  operations  preceding 
Gettysburg,  158,  159, 161 ,  162 ;  res- 
ignation, 165;  at  Chattanooga, 
190,  193-194,  196-201;  Atlanta 
campaign,  241,  243 

Hoppin,  William  W.,  in  peace  con- 
ference, i.  124 

House  of  Representatives,  Davis 
and  Lincoln  in,  i.  3,  10;  Stuart 
elected  to,  14  ;  Douglas  elected  to, 
15 ;  action  on  secession,  87 ;  work 
of  conciliation  committee,  101  ; 
withdrawal  of  Southerners,  113 ; 
action  after  Bull  Run,  327  ;  action 
on  Trent  affair,  272 ;  resolution 
on  the  war,  ii.  74;  elections  of 
1863  for,  103 

Houston,  Sam,  attitude  to  seces- 
sion, i.  88,  131 

Howard,  Benjamin  C. ,  in  peace  con- 
ference, i.  184 

Huward,  Oliver  O.,  Chancellorsville 
campaign,  ii.  134, 136, 140  ;  Gettys- 
burg campaign,  161,  166-169,  172; 
sent  to  Rosecrans,  179 ;  at  Chatta- 
nooga, 190,  196,  199,  203-204;  At- 
lanta campaign.  344,  245  ;  Georgia 
campaign,  263,  264  ;  Carolina  cam- 
paign, 274,  275 

Howe,  Albion  P.,  Gettysburg  cam- 
paign, ii.  159 

Howe,  Samuel  G. ,  aids  Brown,  1.  40 

Howell,  W.  B.,  i.  5 

Huger,  Benjamin,  at  Seven  Pines,  ii. 
2.5-27 ;  before  Richmond,  33,  85- 
37  ;  near  .Malvern  Hill,  38 

Humphreys,  Andrew  A.,  pursuit  of 
Lee,ii.  383 


INDEX 


333 


Hunter,  David,  engaged  at  Manassas, 
i.  219,  220,  233 ;  at  St.  Louis,  237 ; 
moves  from  Springfield  to  RoUa, 
254  ;  proclamation  as  to  slavery, 
ii.  82  ;  repudiated  by  Lincoln,  83  ; 
operations  against  Early,  258 

Hunter,  Hobert  M.  T. ,  attitude  to 
conciliation,  i.  96,  98 ;  speech  in 
Senate,  128 ;  statement  as  to  Bu- 
chanan, 152 

Hurlbut,  Stephen  A. ,  sent  to  Charles- 
ton, i.  160  ;  at  Pittsburg  Landing, 
294  ;  ShUoh,  299,  300,  302  ;  Merid- 
ian expedition,  ii.  235 

Imboden,  John  D.,  Gettysburg 
campaign,  ii.  161,  176 

"  Impending  Crisis,"  the,  i.  33 

Indiana,  election  of  1860,  i.  71,  72 

Isabel,  the,  removes  Anderson  from 
Sumter,  i.  171 

Island  No.  10,  Beauregard  retires  to, 
i.  289 ;  expedition  against,  313- 
316  ;  effect  of  capture,  ii.  41 

luka.  Miss. ,  operations  near,  L  294 ; 
battle  of.  ii.  124 

Iverson,  Alfred,  speech  in  Senate,  L 
87-88  ;  omission  to  vote,  111 ;  de- 
parture from  Senate,  112,  115 

Jackson,  Andrew,  i.  14 

Jackson,  Claiborne  F.,  work  for  se- 
cession in  Missouri,  i.  187-191 ; 
renewed,  224;  attempted  seces- 
sion, 249 

Jackson,  Henry  B.,  at  Buffalo  Hill, 
i.  257 

Jackson,  James  S.,  Perry ville  cam- 
paign, ii.  121 

Jackson,  Thomas  J.,  engaged  at 
Manassas,  i.  221,  223  ;  239 ;  rein- 
forced at  Winchester,  258  ;  capt- 
ures Romney,  258  ;  in  the  Shen- 
andoah, ii.  8,  13,  20 ;  his  escape, 
22 ;  the  Richmond  conference,  30  ; 
march  to  White  House,  32,  33  ;  at 
Frazier's  Farm,  3fi,  37  ;  at  Mal- 
vern HiU,  38 ;  operati(ms  against 
Pope,  15-59 ;  Antietam  campaign, 
90-94 ;  opposed  to  McClellan,  103  ; 
operations  against  Bumside,  108, 
110 ;  ChanceUorsvUle  campaign, 
138-141 

Jackson,  Miss.,  convention  at,  L 
104 ;  occupied,  ii.  155 

Jackson,  Fort,  Va.,  capture,  ii.  3,  5 


Jacksonville,  111. ,  Douglas  at,  i.  12 
Jecker,  deal  in  Mexican   bonds,  ii. 

303 
Jefferson  City,  Mo.,  crisis  at,  i.  190; 

seized  by  anti-secessionists,    191 ; 

248 
Jenkins,  Albert  G. ,  Gettysburg  cam- 

Siign,  ii.  161 
nson,  Andrew,  colloquy  with 
Beniamin,  i.  Ill ;  attitude  to  se- 
cession of  Tennessee,  183  ;  intro- 
duces resolution  on  the  war,  ii. 
74  ;  action  on  Sherman-Johnston 
memorandum,  285 ;  policy  as  to 
France  and  Mexico,  308 

Johnson,  Bradley  T.,  telegram  to,  i. 
196 

Johnson,  Edward,  Gettysburg  cam- 
paign, ii.  162,  163,  171,  172 

Johnson,  Herschel  V.,  nominated 
for  vice-presidency,  i.  70 

Johnson,  Reverdy,  in  peace  confer- 
ence, i.  124 

Johnson,  Richard  W. ,  at  Murfrees- 
borough,  ii.  128  ;  at  Chickamauga, 
186  ;  at  Chattanooga,  200 

Johnston,  Albert  Sidney,  L  239 ; 
occupies  Bowling  Green,  252 ; 
sends  aid  to  DoneJson,  284  ;  moves 
to  Corinth,  289,  294 ;  Shiloh  cam- 
paign, 29.5-302 

Jonnston,  Joseph  E.,  in  command  at 
Harper's  Ferry,  i.  209  ;  threatened 
by  Patterson,  21 4  ;  concentrates 
at  Winchester,  214 ;  orders  from 
Davis,  217 ;  march  to  Manassas, 
218;  engaged  at  Manassas.  220- 
223,  239;  at  Centreville,  259;  at 
Manassas,  ii.  8 ;  on  the  Rappa- 
hannock, 13;  in  the  Shenandoah, 
20  ;  reinforced,  24  ;  superseded  by 
Lee,  28 ;  at  Murfreesborough,  126 ; 
Vicksburg  campaign,  150-155 ; 
supersedes  Bragg,  205 ;  Atlanta 
campaign,  239-243;  Carolina  cam- 
paign, 276-277 ;  surrender,  284-286 

Judah,  Henry  M. ,  operations  against 
Morgan,  u.  181, 182 

Kane,  George  P.,  action  at  Balti- 
more, i.  196 

Kansas,  admission,  i.  127 

Kansas-Nebraska  Act,  i.  1,  10,  182; 
ii  229 

Kautz,  August  V. ,  at  Petersburg,  ii. 
256 


334 


INDEX 


Kearny,  Philip,  at  Williamsburg, 
ii.  16,  17 ;  at  Malvern  Hill,  39 ; 
operations  under  Pope,  52,  54-56, 
59 ;  death,  59 

Kearsarge,  the,  destroys  Alabama, 
ii.  294 

Kelley,  Benjamin  F.,  at  Romney,  i. 
258";  after  Gettysburg,  ii.  176 

Kelly,  R.  M.,  ordered  across  the 
Ohio,  i.  249 

Kenesaw  Mountain,  Gra.,  battle  of, 
ii.  241-343 

Kent,  James,  quoted  by  Pollock,  ii. 
298 

Kentucky,  growth  of  towns,  i.  29  ; 
slavery  in,  1858,  34 ;  delegates  in 
Chicago  convention,  66 ;  attitude 
to  call  for  troops,  1 74 ;  secession 
attempted,  191  ;  struggle  for  politi- 
cal control  in,  192-194 ;  controlled 
by  unionists,  250-252 ;  Bragg'a 
invasion,  ii.  61-71 

Kernstown,  Va.,  battle  at,  ii.  14 

Key  West,  Fla. ,  fortifications  not 
seized  by  Confederacy,  i.  135 

Keyes,  Erasmus  D. ,  before  Washing- 
ton, i.  259 ;  in  the  peninsula,  ii. 
22,  50 ;  at  Frazier's  Farm,  34 ; 
near  Glendale,  35,  36 ;  at  Malvern 
Hill,  37,  38  ;  remains  in  peninsula, 
131,  161 

Kilpatrick,  Judson,  approaches 
Richmond,  ii.  145 ;  Gettysburg 
campaign,  175,  176 ;  Georgia  cam- 
paign, 263 

Kmg,  John  A. ,  in  peace  conference, 
i.  124 

King,  Rufus,  at  Groveton,  ii.  55 

Knoxville,  Tenn. ,  i.  239 ;  occupation 
and  siege  of,  ii.  183-184,  194,  202- 
305 

Know-Nothing  Party,  includes  op- 
ponents of  slavery,  i.  30 

Lafayette,  Fort,  Stone  confined 
in,  265 

Laird  and  Sons,  builders  of  sus- 
pected ships,  ii.  292,  293,  299 

Lamon,  Ward  H.,  attends  Lincoln, 
i.  140 ;  sent  to  Charleston,  160 

Lane,  James  H. ,  engagement  at  Dry- 
wood  Creek,  i.  246 

Lane,  Joseph,  nominated  for  vice- 
presidency,  i.  70 

Laurel  Hill,  W.  Va.,  engagements 
near,  i.  211 


Lecompton  controverBy,  effect,  i.  1 ; 
attitude  of  Douglas,  3 ;  46 

Lee,  Robert  E. ,  at  Harper's  Ferry,  i. 
38;  order  of  April  23,  1861,  302; 
resignation,  202 ;  commander  of 
Virginia  troops,  203,  239 ;  in  com- 
mand in  western  Virginia,  255 ; 
Cheat  Mountain,  257 ;  sent  to 
South  Carolina,  258;  supersedes 
Johnston,  ii.  28 ;  conference  with 
Jackson,  30  ;  at  Gaines's  Mill,  32 ; 
at  Glendale,  37 ;  orders  to  Jack- 
son, 45 ;  operations  against  Pope, 
47,  58 ;  Antietam  campaign,  90, 
96;  orders  against  Burnside,  108; 
Chancellorsville  campaign,  135- 
145;  Gettysburg  campaign,  158- 
178 ;  further  operations  against 
Meade,  206-209  ;  Wilderness  cam- 
paign, 248-253 ;  final  campaign, 
277-283 

Lee,  Stephen  D.,  at  Nashville,  ii. 
269,  270 

Lee,  William  H.  P.,  operations 
against  Stoneman,  ii.  145 

Lee,  William  R.,  occupies  Harrison's 
Island,  i.  263 ;  engagement  at  Ball's 
Bluff,  263 

Lefevre,  Shaw,  opinion  on  the  steam 
rams,  ii.  299 

Lefferts,  Marshall,  at  Philadelphia,  i. 
200  ;  at  Washington,  201 

Letcher,  John,  sends  force  to  West- 
em  Virginia,  i.  208 

Lexington,  Mo.,  engagement  at,  i. 
249 

Liberia,  recognition  advocated  by 
Lincoln,  iL  78 ;  provision  for  colo- 
nization in,  82 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  compared  with 
Davis,  i.  2  ;  with  Davis  and  Doug- 
las, 3,  4  ;  early  life,  5-7 ;  entrance 
into  politics,  7;  marriage,  8;  in 
natural  politics,  9,  10 ;  contrasted 
with  Davis  and  Douglas,  16,  17; 
debate  with  Douglas,  19-23 ;  as  a 
lawyer,  23-25 ;  political  position, 
27 ;  nomination  by  Chicago  con- 
vention, 65,  66 ;  election,  72,  73  ;  ef- 
fect of  his  election,  78 ;  conditions 
at  inauguration,  137;  journey  to 
Washington,  139,  140;  inaugura- 
tion, 141 ;  inaugural  address,  141- 
145;  character  of  cabinet,  149; 
relations  with  southern  commis- 
sioners, 159;  plan  to  relieve  Sum- 


INDEX 


335 


ter,  160,  163  ;  first  call  for  troops, 
173 ;  his  theory  of  the  situation, 
172;  his  action,  174;  reception  of 
his  call  for  troops,  175,  188  ;  atti- 
tude to  North  Carolina,  184  ;  proc- 
lamations of  April  19  and  27,  1861, 
184;  attitude  to  Kentucky,  193  ;  re- 
lations with  Maryland  authorities, 
197-201  ;  appointment  of  McClel- 
lan,  207  ;  relations  with  Wheeling 
convention,  208  ;  holds  council  of 
war,  315 ;  message  to  Congress,  227, 
228 ;  given  special  authority  by 
Congress,  230-332  ;  the  Merryman 
case,  235, 236  ;  disavows  Fremont's 
Missouri  proclamation,  248;  dec- 
laration of  blockade,  265 ;  as  to 
piracy,  266 ;  share  in  Port  Royal 
expedition,  370 ;  the  Trent  affair, 
272,  273 ;  message  to  (.'ongress, 
Dec,  1861,  274;  order  of  Jan., 
1863,  377  ;  War  Order  No.  3,  295  ; 
limits  McClellan's  authority,  ii.  12; 
plan  for  operations  in  Virginia,  19  ; 
telegram  to  McClellan,  237  ;  prom- 
ise to  McClellan,  27 ;  relation  to 
McClellan's  plans,  41,  42  ;  restores 
McClellan  to  command,  59;  call 
for  troops,  65 ;  attitude  to  slavery, 
71 ;  inaugural  address,  73 ;  mes- 
sage of  July  4,  1861,  73,  74 ;  atti- 
tude to  confiscation  act,  75  ;  action 
on  Pre'mont'a  proclamation,  76, 
77 ;  message  of  Dec.  3,  1861,  78 ; 
message  of  March  6,  1862,  78,  79; 
conference  with  congressmen,  80 ; 
signs  act  on  slavery  in  District  of 
Columbia,  82 ;  repudiates  Hunter's 
proclamation,  83 ;  conference  with 
border  State  Congressmen,  48 ; 
signs  second  confiscation  act,  85 ; 
reads  emancipation  proclamation 
to  cabinet,  85-87;  preliminary 
emancipation  proclamation,  97- 
100  ;  removal  of  McClellan,  101- 
104 ;  relation  to  Burnside's  opera- 
tions, 107 ;  relieves  Burnside  from 
command,  113  ;  emancipation  proc- 
lamation, 114-118;  relation  to 
Hooker's  plans,  161 ;  advances 
Grant,  190 ;  proclamation  of  Sept. 
24,  1863,  217;  proclamsition  of 
Sept.  15,  1863,  217,  218 ;  approves 
statute  on  West  Virginia,  330 ; 
proclamation  on  West  Virginia, 
331 ;  Grant's  despatch,  etc. ,  251 ; 


action  on  Lee's  request,  377 ;  as- 
sassinated, 384 

Logan,  John  A.,  in  Corinth  cam- 
paign, i.  318 

Logan,  Stephen  T.,  in  peace  confer- 
ence, i.  124. 

Logan's  Cross  Roads,  Ky. ,  battle  of, 
i.  379,  280 

Longstreet,  James,  at  Williamsburg, 
ii.  17 ;  at  Seven  Pines,  25,  26  ;  near 
Glendale,  35-37  ;  at  Malvern  Hill, 
38  ;  operations  against  Pope,  47- 
49, 54-58  ;  Antietam  campaign,  90, 
91,93;  at  Culpeper,  103;  opera- 
tions against  Burnside,  107,  108  ; 
sent  to  Petersburg,  liJ3  ;  at  Suf- 
folk, 133 ;  Gettysfcurg  campaign, 
1.58-178;  at  Chickamauga,  187, 
188;  operations  at  Chattanooga, 
189,  190,  192 ;  movement  against 
Knoxville,  194,  195,  201-305  ;  Wil- 
derness campaign,  249,  350 ;  Pe- 
tersburg, 278,  381 

Lookout  Mountain,  Tenn. ,  battle  of, 
ii.  197 

Loring,  William  W.,  sent  to  Jack- 
son, i.  358 ;  Vicksburg  campaign, 
ii,  149 

Louisiana  delegates  leave  Charles- 
ton convention,  i.  .54  ;  legislature 
calls  convention,  87;  senators  ad- 
vise secession,  102;  secedes,  112; 
mentioned  in  call  for  troops,  173 

Louisville,  the,  at  Fort  Donelson,  i. 
286 

Lovell,  Mansfield,  in  Corinth  cam- 
paign, i.  318 ;  at  New  Orleans,  ii. 
2,5 

Lyon,  Nathaniel,  work  against  seces- 
sion in  Missouri,  L  187-191  ;  suc- 
cess, 234 ;  in  command  at  Spring- 
field, 336 ;  operations  against 
Price,  243,  244  ;  battle  of  Wilson's 
Creek,  246  ;  effect  of  his  death,  246 

Lyons,  Lord,  the  Trent  affair,  i.  273 

Lytle,  William  H.,  Perryville  cam- 
paign, ii.  131 

McAllister,  Fort,  capture  of,  ii. 
365 

McCall,  George  A.,  before  Washing- 
ton, i.  2.59;  at  Dranesville,  360; 
sent  to  McClellan,  ii.  28 ;  at  Me- 
chanicsville,  31,  33 ;  at  Gaines's 
Mill,  33 

McClellan,  George  B. ,  appointed  to 


386 


INDEX 


oemmand  Ohio  troops,  i.  106 ; 
given  command  of  department  of 
Ohio,  207 ;  work  in  western  Vir- 
ginia, 207-209 ;  orders  crossing  of 
the  Ohio,  209;  at  Grafton,  210; 
at  Rich  Mountain,  211 ;  plans,  212, 
213;  called  to  Washington,  223, 
236  ;  succeeds  Scott,  254 ;  work  of 
organization,  259;  orders  recon- 
noissance,  260 ;  orders  to  Stone, 
261  ;  near  Call's  Bluff,  264  ;  given 
chief  command,  265  ;  effect  on 
Lincoln,  277  ;  orders  to  Grant  for 
Kentucky  campaign,  281  ;  orders 
to  Halleck,  290 ;  attitude,  292 ;  au- 
thority restricted,  295  ;  illness,  ii. 
8  ;  plan  against  Richmond,  9  ;  au- 
thority limited,  12  ;  operations  in 
the  Peninsula,  14-18,  23-43,  45, 
47 ;  restored  to  command,  59,  60, 
87 ;  at  Aquia,  50 ;  the  Antietam 
campaign,  89-96 ;  his  final  removal 
from  command,  103-105 

McClernand,  John  A.,  sent  against 
Columbus,  i.  281  ;  Fort  Henry, 
282  ;  Fort  Donelson,  284,  285,  287  ; 
at  Savannah,  Tenn.,295;  Shiloh, 
297,  299,  304;  Vicksburg,  cam- 
paign, ii.  152 

McCook,  Alexander  McD. ,  at  Shiloh 
i.  304,  305  ;  Corinth  campaign,  319 
Perryville  campaign,  ii.  120-123 
Murfreesborough,     126  -  138  ;     at 
Chickamanga,  18.5-188 

McCook,  Daniel,  Perryville  cam- 
paign, ii.  121 ;  operations  against 
Wheeler,  191 

McCown,  John  P.,  at  New  Ma,drid, 
i.  313 

McCulloch,  Benjamin,  i.  239  ;  joins 
Price,  244  ;  retires  from  Missouri, 
246  ;  again  joins  Price,  249 ;  Pea 
Ridge  campaign,  307-310 

McDowell,  Irvin,  under  Scott,  i.  215 
plans   Manassas  movement,    216 
starts  toward  Centreville,  216, 217 
arrives,  218 ;  plan  of  battle,  219 
the  battle  of  BuU  Run,  220-222 
before  Washington,  259  ;  detained 
by  Lincoln,  ii.  13,  14;  placed  un- 
der Pope,   41 ;    operations    under 
Pope,  48,  50,  53-57,  59 

Mcintosh,  James,  Pea  Ridge  cam- 
paign, i.  307,  310 

Mackall,  W.  W. ,  at  New  Madrid,  i. 
316 


McKean,  William  W. ,  in  command 
of  Gulf  Squadron,  i.  237 

McLaws,  Lafayette,  Antietam  cam- 
paign, ii.,90,  91;  Chancellorsville 
campaign,  138  ;  at  Gettysburg,  171 

McLean,  Wilmer,  Lee  surrenders  at 
house  of,  ii.  283 

McPherson,  James  B..  Vicksburg 
campaign,  ii.  149-151  ;  Meridian 
expedition,  235  ;  Atlanta  cam- 
paign, 239,  240,  242-344 

McRae,  Port,  Fla.,  seized,  i.  269 

Magoffin,  Beriah,  refuses  to  call 
troops,  i.  191,  192 ;  attitude  to  na- 
tional government,  194 

Magruder,  John  B.,  resigns,  i.  203; 
in  command  at  Yorktown,  210  ; 
force,  215,  259 ;  siege  of  York- 
town,  ii.  14-16  ;  before  Richmond, 
33-37 ;  at  Malvern  Hill,  38 

Magruder,  Fort,  Va. ,  engagement  at, 
ii.  16;  17 

Maine,  election  of  1860,  i.  71 

Mallory,  Stephen  R. ,  on  caucus 
committee,  i.  103 ;  in  cabinet  of 
Confederacy,  122 

Malvern  Hill,  Va.,  operations  near, 
ii.  35,  36;  battle  at,  37-39 

Manassas,  Va.,  Beauregard  in  com- 
mand at,  i.  209 ;  advance  upon, 
considered,  215, 216  ;  Johnston  ar- 
rives at,  218 ;  the  battle  at,  220- 
233 ;  effect  of  victory,  236  ;  John- 
ston's situation  at,  ii  8  ;  occupied 
by  federals,  13 ;  battle  at,  57 

Manassas,  the,  work  in  the  Missis- 
sippi, i.  268 ;  at  New  Orleans, 
ii.4 

Manassas  Junction,  Va.,  capture  of, 
ii.  51,  52 

Mansfield,  Joseph  K.,  Antietam 
campaign,  ii.  91,  92,  94,  95 

Manson,  Slahlon  D. ,  battle  of  Rich- 
mond, ii.  66,  67 

Marshall,  Humphrey,  joins  the  Con- 
federates, i.  232 ;  engagement  at 
Middle  Creek,  278 

Maryland,  slavery  in,  1858,  i.  34  ; 
delegates  in  Chicago  convention, 
66 ;  attitude  to  call  for  troops,  175  ; 
struggle  for  political  control  in, 
196,  204 

Maryland,  the,  taken  by  Butler,  i. 
200 

Mason,  James  M.,on  Harper's  Ferry 
eommittee  of  Senate,  i.  37 ;  speech 


INDEX 


337 


in  Senate,  128 ;  the  Trent  affair, 
270-274 

Massachusetts,  troops  mobbed  in 
Baltimore,  i.  178  ;  troops  at  An- 
napolis, 200,  202 ;  troops  at  Ball's 
Bluff,  2rt2-264 

"  Massachusett's  State  Kansas  com- 
mittee," i.  40,  41 

Maury,  Dabney  H. ,  abandons  Mo- 
bile, ii.  274 

Maximilian,  his  empire  in  Mexico,  ii. 
3u7,  310 

Maynard,  Horace,  attitude  to  seces- 
sion of  Tennessee,  i.  183  ;  answer 
to  Lincoln's  plan,  ii.  84 

Meade,  George  G.,  operations  under 
Burnside,  ii.  110-112  ;  Chancel- 
lorsville  campaign,  134,  136,  139, 
142  ;  Gettysburg  campaign,  166- 
177  ;  further  operations  against 
Lee,  206-209;  operations  against 
Richmond,  239 ;  Wilderness  cam- 
paign, 248  ;  at  Petersburg,  260,  281 

Meagher,  Thomas  F.,  at  Seven  Pines, 
ii.  27  ;  at  Gaines's  Mill,  33 ;  at 
Antietam,  95 

Mechanicsville,  Va. ,  ii.  23  ;  battle  at, 
31 

Memminger,  Charles  G. ,  in  cabinet 
of  Confederacy,  i.  122 

Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad, 
i.  289,  292,  293,  294 ;  ii.  62,  125 

Meridian,  Miss.,  expedition  against, 
li.  234,  235 

Merrimac,  the,  engagement  with 
Monitor,  ii.  9-11 

Merryman,  John,  case  of,  i.  235 

Mexico,  war  with,  i.  10  ;  the  French 
in,  ii.  300 ;  disturbed  conditions, 
301-304;  Empire  of  Maximilian, 
304-309 

Middle  Creek,  Ky. ,  engagement  at, 
i.  278 

Middlebury,  Vt.,  Douglas  at,  i.  12 

Miles,  Dixon  S. ,  in  reserve  at  Ma- 
nassas, i.  219 ;  surrender  at  Har- 
per's Ferry,  ii.  93 

Military  Department,  See  Depart- 
ment 

Military  District,  See  District 

Mill  Springs,  Ky.,  fortified  bv  Zolli- 
coffer,  i.  279;  battle  of,  280;  re- 
sulting arrest  of  Crittenden,  296, 
317 

Milligan,  ex  parte,  ii.  216 

Milroy,  Robert  H. .  in  the  Shenan- 

VOL.  II.— 22 


doah,  ii.  20,  161  ;  battle  of  Win- 
chester, 162 

Minnesota,  admission  of,  i.  51 

Minnesota,  Territory,  i.  20 

Minnesota,  the,  engaged  at  Hamp- 
ton Roads,  ii.  10,  11 

Missionary  Ridge,  Tenn. ,  battle  of, 
ii.  199 

Mississippi,  delegates  leave  Charles- 
ton convention,  i.  54 ;  legislature 
calls  convention,  87  ;  senators  ad- 
vise secession,  102  ;  secedes,  104 ; 
mentioned  in  call  for  troops,  172 

Mississippi  River,  hostilities  on,  i. 
268 ;  objective,  277  ;  operations  on, 
313-316,  320  ;  capture  of  New  Or- 
leans, ii.  1-5 

Mis.souri  Compromise,  i.  31 ;  attitude 
of  Bell  to,  181 ;  ii.  229 

Missouri,  slavery  in,  in  1858,  i.  34 ; 
delegates  in  Chicago  convention, 
66;  attitude  to  call  for  troops, 
175;  secession  attempted,  186; 
disturbances  in,  187-191  ;  martial 
law  in,  247 ;  attempted  secession, 
349 

Mitchel,  Ormsby  M.,  sent  to  Mur- 
freesborough,  i.  295  ;  on  the  Ten- 
nessee, ii.  62;  Perry ville  cam- 
paign, 121 

Mitchell,  John  K.,  at  New  Orleans, 
ii.  34 

Mobile,  Ala.,  occupation  of,  ii.  273 

Monitor,  the,  engagement  with  J/cr- 
rimac,  ii.  10,^11 

Monroe,  John  T. ,  at  capture  of  New 
Orleans,  ii.  5 

Monroe  Doctrine,  Seward  and  the, 
ii.  304,  310 

Monroe,  Fortress,  headquarters  of 
Butler,  i.  215;  expedition  from, 
270 ;  Slidell  and  Mason  at,  271  ; 
McClellan's  army  at.  ii.  13  ;  garri- 
son ordered  to  McClellan,  27; 
Davis  confined  at,  287 

Monterey,  Davis  at,  i.  2 

Montgomery,  J.  E.,  at  Memphis  and 
Fort  Pillow,  i.  320 

Montgomery,  Ala.,  state  convention 
at,  i.  104 ;  general  convention,  116 

Morehead,  arrested,  i.  252 

Morell,  George  W. ,  at  Gaines's  Mill, 
ii.  32  ;  at  Cumberland  Gap,  65,  70; 
avoids  Kirby  Smith,  71 

Morgan,  John  H.,  joins  the  Confed- 
erates, i.  252 ;  raids  in  Kentucky, 


338 


INDEX 


ii.  63,  64,  125  ;  checked  by  Harlan, 
130  ;  in  Ohio  and  Indiana,  181-183 

Morgan  County,  111.,  political  ma- 
chine, i.  13,  14 

Morrill,  Lot  M.,  in  peace  confer- 
ence, i.   124 

Morris,  Thomas  A.,  engagement  at 
Philippi,  i.  209;  at  Laurel  HiU, 
211  ;  at  Carrick's  Ford,  212 

Morrison,  William  R. ,  at  Fort  Don- 
elson,  i.  285 

Morse,  the,  operation^  against  Mor- 
gan, ii.  183 

Moultrie,  Fort,  left  by  Anderson,  i. 
93  ;  seized  by  South  Carolina,  94, 
105 

Mulligan,  James  A.,  sent  to  Lexing- 
ton, Mo. ,  i.  248 ;  defeated  by 
Price,  249 

Munford,  Campbell's  letter  to,  i. 
1.58 

Murfreesborough,  Tenn.,  Johnston 
at,  i.  289,  291 ;  Mitchel  sent  to, 
295,  297;  raided  by  Forrest,  ii. 
64 ;  Nelson  at,  64 ;  battle  of,  126- 
130 

Nashville,  Tenn.  ,  secessionist 
meeting  at,  i.  180;  camp  at,  224, 
239  ;  foundry  at,  242  ;  Confederates 
retire  toward,  280 ;  fight  for  con- 
trol of,  284,  289 ;  operations 
around,  290,  291,  296  ;  battle  of,  ii. 
269,  270 

Natchez,  Miss.,  occupied,  ii.  6 

"  National  Kansas  Aid  Committee," 
i.  40 

National  Nominating  Conventions, 
Democratic  at  Charleston,  1860,  i. 
50-.54 ;  Democratic  at  Baltimore, 
186i>,  .55,  69  ;  Democratic  at  Rich- 
mond, 1860,  55,  70  ;  Republican  at 
Chicago,  1860,  58-67 

Nebraska  Democrats,  i.  10 

Negley,  James  S. ,  at  Murfrees- 
borough, ii.  129 ;  at  Chickamauga, 
186 

Nelson,  William,  operations  in  Ken- 
tucky, i.  19t5, 278 ;  sent  to  Donelson, 
290  ;  at  JSashville,  2tK),  291 ;  Shiloh 
campaign,  296,  303-o05;  Corinth 
campaign,  319 ;  in  Murfrees- 
borough, ii.  64  ;  occupies  McMinn- 
ville,  65  ;  relieved  by  Thomas,  65  ; 
bat'le  of  Richmond,  66,  67 

Nelson,     William,     relation      with 


Southern  commissioners,  i.  154- 
161 

New  Hope  Church,  Ga.,  battle  of,  ii. 
240 

New  Madrid,  Mo. ,  i.  289 ;  expedition 
against,  313-314;  eflFect  of  capt- 
ure, ii.  41 

New  Mexico,  admission  proposed,  i 
109;  modified  proposition,  132 

New  Orleans,  La.,  supplies  from,  i. 
242  ;  share  in  local  hostilities,  268; 
ex]iedition  against,  ii.  1-4 

New  Salem,  111. ,  Lincoln  at,  i.  6,  7 

Newton,  John,  at  Etham's  Landing, 
ii.  17;  under  Burnside,  113;  at 
Gettysburg,  169,  172 

New  York,  troops  at  Philadelphia,  i. 
200  ;  at  Washington,  201  ;  troops 
at  Ball's  Bluff,  203,  264 ;  riots  at, 
u.  178 

New  York  Daily  News,  the  copies 
seized,  li.  220 

New  York  Tribune,  the  editorial  of 
November  9,  1860,  i.  146,  147,  168 

Norfolk,  Va.,  ISee  Gosport  Navy 
Yard 

North  Carolina,  slavery  in,  18.58,  i. 
34;  attitude  to  call  for  troops,  174; 
secedes,  183 ;  blockade  proclama- 
tion against,  184 ;  blockade-run- 
ning, 267 

Northern  Democrats,  i.  46,  47 ;  in 
Charleston  convention,  .53,  54 ; 
join  Republican  party,  70 ;  atti- 
tude to  secession,  88 

Northern  Whigs,  See  Whigs,  North- 
ern 

Noyes,  William  Curtis,  in  peace  con- 
ference, i.  124 

Oak  Grove,  Va.  ,  engagement  at.  ii. 

29 
Offut,  Denton,  employer  of  Lincoln, 

i.  6 
Oglesby,  Richard  B.,  works  for  Lin- 
coln, i.  65 
Okalona,  engagement  at,  ii.  335 
Olustee,  Fla.,  engagement  at.  ii.  238 
Opdvcke,  Emerson,  at  Franklin,  ii. 

268 
Opelousas,  Va.,  occupied  by  Banks, 

ii.  148 
Opequon,  Va.,  battle  of,  ii.  258 
Orangeburg,  S.  C. ,  engagement  at,  ii. 

Ord,  Edward  O.  C,  engagement  &t 


INDEX 


339 


Dranesville,  i.  265 ;  Corinth  cam- 
paign, ii.  134 ;  at  Petersburg,  280  ; 
pursuit  of  Lee,  281.  282 

Oregon,  admission  of,  i.  51  ;  demo- 
crats of,  51  ;  Davis's  speech  on,  17 

Orr,  James  L. ,  commission  from 
8outh  Carolina,  i.  90 

Orth,  Godlove  8.,  in  peace  confer- 
ence, i.  124 

Osterhaus,  Peter,  battle  of  Pea 
Ridge,  i.  309-310  ;  at  Chattanooga, 
196-197 

Pacific  Railways,  Chaxleston  plat- 
form on,  i.  52 

Paducah,  Ky.,  occupied  by  Grant, 
1.250 

Palmer,  John  M. ,  in  peace  confer- 
ence, i.  124  ;  at  Chickamauga,  ii. 
186  ;  at  Chattanooga,  197  ;  Knox- 
ville  operations,  202 

Paris,  Congress  of,  i.  266 

Parke,  John  G.,  defence  of  Knox- 
viUe,  ii.  204 

Patterson,  Robert,  commands  de- 
partment of  Pennsylvania,  i.  203  ; 
threatens  Harper's  Ferry,  214 ; 
occupies  Martinsburg,  214  ;  moves 
to  Bunker  Hill,  216 ;  his  blunder, 
217 

Payne,  Henry  B.,  in  Charlestown 
convention,  i.  52,  53 

Pe^cp  Conference,  See  Union  Peace 
Conference 

Peacli  Tree  Creek,  Ga. ,  battle  of,  ii. 
243 

Peck,  John  J.,  operations  at  Suffolk, 
Va.,  ii.  131,  133 

Pegram,  John,  surrenders  at  Rich 
Mountain,  i.  211 

Pemberton,  John  C,  Vicksburg 
campaign,  ii.  149-154 

Pennsylvania,  election  of  1860,  i.  71, 
72;  troops  at  Washington,  178 

Perry,  the,  capture  of  the  Savan- 
nah, i.  266 

Perryville,  Ky.,  battle  of,  ii.  121-123 

Petersburg,  Va.,  Longstreet's  base, 
ii.  132 ;  operations  against,  255, 
256,  260,  279 

Pettigrew,  J.  Johnston,  in  North 
Carolina,  ii.  132 

Pettus,  Edmund  W.,  at  Chatta- 
nooga, ii.  197 

Phelps,  John  W.,  at  Ship  Island,  i. 
269 ;  at  New  Orleans,  ii.  5 


Philadelphia,  Pa.,  attitude  to  slav- 
ery, i.  148 

Philippi,  W.  "Va. ,  engagement  at, 
i.  209,  211 

Phillips,  Wendell,  opinion  of  Lin- 
coln's nomination,  i.  66 ;  speech 
on  becession,  148-149 

Pickens,  Francis  W. ,  elected  gover- 
nor of  South  Carolina,  i.  79  ;  de- 
mands surrender  of  Sumter,  108  ; 
allows  Fox  to  visit  Sumter,  100  ; 
his  despatch  to  Campbell,  161 ; 
formal  notice  served,  162, 163 

Pickens.  Fort,  S.  C. ,  not  seized  by 
Confederacy,  i.  135  ;  policy  of  ad- 
ministration, 158  ;  attacked,  269 

Pickett,  George  B.,  at  Gettysburg, 
ii.  172-174;  captured,  281 

Pierpont,  Francis  H. ,  elected  gover- 
nor of  Virginia,  i.  210;  asks  help, 
210 

Pike,  Albert,  Pea  Ridge  campaign, 
i.  307,  312 

Piketon,  Ky.,  engagement  near,  i. 
278 

Pillow,  Gideon  J.,  i.  239;  engage- 
ment at  Belmont,  253  ;  Fort  Don- 
elson  campaign,  284,  286-288 

Pillovf,  Fort,  Tenn. ,1.319;  evacuated, 
320  ;  taken  by  Forrest,  ii.  235,  236 

Pinkerton,  Allan,  i.  139 

Pittsburg  Landing,  Tenn.,  Sher- 
man at,  i.  294 ;  concentration  at, 
295;  situation  at,  296-298;  the 
battle  near,  300-306,  317,  319 

Pittsburg,  the,  at  Island  No.  10,  i. 
316 

Platform,  Democratic  of  1856,  i.  46, 
53,  55;  Democratic  of  1860, 
Charleston,  51 -.53,  61;  Repub- 
lican of  1860,  .59-(>4 ;  basie  of  the 
Republican,  98 ;  relation  of  Repub- 
lican platform  to  slavery,  ii.  72; 
Republican  of  I860,  73 

Pleasanton,  Alfred,  at  Chancellors- 
ville,  ii.  141  ;  Gettysburg  cam- 
paign, 1.59,  160,  163.  174 

Polk,  Leonidas,  i.  239  ;  occupies 
Hickman  and  Columbus,  250  ;  re- 
lations with  Kentucky  legislature, 
251  ;  engagement  at  Belmont,  2.',3  ; 
at  Corinth,  289,  294 ;  Shiloh,  290, 
298,  :^00 ;  sent  to  Chattanooga,  ii. 
62;  Perryville  campaign,  120,  121, 
123  ;  at  Murfreesborough,  126  ;  at 
Chickamauga,  186,  187  ;  at   Chat- 


340 


INDEX 


tanooga,  189 ;  at  Meridian,  235 ; 
Atlanta  campaign,  239,  241 

Pollock,  Baron,  opinion  in  Alexan- 
dra case,  296, 298 

Pope,  John,  expedition  against  New 
Madrid,  i.  313,  314 ;  against  Island 
No.  10,  315,  316  ;  effect,  317  ;  Cor- 
inth campaign,  317-319 ;  command 
increased,  ii.  41 ;  his  plans,  42 ; 
operations  in  northeastern  Vir- 
ginia, 44-58 ;  superseded,  59 

"  Popular  Sovereignty,"  i.  15,  19,  20, 
27,  46,  47,  51,  5  i,  58.  See  "  Squat- 
ter Sovereignty" 

Porter,  David  D. ,  at  New  Orleans, 
ii.  3,  5;  near  Vicksburg,  146-149; 
on  the  Red  River,  2b6,  237;  at 
Pert  Fisher,  272,  273 

Porter,  Fitz  John,  before  Washing- 
ton, i.  259  ;  at  Gaines's  Mill,  ii.  23 ; 
engaged  with  Branch,  24 ;  at 
Gaines's  Mill,  32,  3::i ;  at  Malvern 
Hill,  36-38;  at  Aquia,  50;  at 
Groveton,  55-57 ;  at  Manassas,  58 ; 
at  Chantilly,  59 

Portertield,  G.  A. ,  sent  with  force  to 
western  Virginia,  i.  208  ;  engage- 
ment at  Philippi,  209  ;  aid  sent  to, 
210 

Port  Gibson,  Miss.,  capture  of,  ii. 
149 

Port  Hudson,  La.,  objective  of 
Bragg,  ii.  61  ;  capture  of,  155 

Port  Royal,  S.  C,  expedition  to,  i. 
268;  captured,  269,  270 

Powell,  Lazarus  W.,  on  committee 
on  conciliation,  i.  96  ;  proposes 
amendment  to  Crittenden  resolu- 
tions, 132 

Powhatan,  the,  ordered  to  Fort 
Pickens,  i.  163 

Prentiss,  Benjamin  M. ,  in  command 
at  Cairo,  i.  236  ;  superseded,  237  ; 
in  Shiloh  campaign,  295,  297,  299, 
300,  302 

Preston,  William,  joins  the  Confeder- 
ates, i.  '2.52 

Prestonburg,  Ky. ,  engagement  near, 
i  278 

Price,  Rodman  M.,  in  peace  confer- 
ence, i.  124 

Price,  Sterling,  work  in  Missouri, 
i.  2:i4-2i9  ;  movements  against 
Lyon,  243 ;  engagement  with  Sigel, 
244 ;  battle  of  Wilson's  Creek,  245  ; 
engagement    at    Drywood    Creek, 


246  ;  occupies  Fort  Scott,  246 ;  de- 
feats Mulligan,  2-19 ;  joins  Mc- 
Culloch  at  Aeosho,  249;  occupies 
Cassville,  249  ;  occupies  Spring- 
Held,  254  ;  at  Corinth,  306  ;  oper- 
ations against  Curtis,  307 ;  battle 
of  Pea  Ridge,  308-311  ;  Corinth 
campaign,  318  ;  occupies  luka,  ii. 

Pritchard,  Benjamin  D.,  capture  of 
Davis,  ii.  286 

Prussia,  relations  with  United 
States,  ii.  313 

Pugh,  George  E. ,  in  Charleston  con- 
vention, i.  53 ;  vote  in  Senate,  58 

Rains,  James  E.,  engagement  with 
L>on,  i.  245 

Raleigh,  N  C,  convention  at,  i.  183 

Raymond,  Miss.,  engagement  at,  ii. 
150 

Reagan,  John  H.,  in  cabinet  of  Con- 
federacy, i.  1:^2 

Reno,  Jesse  L.,  at  Roanoke  Island, 
ii.  9  ;  Culpeper.  47 ;  operations 
under  Pope,  48,  50,  52,  54-56,  59 ; 
Antietam  campaign,  91 

Republican  party,  relation  to  views 
of  Lincoln,  L  26 ;  relation  of 
Clay  to  its  principles,  31 ;  absorbs 
Northern  Whigs,  32  ;  reason  for 
success  in  1860,  64 ;  election  of 
1860,  71-73  ;  basis  of  its  platform, 
98 ;  relation  to  plans  of  Toombs 
and  Crittenden,  99 ;  attitude  to 
secession,  115;  relation  of  leaders 
to  conciliation,  131-134;  abolition- 
ist wing  of,  148  ;  relation  to 
slavery,  ii.  71  ;  Chicago  platform, 
73  ;  Its  platform  realized,  84 

Resaca,  Ga. ,  occupation  of ,  ii.  240 

Reynolds,  John  F. ,  operations  under 
Pope,  ii.  50,  52,  58;  Chancellors- 
ville  campaign,  134,  137,  139,  142  ; 
Gettysburg  campaign,  161, 166,  167 

Reynolds,  Joseph  J.,  in  western 
Virginia,  i.  2.56;  at  Cheat  Mountain 
and  Buffalo  Hill,  ii.  57  ;  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  187,  188 

Rhett,  Robert  B,,  theory  of  the 
constitution,  i.  17, 18 ;  opinion  on 
secession  movement,  ii.  116 

Rhode  Island,  attitude  of  Democratic 
war  governor,  i.  175 

Rice,  Henry  M. ,  committee  on  con- 
ciliation, i.  96 


INDEX 


341 


Rich  Mountain,  W.  Va.,  engage- 
ment at,  i.  21 1 

Richardson,  Israel  B. ,  at  Antietam, 
ii.  95 

Richardson,  Fort,  captured,  ii.  135 

Richmond,  Ky. ,  battle  at,  ii.  66,  67 

Richmond,  Va. ,  action  of  convention 
at,  i.  1 T7 ;  congress  at,  .309 ;  Lee 
in  command  at,  210 ;  foundry  at, 
242 ;  objective,  277 ;  operations 
against,  ii.  260 

Riclimond,  the,  attacks  Fort  Mc- 
Rae,  i.  269 

Ricketts,  James  B. ,  at  Cedar  Moun- 
tain, ii.  46 ;  under  Pope,  54,  58 

Rives,  William  C. ,  in  peace  confer- 
ence, i.  124 ;  conversation  with 
Lincoln,  140 

Roanoke  Island,  N.  C,  expedition 
against,  ii.  8,  9 

Rodes,  Robert  B.,  Gettysburg  cam- 
paign, ii.  163,  171 

Rodney,  George  B. ,  in  peace  confer- 
ence, i.  124 

Roebuck,  John  A.,  opinion  on  the 
steam  rams,  ii.  300 

Rolla,  Mo.,  i.  244.245;  Sturgis  re- 
treats to,  246,  247,  248  ;  headquar- 
teis  of  Hunter,  354  ;  Curtis  moves 
from,  307 

Roman,  A.  B. ,  commissioner  to 
Washington,  i.  151 

Romney,  W.  Va.,  captured  by  Jack- 
son, i.  258 

Rosecrans,  William  S.,  in  command 
in  western  Virginia,  i.  236,  255 ; 
engagement  at  Carnifex  Ferry, 
256 ;  against  Lee,  257  ;  supersedes 
Biiell,  ii.  124;  Corinth  campaign, 
124,  125  ;  Murfreesboi  ough  cam- 
paign, 126-130  ;  reinforced,  179  ; 
Chickamauga  campaign,  180,  183- 
189;  superseded  by  Thomas,  193 

Rousseau,  Lovell  H. ,  organizes  Ken- 
tucky troops,  i.  194 ;  PerryviUe 
campaign,  ii.  121 ;  at  Murfreesbor- 
ough, 128 

Ruffin,  Thomas,  in  peace  conference, 
1.  124 

Runyon,  Theodore,  in  Manassas 
campaign,  i.  219,  230 

Russell,  David  A. ,  Gettysburg  cam- 
paign, ii.  160 ;  operations  against 
Lee.  208 

Russell,  Lord,  opinion  on  the  steam 
rams,  iL  299 


Russia,  relations  with  United  States, 

ii.  313 
Rutledge,  Annie,  Lincoln's  fiancee, 

i.  8 

Sabine  Cross  Roads,  La.,  battle 
of,  ii.  337 

St.  Albans,  Vt.,  the  raid  at,  ii.  311 

St.  Louis,  the,  at  Fort  Donelson,  i. 
386 

St.  Louis,  Mo.,  Douglas  at,  i.  13; 
attempt  to  seize  arsenal  at,  187; 
headquarters  of  Fremont,  236 ; 
headquarters  of  Halleck,  237 

St.  Philip,  Fort,  La.,  capture,  ii 
8-5 

St.  Thomas,  B.  W.  L,  i.  271 

Sandford,  Charles  W.,  operations 
under  Patterson,  i.  217,  218 

San  Jacinto,  the,  in  the  Trent  afiTair, 
i.  271 

Santa  Fe,  N.  M.,  occupied,  ii.  6 

Santa  Rosa  Island,  Fla. ,  occupied,  i. 
269 

Savage  Station,  Va. ,  engagement  at, 
ii.  35 

Savannah,  the,  capture  and  case  of , 
i.  266,  267 

Schenck,  Robert  C,  in  the  Shenan- 
doah, ii.  20,  162 

Schoepf,  Albin,  operations  in  Ken- 
tucky, i.  278;  at  Mill  yprings, 
279,  280  ;  PerryviUe  campaign,  IL 
122 

Schofield,  George  W. ,  Atlanta  cam- 
paign, ii.  239,  248,  244,  246 ;  oppra- 
tions  against  Hood,  262,  266- 
368,  270 ;  Carolina  campaign,  276, 
277 

Schurz,  Carl,  at  Chancellorsville,  ii. 
140  ;  Gettysburg  campaign,  168 

Scott,  Winfield,  prepares  for  Lin- 
coln's inauguration,  i  141  ;  opin- 
ion as  to  bumter,  155,  160 ;  pro- 
vision for  attack,  176,  179 ;  letter 
from  Crittenden,  192 ;  consulted 
by  Lincoln,  198 ;  letter  from  Lee, 
202 ;  force  under  his  commaud, 
215  ;  attitude  to  Manassas  move- 
ment, 215,  216;  retires,  2.54 

Scott,  Fort,  Kan.,  occupied  by 
Brice,  i.  246 

Secession,  theory,  i.  74,  75  ;  discussed, 
75-78  ;  acts  of  South  Carolina,  78, 
79 ;  of  Georgia,  80 ;  the  opinion  of 
Attorney-General   Black,  80,  81  ; 


342 


INDEX 


President  Buchanan's  message,  82- 
87  ;  speeches  in  the  Senate,  87,  88  ; 
final  action  of  South  Carolina,  88  ; 
ordinances  passed,  104  ;  the  cau- 
cus of  Senators,  103 ;  act  of 
Georgia,  112;  of  Louisiana,  112; 
Rhett's  opinion,  ll'i  ;  act  of  Texas, 
121 ,  122  ;  Lini'oln's  opinion  of  effect 
of  ordinances,  14:^  ;  of  New  York 
city  proposed,  147;  action  of  Vir- 
ginia, 177,  178  ;  action  of  Tennes- 
see, 18o  ;  action  of  North  Caro- 
lina, 18o-185  ;  action  of  Arkansas, 
186;  attempted  in  Missouri,  18li, 
187,  191  ;  mock  action  in  Missouri, 
249 

Seddon,  James  A.,  in  peace  confer- 
ence, i.  124 

Sedgwick,  John,  at  Antietam,  ii. 
95 ;  ChanceUorsville  campaign, 
i;-54,  137,  139,  142-144 ;  Gettysburg 
campaign,  159,  160,  166,  lti9,  172; 
operations  against  Lee,  207,  208 ; 
Wilderness  campaign,  248-250 

Selma,  Ala.,  expedition  against,  ii. 
234 

Senate  of  the  United  States,  Lincoln 
a  candidate  for.  i.  10;  Trumbull 
elected  to,  10;  Douglas  elected  to, 
21 ;  Douglas  a  candidate  for,  15 ; 
excitement  in,  47  ;  resolution  of 
Davis,  47 ;  speech  by  Wigfall,  55, 
56  ;  discussion  and  adoption  of  the 
Davis  resolutions,  n7,  58 ;  with- 
drawal of  Southern  members,  87  ; 
work  of  conciliation  committee, 
96-101 ;  caucus  of  Southen  mem- 
bers, 103  ;  withdrawal  of  Souther- 
ners, 112  ;  action  on  peace  confer- 
ence resolutions,  127;  admits 
Senators  from  loyal  Virginia  legis- 
lature, 210 ;  speech  of  Sumner  on 
Trent  affair,  273 ;  resolution  on 
the  war,  ii.  74.  See  Statutes  of 
the  United  States 

Seven  Pines,  Va.,  ii.  22;  battle  of, 
25 

Seward,  Frederick  W.,  interview 
with  Lincoln,  i.  139 

Seward,  William  H.,  presidential 
candidate,  i.  64,  65  ;  committee  on 
conciliation,  96  ;  t>lan  for  compro- 
mise, 99 ;  committee  on  peace  con- 
ference resolutions,  127.128;  policy 
toward  South,  149  ;  dealings  with 
commissioners,    153-159 ;    opinion 


as  to  Sumter,  155 ;  orders  naval 
force,  163;  instructions  as  to  Pres- 
ident's proclamations,  185 ;  the 
Trent  affair,  272-274 ;  in  confi- 
dence of  Lincoln,  ii.  8o ;  attitude 
to  emancipation  proclamation,  87  ; 
character,   288-290 ;    action  as  to 

^  Mexico,  304-310 

Seymour,  Truman,  engaged  at  Olus- 
tee,  ii.  238 ;  the  Wilderness,  250 

Shackelford,  James  M.,  operations 
against  Morgan,  ii.  183 ;  engage- 
ment at  Bean's  Station,  2U4 

Shaler.  Alexander,  the  Wilderness, 
ii.  250 

Sharpsburg,  Md. ,  battle  of,  ii.  93-96 

Shaw,  Robert  Gould,  at  Fort  Wag- 
ner, ii.  211 

Shenandoah  Valley,  the,  Jackson 
m,  ii.  8,  13  ;  Sheridan  in,  254,  258  ; 
Early  in,  257 

Sheridan,  Philip,  Perryville  cam- 
paign, ii.  121  ;  at  Murfreesbor- 
ough,  128;  at  Chickamauga,  187, 
188;  at  Chattanooga,  200;  WU- 
derness  campaign,  248,  250.  251  ;  in 
the  Shenandoah,  254,  258,  259; 
Five  Forks,  279;  pursuit  of  Lee, 
280-283 ;  in  Texas,  308 

Sherman,  Thomas  W.,  Port  Royal 
expedition,  i.  270 

Sherman,  William  Tecumseh,  at 
Louisville,  i.  237,  252  ;  on  the  Ten- 
nessee, 294  ;  Shiloh.  297,299-306; 
repulsed  at  Chickasaw  Bluffs,  ii. 
113 ;  Vicksburg  campaign,  148, 
150,  1.54,  155;  operations  around 
Chattanooga,  192-199;  relief  of 
Knoxville,  202--'04  ;  Meridian  ex- 
pedition, 234,  235 ;  Red  River  ex- 
pedition, 236 ;  Atlanta  campaign, 
238-246 ;  Georgia  campaign,  261- 
266  ;  Carolina  campaign,  274-277 ; 
surrender  of  Johnston,  284-286 

Shields,  James,  in  the  Shenandoah, 
ii.  13,  19,  21,  22;  battle  of  Kems- 
town,  14 

Shiloh,  Tenn.,  the  battle  of,  i,  300- 
306 

Ship  Island,  Miss.,  occupied,  i.  269; 
Butler  at,  ii.  1 

Sibley,  Henry  H.,  defeated  by  Can- 
by,  ii.  6 

Sickles,  Daniel  E. ,  speech  on  New 
York  City  secession,  i.  147;  at 
Seven  Pines,  ii.  27 ;  Chancellors- 


INDEX 


343 


▼ille  campaign,  134,  137,  138,  140- 
14"3 ;  Gettysburg  campaign,  161, 
1()6,  1(58-17:3 

Bigel,  Franz,  occupies  Springfield, 
Mo.,  i.  244;  engagement  with 
Price,  244 ;  battle  of  Wilson's 
Creek,  245  ;  Pea  Ridge  campaign, 
308-311  ;  supersedes  Fremont,  ii. 
41  ;  at  Cedar  Mountain,  46  ;  oper- 
ations under  Pope,  48,  50,  52,  ^<5, 
56  ;  operations  in  West  Virginia, 
238 

Sill,  Joshua  W.,  Perr)'ville  cam- 
paign, ii.  122 

Slavery,  republican  doctrine  as  to  its 
extension,  i.  24  ;  effect  of  constitu- 
tion upon,  in  territories,  ^7 ;  its 
extent  in  1860,  28  ;  hostility  to,  at 
South,  29  ;  attitude  of  Whig  party, 
31  ;  strength  in  1858,  34 ;  agitated 
in  Congrrss,  47  ;  relation  to  elec- 
tion of  1860,  69.  See  Emancipation 

Slave-trade,  i.  24 

Slidell,  John,  on  caucus  commit- 
tee, i.  103  ;  omission  to  vote.  111  ; 
opinion  on  effect  of  Lincoln's  ac- 
cession, 115  ;  the  Trent  affair,  270- 
274 

Slocum,  Henry  W.,  Chancellorsville 
campaign,  ii.  134, 136,  137  ;  Gettys- 
burg campaign,  166,  168  ;  sent  to 
Rosecrans,  179;  at  Chattanooga, 
190  ;  Georgia  campaign,  263,  264  ; 
Carolina  campaign,  274-276 

Smith,  Andrew  J.,  on  the  Red 
River,  ii.  236  ;  battle  of  Nashville, 
269,  270  ;  at  Mobile,  273 

Smith,  Caleb  B. ,  in  peace  confer- 
ence, i.  124  ;  policy  in  cabinet,  149 

Smith,  Charles  F.,  sent  against  Co- 
lumbus, Ky. ,  i.  253  ;  engagement 
at  Belmont,  253  ;  Fort  Henry  cam- 
paign, 281,  282;  Fort  Donelson, 
284,  285,  287 ;  sent  to  Clarksville, 
290 ;  order  from  Buell,  291  ;  sent 
to  Eastport,  293 ;  operations  on 
the  Tennessee,  294 

Smith,  Edmund  Kirby,  engaged  at 
Manassas,  i.  221,  223;  at  Chatta- 
nooga, ii.  62  ;  invades  Kentucky, 
65-67,  69-71 ;  Perryville  campaign, 
120-122 ;  Murfreesborough,  128  ;  at 
Sabine  Cross  Roads,  236  ;  surren- 
ders, 286 

Smith,  Gerritt,  aids  Brown,  i.  40 

Smith,     Gustavus    W.,    at     Seven 


Pines,  ii.  25,  26 ;  Carolina  cam- 
paign, 275 

Smith,  William  Parrar,  letter  to 
Lincoln,  ii.  112.  113  ;  at  Chatta- 
nooga, 193  ;  at  Cold  Harbor,  253  ; 
at  Petersburg,  2.55 

Smith,  William  Sooy,  engagement  at 
Okalona,  ii.  235 

Smithfield,  occupied  by  Grant,  i. 
250 

South  Carolina,  acts  of  secession,  i. 
78,  79,  88 ;  the  commissioners  to 
the  President,  90-95,  1(16;  dele- 
gates leave  Charleston  convention, 
54 ;  legislature  calls  convention, 
87  ;  begins  hostilities,  168  ;  men- 
tioned in  call  for  troops,  172 

South  Mountain,  Md.,  engagements 
at,  ii.  91 

Southern  Democrats,  i.  47,  60,  61, 
69,  70,  73,  96 

Speed,  Joshua  P.,  Lincoln's  friend, 
i.  8 

Sprague,  William,  action  on  call  for 
troops,  i.  175 

Springe! ale,  Iowa,  John  Brown  at,  i. 
37,40 

Springfield,  111.,  Lincoln's  home,  L 
7  ;  Lincoln's  speech  at,  25 

Springfield,  Mass.,  armory  at,  i.  238 

Springfield,  Mo.,  Lyon  in  command 
at,  i.  236  ;  occupied  by  Sigel,  244  ; 
Fremont  at,  249 ;  abandoned  by 
Hunter,  occupied  by  Price,  254 ; 
abandoned  by  Price,  307 ;  opera- 
tions near,  3U8-310 

"  Squatter  sovereignty,"  i.  15,  19, 
20,  24,  27,  46,  47,  51,  .52,  54,  58 

Stanley,  David  S. ,  operations  against 
Hood,  ii.  262 

Stanton,  Edwin  M.,  becomes  attor- 
ney-general, i.  89;  mfluence,  V-3; 
effect  of  War  Order  No.  3,  295; 
plan  for  operations  in  Virginia,  ii. 
19  ;  attitude  to  emancipation  proc- 
lamation, 86  ;  at  Cairo,  190  ;  action 
on  Lee's  request,  277 

Star  of  the  West,  the,  attempt  to 
relieve  Sumter,  i.  106-108 ;  fired 
on, 168 

Starkweather,  John  C,  Perryville 
campaign,  ii.  121 

State  sovereignty,  i.  119.  135 

State's  rights,  L  81,  85,  145,  149;  ii. 
215 

Statutes  of  the  United  States,  of  July 


344 


INDEX 


33,  35,  1861.  i.  330;  of  July  13, 
1861,  331-333;  of  July  17,  1801, 
331  ;  of  August  6, 1861,  331,  348,  ii. 
75,  78  ;  abolishing  slavery  in  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia,  83 ;  of  March 
13,  1863,  83,  99  ;  of  June  19.  186:i, 
84;  of  July  17,  1863.  85,  87,  99, 
214;  of  March  3,  1863,  215-317; 
of  August,  18G1.  319;  of  July  1, 
1863,  3-30-223 ;  of  March  3,  1863, 
324  ;'iof  February  25,  1863,  226-338; 
of  June  3,  lSti4,  237  ;  of  March  3, 
1865,  337;  of  February  34,  1863, 
329  ;  December  31,  1863,  330 

Sfceadman,  Fort,  Va.,  attack  on,  ii. 
378 

Stearns,  George  L.,  aids  Brown,  i. 
40 ;  testimony,  40 

Steedman,  James  B.,  ordered  across 
the  Ohio,  i.  309 

Steele,  Frederick,  Red  River  cam- 
paign, ii.  236,  337 

Steinwehr,  Adolph  von,  at  Chancel- 
lorsville,  ii.  140 

Stephens,  Alexander  H. ,  speech  in 
Georgia  legislature,  i.  79 ;  result, 
80 ;  elected  vice-president  of  Con- 
federacy, 130 

Stevenson,  Carter  L.,  at  Chatta- 
nooga, ii.  197 

Stewart,  Alexander  P.,  at  Chatta- 
nooga, ii.  200 ;  Atlanta  campaign, 
243  ;  at  Franklin,  367 ;  at  Nash- 
ville, 2(59 

Stockton,  Robert  F.,  in  peace  con- 
ference, i.  134 

Stokes,  WilUam  B.,  attitude  to 
secession  of  Tennessee,  i.  183 

Stone,  Charles  P.,  before  Washing- 
ton, i.  859 ;  McClellan's  order  to, 
361  ;  engagement  at  Ball's  BlufiF, 
263-364 ;  arrest,  265 

Stoneman,  George,  at  Williamsburg, 
ii.  16  ;  raid,  38 ;  Chancellorsville, 
135,  145 ;  Atlanta  campaign,  344 

Story,  Joseph,  quoted  by  Pollock,  ii. 
298 

Stringham,  Silas  H.,  expedition  to 
Hatteras,  i.  268 

Strong,  George  C,  at  Fort  Wagner, 
ii.  310-311 

Stuart,  James  E.  B.,  engagement  at 
Dranesville,  i.  265 ;  raid,  ii.  29 ;  at 
Catlett's  Station,  49 ;  operations 
against  Burnside,  108 ;  Chancel- 
lorsville campaign,  137,  139,  140 ; 


Gettysburg  campaign,  158,  160, 
164,  169,  174-176;  engaged  with 
Sheridan,  351 

Stuart,  John  T. ,  Lincoln's  partner,  L 
8  ;  defeats  Douglas,  14 

Sturgis,  Samuel  D.,  retreats  to 
RoUa,  i.  246;  under  Burnside,  ii. 
113 

SuflFolk,Va.,  operations  near,  131-133 

Sullivan,  Jeremiah  C,  checks  For- 
rest, ii.  130 

Sumner,  Charles,  position  in  the 
Trent  affair,  i.  273,  374  ;  proposed 
resolutions,  ii.  81 

Sumner,  Edwin  V. ,  in  the  Penin- 
sula, ii.  33 ;  at  Seven  Pines,  35, 
26 ;  at  Savage  Station,  35  ;  at  Glen- 
dale,  36 ;  at  Malvern  Hill,  37 ;  at 
Aquia,  50 ;  Antietam  campaign, 
91,  93,  94,  95 ;  operations  under 
Burnside,  107, 108,  110,  113,  113 

Sumter,  the,  Southern  privateer,  i. 
271 

Sumter,  Fort,  S.  C,  occupied  by  An- 
derson, i.,  93,  105;  attempt  at 
relief  ,107 ;  surrender  demanded 
108  ;  not  among  first  seizures,  135 
situation  at  Washington,  155-159 
plan  for  relief,  160,  163;  evacua- 
tion demanded,  165 ;  attacked, 
166 ;  surrender,  171 ;  attempt  to 
take,  ii.  312 

Sykes,  George,  at  Gaines's  Mill,  ii. 
32  ;  at  Chancellorsville,  139 ; 
Gettysburg  campaign,  166,  169, 
170,  172 ;  operations  against  Lee, 
207 

Tabob,  Iowa,  John  Brovyn  at,  i.  40 
Talbot,  Theodore,  sent  to  Charles- 
ton, i.  162 
Taliaferro,     William    B.,    captures 

Gosport  Navy   Yard,   i.   178 ;    at 

Fredericksburg,  111 
Tallahassee,  Fla.,  convention  at,  i. 

104 
Tammany,  regiment  at  Ball's  Bluff, 

i.  263 
Taney,  Roger   Brooke,  opinion  ia 

Merryman  case,  i.  235,  236 
Tappan,  Mason  W.,  makes  minority 

report,  i.  1 10 
Tariff,   in  Republican  platform  ol 

1860,  i.  63 
Tatnall,   Josiah,   at  Port  Royal,  i 

270 ;  destroys  the  Virginia,  ii.  1& 


INDEX 


345 


Taylor,  J.  H.,  under  Burnside,  ii. 
113 

Taylor,  Richard,  defeated  by  Banks, 
ii.  148;  takes  Brashear  City,  155; 
at  Sabine  Cross  Roads,  236  ;  sur- 
renders, 286 

Taylor,  Zachary,  i.  4 

Tennessee,  growth  of  towns,  i.  29; 
slavery  in,  1858,  34;  attitude  to 
Call  for  troops,  175 ;  effect  on 
Bell's  action,  180;  military  alli- 
ance with  Confederacy,  18o  ;  se- 
cedes. 183;  operations  in,  277; 
results.  289 

Terrill,  William  R.,  Perry ville  cam- 
paign, ii.  121, 122 

Terry,  Alfred  H.,  at  Fort  Wayne, 
ii.  210;  at  Fort  Fisher,  272;  at 
Goldsboro,  276,  277 

Texas,  slavery  in,  1858,  i.  35 ;  dele- 
gates leave  Charleston  convention, 
.54 ;  senators  advise  secession,  102  ; 
secedes,  121 ;  takes  control  of 
federal  property,  136  ;  mentioned 
in  call  for  troops,  172 

Thayer,  James  h.,  speech  at  New 
York,  i.  147,  148 

Thayer,  John  M.,  Port  Donelson 
campaign,  i.  284 

Theodora,  the,  carries  Mason  and 
SlideU,  i.  271 

Thomas,  George  H. ,  at  Mill  Springs, 
i.  279,  280;  Johnston  retires  be- 
fore, 284;  Corinth  campaign,  317, 
318  ;  relieves  Nelson,  ii.  65 ;  opera- 
tions against  Bragg,  69 ;  Perry- 
ville  campaign,  122,  123;  Mur- 
freesborough,  126,127;  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  185-188  ;  supersedes  Rose- 
crans,  192  ;  Chattanooga,  193,  195, 
198,  199,  205;  Atlanta  campaign, 
239,  242,  243,  246;  operations 
against  Hood,  261,  263,  267,  269 

Thomas,  Philip  P.,  resigns  from 
cabinet,  i.  107 

Thompson,  Jacob,  resigns  from  cab- 
inet, i.  107 

Thomson,  John  R.,  committee  on 
peace  conference  resolutions,  i.  127 

Thomson,  S.  Edgar,  i.  199 

Tilghman,  Floyd,  Fort  Henry  cam- 
paign, i.  282,  283 

Todd,  Mary,  marriage  to  Lincoln,  i 
8,9 

Toombs,  Robert,  proposition  as  to 
secession,  i.  80  ;  attitude  on  concili- 


ation, 96-98,  99 ;  his  telegram  to 
the  Savannah  News,  101  ;  absence 
from  Senate,  111 ;  departure  from 
Senate,  112;  candidate  for  presi- 
dency of  Confederacy,  119 ;  in  cab- 
inet of  Confederacy,  122 

Trent,  the,  affair  of  the,  i.  273,  274: 
ii.  290 

Trumbull,  Lyman,  elected  senator, 
i.  10  ;  committee  on  peace  confer- 
ence resolutions,  127, 128  ;  bill  dis- 
cussed, ii.  81 

Tuichin,  John  B. ,  at  Chattanooga, 
ii.  194 

Turner's  Gap,  Md. ,  engagement  at, 
ii.  91 

Twiggs,  David  E. ,  surrender  to  Tex- 
an s,  i.  136 

Tybee  Island,  Ga. ,  occupied  by  fed- 
erals, i  270 

Tyler,  Daniel,  engaged  at  Black- 
burn's Ford,  i.  218;  engaged  at 
Manassas,  219-231 

Tyler,  ErastusB.,  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
ii.  161 

Tyler,  John,  in  peace  conference,  i. 
124 ;  chairman  of  convention,  125 

Union  Peace  Conference,  mem- 
bers, i.  124  ;  work,  125-127 ;  result, 
128,  129 

United  States  Military  Academy, 
Davis  graduates,  i.  4 

United  States  Supreme  Court,  i.  23, 
61,  114,  133.     See  Milligan 

Valverde  Farms,  N.  M.,  engage- 
ment at,  ii.  6 

Van  Buren,  Martin,  gives  office  to 
Douglas,  i.  14 

Van  Cleve,  Horatio  P. ,  at  Murf  rees- 
borough,  ii.  127-129;  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  187 

Van  Dom,  Earl,  at  Corinth,  i.  306  ; 
in  Arkansas,  307 ;  battle  of  Pea 
Ridge,  310-312;  Corinth  cam- 
paign, 318 ;  occupies  Vicksburg, 
ii.  62;  at  Holly  Springs,  113; 
luka,  124 

Vermont,  election  of  1860,  i.  71 

Vicksburg,  Miss. ,  i.  320 ;  reinforced, 
ii.  5  ;  reached  by  Farragut,  6 ;  ob- 
jective of  Bragg,  61  ;  occupied  by 
Van  Dorn,  62  ;  capture  of,  153, 154 

Vienna  Station,  Va.,  engagement  at, 
i  215 


346 


INDEX 


Vincent,  Strong,  at  Gettysburg,  ii. 
170 

Virginia,  delegates  in  Chicago  con- 
vent on,  i.  66 ;  legi>lature  calls 
peace  conference,  134  ;  attitude  to 
call  for  troops,  174;  secedes,  177; 
blockade  proclamation  against, 
184;  creation  of  loyal  State  gov- 
ernment, 210 

Vir(/iiiia,  the,  engagement  with 
Monitor,  ii.  10-12  ;  destroyed,  18 

Wade,  Benjamin  F.,  committee  on 
conciliation,  i.  96 

Wadsworth,  James  S.,  in  peace  con- 
ference, i.  124  ;  Wilderness  cam- 
paign, ii.  249 

Wagner.  Fort,  assault  on,  ii.  211 

Walke,  Henry,  at  Fort  Donelson,  i. 
281;  at  New  Madrid,  316 

Walker,  Cjrrus,  in  Illinois  politics,  i. 
14 

Walker.  Leroy  Pope,  speech  in 
Charleston  convention,  i.  54 ;  in 
cabinet  of  Confederacy,  122 ; 
speech  at  Montgomery,  177 

Walker,  Fort,  S.  C,  capturod,  i.  270 

Wallace,  Lew,  Fort  Donelson  cam- 
paign, i.  284,  285 ;  at  Crump's 
Landing,  294;  Shiloh,  297,  299, 
301.  304;  defence  of  Covington, 
ii.  67 

Wallace,  William  H.  L.,  in  Shiloh 
campaign,  i    295,  299,  300,  302 

Ward,  J.  H.  H.,  at  Gettysburg,  ii. 
170 

Warren,  Gouverneur  K.,  at  Gettys- 
burg, ii.  170;  operations  against 
Lee,  207 ;  Wilderness  campaign, 
248-250,  353,  253  ;  Five  Forks,  279 

Warren,  Fort,  Mass. ,  confinement  of 
Mason  and  Slidell,  i.  271 

Washburn,  Cadwallader  C,  makes 
minority  report,  i.  110 

Washington,  Lewis,  captured  by 
John  Brown,  i.  38 

Washington,  D.  C,  peace  confer- 
ence at,  i.  124;  Lincoln's  journey 
to.  139 ;  rumors  of  attack  upon, 
201-202;  made  spcure,  205;  ex- 
posed, 222 ;  McClellan  in  com- 
mand at,  236 

Washington,  Fort,  troops  opposite, 
201 

Webster,  George,  Perryville  cam- 
paign, iii.  121-122 


Webster,  Joseph  D.,  at  Shiloh,  i 
30i-303 

Weed,  Stephen  H.,  at  Gettysburg, 
ii.  170 

Welles,  Gideon,  policy  in  cabinet,  i. 
149  ;  opinion  as  to  Sumter,  ibl  ;  or- 
ders as  to  Sumter  and  Pickens.  163; 
action  on  the  Trent  affair.  272  ;  ii. 
290 ;  in  confidence  of  Lincoln,  8.5 

West  Point,  Sve  United  States  Mili- 
tary Academy 

West  Virginia,  slavery  in.  185S.  i. 
34 ;  McClellan  in,  207  ;  convention 
at  Wheeling,  208 ;  secured  to  the 
Union.  212;  commonwealth  organ- 
ized, ii.  230 

Wharton,  John  A. ,  operations  under 
Wheeler,  ii.  191.  192 

Wheeler,  Joseph,  Chattanooga 
campaign,  ii.  191,  192;  Carolina 
campaign,  274 

Wheeling,  W.  Va. ,  convention  at,  i. 
308-210 

Whig  Party,  Lincoln  in,  i.  7  ;  defeat 
by  Douglas,  13-14 ;  opponents  of 
slavery  in,  30 ;  Clay  its  leader  in 
the  southwest,  31 ;  its  remnant  in 
1860.  67 

Whigs,  Northern.  Lincoln  acts  with, 
i.  2 ;  absorbed  by  Republican 
party,  32 ;  attitude  to  Republican 
platform,  63 

Whipple,  at  New  Orleans,  ii,  2 

White,  Julius,  surrender  of  Harper's 
Ferry,  ii,  92 

White  House,  Va.,  McClellan's  base, 
ii.  19,  28,  31-32 

White  Oak  Swamp,  Va.,  operations 
in,  ii.  3&-36 

Whiting,  W.  H.  C,  at  Fort  Fisher, 
ii.  273 

Wigfall.  Louis  T.,  speech  on  Davis 
resolutions,  1.  55-.56 ;  speech  on 
secession,  88;  omission  to  vote, 
111 

Wilcox,  Cadmus  M.,  at  Chancellora- 
ville.  ii.  143 

Wilderness,  the,  Va.,  battles  in,  ii. 
348-252 

Wilkes,  Charles,  the  Trent  affair,  L 
271-273 

Willey,  Waitman  T.,  elected  to 
Senate,  i.  210;  speech  in  Senate, 
ii.  80 

Williams,  Alpheus  S.,  at  Gettysburg, 
ii.  172 


INDEX 


347 


Williams,    John    S.,    operations    in 

Kentucky,  i.  278 
Williams.  Roger,  i.  11 
Williamsburg,  Va.,  battle  at,  ii.  16 
Willich,  August,  at  Chattanooga,  ii 

196 
Wilmington,  N.  C,  fort  seized  near, 

i.  184 
Wilmot,  David,  in  peace  conference, 

i.  124 
Wilmot  proviso,  i.  53 
Wilson,  Henry,  iiritates Biggs,  1.  32  ; 

knowledge  of    John  Brown,   40  ; 

offers  resolution,  229 
Wilson,  James  Harrison,  at  Peters- 
burg, ii.   25(i  ;   operations   against 

Hood,  262-269  ;  capture  of  Davis, 

286 
Wilson's  Creek,  Mo.,  battle  of,  i.  245 
Winchester,  111.,  Douglas  a  teacher 

at,  i.  12 
Winchester.   Va.,    i.    217,    220-221, 

239,  258,  274  ;  ii.  13,  14  ;  battle  at, 

21  ;  battle  at,  162 
Winslow,  John  A. ,  on  the  Kearsarge, 

ii.  294 
Wise,    Henry  A.,   sent  to  western 

Virginia,  i.  210,  239 ;   reinforced, 

255  ;   recalled,  258  ;    at    Roanoke 

Island,  ii.  8-9  ;  before  Richmond, 

85  ;  at  Malvern  HiU,  37 


WoflFord,  William  T.,  at  GettyBburg, 
ii.  170  ^        '' 

VVood,  Fernando,  recommends  se- 
cession of  New  York  City,  i.  1 47 

Wood,  John  E.,  in  peace  conference, 
i.  124 

Wood,  Thomas  J.,  at  Murfrees- 
borough,  ii.  127;  at  Chickamauga, 
187  ;  at  Chiittanooga,  196,  200 

Worden,  John,  in  command  of 
Monitor,  ii.  11,  12 

Wright,  Horatio  G.,  battle  of  Rich- 
mond, ii.  66 ;  Wilderness  cam- 
paign, 250,  252,  253 ;  ajjainst  Early, 
257  ;  at  Cedar  Creek,  259 


Yancey,  William  L.,  speech  au 
Baltimore  convention,  i.  70 

Yellow  Tavern,  Va. ,  engagement  at, 
ii.  251 

Yorktown,  Va.,  Magruder  in  com- 
mand at,  i.  210;  engagement  near, 
215 ;  239,  274 


ZOLLICOFFER,  Felix  K  ,  in  peace 
conference,  i.  124,  £39;  occupies 
Cumberland  Gap  and  Barbours- 
ville,  251 ;  at  Mill  Springs,  279 ; 
death,  280 


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THE  CIVIL  WAR  AND  THE 
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IN  PREPARATION 

RECONSTRUCTION  AND  THE 
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By  Prof.  John  W.  Burgess,  Professor  of  Political 
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